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i 
Abstract 
Patrick Josef Illmer 
Agency in the Shadow of a co-opted State: Territory, Difference and 
Democratisation in post-war Guatemala 
Key words: Agency, collective action, state co-option, elites, natural 
resources, ethnicity, difference, democracy. 
This thesis examines a new form of agency for change that has surfaced in 
rural areas of post-war Guatemala around the defence of territory and natural 
resources. I argue that this new form of agency emerges in the shadow of a 
state co-opted by elite factions and manifests distinct qualities from previous 
expressions of revolutionary and democratic activism. It is localised and 
characterised by varied aspects of what I call ‘difference’, an antagonistic 
stance based on locally embedded political, economic and cultural meanings 
which challenges the elite-promoted reordering of relationships and spaces. 
This ‘difference’ is enacted through the ‘defence of territory’, which expresses 
a socio-political and cultural attachment to particular physical spaces and has 
instigated collective resistances to the implementation of projects linked to 
the exploitation of natural resources.  
The thesis analyses this form of agency through two case studies, one 
among indigenous communities in the Northern Quiché, the second among 
primarily non-indigenous communities in the municipalities of San José del 
Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc. As this research demonstrates, given the 
firm integration of conventional channels of democratic participation into the 
patterns of state co-option, the primary aim of these struggles is the re-
appropriation of decision-making processes and the carving out of spaces, in 
which their ‘difference’ can evolve. In the context of a co-opted state, these 
local expressions of agency create spaces in which fragile, embryonic forms 
of collective interaction and deliberation that represent a condition for 
democratic processes, are kept alive. However, their non-linear articulations 
and specific local character are also a testament to the complexity of the 
construction of democratic processes in countries like Guatemala. 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines a new moment in the history of agency for change that 
has surfaced in rural areas of post-war Guatemala around the defence of 
territory and natural resources. I argue that this new form of agency emerges in 
the shadow of a state co-opted by elite factions and manifests distinct qualities 
from previous expressions of revolutionary and democratic activism. It is 
localised and characterised by varied aspects of what I call ‘difference’, an 
antagonistic stance based on locally embedded political, economic and cultural 
meanings that challenges the elite-promoted reordering of relationships and 
spaces in the historic indigenous lands of Guatemala.  
This ‘difference’ is enacted through the ‘defence of territory’, which expresses a 
socio-political and cultural attachment to particular physical spaces and has 
instigated collective resistances to the implementation of projects linked to the 
exploitation of natural resources. The defence of territory highlights the 
incompatibilities between elites and this locally based agency not just at the 
level of meanings, as local community members advance contrasting 
understandings of ‘land’ and ‘resources’ as well as how to frame development in 
their local surroundings. Instead, they are also evident at the level of practices, 
as the organisational processes evolving from this agency create spaces that 
reflect their divergent understandings of decision-making and participation. As 
this research demonstrates, given the integration of the conventional channels 
of democratic participation into the dynamics of state co-option, the primary aim 
of these struggles is the re-appropriation of decision-making processes and 
carving out of spaces, in which their collective agency and ‘difference’ can be 
kept alive and developed. 
In order to understand the features of this agency as well as its implications for 
debates around democracy, I argue that it has to be analysed in the light of 
Guatemala’s particular state-formation process. Traditional elites have been the 
prime drivers of this process and have periodically adjusted the legal, coercive 
and political mechanisms to perpetuate their privileged societal position and 
processes of accumulation. They have done so without articulating a nation-
building project, or attempting to integrate the indigenous majority, or taking into 
account the demographic complexity of the 24 linguistic communities in 
Guatemala. Instead, over the course of centuries their dominance has been 
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marked by authoritarian governance, periodic use of violence and repression, 
racist ideology and its enactment through state policies. However, I argue that 
over recent decades new patterns have started to mark the relationship 
between elites and the state. Against the backdrop of the transitional framework 
towards a formal democratic constitution in 1985, a gradual shift from openly 
authoritarian forms of governance towards patterns of ‘state co-option’ can be 
perceived.  
I draw on authors such as Garay and Salcedo-Albarán (2012) as well as 
Gutiérrez and Méndez (2012) to define this gradual shift in the mechanisms 
applied to control the institutional framework of the state. In contrast to the 
authoritarian control based on an alliance with the military elites exercised up to 
the transitional period, ‘state co-option’ implies the use of an array of legal and 
illegal, formal and informal mechanisms by elites to modify and influence the 
design as well as application of laws and policies. In this scenario, a 
bidirectional dynamic develops, as different elite factions strike alliances with 
officials within the state or with political operators with the capacity to influence 
the actions of key actors positioned within the institutional framework. Bribery, 
corruption, exchange of favours and coercive strategies feature among the 
mechanisms used by different elite factions to co-opt the operations of the state 
and in some cases even reconfigure the functions of institutions as such.  
In turn, formal actors within the state also develop an interest in the continuation 
of these patterns as they reap benefits from this interaction (Garay and 
Salcedo-Albarán, 2012). They do so among other things by drawing on the 
capacity of actors outside the state to use violence. I argue in the case of 
Guatemala that sections of the traditional, historic elites as well as elites 
emerging over recent decades, some with a more explicit capacity to exercise 
violence and linked with illicit modes of accumulation, engage in state co-option. 
Using strategies beyond the realm of legality, the different elite factions are 
locked into competition and cooperation as the formal institutional functions and 
rules are co-opted or reconfigured to promote specific interests, strategies of 
accumulation and capture rents.  
The impact on wider society of the patterns of governance resulting from the co-
option and reconfiguration of state functions becomes evident through specific 
policies and influences the forms collective agency takes in response to the 
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antagonisms generated at the local level. This has been exemplified in this post-
war period by the state policies promoting the exploitation of natural resources. 
The rural sections of Guatemala have been targeted through various 
dimensions of these policies including licenses for oil-extraction, mining, 
hydroelectric projects as well as the expansion of electricity grids. This is in line 
with regional and global trends, as many governments in the Latin American 
region and the Global South accept their role in the international division of 
labour as providers of energy and raw materials such as hydrocarbons, metals 
and minerals. Different national elite factions have integrated these economic 
interests into their strategies of accumulation. In the outlined context of state co-
option, elites within and outside the institutional framework cooperate at a local 
and national level, to pursue the implementation of projects linked to the 
extractive and energy producing industry.  
I do not argue that the interests and policies linked to the exploitation of natural 
resources completely explain the emergence of agency around the defence of 
territory, which is the central focus of this thesis. A socio-historic lens has to be 
applied in order to de-construct the multiple layers of cultural and political 
complexity and identify further factors that account for collective action among 
communities. Nevertheless, this thesis does argue that due to the way in which 
these recent elite-determined policies impact upon rural communities, they 
constitute a crucial variable that has stimulated antagonistic affinities and 
responses based on local problems and experiences. In the course of local 
sense-making activities, frameworks of collective action have consolidated to 
constitute signifiers that are filled with the meanings and practices produced by 
the local community members. 
At the same time the nature of Guatemala’s state-formation process and the 
current scenario of state co-option influence the characteristics of this agency. 
Rather than broad, over-arching movements that challenge national power-
structures, localised nodes of resistance have emerged and gradually 
consolidated. In contrast to previous periods of authoritarian military rule, they 
maintain strategic interactions with the institutional framework. However, these 
connections are sought with the local and the community in mind, in order to 
highlight and seek recognition of their dissenting voices, frequently with 
references to national and international legislation. Notions of ‘territory’ acquire 
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special weight among local community members as they do not just symbolise 
the incompatibility of understandings between local communities and elites on 
the use of land or the model of development. Instead, ‘territory’ also represents 
the space in which local community members can determine their own 
production of meanings and frame their political interactions in ways that 
contrast with institutional spaces marked by patterns of state co-option. 
Accordingly, in the context of a co-opted state, the ‘local’ becomes the space in 
which fragile, embryonic forms of collective interaction and deliberation that 
represent a condition for democracy can be kept alive.  
To illustrate the aspects of this central argument, the thesis examines two 
localised expressions of agency that have surfaced among the various 
organisational processes in rural parts of the country.  
One of the organisational processes analysed in this thesis is located among 
indigenous communities in the Northern Quiché region.1 I also examine a 
second expression of collective action, the Pacific Resistance La Puya, 
(Resistencia Pacífica La Puya, RPLP) that has emerged close to the capital city 
among predominantly non-indigenous communities in the municipalities of San 
José del Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc. Both processes have been driven by 
local community members as they have engaged in strategies to defend their 
territories, livelihoods and communities from the impact of projects linked to the 
exploitation of natural resources. The variations in the demographic 
characteristics and composition of the communities featuring in the case studies 
enable me to explore and contrast how territory and meanings ‘interact’, when 
indigenous identity comes into play. Meanings rooted in indigenous language 
and cosmovision, a system of practices and knowledge deriving from a specific 
cultural worldview, play a central role in accentuating and revitalising holistic 
understandings of territory among indigenous communities in the Northern 
Quiché. In the case of the RPLP the differential meanings around territory that 
frame their resistance are based on more immediate and short-term sense-
                                                          
1 In the course of the thesis the term ‘Northern Quiché’ will be used to refer to the area of 5 
municipalities of Nebaj, Cotzal, Chajul, Cunén and Sacapulas. These do not constitute an 
administrative region and are 5 of a total of 21 municipalities in the department of Quiché. The 
community members of the network analysed in this thesis commonly use this definition as a 
general term of reference for their organisational space. Accordingly, it will be referring to 5 
municipalities, in which members of the network operate. 
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making processes. However, by drawing on the demographic complexity and 
various forms of knowledge, they too develop meanings that challenge the 
divide between nature and humans as well as the elite-promoted 
understandings of territory. 
Additionally, the two case studies allow me to outline their implications in the 
context of the Guatemalan state. They highlight how the most sustained 
collective organisational patterns in this post-war period emerge outside the 
formal political system and beyond the social centres of society. The 
communities’ desire to determine their immediate surroundings based on the 
flow of locally produced and collectively legitimated meanings represents the 
central dimension of their struggle. In both cases this differential production of 
meanings is translated into fragile attempts at redesigning patterns of political 
interaction. As the case studies will show, this is reflected in aspects such as the 
organisation of community consultations as well as the introduction of horizontal 
patterns into the processes of decision-making and representation. In doing so, 
they do not adopt the strategies of previous revolutionary or democratic activism 
that orientates its organisational strategies towards the state or follows more 
conventional, institutional lines of participation. The discourses and practices of 
these communities engage in strategic interactions at different scales beyond 
the local, however, the constant search for legitimacy and acceptance at the 
community level as well as the claims to determine their immediate 
surroundings, represent the crucial features of these organisational processes.  
The specific character of collective agency in the context of co-opted states with 
demographic complexity and its implications for democracy will constitute the 
central contribution of this thesis to existing research. This idea of state co-
option has to be contextualised among the state formation processes in Latin 
America. In the region, the formation of nation-states was driven by the external 
colonization of the native peoples by European colonizers and gave way to the 
consolidation of a centralized state that delineated a conquered space of 
domination. According to the rationale of the colonizers this process required 
the destruction of the indigenous peoples’ ways and views of life as well as their 
forms of self-government in addition to the physical elimination of large sections 
of this population, especially those unwilling to conform to the colonial rules and 
demands.  
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Even following independence, the post-colonial regimes continued to evolve 
and operate along these lines as they sought to conquest indigenous territories 
and peoples, eliminate their cultural frameworks and their capacity to resist. 
These measures were seen as necessary to homogenize national populations 
and enhance the process of constituting nation-states. Accordingly, the process 
of independence for Latin American states did not translate into a 
decolonization of society. Instead, as Qujiano has argued, it represented a “re-
articulation of the coloniality of power” upon new institutional bases (Quijano, 
2000, p.228), which in the second half of the 20th century was guided for 
extensive periods by brutal, authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, the structure of 
power in these states was and to a large extent continues to be organised 
around a colonial matrix (Qujiano, 2000; Mignolo, 2011; Lander, 2012). 
However, this continuity of the colonial matrix dominating the state in the region 
has over centuries been met by multiple expressions of defiance and 
resistance, as peoples and collectives have sought to respond to the various 
forms of imposition and politics promoted by the institutional frameworks. The 
forceful emergence of the Latin American social movements has represented 
the most recent feature of this trend and marked the socio-political dynamics of 
the region, often by engendering an explicit challenge to neoliberal policies. 
From the perspective of many indigenous peoples they represent a continuation 
of the colonial structuring of power-relationships and its translation into policies. 
Numerous movements across the continent have framed their articulations 
around an explicit quest to decolonize power-relationships and gain 
autonomous spaces of self-determination. They have done so without 
necessarily seeing the state as the prime objective of their articulations, while 
the pursuit of a political, economic and social development in line with their own 
cultural understandings has represented more of a common denominator of 
these movements. 
Picking up on the central contribution of the thesis, the research aims to speak 
to contexts where the state-formation processes have not just continued along 
this colonial axis. Instead it refers to settings, where the last decades have 
given way to particularly advanced levels of co-option of formal institutional 
functions and decision-making processes by elite-factions. Accordingly, illegal 
and informal patterns of relating with the institutional framework and 
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determining policies and laws predominate. These features combine with 
periodically and often violently reinforced political, economic and cultural forms 
of exclusion, which are enacted against large sections of an ethnically diverse 
population. By referring to these contextual characteristics, the thesis relates to 
various strands of literature as it highlights the particular features this agency 
takes on in these contexts and discusses its implications.  
Based on the experience of European states, an extensive body of literature on 
democracy and state-formation in the Global South has tended to focus on 
elites and their role in conceding openings that pave the way for more inclusive 
and democratic societies (Burton et al., 1992; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; 
North et al., 2009; Putzel and Di John, 2012). In the course of the thesis I 
discuss the limitations of this emphasis on the promotion of conditions for 
agreements between elite factions that fail to sufficiently acknowledge the 
excluding social relationships and undemocratic practices they perpetuate. 
Further insights can be gained from literature looking at the state in the Global 
South, often by adopting a neo-patrimonial perspective in order to reflect the 
combination of patrimonial dominance and a ‘modern’ bureaucracy that marks 
many regimes. A series of analyses have highlighted the economic patterns of 
patronage, rent-seeking and corruption at work, as many societies are marked 
by a perpetuation of exclusive social orders with elites locked into patterns of 
accumulation (eg. Bratton and Van der Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Erdmann and Engel, 2006; Niemann, 2007).  
Additionally, a recent body of literature has shed further light on how elite 
factions establish co-optive relationships around the state to determine the 
formulation of policies and legal frameworks (eg. Garay and Salcedo-Albarán, 
2012; Gutiérrez and Méndez, 2012; Briscoe, 2014). Informal and illegal 
mechanisms predominate as elite factions seek to control, co-opt and 
reconfigure the formal functions and ways of operating of the state by 
establishing alliances with agents and networks within the institutional 
framework. Based on these alliances, short and long term strategies of 
accumulation of elite-factions are promoted, while the formally democratic 
structure of the state is eroded. 
Given that elites have proved unable to consolidate democratic regimes beyond 
Dahl’s (1989) ‘procedural minimum’ that had represented a benchmark for many 
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theorists on democratic transitions, it seems important to explore the role of 
alternative sources of agency. A substantial body of literature has examined 
non-elite forms of agency and their relationship with democratisation processes. 
Tilly (1978, 1984) has been especially influential in relating collective action and 
social movements to interactions with the institutional framework. Other 
scholars (Giugni, 1998; McAdam, 1998) have followed similar approaches to 
establish the impact of social movements on the state and outcomes relevant to 
democratisation. On the other hand, another line of research has emphasised 
that collective action does not necessarily take place on established political 
and institutional terrain (Melucci, 1996; Avritzer, 2002; Della Porta, 2013). 
Instead, these scholars have preferred to emphasise the cultural processes at 
work in collective agency and the challenge to dominant meanings it represents. 
In doing so, they argue for the relevance of expressions of collective agency 
‘per se’ and see them as forms of incipient associational patterns, among which 
alternative and more democratic processes can develop. 
My argument with regards to the processes of defence of territory in Guatemala 
follows a similar line. The expressions of dissent are articulated from localised 
spaces, outside the formal political system and beyond the social centres of 
society. These nevertheless represent the primary spaces of struggle for 
community members in order to shape the political, cultural and economic 
relationships of their immediate surroundings. Despite the seemingly dispersed 
features of these local nodes of agency, this thesis does not concur with a 
significant body of literature in political science that eschews the importance of 
collective action and its relevance for democratic processes. The argument for 
this perspective is not made in order to encourage a top-down integration of 
rural communities or emphasise their potential as a revolutionary or 
democratising force that targets central state power. Instead, it is presented 
through the ‘condition’ for democratic processes these rural communities 
articulate by asserting that they cannot be constructed without them. Thus, they 
highlight the respect for the determination of their local spaces, meanings and 
organisational practices as a starting point for these processes. In doing so, 
they challenge not just the imposition of specific policies, but also outline forms 
of interaction that can contribute to make their social realities and everyday lives 
‘more democratic’.  
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The focus on the cultural challenge of expressions of collective agency to 
dominant meanings has also been highlighted in research on Latin America (eg. 
Escobar, 1992, 2008; Álvarez, 1998; Dagnino, 1998). This view has 
emphasised the importance of research that pays attention to local cultures and 
epistemologies to develop an understanding for these organisational processes 
that frequently emerge in contexts with high demographic and cultural 
complexity (Santos, 2007, 2010; Escobar, 2008). The agency of indigenous 
movements has been tracked by a number of authors to show how policies, 
which are perceived as undermining cultural understandings, organisational 
autonomy and control over territories, can generate antagonistic responses 
from those they target (Yashar, 2005; Van Cott 2007, 2008). They have also 
emphasised the importance of space and territory in the course of these 
organisational processes, highlighting the attachment and meanings attributed 
by indigenous communities to their local surroundings. 
I will argue that in the context of a co-opted state, this spatial, territorial 
dimension acquires special weight in processes of collective agency. On one 
hand, territory symbolises the incompatibility of meanings between local 
communities and elites around the use of land and ideas of development. On 
the other hand, this territorial aspect becomes crucial as local communities seek 
to consolidate spaces, in which they can remain in control of their own designs 
of political interaction and decision-making that contrast with the patterns 
predominant in formal institutions marked by state co-option.  
In the same vein, the thesis contributes to the body of literature on collective 
action and social movements in Latin America that has sought to come to terms 
with the ethnic and cultural diversity predominant in many of these countries. As 
mentioned above, significant attention has been paid to the emergence of 
indigenous movements and their contestation of state policies. A growing 
number of scholars have also analysed non-indigenous movements and 
expressions of collective action (Porto Gonçalves, 2001; Ceceña, 2008; Zibechi, 
2007, 2011; Svampa, 2011; Dinerstein 2013, 2015). This thesis will 
conceptualise the antagonistic meanings and practices that generate collective 
affinities and agency at the local level around the outlined understanding of 
‘difference’. Accordingly, ‘difference’, which in this case is expressed through a 
socio-political attachment to specific territories, is not limited or exclusive to 
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particular ethnic identities. Instead, it will be suggested as a conceptual 
framework for the agency among indigenous as well as non-indigenous 
communities. I indicate how even in areas with an ethnically diverse population, 
community members have consolidated spaces around a shared antagonistic 
stance. The case studies will also show how in the course of the organisational 
processes, the emphasis of designing political interactions in ways that can 
address without suffocating the ‘difference’ among the community members, 
increases. 
The research objective to examine these grass-root processes engaging in the 
defence of territory, and analyse their implications for democracy, required a 
methodological approach that goes beyond those commonly used in political 
science. On one hand, my methods had to address the cultural and 
demographic complexity of grass-roots Guatemala, marked by multiple layers of 
local histories and processes. On the other hand, they were also required to 
deconstruct the dynamics surrounding the institutional framework of the state as 
well as the political and economic processes they are embedded in. To achieve 
this goal, I used a political ethnographic approach moving at the interface of 
methods ascribed to political science and ethnography. Methods closer to 
anthropological research were indispensable to arrive at an understanding of 
the characteristics of specific expressions of agency, the ongoing processes of 
production of meaning as well as their procedural and organisational 
understandings. Political science approaches enabled me to examine political 
processes and relationships surrounding the state institutions as well as the 
implications for democracy emerging from this grass-roots agency.  
 
The central focus of the thesis  
In the course of the research process three interlinked research objectives are 
being addressed:  
Firstly, the thesis seeks to explain the emergence of the current nodes of 
collective agency based on the ‘defence of territory’ among rural communities 
and how it relates to previous generations of agency in Guatemala. Secondly, it 
will characterise this community-based agency by highlighting the specific 
features it acquires in the context of a co-opted state such as Guatemala. 
 11 
 
Thirdly, it explores the insights and implications for debates around collective 
action and democracy emerging from the analysis of the previous research 
objectives. 
The first research objective aims to develop an understanding of the 
emergence of the current processes of collective action in Guatemala. A 
conceptual exploration (chapter 2) of collective agency in elite-dominated and 
multi-ethnic settings will provide the theoretical framework for this 
understanding. This sets up the process of convergence of community 
members into an expression of collective action around the production and 
struggle for the re-appropriation of meanings. Antagonistic affinities are 
generated and community members converge to defend their own production of 
meanings or in Melucci’s words, ‘coding’ of social realities (Melucci, 1996). Their 
agency focuses on highlighting the antagonisms resulting from policies or 
mechanisms that are perceived as incompatible with local understandings and 
sense-making activities. This framework will also outline why this emergence of 
agency cannot be restricted to original or ethnically rooted difference. Instead, it 
emphasises the complexity and contingency of social realities and how this 
collective antagonistic stance or ‘difference’ can be developed in multiple social 
settings and contexts. 
An understanding of the characteristics of the current expressions of agency will 
be established by bringing them into relation with previous generations of 
agency (chapter 4). Different attempts at breaking with the elite-dominated 
societal order have been undertaken, among them, a popular, urban movement 
headed by a middle-class leadership challenging authoritarian rule in 1944; a 
community-based agency, seeking to consolidate an autonomous economic 
and political model in rural areas of the country in the 1960s; the revolutionary 
challenge by guerrilla factions in the course of the armed conflict (1960-1996); 
and the Mayan articulations emerging in the context of the Peace Accords of 
1996, based on a civil society framework as well as party activism. By 
examining these different expressions of agency I discuss some of the 
limitations or constraints they have encountered. This socio-historical lens leads 
me towards explaining the emergence of the current agency around the 
defence of territory and examining its relationship and differences with regards 
to these previous generations of agency.  
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The data collected for the case studies through interviews and participant 
observation adds empirical detail to this analysis by reflecting the internal 
processes of convergence, the cultural understandings nurturing these 
resistances, as well as the organisational patterns developed in the course of 
the agency. The case studies explore how meanings associated with the 
defence of territory develop when indigenous identity comes into play. The case 
of the communities in the Northern Quiché region demonstrates how this 
accentuation of particular meanings featured among indigenous communities 
and consolidated a network across ethnic and municipal borders (chapter 7). 
The revitalisation of meanings around territory and community indicates the role 
of ethnically rooted meanings in the framing of their resistance. The RPLP on 
the other hand shows how this affirmation of ‘difference’ is articulated in a space 
among primarily non-indigenous community members (chapter 8). In this case 
the framing of the resistance is a much more immediate and short-term 
process. By drawing on the local demographic complexity and diverse 
knowledge the RPLP has also consolidated an antagonistic stance with regards 
to the elite-imposed understandings and policies. 
The second research objective seeks to identify the specific features of this 
community-based agency by relating it to the context of a co-opted state. A 
review of literature on state-formation and democratisation processes in the 
Global South will provide the background for this analysis (chapter 1). It will set 
up the link between elites as the prime drivers of these processes and their 
aspirations to ensure their privileged status by promoting their strategies of 
accumulation and access to rents, which in turn has consolidated elite-
dominated social orders in many states of the Global South. I will also draw on 
literature highlighting ‘state co-option’ that provides more detail on how elite 
factions use formal and informal, legal and illegal mechanisms, to influence 
policies and reconfigure areas of the institutional framework to respond to 
particular economic interests.  
This literature represents the link for the analysis of the particular formation of 
the Guatemalan state, which I will explore by looking at its evolution over 
various historical stages (chapter 3). In doing so, I will highlight some of the 
legal, political and economic mechanisms used in the course of this process 
that have periodically reaffirmed the exclusion of large parts of the population, 
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while enabling elite-networks to consolidate their dominant societal position. 
Additionally, I will indicate the shift from authoritarian forms of government to a 
mode of governance based on ‘state co-option’ in the context of the transition to 
formal democracy initiated in 1985. As mentioned above, elites increasingly 
used new mechanisms to control the formulation of policies and rules by 
establishing alliances with individuals and networks within the institutional 
framework to benefit particular strategies of accumulation. These mechanisms 
of state co-option have not only been used by traditional elites. Instead, elites 
emerging on the basis of legal as well as illegal opportunities of capital 
accumulation in the context of the Peace Accords have used similar 
mechanisms of state co-option to promote their interests. This has consolidated 
complex and multilevel networks around the state institutions, as different elite 
factions are locked into competition as well as cooperation in their drive to 
ensure a privileged access to wealth and rents. The thesis also highlights how 
the co-option and reconfiguration of state functions as well as policies in accord 
with particular elite-interests have coincided with the growing influence of 
neoliberal policies and new strategies of accumulation for elites, among them 
the exploitation of natural resources in rural areas. This has translated into a 
wave of licenses for mining, oil extraction, and hydroelectric plants as well as 
the expansion of electricity grids in various parts of the country.  
Based on this context and by analysing the organisational processes around the 
defence of territory, I will seek to identify some of the specific features collective 
agency acquires. As the case studies demonstrate, it fails to emerge along 
conventional channels of democratic participation. Only in specific moments 
does this agency engage with institutional spaces as the communities seek to 
gain recognition of their dissent and advance their claims to determinate their 
surroundings on the basis of national and international legal frameworks. Their 
opposition to the policies aimed at the exploitation of natural resources is voiced 
primarily in local spaces among sections of the population that have been 
politically and socially marginalised. This agency differs from previous 
experiences of revolutionary or democratic activism as the appropriation of 
decision-making processes and the determination of their local surroundings, 
rather than the targeting of state power, constitute the central objective of their 
organisational processes. ‘Territory’ becomes crucial in this struggle, as it also 
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represents the space in which communities seek to remain in control of their 
production of meanings and decide on the design of their social and political 
interactions. 
The third research objective to examine insights for the understandings of 
democratisation based on the analysis of collective agency in the context of a 
co-opted state, is tightly linked to the previous research aims. It underlines the 
importance of the political ethnographic approach since it connects the analysis 
of the grass-root processes, and their implications for meta-political issues such 
as democracy. The case studies and the in-depth analysis of the processes of 
collective action focus on the epistemological processes and practical 
mechanisms the community members engage in to carve out local spaces. 
These range from the use of direct action, the attempts to experiment around 
and redesign patterns of political interaction, to the demand for recognition of 
their autonomous practices based on legal frameworks.  
In the case of the communities of the Northern Quiché, the organisation of local 
community consultations to re-appropriate decision-making processes reflects 
the attention paid to procedural aspects in their struggles. A reformulation of 
mechanisms of representation has been another feature that reinforces the 
participative elements of this collective agency. Similar aspects have been 
developed in the case of the RPLP. An assembly, integrated by all participating 
community members was established as the central space for deliberation and 
decision-making. Additionally, horizontal understandings and the idea of 
accountability have been reinforced in patterns of representation. This 
experimentation around procedural mechanisms means their struggle for the re-
appropriation of meanings implies not just a discursive affirmation of ‘difference’. 
Instead, in the course of this agency they have also introduced fragile attempts 
at experimenting and imagining new ways of organising political processes. 
Accordingly, these efforts oriented towards the re-appropriation of decision-
making processes, highlight the often disregarded relevance for meta-political 
issues of this agency. It shows how this agency and the commitment to 
redesign political interactions constitute a crucial attempt at making their local 
realities ‘more democratic’ in the face of the vertical imposition of elite policies 
and co-opted institutional spaces.  
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Some working definitions: 
One of the concepts central to the thesis is that of ‘elites’. An economic 
perspective in line with Mills (1956) has emphasised the elites’ capacity to 
appropriate resources. However, a definition of ‘elites’ based on their capacity to 
accumulate, capture rents and organise economic processes seems to only 
provide a partial explanation for the persistence of elites in states such as 
Guatemala. Accordingly, it is important to complement this understanding by 
drawing on Parry (1969), who emphasises the elites’ ability to influence political 
processes. Additionally, scholars such as Burton et al. (1992) and North et al. 
(2009) have highlighted the elites’ ability to form and/or lead organisations, 
networks and alliances that enables a sustained and regular pursuit of their 
respective interests. In the context of Guatemala, the focus will be on 
‘traditional’ elites on one hand and ‘emerging’ elites on the other. ‘Traditional’ 
refers to the sustained period of their elite status, which in line with the work of 
Guatemalan scholar Casaús Arzú (2007), has been consolidated in most cases 
since the 19th century. ‘Emerging’, on the other hand refers to elites that have 
emerged since the transition to democracy, primarily by seizing on legal as well 
as illegal opportunities for accumulation arising in this context. Drawing on 
Burton et al.’s (1992) classification of elites, especially given the emergence of 
new elite factions over recent decades, Guatemalan elites can be seen as a 
“disunified elite”, with minimal “structural integration or value consensus” 
(Burton et al, 1992, p.10). In the context of the outlined scenario of state co-
option, this is reflected in the complex and multilevel alliances elite factions 
have established with individuals and networks positioned outside and within 
the state institutions. Accordingly, different elite factions are locked into evolving 
patterns of competition as well as cooperation in their drive to influence policies 
and institutional functions to ensure a privileged access to wealth and rents.  
The idea of the ‘state’ is strongly linked to this understanding of ‘elites’. It refers 
to the political and legal apparatus that in Marxist tradition has often been 
described as an instrument used by the dominant capitalist class in pursuit of its 
economic interests. However, I regard this understanding as too reductive and 
advocate a view that reflects the evolving correlation of forces that surround this 
apparatus as well as the range of cultural, social and political processes and 
relationships that are promoted through the multiple institutions, norms, rules 
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and values. This amplified view pays reference to the state as a form of 
exercising and stabilising power-relationships, while also acting as an 
‘apparatus of capture’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) that seeks to integrate 
relationships and processes that escape its control, be it in a coercive or bio-
political way. For many states in the Global South, this integration or capture 
can be interpreted as a ‘sub-sumption by exclusion’ (Dinerstein, 2014), as 
peoples are integrated into the grammar of state and capital, however in a 
position of exclusion and invisibility. 
In the case of Guatemala, similar to many states in the Latin American region, 
the relationships that mark the state and its political regime cannot be 
disconnected from its colonial and mono-ethnic characteristics as well as its role 
in reinforcing class-divides. The colonial articulation of power has continued 
throughout post-colonial periods, without the introduction of a formal democratic 
framework constituting a break with this colonial axis. As the essentially mono-
ethnic character of the Guatemalan state has persisted, this also highlights the 
lack of independence of the political regime from traditional and emerging elite 
factions. 
The mechanisms of domination exercised through the state have also continued 
to be articulated along class divides, in this sense consolidating a structure that 
stabilises colonial and class-based exercise of power. The mentioned absence 
of independence of the political regime from elite factions leads me to 
conceptualise the Guatemalan state as marked by an advanced level of co-
option to highlight the predominant patterns relationships around the 
institutional apparatus follow. While all states are marked by some degree of co-
option, these dynamics are especially predominant in states such as 
Guatemala, where there is evidence of a ‘co-opted reconfiguration of the state’ 
(Garay et al., 2010). Thus, political and legal processes as well as entire state 
functions are reconfigured in accord with the interests of traditional and 
emerging elites. This idea of state co-option seeks to emphasise the multiple 
mechanisms used in the competition among elite factions to control the 
institutional framework, which is framed by a consensus or pact around the 
informal as well as illegal determination of formal decision-making processes. 
The definition of ‘agency’, another key element of my conceptual framework, will 
be based on an understanding of the capacity of individuals to act. Agency will 
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be used primarily at a collective level, with ‘collective agency’ implying a 
convergence of individuals in order to act together. The concept of ‘collective 
agency’ was preferred over that of ‘movements’ with previous work of 
Guatemalan scholars such as Bastos and Camus (2003) or Brett (2006) in 
mind. I chose this terminology in an attempt to indicate the particular features of 
the organisational processes under analysis in this thesis and highlight their 
much more local and subaltern character. This distinguishes them from the 
earlier broader articulations these scholars have referred to as social, popular or 
indigenous movements and that spring to mind in the Guatemalan context when 
the term ‘movement’ is used. However, to emphasise the contingent character 
of this collective agency I also move away from a dualistic definition of agency 
in relation to structure. Instead, I seek to build on a more fluid understanding 
provided by authors linked to complexity theory (eg. Urry, 2003; Chesters and 
Welsh, 2010; Chesters, 2012). This enables the analysis to emphasise the 
unpredictable, undefined flow of agency and, especially when referring to 
collective agency, the immanent characteristics of these processes. Accordingly, 
as individuals converge in processes of collective agency or in De Landa’s 
(2006) understanding agglomerate to form ‘assemblages’, they have the 
capacity to develop properties in the course of their actions or practices that are 
not just drawn on their relationship with structure. This requires an engagement 
with the epistemological processes at work that are often developed on the 
basis of different ontological frameworks. Additionally, the various local 
assemblages can constitute ‘nodes’ -that is particular ‘places’ marked by intense 
communicative work within the broader organisational network (Chesters, 
2012). The processes of collective convergence to form assemblages will in 
turn be explained by referring to the processes of production or appropriation of 
meanings. This idea of escaping a too narrow structure-agency debate also 
implies removing the state as the prime target or objective of the collective 
articulations. Instead, it equips the expressions of collective agency with more 
flexible properties and pays justice to the ways in which they shuttle between 
different scales and strategies. This means the state apparatus and its arenas 
only represent one among various areas of interaction.  
The concept of ‘meanings’ will be central to examine the embedded 
understandings and emergence of the expressions of collective agency. In line 
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with a number of authors (e.g. Melucci 1989, 1996; Álvarez, 1998; Dagnino, 
1998; Escobar, 1992, 2008), I emphasise that societies are not just based on 
production in the economic sphere. Instead, there are ongoing processes of 
production of symbols, social relationships, needs and identities among others. 
Behind these different words lie a plurality of meanings that in turn imply 
practices, policies and actions, which can come into opposition and conflict. 
Following this understanding, Melucci (1989, 1996) sees the emergence of 
social movements and collective action as a ‘symptom’ of these conflicts over 
meanings. Collective action constitutes an attempt to re-appropriate and remain 
in control of the production of meanings, not just in their semantic sense but 
also in terms of the practices they imply. According to this view, expressions of 
collective agency can be seen as engaging in what Escobar has labelled 
“cultural distribution conflicts” (Escobar, 2008, p.14). This highlights struggles 
not just over access and control over resources but instead embedded in a 
perspective of ‘difference’ to fundamentally question their use and the meanings 
attached to them. 
A further aspect of my conceptual framework is that of ‘difference’, which is 
closely linked to this dimension of production of meanings. The differential 
production of meanings points to the variety of understandings that underlie 
words, processes, policies and symbols (Melucci, 1996; Escobar 2008). 
‘Difference’ will draw on contrasting ways of coding economic, social, political 
and cultural relationships that are reflected in practices and thinking. I highlight 
how processes engaging in an affirmation of ‘difference’ feature not just at the 
level of meanings but also at the level of political practices. Accordingly, an 
explicit political notion can be associated with ‘difference’, as it is embedded in 
auto-poietic processes that seek to redefine power relationships, social patterns 
and rules. Additionally, it is important to understand ‘difference’ in its integral and 
evolving sense of a ‘becoming’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987), rather than 
limiting it to an oppositional understanding or a specific set of characteristics 
such as ethnic identity. Instead, drawing on Deleuze (1994), I propose seeing 
the collective enactment of ‘difference’ as ‘a movement in itself’ that in the case 
of collective action is reflected in practices and discourses.  
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Thesis structure: 
The first chapter reviews various bodies of literature to present different 
understandings of democratisation and state-formation processes in the Global 
South. By examining literature on democratic transitions I will indicate how an 
emphasis on elites and their role in providing openings predominates in 
literature focusing on democratisation. Another strand of literature on state-
formation processes in the Global South sheds a more critical light on this 
perspective. This literature highlights how elites have frequently perpetuated 
their dominant societal position based on economic strategies of accumulation 
such as patronage and rent-seeking. I will also introduce literature examining 
patterns of ‘state co-option’ to show how elite factions use legal and illegal, 
formal and informal mechanisms to establish alliances with individuals or 
networks within the state institutions. Seeking to overcome the ‘elite-bias’ in 
literature on democratisation, I will then turn to review a body of literature based 
on the non-elite expressions of agency and their relationship with 
democratisation processes. In doing so, I will argue for the importance of 
exploring alternative, non-elite sources of agency not just in terms of their 
impact on the institutional framework of the state. Instead, despite engaging 
outside institutional terrains they represent a crucial condition for democratic 
processes, as these grassroots movements struggle to make their local 
surroundings and every-day lives more democratic. 
The second chapter develops some of the conceptual elements, which will be 
used for the analysis of the expressions of collective action in the context of a 
co-opted state in the second part of the thesis. It will outline these processes by 
emphasising the antagonistic dimension integral to struggles around the 
appropriation of meanings. In doing so, I will introduce the idea of ‘difference’ 
and ‘space’ as categories to examine some of the characteristics acquired by 
processes of agency in societies marked by a multi-ethnic constellation and the 
context of a co-opted state. The chapter will frame this collective action as 
emerging from the margins of society and finding its incentives primarily in 
locally embedded meanings and problems. While failing to engage along the 
conventional political and institutional terrain, the chapter will also highlight how 
this agency can build on attempts to re-appropriate decision-making processes 
and develop alternative ways of organising political interactions.  
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The third chapter examines the genesis of the Guatemalan state to provide a 
contextual framework for the analysis of collective agency in the chapters which 
follow. It will focus on the elite-dominated societal order across different 
historical moments. In doing so, I will argue that the attempts to perpetuate 
strategies of accumulation and capture rents have acted as the defining 
dynamics of this state-formation process. While authoritarian forms of 
governance have predominated during long periods of the state-formation 
process, I will also highlight the shift in mechanisms used to ensure privileged 
societal positions in the course of the transitional framework to formal 
democracy initiated in 1985. Patterns of state co-option began to mark the 
relationships between elites and the state. Accordingly, different elite factions 
seek to determine policies and legal formulations through a series of 
mechanisms and alliances with individuals and networks within the institutional 
framework. This has indicated the consolidation of a formal democracy that is 
marked less by the institutional relationships and spaces than the informal 
networks and opaque negotiations surrounding them.  
The fourth chapter will trace some of the most important expressions of agency 
that have emerged to challenge elite domination in Guatemala. After analysing 
the urban uprising by a popular movement with a middle-class leadership in 
1944 and its attempt to break with the oligarchic structure of the state, I will turn 
to a generation of agency emerging in the 1950s primarily in the Quiché region. 
Under partial influence of the Catholic Church, a community-based network was 
consolidated with an emphasis on economic and political autonomy. Next, the 
guerrillas’ attempt to challenge the coalition of military and economic elites will 
be examined, while also paying attention to the indigenous organising emerging 
in the shadow of the insurgent project. Subsequently, the role of civil society 
organisations in the context of the Peace Accords as well as the articulation 
around a Pan-Mayan discourse will be reviewed. In the course of the chapter I 
will highlight some of the limitations the different expressions of revolutionary, 
democratic and community-based expressions of agency have faced in terms of 
dealing with the societal complexity as well as overcoming the constraints 
imposed by the elite dominated state. 
The fifth chapter brings together two oppositional dynamics: Firstly, the targeting 
of natural resources and territories as part of global economic and political 
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trends. Secondly, the emergence of localised expressions of agency around the 
defence of territory. While contextualising the exploitation of natural resources 
against the background of global and regional economic patterns, I will indicate 
how this trend has been reproduced at a national level. Thus, Guatemalan elites 
have integrated this dimension into their economic interests, which are 
promoted through a series of state policies. I will also highlight how a ‘new’ 
generation of agency has gestated as over the last decade a number of 
expressions of collective agency emerged to challenge a series of projects and 
policies linked to the exploitation of natural resources.  
In preparation for the case studies, the sixth chapter presents the combination 
of various methods used in the course of the research process as a ‘political 
ethnography’. I have moved at the interface of different methodological 
approaches, using methodology closer to ethnographic research such as 
participant observation and interviews. I have also engaged with a 
methodological perspective closer to political science. This perspective enabled 
me to explore the implications of the community-based agency for 
understandings of democratisation in the context of a co-opted state. This 
chapter also reflects on the selection of the case studies and on my role as a 
researcher engaging in an environment marked by cultural complexity, linguistic 
diversity and a high degree of public insecurity.  
The seventh chapter looks at a specific organisational process among 
indigenous communities in the Northern Quiché region. In the course of the 
chapter I analyse the organising patterns emerging in response to the projects 
oriented at the exploitation of natural resources. In doing so, I argue that these 
projects have accentuated meanings around ‘territory’ to reflect a socio-political 
and cultural attachment to specific places among the local community 
members. Based on these culturally rooted meanings a revitalisation of the 
‘community’ has been engendered that has constituted a signifier which has 
been defined by the resistance linked to the defence of territory. At the same 
time the community members have added an explicit political element to their 
‘difference’. The struggle to re-appropriate decision-making processes becomes 
a central dimension of their collective action. In doing so, they emphasise the 
voice of the local, its differential production of meanings and autonomous 
decision-making as an alternative way of organising political processes. 
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The eighth chapter examines a second process of collective agency among 
community members in the municipalities of San Pedro Ayampuc and San José 
del Golfo, the RPLP. In the course of the chapter I argue that in the case of the 
RPLP local community members have also consolidated a collective position of 
‘difference’ in their resistance to a mining project. This stance has resulted from 
a process in the course of which a physical and symbolic space for the 
community members to engage in collective sense-making activities was 
created. The RPLP draws on a diversity of meanings and knowledge, in doing 
so reflecting the complex multi-ethnic constellation of the local population. 
Additionally, similar to the previous case study, a political notion has been 
added to the consensus around the communities’ central demands: In their 
struggle to contest vertically imposed decisions, the community members have 
also introduced a deliberative arena and horizontal political practices into their 
organisational processes that contrast with those predominant in institutional 
spaces.  
The final chapter brings together insights developed in the course of the thesis 
referring to the methodological and theoretical aspects and addressing the 
central research objectives outlined in this introduction. Additionally, it discusses 
some of the research limitations and provides suggestions for future research. 
After having introduced the argument, the main research objective and the 
structure of the thesis, the following chapter establishes the links between this 
research and bodies of literature taking different perspectives around 
democratisation and state-formation processes in the Global South. In doing so, 
it sets up a first aspect of the central argument by signalling the importance of 
exploring non-elite forms of agency and their implications for debates around 
democracy.  
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1. Democratisation and social change: Reviewing elite-relationships, state 
co-option and democratisation ‘from below’ 
This chapter aims to review different strands of literature which shine light on 
one of the central aspects of this thesis, the argument for the importance of 
non-elite agency for understandings of democracy. This review will prepare for 
an analysis of the specific expressions of collective agency in Guatemala in the 
second part of the thesis. It will indicate empirical and conceptual limitations in 
literature, which has chosen to emphasise the centrality of elites in 
democratisation processes. Additionally, it will outline the argument for 
conceptualising grass-root agency and its cultural challenge as a crucial 
condition for democracy.  
Based on the experience of European states, significant emphasis has been 
placed on economic conditions and the role of elites in setting in motion and 
guiding the necessary economic and political processes towards democracy. 
Transitional literature on Latin America has been particularly explicit in viewing 
successful transitions as an outcome of elite-interactions, while non-elite actors 
such as popular or civil society organisations are relegated to a secondary, 
restricted role (e.g. O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Diamond, Linz and Lipset, 
1988). However, when examining states in the Global South elite-guided 
processes have been marked by a series of patterns, which in many cases 
severely curtail their democratic character. A number of scholars looking 
primarily at the state in Africa have sought to highlight some of the economic 
and political processes at work that tend to perpetuate the elite-dominated 
societal structure (e.g. Bratton and Van der Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Erdmann and Engel, 2006; Niemann, 2007).  
Recent work has added more detail to the analysis of inter-elite relationships 
and the role of elite pacts in framing state-society relationships (e.g. Khan, 
2005; North et al., 2009; Putzel and Di John, 2012). With regards to Latin 
America a strand of literature has highlighted patterns of state co-option and the 
insertion of illicit strategies and actors into elite networks (eg. Garay and 
Salcedo-Albarán, 2012; Gutiérrez and Mendéz, 2012; Briscoe, 2014). In line 
with this analysis, a number of countries in the Global South seem to have 
reached a situation of a democratic impasse or reversal. Despite complying with 
Dahl’s (1989) criteria of a ‘procedural minimum’ this has not translated into a 
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democratisation of societies. Instead, the institutional framework is dominated 
and reconfigured by legal and illegal elites locked into cycles of accumulation, 
without showing any democratising intent. 
Given this scenario, I will argue for debates around democracy to be 
approached through an exploration of non-elite expressions of agency based on 
the review of a body of literature which emphasises the potential of 
democratisation ‘from below’. Several strands of literature have emerged to 
highlight the role of class, social movements and different forms of collective 
action in providing a democratising impetus (e.g. Moore, 1966; Tilly, 1984; 
Rueschmeyer et al., 1992; Foweraker, 1995; Melucci, 1996; Della Porta, 2013). 
However, many of the conventional social movement approaches developed 
primarily in the Global North seem insufficient to capture the motivations, 
directionality and cultural understandings of different ways of imagining political 
and democratic processes emerging in contexts of the Global South. As I will 
argue, it is in these contexts that the role of culture acquires special importance 
in collective action to challenge dominant understandings of democracy and to 
do so without necessarily focusing on institutional spaces or structures.  
 
Identifying structural conditions and agents for democratisation 
By the second half of the 20th century there was general agreement among 
scholars that democracy represented the best system of government to frame 
societal relationships. At the same time debates were marked by the search for 
an adequate conceptualisation of the term. Dahl’s (1989) concept of ‘polyarchy’ 
proved especially influential and offered an understanding of democracy whose 
implementation seemed feasible. ‘Polyarchy’ was defined around seven 
institutional criteria focused on establishing a procedural minimum and was 
complemented with certain freedoms, or “primary political rights”, which were 
seen as necessary in order for elections to be acknowledged as democratic 
(Dahl, 1989, p.170). This approach consolidated an institutional view of 
democracy framed around a model that combined a restriction on participation 
and sovereignty with a consensus around electoral processes. Drawing on 
these understandings, a number of scholars would go on to base their work on 
a procedural or minimalist definition of democracy by drawing on Dahl’s 
definition, among them O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), Diamond et al. (1988), 
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Burton et al. (1992), Linz and Stepan (1996) as well as Diamond (1999). This 
also meant elections would constitute the crucial benchmark for the analysis of 
political developments in the countries that became democratic in the course of 
the second half of the 20th century. 
Another strand of literature emerged choosing to emphasise the structural 
conditions required for democratisation and exploring the relationship of 
democracy with forms of capitalist development. The underlying assumption 
was that a certain level of economic and social development represented the 
necessary conditions for democracy to flourish. One of the classical 
comparative analyses was that undertaken by Lipset (1959), who linked 
capitalism and democracy by arguing that capitalism distributes wealth to larger 
segments of the population and translates into economic prosperity. Increases 
in wealth, education, communication and equality were seen as leading to an 
enlargement of the middle class, which in turn would go on to constitute the 
main pro-democratic force. Where these preconditions are not given, the 
likelihood of a return to authoritarian forms of government was seen as 
increasing (Lipset, 1959). 
A similar view was advanced in modernization theories based on the 
assumption of a ‘backward’ society that was being transformed into ‘modern’ 
(Parsons, 1949; Rostow, 1960; Eisenstadt, 1966). For the Global South this 
obviously meant that “the encounter of European and non-European 
civilisations leads the latter to assume the characteristics of the former.” 
(Avritzer, 2002, p.59) Despite its economic focus, this body of literature also 
carried suppositions about democracy. They were based on the idea that in the 
long run economic growth represents the structural condition decisive for 
democratisation processes. Democracy is seen as the final stage of social 
processes resulting from a gradual transformation in economic structures that 
elevates countries into modernity.  
Despite differing in its understandings of the causes of underdevelopment and 
taking a more critical stance with regards to the world market, dependency 
theory (eg. Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) also shared this focus on economic 
variables to explain societal features. In doing so, both strands followed a 
simplistic, dual framework to explain the transformation of societal structures. In 
modernisation theory this was constituted by the dichotomy of non-modern and 
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modern, whereas in dependency theory the binary categorisation was based on 
central and peripheral positions in the world market. This also pretended to set 
out the route for countries in the Global South to follow (Avritzer, 2002). 
However, in both strands of literature, modernisation and dependency theory, 
democracy was seen as a side-product of the transformation of economic 
structures. 
Scholars also began to focus on the actors who would promote and guide the 
required political processes towards democracy. Nurtured by a line of 
democratic elitism, the focus on elites became predominant. Schumpeter in his 
work ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy’ published in 1942 had already 
outlined this view by arguing that “democracy does not mean and cannot mean 
that the people actually rule in any obvious sense of the terms ‘people’ and 
‘rule’. Democracy means only that the people have the opportunity of accepting 
or refusing the men who are to rule them.” (Schumpeter, 2005, p.285) 
Scholars such as Pye (1953), Lipset (1959), Almond and Verba (1963) and 
Huntington (1969) also advanced this understanding of setting limits to public 
participation. Their work focused on the challenges faced by “the transfer of 
democratic institutions to the Third World” by identifying and implementing 
mechanisms, which would “enhance governmental and elite authority from the 
start.” (Cammack 1994, p.357) This stance reinforced the idea that democratic 
governments were to be run by active minorities while a plurality of intermediary 
groups were to act as a guarantee for societal participation. Accordingly, a view 
was taken that “democracy does not seem to require a high level of active 
involvement from all citizens; it can work quite well without it.” (Held, 1987, 
p.192)  
Transitional literature (e.g. O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Diamond, Linz and 
Lipset, 1988) represented a further strand that was influential in maintaining the 
focus on elites. It emerged to analyse the transitions from authoritarian to 
democratic regimes with a regional focus on Latin America and Eastern Europe. 
Transitions to democracy were framed primarily as a political process based on 
interactions between civil and military leaders. While delegating this process to 
elites, transition theory did not assume them as a priori possessing democratic 
values. Instead, it distinguishes between three different groups of actors within 
the political system. Firstly, duros (hardliners), who seek a perpetuation of 
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authoritarian rule or at least to maintain the hierarchies of power-distribution. 
Secondly, the blandos (soft-liners), who agree that some form of electoral 
legitimation should be introduced into authoritarian regimes in the near future. 
Thirdly, the democratic opposition, who demand the institutionalisation of 
electoral competition while at the same time acknowledging the need to 
negotiate a transitional framework with the authoritarian power-holders 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). This means actors and their strategic choices 
move into the centre of analysis. Liberal democracy is presented as only one 
possible outcome, depending on the patterns of interaction between dominant 
elites (O’Donnell et al., 1986).  
Accordingly, transition is understood as an institutional arrangement or pact that 
aims at the re-establishment of political competitiveness between civilian and 
military elites based on a procedural minimum. Broader societal participation or 
a role for civil society is only seen as convenient and encouraged in specific 
moments. Thus civil society is viewed as playing a role in mobilizing and 
generating a “popular upsurge” against the authoritarian regime in order to 
highlight the crisis of legitimacy as well as accompany the negotiation 
processes (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.65). However, once this initial 
objective is achieved, transition literature advocates a more passive role for 
social movements and civil society. As a number of critics (eg. Pearce, 1997; 
Avritzer, 2002; Della Porta, 2013) have indicated especially with regards to 
post-transitional scenarios, transitional scholars see their mobilisational 
strategies and sustained demands as putting the fragile new regimes at risk. 
The stability of the agreement as well as the post-transitional order was 
prioritized, with non-elite actors being side-lined and only called upon in specific 
moments. Thus, the necessary processes of institutional engineering are to be 
led by ‘rationally acting elites’. 
As Della Porta (2013) has indicated, scholars such as Huntington (1991) as well 
as O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also extended the call for moderation to the 
opposition parties involved in the negotiations: “If the opposition menaces the 
vertical command structure of the armed forces, the territorial integrity of the 
nation state, the country's position in international alliances, or the property 
rights underlying the capitalist economy or if widespread violence recurs, then 
even bland regime actors will conclude that the costs of tolerance are greater 
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than those of repression.” (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.27). Without 
considering how this could influence the characteristics of the post-transitional 
order, these scholars advocated a role for moderate political parties instead of 
movements. In doing so, they failed to anticipate how these political parties 
would engender the demobilization of considerable sections of society, as 
evidence from various post-transitional democracies suggests (Bermeo, 1990; 
Della Porta, 2013).  
Even prominent transitologists such as O’Donnell (1996) would later admit that 
the outcomes of transitions in many cases could not be classified as 
democratic. The euphoria over transitions soon gave way to a growing 
recognition that these states in many cases did not surpass the minimum 
criteria of electoral processes. While elections were initially seen as a 
mechanism to inject a democratic routine that would encourage the 
consolidation of a regime of rights, scholars have highlighted contradictory 
developments. Thus, the transitional processes resulted in a number of 
ambivalent regimes that continue to be marked by elements associated with 
authoritarian forms of government. Among the characteristics identified are a 
weak state of law, inadequate guarantees for social, economic and civil rights, 
high levels of inequality, fragile institutions with deficient control and supervision 
over administrative functions of the state as well as low levels of legitimacy of 
the respective governments (O’Donnell, 1996, 1999, 2012; Diamond, 1999, 
2002; Ansaldi, 2008; Velasco, 2008).  
Realising that the linear changes to form Western liberal democracies and to 
fulfil the criteria for Dahl’s ideal of ‘polyarchy’ were not taking place, transitional 
scholars (eg. Linz and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell, 1996) turned their attention 
towards the ‘consolidation’ of democratic regimes. As Linz and Stepan (1996) 
argued this stage begins once democracy becomes “the only game in town” 
and “when all actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political 
conflict within the state will be resolved according to established norms” (Linz 
and Stepan, 1996, p.15). Among the six conditions for democratic 
‘consolidation’ they establish, they also advocate citizenship participation 
through a “free and lively civil society” (Linz and Stepan, 1996, p.15). 
Nevertheless, they continued to distinguish ‘civil society’ and its role from that of 
the ‘political society’ represented primarily by political parties. As Pearce (1997) 
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argues, this continues to represent a view that civil society was to be restrained 
and instead political parties were seen as the adequate instruments to set up a 
stable, sustainable and legitimate political order: “The associations of 'civil 
society' can positively contribute to these as long as they accept the limits of 
their role as well as the fact that the health of the entire order demands the 
aggregation and channelling of their interests by political parties. Associational 
life, by implication, will disrupt rather than deepen democracy if it retains the 
over-politicized role, which helped it bring down non-democratic governments.” 
(Pearce, 1997, p.70) This means social mobilisation and collective agency is 
not considered as relevant to these post-transitional orders, while instead an 
‘ontological superiority’ is attributed to elites (Avritzer, 2002, p.34).  
O’Donnell (1996) sought to frame his revision of previous transitional literature 
around the idea of ‘delegative democracies’. He indicates a gap between norms 
of democratic institutions and the practices of social actors, thus highlighting 
“various sorts of non-universalistic relationships ranging from hierarchical 
particularistic exchanges, patronage, nepotism and favours to actions that, 
under the formal rules of the institutional package of polyarchy, would be 
considered corrupt.” (O’Donnell, 1996, p.40) Accordingly, in his work on 
‘consolidation’ O’Donnell (1996) points to a number of issues related to political 
culture and highlights how patterns from the authoritarian past continue to 
overshadow the new democracies. However, without pursuing the implications 
of this cultural dimension with more detail, he was instead led to an emphasis 
towards reforming the state institutions in an attempt to enhance democratic 
regimes. A similar line of research was followed by other scholars, whose work 
focused on aspects such as constitutional reforms as well as the comparative 
advantages between presidential and parliamentary systems (eg. Linz and 
Stepan, 1994; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997). 
Accordingly, the role of institutions began to be seen as the crucial aspect for 
democratic consolidation, as the political elites occupying them were entrusted 
to pursue the respective processes. While in more recent work there is 
recognition of the undemocratic patterns developing around these institutions, 
the literature fails to deliver enough detail and empirical depth to deliver a more 
concise framework for the relationships that evolve around these institutions. A 
body of literature focusing on the nature of the state in the Global South that will 
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be analysed in the next section, has added more precision to these elite-
relationship and economic processes that surround state-institutions. 
 
Patronage, rent-seeking and elite-networks in the Global South 
Over recent decades a considerable body of literature has emerged to focus on 
the nature of states in the Global South. A number of scholars have used the 
terms of ‘state failure’ and ‘fragility’ to frame their analysis often in attempts to 
establish criteria for comparative analysis (eg. Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2003; 
Torres and Anderson, 2004). In many cases this is based on a view that 
economic liberalisation and democratisation can be seen as the best ways to 
approach the negative features of states in the Global South. However, a 
substantial field of literature has chosen to provide more depth in the analysis of 
these regimes, often by taking a neo-patrimonial perspective that seeks to 
reflect the combination of characteristics deriving from patrimonial dominance 
on one hand and the legal-rational bureaucratic aspects on the other. In doing 
so, this research predominantly focusing on African states, has argued that it is 
pointless to measure ‘state failure’. As Niemann points out, these scholars 
“assert that the state in Africa is not any different from other states. It fulfils 
functions, although this may not be in accordance with ideal held notions of 
statehood.” (Niemann, 2007, p.22) Accordingly, these scholars are less intent 
on identifying elements for relational analysis. Instead, they seek to discuss the 
way these states in Africa ‘work’, despite their clear differences to 
understandings of statehood in the West. 
As Chabal and Daloz outline: “in most African countries, the state is no more 
than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply 
personalised political relations. … In Western Europe the Hobbesian notion of 
the state led to the progressive development of relatively autonomous centres 
of power, invested with sole political legitimacy. In Black Africa … such 
legitimacy is firmly embedded in the patrimonial practices of patrons and their 
networks” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, p.16). Additionally, these scholars have 
highlighted some of the particular features of states and have been keen to 
point out their ability to maintain processes of capital accumulation and a certain 
level of legitimacy, despite failing to comply with conventional attributes of 
western states. In doing so, they pay special attention to the particular ways in 
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which economic processes are structured around the state and how they in turn 
involve political mediation and interactions. 
One of the central features identified in this literature is the role of ‘patronage’ or 
politically motivated distribution of favours to groups. The establishment of 
these pyramidal patronage or patron-client networks is not just a feature of 
authoritarian models. Instead, they are seen as compatible with multi-party 
systems as they reflect a repeated relationship of exchange between a patron 
and usually identifiable clients. This means the exchange takes place between 
two agents or between one agent and a collective, distinguished either by 
status, power or other characteristics. As Khan (2005) in his work on South-east 
Asia has argued, it is important to understand how these patron-client 
relationships, predominant in the economic system, also permeate the political 
system and are reproduced in its organisational patterns. He indicates how this 
leads to a “proliferation of patron-client networks” and a consolidation of a 
personalised way of doing politics, which stands in contrast to liberal ideals of 
democracy (Khan, 2005, p.17). As these dynamics become integral to the 
political system, this also consolidates a political culture among elites that links 
the drive to capture rents with ways of organising the political system (Khan, 
2005).  
Accordingly, ‘rent-seeking activities’ constitute another central element of this 
body of literature. ‘Rents’ is generally used to refer to incomes or returns on an 
economic asset, which is above what the individual or collective economic 
agent/s would have received in its best alternative use (Khan, 2000; North et al., 
2009; Di John, 2010). This means ‘rents’ include a wide range of legal and 
illegal incomes among them monopoly profits, illegal transfers by mafias or 
state distributed subsidies and transfers (Khan, 2000). However, in this body of 
literature a lot of attention is paid to ‘rents’ that imply a certain level of political 
mediation and capacity to obtain wealth from non-productive activities or 
resources (Gallagher, 1991; Boone, 1994; Erdmann and Engel, 2006). There is, 
equally, a wide spectrum of activities that can be ascribed to ‘rent-seeking’ 
ranging from bribery or coercion to legal political activities such as lobbying and 
advertising. As Khan outlines, all these activities share the objective “to create, 
maintain or change the rights and institutions on which particular rents are 
based.” (Khan, 2000, p.6)  
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In this analysis the state acquires a key role as a means for enrichment of 
elites, with Bayart (1993) developing the idea of the ‘politics of the belly’, as 
leaders ‘eat’ from state resources. According to his argument this coincides with 
the incursion of informal political networks into formal economic activities and 
an increasing ‘criminalisation of the state’ (Bayart et al., 1999).2 Various authors 
have also sought to highlight the mutually reinforcing relationship between the 
activities linked to a rentier economy and patterns of patronage (Lewis, 1994; 
Van de Walle, 2001; Erdmann and Engel, 2006).  
As mentioned, this literature has also outlined how rent-seeking and patronage 
networks are replicated within the political domain, with clientelism and 
corruption seen as playing a greasing role. Most scholars view the combination 
of these factors as constituting a difficult scenario for expressions of collective 
action or participative dynamics, although there is acknowledgement for the 
ongoing potential for mass protests, given the level of discontent among the 
population (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994). This discontent is however 
usually seen as a temporary feature or as bound to be integrated into counter-
patronage networks that represent the only real alternative channel to issue 
dissent (Reno, 2002).  
In contrast to some of the transitional literature outlined earlier, these scholars 
are less focused on outlining ways to replicate the western models of statehood 
and democracy. Instead, they take a functionalist approach to establish some of 
the specific processes and relationships into which institutions in the Global 
South are embedded. Despite at times lacking empirical depth, this literature 
highlights the proliferation of mechanisms of corruption, rent-seeking and 
patronage that make these states ‘work’ in a fundamentally different way.  
Recent research by a group of scholars close to Institutional Economics has 
sought to add further elements for the analysis of societal orders in the Global 
North and South. In doing so, North, Wallis and Weingast (2009, 2013) have 
sought to examine not just the functional logics of states but also to address 
one of the shortcomings of neo-patrimonial literature by developing a framework 
for state trajectories over time. They have argued for a focus on elites, the 
                                                          
2 ‘Criminalisation’ in this understanding signals that functions and state institutions are being 
used to facilitate criminal activities (Bayart, 1999). 
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economic incentives behind their interactions, as well as the analysis of elite-
settlements to achieve a precise characterisation of states.  
North, Wallis and Weingast introduce a basic distinction between ‘open access 
orders’ and ‘limited access orders’ to indicate differences in relationships and 
power equations at the level of elites. In turn, this is linked to an explanation for 
the control of violence. They see ‘open access orders’ as characterised by 
political and economic development, vibrant civil society organisations, big 
decentralised governments and positive growth rates. ‘Limited access orders’ 
on the other hand, refer to states marked by policies implemented without 
generalised consent, a small number of organisations, a slow growing 
economy, small centralized government and social relationships organised 
along privileges and hierarchies.3  
Concordant with other authors (e.g. Khan, 2005; Putzel and Di John, 2012), 
North et al. (2009, 2013) have argued that at the heart of states lies an ‘elite 
bargain’ or ‘settlement’. This guarantees privileged access to resources and 
positions for the different political, economic, religious and educational elite 
factions. Their incentives to come together and form a dominant coalition is 
based on an economic rationale, which in turn implies a shared interest to 
control violence. Hence, the respect for each other’s privileges (e.g. property 
rights, access to resources) prevents any outbreak of violence between elite 
factions as this would also result in a reduction of rents. This means the 
interests of powerful elites are tied to continued cooperation within the coalition, 
and in doing so, guarantee the survival of this ‘elite pact’ by abstaining from the 
use of violence (North et al., 2009, 2013).  
In their comparative approach, North et al. (2009) focus on changes in elite 
relationships to identify how they translate into different state trajectories. They 
argue that the evolution of states towards ‘open access orders’ is achieved 
when elites based on the above-mentioned economic rationale begin to accept 
the expansion and progressive institutionalisation of impersonal relationships. 
This progressively opens their coalitions up to the point of permitting open 
access even to non-elites. But for this process to go ahead three necessary 
                                                          
3 As these authors indicate, 85% of the world’s population currently lives in social orders marked 
by the characteristics of a ‘limited access order’ (North et al., 2009). 
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doorstep conditions have to be reached: 1) The establishment of rule of law4, 2) 
the implementation of perpetually lived organisations5 (e.g. state, institutions) 
and 3) the control of the military6. Based on these assumptions, this group of 
scholars argues for the importance of a strong institutional framework through 
which impersonality, rule of law and control of violence can be ensured. 
Similar to the previously outlined neo-patrimonial literature, these scholars offer 
elements to understand the particular characteristics of states in the Global 
South, especially with regards to elite-interactions. However, they fail to offer a 
convincing explanation for the motivation of elites to concede openings or in 
North et al.’s (2009, 2013) understanding, pave the way for ‘doorstep 
conditions’. This seems to represent a crucial limitation and there is little 
empirical evidence to suggest that the outlined economic rationale acts as an 
incentive to establish control over violence or for concessions by elites. The 
pursuit of economic interests and the individualistic behavioural patterns this 
rationale implies seem to be incompatible —especially in the short term— with a 
move towards the above-mentioned door-step conditions. Instead, as the 
analysis of Guatemala in chapter 3 will also reflect, different elite factions 
become locked into the reproduction of drives for accumulation with patterns of 
patronage and rent-seeking reinforcing these dynamics. As some elite factions 
and their strategies of accumulation are intimately linked to personalised, illegal 
as well as coercive patterns, this makes it unlikely for elite-factions to agree to 
concede control to an impersonal institutional framework or to support a more 
inclusive societal order.  
                                                          
4 At this point the authors are quick to indicate that a completely ‘impersonal’ rule of law is rarely 
the case since legal systems create other ways to differentiate or discriminate among categories 
of legal persons according to the requirements of the dominant coalition (North et al., 2009). 
5 This means the character of organisations is defined by function and not by person (North et 
al., 2009). 
6 North et al. state that this represents a consequence of the ability of members within the 
dominant coalition to discipline the military force through non-military means. This is a result of 
elites specialising in economic resources developing more powerful organisation and providing 
an institutional arrangement for allocating resources. The control of these resources makes it 
possible to put the military under civilian control. Therefore, military leaders can decide “when to 
fight but not how to fight” (North et al., 2009, p.171). 
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Additionally, North et al.’s approach of conceptualising elites as following 
rational economic interests and then generalising this as a pattern to 
understand state-society relationships seems to reduce the complexity of the 
social processes at work. Similar to the literature closer to a neo-patrimonial 
perspective, North, Wallis and Weingast almost completely side-line the variety 
of cultural frameworks as well as the potential for resistance to emerge from 
within societies. This limitation becomes apparent as they expand the 
behavioural logics and aspirations they identify among elites to non-elite 
sections and all forms of collective organising. While emphasising the 
importance of a “broad-based and active civil society” (North et al., 2009, p.118) 
they are also clear in delineating their incentives for action which is marked by a 
rather reductive economic understanding: “Organisations are the lifeblood of 
both political and economic competition. They are the vehicles through which 
economic and political entrepreneurs implement their ideas and affect the 
dynamics of the economy and the polity. … Most organisations seek rents and 
some … succeed in gaining policies that provide them with government-run 
cartels, subsidies and rents.” (North et al., 2009, p.141)  
Before exploring the variety of cultural and political motivations beyond this 
economic reductionism that underlie collective action in the fourth section of this 
chapter, I will introduce another strand of literature that has focused on the 
permeation of elite circles by dynamics linked to illicit economic activities and 
networks of organised crime. This adds another dimension to the analysis of 
inter-elite relationships. As the logics of trans-national capitalism and the 
potential of accumulation offered by illicit activities reconfigure inter-elite 
relationships, the co-option of states and their institutional functions has thrived.  
 
The intrusion of the illicit: Criminal networks capturing and reconfiguring 
states 
Over the last decade increasing attention in social science has been paid to the 
growing impact of criminal networks and organised crime. This has encouraged 
an analysis beyond a conventional security perspective in order to determine 
the nexus organised crime establishes with institutional frameworks and how it 
influences economic as well as political relationships. Accordingly, a body of 
literature has emerged to examine states in the light of ‘state capture’ to indicate 
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the increasing intervention of criminal actors in the formulation of laws, 
regulations and public policies in the short and long term, usually in detriment of 
the broader public (Hellman et al., 2000; Garay et al., 2010). This analysis 
continues to rely on a focus on elites and elite-interrelationships, since this 
scenario in many cases develops with different levels of participation or 
complicity of established economic and political elites. In many cases it also 
signals a certain level of social mobility as new elite factions emerge, often by 
seizing the opportunities granted by transitional moments and a redrawing of 
the political or economic landscape.  
Chelokhine and King (2007) have indicated how networks of organised crime 
have consolidated around the state in the context of the transition towards post-
communist Russia. They identify a paradoxical effect in corruptive practices 
since they played a “greasing role” during the initial phase of the transition and 
paved the path for democratic reforms (Chelokhine and King, 2007, p.111). 
However, on the other hand these practices also expanded exponentially, with 
the individually isolated criminal transactions reaching new levels by forming 
well organised and coordinated corruption networks. 
As these scholars indicate, this adds complexity to traditional patron-client 
relationships between state officials and corporate interests as networks are 
established that include not only vertical (relationships within one institution) but 
also horizontal interdependences (relationships between different institutions). A 
series of corruptive practices such as the allocation of budget funds or contracts 
in favour of networks, enhancement of illegal profits or competitive advantages 
for financial and commercial structures have become routine operations for 
these networks (Chelokhine and King, 2007). 
Other authors have indicated how the level of corruption and penetration by 
organised crime and drug trafficking networks reaches a level they identify as 
‘state capture’, as individuals outside the state seek to manipulate legislative 
institutions through bribery (Hellman et al., 2000; Garay et al., 2010). This 
implies a certain level of coordination and complicity among actors within as 
well as outside the state institutions engaging in practices to ensure the 
promotion of particular interests, mainly of economic nature, to the detriment of 
public interests.  
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Garay et al. put forward an understanding of state capture that includes “(i) the 
action of lawful groups such as economic groups, domestic and transnational 
companies; (ii) taking the form of corruption with economic motivation and 
consequences; (iii) implemented mainly through bribery at a domestic and 
transnational level and (iv) exercised over the legislative and executive 
branches at a central level” (Garay et al., 2010, p.17). 
These forms of state capture have an obvious influence on the nature of 
societal constellations, in some cases reaffirming existing forms, in others 
encouraging the emergence of new unequal and oligarchic social relationships. 
Building on a similar understanding of state capture in her analysis of Serbia, 
Pesic identifies the political party leadership and the 10-15 richest tycoons as 
“the most important capturing agents” (Pesic, 2007, p.6). While the former have 
engaged in the seizure of state property including public companies, public 
offices and institutions, by financing all relevant parties, the latter have 
undermined the separation between particular economic interests and political 
institutions. According to Pesic, the “high convertibility of influences between 
political and economic sectors has created a non-transparent and 
unaccountable government, which undermines the main state institutions, 
including the judiciary, the parliament and the principal regulatory and 
controlling institutions, thus creating a framework for systemic 
corruption.”(Pesic, 2007, p.30) 
The experience of Latin American countries and more specifically the influence 
of drug-trafficking networks have led Garay and Salcedo-Albarán (2012) to 
develop a framework for a more advanced scenario of state capture, a “co-
opted reconfiguration of the state”. Garay and Salcedo-Albarán put forward the 
following definition for this scenario:  
“The action of lawful and unlawful organisations, which through unlawful 
practices seek to systematically modify from inside the political regime and 
to influence the drafting, modification, interpretation, and application of the 
rules of the game and public policies. These practices are undertaken with 
the purpose of obtaining sustained benefits and ensuring that their 
interests are validated politically and legally, as well as gaining social 
legitimacy in the long run, although these interests do not follow the 
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founding principle of social welfare.” (Garay and Salcedo-Albarán, 2012, 
p.36) 
These scholars develop this understanding of state co-option on the basis of 
case studies in Mexico, Guatemala and Colombia. It goes beyond state capture 
by adding special emphasis on two criteria. Firstly, the involvement of 
individuals or groups capable and prepared to exercise violence to complement 
or substitute bribery. Accordingly, individuals seek to increase their impact by 
threatening to or actually engaging in “techniques of violence” (Garay et al., 
2010, p.19). Secondly, the bidirectional character in this process of co-opted 
reconfiguration signals the various positions taken up by illicit actors in this 
process. Relationships take on a networked shape and are not limited to 
attempts of agents external to the institutional framework of the state to co-opt 
lawful state agents. In this advanced scenario the relationship is consolidated 
bi-directionally and reveals an increased level of coordination between lawful 
and unlawful agents, as agents within the state seek benefits by coordinating 
with agents outside the institutional framework (Garay et al., 2010; Garay and 
Salcedo Albarán, 2012).  
This co-opted reconfiguration of states can follow a top-down logic when 
processes of co-option are led from the central level of state institutions. On the 
other hand, bottom-up processes can take place through reconfigurations 
promoted from local or regional levels that seek to capture different sections of 
the public administration (Garay et al., 2010).  
These dynamics indicate a high level of fluidity in the divides separating formal 
and informal spheres as well as legal and illegal practices, with agents 
engaging in different modes of capital accumulation as well as moving at their 
interface. Briscoe (2014) also highlights the complexity of the resulting scenario 
as actors from the criminal economy compete for rents in the public as well as 
private sector. Firstly, he points to the rapprochement between the financial 
policy of the state and the processes oriented at large scale money-laundering. 
Accordingly, public funds or debts are used to integrate illegally accumulated 
capital into the formal economy. Secondly, he points to an evolving nature of 
illicit activities and their reorientation towards new sources of accumulation such 
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as mining or other forms of natural resource extraction.7 This means no clear 
separation between the different spheres of the legal and illegal economy can 
be made: Just as illicit capital flows enter the formal economy, the agents 
behind illegal activities move between the realms of institutional and informal 
spaces.  
Beyond Garay and Salcedo-Albarán’s emphasis on emerging, criminal elites, 
the inseparable paths of capital-flows explain the existing connections between 
established, traditional elites and emerging elites as their respective patterns of 
accumulation and rent-seeking overlap and consolidate around a vague 
separation of legality and illegality. At least in part by capitalising on the 
absence of firm regulation or oversight, financial institutions, banks as well as 
companies owned by traditional elites are just as likely to act as platforms or 
play their role in introducing illicit capital into the formal economy.  
Recent studies have also been keen to highlight the wider impact on societal 
interactions (PNUD, 2013; Briscoe, 2014). For individuals that find themselves 
marginalised from the centres of power, the illicit economy is perceived as 
offering opportunities for upward mobility or integration into social and political 
groups. Accordingly, the illicit sphere is viewed as a means to fulfil social 
aspirations and to access economically as well as politically elevated social 
strata. As elites resist a broader distribution of rents as well as regulatory 
frameworks, illegal actors with coercive potential seem most likely to scale 
social hierarchies and gain access to state institutions or at least increase their 
influence on them. 
In the case of the Latin American region the fluidity of the divide between legal 
and illegal practices also has to be contextualised historically. Here extensive 
periods of the state-formation processes have been driven by the various post-
colonial regimes on the basis of arbitrary rule (Centeno, 2002). Thus, while the 
distinction of legality and illegality varies across time, as Schirmer (1998) points 
out in the case of Guatemala, elites have tended to use the law to govern rather 
than govern in accord with law. Accordingly, the current nexus between politics 
and criminality at multiple institutional and non-institutional levels is no 
                                                          
7 Briscoe (2014) points to the example of Perú, where the profits of illegal gold mining (3.000 
million USD) exceed the income of drug-trafficking, despite the country being the second largest 
producer of cocaine.   
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coincidence. Instead, the underlying historical processes indicate an assertive 
link between the state and traditional elites as well as their attempts to 
perpetuate societal domination, enhance their strategies of accumulation and 
capture rents. As Briscoe signals:  
“Various examples reveal situations in which the involvement of public 
officials in illegal business is not just the result of ‘a few bad apples’ 
succumbing to a tempting opportunity within the state apparatus, but 
rather the result of an intrinsic legacy of states with a history of 
authoritarianism or complicity with crime (...).” (Briscoe, 2014, p.42) 
Adding to this nexus with the tradition of arbitrary rule in Latin America, Pearce 
(2010) has maintained the emergence of a particular, ‘perverse’ form of state, 
as elites fail to contribute to the establishment of a monopoly around violence. 
As a result, she sees the state as playing a key role as it “contributes to 
violence, it actively transmits and reproduces violence, sometimes through its 
own acts, sometimes through complicity with violent acts of others and often 
through criminal negligence in ceding spaces to privatised expressions of 
violence.” (Pearce, 2010, p.295) Accordingly, violence becomes crucial to 
structure relationships across society, as elites prioritise the preservation of 
their exclusive societal status over making concessions to institutions that could 
escape their control in some aspects. 
Pearce’s account as well as the literature exploring state co-option enhances 
the scepticism outlined in previous sections with regards to the role of elites in 
engendering processes towards more equal or democratic societies. The co-
optive and arbitrary patterns have historically been part of the elites’ 
mechanisms to structure social orders as they insert themselves onto the 
colonial and post-colonial legacies. In many countries in Latin America they 
continue to draw on conservative, ideological frameworks to substantiate their 
exclusive social status. In addition to these deeply engrained historical patterns, 
the increasing weight of the illicit economy and its superior potential for 
accumulation alters the balances of inter-elite relationships. As traditional and 
emerging elite factions are locked into cycles of competition and accumulation 
they operate on the basis of similar mechanisms and strategies with the aim to 
influence and determine policies as well as functions of the institutional 
framework of the state. Additionally, despite the competitive nature of inter-elite 
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relationships, the inseparable flows of capital between illicit and licit 
accumulation represent a crucial nexus between different factions.  
This scenario begs questions for perspectives on social change or 
democratisation. Mechanisms of state co-option clearly erode and side-line the 
mechanisms of accountability and participation designed as part of formal 
democratic systems. The political system and the control of the institutional 
framework becomes key to pursue economic interests, while the co-optive 
mechanisms used to do so erode the checks and balances established as part 
of a democratic polity. The resulting regimes tend to comply with a procedural 
minimum as outlined by transitional literature. However, a large proportion of 
their political and economic decision-making processes at a national, regional 
and local level are informally and/or illegally determined.  
Despite these scenarios of state co-option expressions of collective action and 
social movements have represented another key feature of Latin America's 
social realities as they challenge forms of discrimination, injustice, violence and 
inequality. Accordingly, the following section will move towards identifying 
features of this non-elite agency by reviewing some of the literature that has 
analysed the role and characteristics of social movements and collective action 
in different contexts.  
 
Subaltern classes and social movements in democratisation processes  
A significant body of literature has focused on non-elite forms of agency to 
approach the issue of democracy. A prominent attempt at framing 
democratisation ‘from below’ was made by a group of authors exploring social 
constellations and pathways towards democracy by focusing on the interaction 
of classes, including the role of subaltern ones. Barrington Moore (1966) can be 
seen as the scholar initiating this line of research while other authors sought to 
expand, confirm or question his findings.  
In his research in the 1960s Moore identified three pathways to modern society, 
one leading to liberal democracy based on a combination of capitalism and 
parliamentary democracy, a second leading to fascism, based on a form of 
capitalism combined with reactionary political expressions, and a third option 
leading to communism. While the factors favouring the implementation of 
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democracy in the West are multiple, he singles out the bourgeoisie as playing 
the central role in promoting democratisation processes (Moore, 1966). He 
sums up his argument with “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” to underline the 
importance of this societal sector participating in an alliance to achieve 
democratic outcomes (Moore, 1966, p.418). Accordingly, the chances to 
establish parliamentary democracy are seen as rising, when the bourgeoisie is 
able to displace the landholding elites and avoid becoming a subordinate 
partner in an alliance against the peasantry. 
Moore’s central argument was placed under scrutiny as a number of scholars 
sought to contribute new elements to his original case studies or test the 
applicability of his hypothesis in other regions. Rueschmeyer et al. (1992) are 
one group of authors exploring the relevance of Moore’s argument to Latin 
America. They also framed their research around class-based categories in an 
attempt to identify the driving forces and alliances behind the emergence of 
democracy. In their outcomes they questioned the central role attributed by 
Moore to the bourgeoisie and instead preferred to emphasise the working class 
as “the most consistent democratic force” (Rueschmeyer et al., 1992, p.8). Their 
argument is also based on the idea that capitalist development favours the 
emergence of democracy, however, in an understanding that clearly contrasts 
with Lipset’s view as outlined earlier. They argue that capitalist development 
encourages the expansion of organisational spaces for the working class, which 
in their view favours the emergence of a stronger civil society and allows 
subordinate classes to seek alliances in their push for democracy 
(Rueschmeyer et al., 1992). Accordingly, the working class is identified as the 
crucial collective agent, thereby questioning the centrality of the bourgeoisie 
often emphasised in more orthodox Marxist work. 
Rueschmeyer et al.’s analysis can be seen as an attempt to introduce the role 
of non-elite actors in the promotion of democracy and introduce a view of 
democratisation as a bottom-up process. However, their understandings do 
remain biased towards a too simplistic explanation of change through structural 
conditions, thus “predicting democratisation when democracy-demanding 
classes (especially the working class) are stronger than democracy resisting 
ones.” (Della Porta, 2013, p.128) 
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Additionally, as the work of various scholars (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Mann, 1986; 
Kymlicka, 1995; Habermas, 1998; Centeno, 2002; Lander, 2012) has shown, 
the category of social class does not suffice to explain and contextualise the 
processes of collective action in the Global South. They have highlighted the 
multiple divides as well as racial tensions that mark societies in the South, 
where class does not represent the predominant signifier for the formation of 
collective identities. In many cases even the coherence as a nation is put into 
question given the level of demographic complexity. In European contexts it has 
been argued that the evolution of most states was marked by a homogenisation 
of identities, which involved an imposition of common languages, religions, 
currencies and legal systems on a designated territory (Tilly, 1990). However, 
this argument does not hold for the Global South. Here, in most cases state-
formation processes were either externally or elite induced processes that have 
engendered a strong hierarchisation of society. These hierarchies often 
coincide with “centuries-long racial gulfs” between colonial elites and the non-
white subalterns as well as the distribution of political and economic power 
(Centeno, 2002, p.150). As de-colonial scholars such as Lander have 
emphasised, even today in Latin America, states in many cases “continue to be 
mono-cultural colonial states in heterogeneous and pluri-cultural societies.” 
(Lander, 2012, p.74)  
The idea that subaltern actors and groups have a role to play in democratisation 
has been reinforced by a second strand of literature focusing on social 
movements and collective action. Attention to collective agency was revitalised 
in the course of the 1960s, as the approaches of the Collective Behaviour 
School and research emphasising structural functionalism were unable to 
adequately explain the protests and mobilizations in the USA and Europe. 
Despite similarities in the movements as such, differences were identified in 
terms of the methodological approach and research focus of scholars in Europe 
and North America (Chesters and Welsh, 2010).  
North American scholars such as Oberschall (1973) as well as Zald and 
McCarthy (1987) predominantly focused on the question of ‘how’ social 
movements emerged at particular moments by looking into organisational 
resources and the rational orientation of political actors. This body of literature 
developed Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) to frame their approach. In 
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doing so, it followed a line of research seeking to produce objective, 
generalisable knowledge based on the premise, “that social discontent is 
universal but collective action is not” (Foweraker, 1995, p.15). This strand of 
literature focused on highlighting the participants in collective action as rational 
and strategic agents able to evaluate constraints and resources as well as 
levels of organisation.  
Critiques of the body of literature engaging with RMT pointed to its too 
mechanistic structure-agency approach to explain the strategies of movements, 
while remaining indifferent to political and ideological content (chapter 4 will 
expand on the structure-agency debate). Thus, the framework was deemed as 
being overly rationalising with regards to personal interests and evaluating 
chances of success. Foweraker (1995) and Melucci (1996) also criticised the 
fact that this calculative feature was extended to identity issues without 
acknowledging cultural, affective or intuitive dimensions. This resulted in a 
premised stance on collective identity issues without sufficiently acknowledging 
the processes of constant negotiation involved in its construction. 
Apart from this North American line of research, a second approach followed by 
European scholars (e.g. Touraine, 1981; Habermas, 1985, 1987; Offe, 1985; 
Melucci, 1985, 1989) developed an understanding of ‘why’ non-traditional or 
‘new’ social movement actors got involved in particular collective struggles. 
These theoretical frameworks gave rise to the New Social Movement 
approaches that aimed to explain the struggles enacted by a range of societal 
groups such as women, student, environmental and anti-nuclear movements 
(Chesters and Welsh, 2010). According to Klandermans the ‘newness’ was 
reflected in three aspects of these movements, firstly, the new constituencies 
that were not formed by a conventional proletarian membership; secondly, the 
challenge to consolidated values around political representation and economic 
development; thirdly, new forms of autonomous organisation outside 
established groups or parties, which in many cases also emphasised an 
antagonistic stance towards state institutions (Klandermans, 1991). 
In many cases this perspective differed from the theories of American scholars 
by looking into causal relationships behind the changes in mobilisation 
practices, rather than paying attention to the organisational processes or 
mobilisation as such. Authors such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Melucci 
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(1996) and Habermas (1996) set aside concepts such as class or basic needs 
and instead emphasised identity, production of meaning and structural 
conditions underlying these emerging movements.  
New Social Movement approaches have however also been submitted to 
criticism. Especially their overemphasis on macro-theoretical aspects while 
remaining unable to shed light on to the resources and opportunities seized by 
movements in their struggles has been highlighted (Foweraker, 1995; Chesters 
and Welsh, 2010). Melucci also argues in his later work that the adherents of 
the New Social Movement approach, just like the RMT, share an 
epistemological problem with regards to identity: They continued to 
conceptualise the movements as unitary empirical objects and neglect the 
complexity of collective identities. This means they disregard the ongoing 
process of negotiations involved in the collective construction of meanings and 
challenge to dominant understandings (Melucci, 1996). 
The most explicit linkages between social movements and democratisation 
processes were initially established by North American scholars. They did so by 
focusing on the Political Opportunity Structure of movements, which 
“corresponds to the process by which a national political system shapes, checks 
and absorbs the challenges to it” (Tilly, 1984, p.312). This approach inserted 
movements into the broader political context and examined their potential to 
impact on the political system or to influence changes in public policies. Tilly 
(1984) was one of the scholars who prepared the ground for this analysis of 
collective action in relation to the institutional framework of the state. This 
interaction also framed his understanding of social movement, which he saw as 
a “sustained interaction between a specific set of authorities and various 
spokespersons for a given challenge to those authorities” (Tilly, 1984, p.305). 
He sought to highlight how changes in the ‘action repertoire’ related to changes 
in power structures at regional and national levels. In more recent work Tilly 
reemphasised “a broad correspondence between democratisation and social 
movements”, despite insisting it did so only under specific terms (Tilly, 2004, 
p.125). “The proliferation of social movements only promotes democracy under 
limited conditions: it only occurs when movements organise around a wide 
variety of claims including explicit demands for democracy and the state gains 
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capacity to realize such claims at least as fast as the claims increase.” (Tilly, 
1994, p.22) 
This perspective of embedding social movements into political processes and 
channelling their agency towards political institutions also seems to have 
reinforced a tendency seeking to establish ‘outcomes’ of these organisational 
processes. Accordingly, various scholars have turned towards highlighting the 
impact of social movements and collective action on institutions (e.g. Giugni, 
1998; McAdam, 1998). One of the crucial dimensions associated with their 
agency is the expansion of citizenship rights. In line with this idea Giugni (1998) 
has argued that for social movements to have a democratising impact they 
would have to affect at least one of the aspects that according to him define 
democracy: broad citizenship; relative equality among citizens; a binding 
consultation of citizens to state policies and personnel; as well as the protection 
of citizens from arbitrary state action. Accordingly, he argues that “the process 
of democratisation develops when a transfer of power couples with a 
modification of the mutual rights and obligations between the state and its 
citizens” (Giugni, 1998, xv). 
Beyond this role in the expansion of rights, Della Porta (2013, 2014), in her 
review of social movement literature, has highlighted context-specific aspects to 
emphasise the relevance of social movements to democratisation processes. 
Firstly, she indicates how their protests - at times in coordination with 
transnational actors - can initiate a liberalisation phase as authoritarian elites 
are left with no other choice than conceding democratic openings. Secondly, 
she emphasises the importance of mobilisation to demand rights during the 
transition to democracy as well as support for the pro-democracy groups in the 
context of inter-elite negotiation. Thirdly, she also introduces an aspect that 
emphasises the role of social movements and collective action following the 
transition to formal democracy. On one hand, during the consolidation phase 
and the holding of free and open elections, social movements can be seen as 
channelling their energies into political parties. On the other hand, in the case of 
low-intensity democracies, they can play an important role demanding more 
inclusive forms of democracy or mobilising against persisting exclusionary 
patterns (Della Porta, 2013, p.134).  
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While the first two points correspond to the aspects highlighted in transitional 
literature, this third point especially establishes a crucial nexus to this thesis, as 
it emphasises a role for social movements and collective action not just in 
transitional democratisation processes. Instead, it also enhances attention to 
the sustained role and importance of collective organising once formal 
democracies have been established. This introduces new elements into the 
debates around the relevance of different forms of collective action for 
democracy, especially with regards to contexts in which it fails to surpass a 
procedural minimum. It also encourages a shift away from a perspective 
seeking to determine concrete outcomes of organisational processes or 
measure their impact on procedures, rules and institution. Instead, it provides 
an opening towards recognition of the importance of collective organisational 
patterns ‘per se’. 
This is a view that Pearce had noted as persisting in radical discourses of civil 
society in Latin America, a context that has seen a continued emergence of 
collective action over recent decades. “…the hope persists that the 
associationalism and activism of Latin America's grass-roots may still constitute 
the embryo of an alternative, both to the dominant economic model and also to 
the persistent elitism and exclusions of the liberal democratic model.” (Pearce, 
1997, p.75) 
This shifts the research perspective towards the political and cultural patterns of 
these grass-roots processes, while also opening the door to a more systemic 
critique by its protagonists. Especially the emergence of indigenous movements 
over recent decades have been characterised by issues around identity, culture 
and disputes over meanings. In their resistance to specific economic, social and 
cultural policies various scholars have seen them as engaging in a symbolic 
challenge to question the dominant frameworks of meanings into which policies 
and understandings of democracy are embedded (Álvarez et al., 1998; Dussel, 
2000; Quijano 2000; Escobar 2008). 
According to this understanding, social movements and collective action 
represent struggles to determine meanings, or “wars for interpretation” that 
question imposed notions of democracy, modernisation and development 
(Slater, 1998, p.385). This constitutes a perspective that links culture to politics, 
with the former representing the basis for a challenge to a variety of policies. As 
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the case of indigenous movements indicates, collective action is in many cases 
driven by historically marginalised societal factions that emerge as specific 
cultural understandings and organisational patterns come under threat. Escobar 
has argued that these movements can be seen as highlighting “cultural 
distribution conflicts” (Escobar, 2008, p.14). This means they call attention not 
just to a conflict over access and control over resources but instead take on a 
position that fundamentally questions the persistent colonial and marginalising 
dimensions of this cultural project and its claims to universality (Dussel, 2000; 
Quijano, 2000; Escobar, 2008). 
This emphasis on culture and resistance to coloniality advanced by social 
movements in Latin America has implications for the ways in which they 
address dominant understandings of democracy. Scholars such as Avritzer and 
Santos (2005) have indicated how collective action can challenge unresolved 
issues in democratic theory as well as the idea of a ‘standard option of 
democracy’. Rather than accepting a “reduction of proceduralism to a process 
of elections of elites” (Santos and Avritzer, 2005, p.xxxix), conceptions of 
democracy are presented as highly disputed and based on a series of 
unresolved assumptions. Santos and Avritzer (2005) point to three different 
aspects around which debates on understandings of democracy have emerged: 
Firstly, the relation between procedure and societal participation in an attempt 
to challenge and redraw relationships between state and society. Secondly, the 
questioning of the implementation of non-participatory and bureaucratic modes 
of governance at the local level and thirdly, the relation between representation 
and cultural or social diversity. Accordingly, “demo-diversity”, based on a variety 
of democratic models and practices, is counter-posed to universal and Western-
dominated understandings of democracy (Santos and Avritzer, 2005, p.lxiii).  
This literature brings into play a number of aspects with regards to the role of 
collective action and contextualises some of its features. Additionally, it shifts 
the attention from an exclusive focus on the level of elites and their role in 
‘administering democracy’. The agency of non-elite actors is highlighted as 
contributing to partially transform or destabilise dominant discourses and 
exclusionary practices of existing Latin American democracies. In doing so, 
these debates set up social movements and expressions of collective agency 
as following multiple but interlinked lines of action that will also be reflected in 
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the case studies of this thesis (chapters 7 and 8): On one hand, they can be 
seen as putting forward demands towards changes in policies and institutional 
aspects of democratic regimes by challenging features such as the limits on 
decision-making processes or the definition of policies through elites. On the 
other hand, they can be conceptualised as subjectivities engaging in their own 
production of knowledge and discourses. This also implies a struggle to 
establish ‘more democracy’ not necessarily through institutional bodies but by 
reconceptualising relationships and meanings that have an impact on their 
concrete every-day lives. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I set out to review strands of literature that examine the 
relationship between elite and non-elite forms of agency and democracy. In 
literature on democracy, a focus on establishing a ‘procedural minimum’ (Dahl, 
1989) has predominated and, in part fuelled by a strand of democratic elitism, 
elites were identified as the agents to guide political and economic processes 
towards democracy. Literature on transitions and democratic consolidation 
continued in this tradition, although in more recent work the ‘low-intensity 
democracies’ in Latin America with strong discrepancies from a liberal ideal of 
democracy are acknowledged.  
A second body of literature has highlighted some of the economic processes as 
well as the way states in the Global South ‘work’ to perpetuate excluding state-
society relationships, often by emphasising neo-patrimonial characteristics. 
Thus, networks resulting from rent-seeking activities and patronage are seen to 
be dominating the political and economic spheres of these regimes. Authors 
such as Khan (2005), North et al. (2009), Putzel and Di John (2012) have 
added more detail to the analysis of elite inter-relationships by focusing on elite-
settlements or pacts. They view them as central to understanding the nature of 
states as well as their links with society. However, I have questioned the 
assumption that this protagonist role of elites will translate into concessions to 
an impartial institutional framework beyond their control that can pave the way 
for democratic openings. Literature on state co-option in Latin America seems 
to further enhance this scepticism and has also signalled how violence 
complements conventional forms of corruption, as elites reconfigure and co-opt 
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functions of the institutional framework to determine state policies and 
legislation (e.g. Garay et al., 2010). It also adds ideas to contribute to an 
understanding of the bi-directional dynamic that consolidates as individuals and 
networks positioned within the institutional framework engage in alliances with 
agents outside the institutional framework in order to promote particular 
interests and rent flows.  
However, in Latin American states these co-optive patterns have to be 
contextualised within their particular state formation processes. This indicates 
the link between current patterns of state co-option and traditional elites’ 
historical aim of perpetuating their privileged societal position by enhancing their 
strategies of accumulation and capturing rents. As different elite factions are 
locked into cycles of accumulation and competition, this has led to a 
proliferation of co-optive modes of operating and the informal and/or illegal 
determination of formal decision-making. This has meant a number of societies 
have reached a point of democratising impasse or reversal, while elites are 
unwilling to make any concessions to impartial procedures and institutions 
beyond their control. This constellation clearly calls into question the view of 
seeing elites as democratising agents. 
Building on this argument I have indicated the importance of exploring the role 
of non-elite actors in relation to democratisation processes. Approaches 
focusing on class, resource mobilisation and political opportunity structures 
propose too mechanistic and rationalising a framework to grasp non-elite actors’ 
emergence, despite suggesting a role for agents ‘from below’ in democratisation 
processes. Other strands of literature emphasising the cultural dimension 
inherent to this form of agency seem more appropriate for capturing the 
complexity of societies and their movements in the Global South. Accordingly, a 
number of scholars have highlighted these collective struggles to remain in 
control of the production of meanings and organisational practices (Álvarez et 
al., 1998; Dussel, 2000; Quijano, 2000; Santos, 2007; Escobar, 2008). This 
literature highlights their challenge to elite policies as well as the imposition of 
meanings by dominant societal actors. It also signals their engagement outside 
institutional terrains in a more ‘systemic’ critique of meanings and the ways of 
structuring relationships inherent to dominant understandings of democracy. In 
doing so, it emphasises the capacity of these associational patterns to develop 
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and imagine their own ways of organising political processes as they struggle to 
make their every-day lives ‘more democratic’. 
The next chapter will draw on some of the aspects of this literature on non-elite 
agency presented here. Furthermore, it will develop a framework for the 
discussion of the particular characteristics of expressions of collective action in 
contexts marked by state co-option and cultural complexity. 
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2. Conceptualising collective agency in elite-dominated and multi-ethnic 
settings 
In the previous chapter I examined different bodies of literature to analyse the 
relationships between elite as well as non-elite agency and processes of 
democratisation. In doing so, I highlighted the predominant focus on elites in 
literature on democracy and argued for the importance of exploring non-elite 
expressions of agency. This argument was made due to evidence of the 
perpetuation of excluding patterns, as elites are locked into cycles of 
competition and accumulation and establish co-optive relationships around the 
state. I have also argued for this perspective by emphasising collective action 
as engaging not only within but also outside the conventional institutional terrain 
as it aims to make concrete and every-day relationships ‘more democratic’.  
This chapter aims to elaborate on some of the conceptual elements I will use for 
the analysis of collective agency in the context of Guatemala in the second part 
of this thesis. The concepts featuring in the following sections are based on 
scholars engaging with different theoretical approaches, some closer to the field 
of collective action and social movements, others working with aspects of 
complexity or post-structural theory. In doing so, I will examine concepts of 
collective agency, difference and space, leading up to their relationship with 
understandings of democracy. This will allow me to set the stage for the 
analysis of ongoing processes of collective agency in a society marked by 
cultural complexity and patterns of state-co-option in the second part of the 
thesis. 
In the course of the chapter I will argue for an understanding of expressions of 
collective agency as resulting from convergences or ‘agglomerative processes’, 
as antagonistic affinities are generated in response to the hierarchical 
imposition of meanings by states and elites. In the course of these 
organisational processes this collective agency can develop its own emerging 
properties, which are expressed in an affirmation of difference and reflected in 
their struggles for a re-appropriation of meanings. Accordingly, processes of 
collective agency such as the defence of territory are not limited to their 
engagement in oppositional strategies. Instead, they also put forward a more 
comprehensive critique of the design of institutional political processes, by 
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carving out spaces in which alternative ways of organising political interactions 
and decision-making can be developed in the context of a co-opted state.  
 
Beyond structure and agency: Relationality and complexity in analysis of 
collective action  
As already mentioned in the final section of the previous chapter a crucial 
aspect in debates around social movements and democratisation has evolved 
around the relationship of agency and structure. In social science this issue has 
been discussed across various academic fields, with different disciplines such 
as linguistics, anthropology and economics adding to the debate. In his famous 
statement in the “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”, Marx pointed to 
the constraints posed to human activity:  
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The 
tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of 
the living.” (Marx, 1978, p.595) 
Marx, in the context of the historical settings of the 19th century, turned towards 
a class-based approach to indicate the role played by class structures in 
determining the nature of agency. Linguists on the other hand advanced a 
conceptualisation of the term that created the basis for work of sociologists such 
as Giddens (1979; 1984) or Bourdieu (1977). Saussure’s (1983) distinction 
between langue (the grammatical rules that make possible the production of 
grammatical sentences) and parole (the actual production of sentences in 
speech) constitutes one of the starting points. He saw language not as a social 
institution that represents the creation of the individual speaker. Instead, he 
argued that the speaker passively assimilates the pre-existing forms that 
language assumes and accordingly enacts its structures. Parole on the other 
hand represents a heterogeneous mass of events and meanings (Loyal, 2003). 
Accordingly, Saussure introduces a contingent view of the speaker and his 
ability to explore the potential of his speaking agency, while the determining 
influence of structures started to be reduced in linguistic theory.  
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Derrida (1978) overcame what he perceived as a too rigid Saussurian 
separation of langue and parole as well as the divide between synchrony and 
diachrony. In order to do so, he introduced the idea of “the structurality of 
structure” as resulting from an infinite and continuous process of production 
(Derrida, 1978, p.354). His linguistic framework was framed around the 
understanding of différance, the idea that terms obtain their meaning through 
differentiation from each other, thus emphasising the differential between what 
is signified, that is the difference between signifier and signified. Derrida (1978) 
also set out the idea that meanings are never complete or total and the 
contingent understanding of structures as evolving and never completed 
processes. Accordingly, he introduced a temporal link with history and present 
required for analysis beyond the field of linguistics.  
These ideas were taken on board by Giddens in an attempt to overcome rigid 
determinism attributed to economic structures in Marxist traditions and to further 
de-construct the determining relationship between agency and structure. He 
proposed to use agency not in reference to separate, isolated acts and instead 
understood it as a “continuous flow of conduct” (Giddens, 1979, p.55). At the 
same time he pointed to the importance of identifying this flow “as situated 
practices … in the context of historically located modes of activities” that can be 
linked with the idea that “the agent could have acted otherwise.” (Giddens, 
1979, p.56) 
His understanding of structure reflects a dynamic, interrelated conception of 
agency as he argues for the potential of agents to put their structured 
knowledge at work in a creative or formative way (Giddens, 1979). As such he 
gives structure not just a constraining notion but also places an emphasis on its 
enabling characteristics. Giddens attaches a purely virtual existence to 
structures, while he argues that weight or impact of structures can be 
distinguished in terms of their historical durability and their spatial breadth. At 
the same time he introduces the concepts of rules and resources as “structuring 
properties” into his framework in order to convey an understanding of structures 
as the binding of time and space in social systems and to indicate the notion of 
constant reproduction integral to social systems (Giddens, 1979, p.64). 
Accordingly, Giddens outlines a recursive understanding of social life. 
Structures are drawn upon to generate actions but are also the unintended 
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outcome of actions undertaken by agents. In doing so, the duality and the 
conventional distinction between structure and agency is disrupted and instead 
characterised as interlinked and co-evolving. The agent is seen as being 
constituted and defined by a complex set of relations, thus, integrating a 
relational perspective of society. The re-framing of the structure-agency 
relationship through his model of ‘structuration’ certainly represented an attempt 
to introduce a more contingent understanding into the analysis of agency and 
contributed to de-construct notions of structural over-determination. However, a 
number of shortcomings have been pointed out that put into question the ability 
of this framework to represent a generalisable model to illustrate social 
relationships.  
Especially the criticism voiced by scholars close to complexity theory such as 
Urry (2003) offers insightful elements for the conceptual framing of this thesis. 
He has argued that Giddens’ view of relationality remains too simplistic and fails 
to equip agency with sufficiently contingent characteristics to adequately grasp 
its dynamic movements. Instead, he suggests an approach based on an 
understanding of ‘complexity’, in which even small-scale changes can generate 
transformations in large-scale structures through iteration8. Accordingly, Urry 
tries to re-conceptualise agency as embedded in a wide array of networked and 
circulating relationships that are affected by performances from a variety of 
positions and distances. In doing so, the idea of juxtaposing structure and 
agency is replaced by an understanding of non-linear relationships, as he seeks 
to come to terms with constantly evolving social constellations. This 
conceptualisation also questions the ability of conventional approaches in social 
science to grasp the complexity of patterns of social interaction and formation of 
collective identities, given the perpetual alterations in the levels and balances of 
relationality agents are embedded in.  
Another line of critique of Giddens’ work has pointed to the epistemological 
shortcomings resulting from his failure to address ontological questions. 
Accordingly, he is seen as failing to elaborate sufficiently on the multiple 
                                                          
8 Urry proposes to replace the concept of ‘recurrence’ through ‘iteration’, which means that “the 
tiniest local changes can generate over billions of repeated actions unexpected, unpredictable 
and chaotic outcomes, sometimes the opposite of what agents thought they were trying to bring 
about.” (Urry 2003, p.47) 
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components of relationships as well as the conceptual frameworks that underlie 
agents and their practices (Stones, 1996; Chesters, 2012). This flaw can be 
highlighted especially in Giddens’ later work, where his approach ends up being 
not just too mechanistic but also too homogenising for the analysis of agency 
and social organising, especially when applied to different global contexts. 
Escobar outlines this flaw by arguing that Giddens’ work is based on the 
assumption that globalisation processes imply an “universalisation of 
modernity”, which “although hybridized, contested, uneven heterogeneous, 
even multiple … end up being a reflection of a Euro-centred social order.” 
(Escobar, 2008, p.167) 9  
In addition to the limited attention to the diversity and ontological complexity 
characterising expressions of agency, Giddens’ work also chooses not to focus 
on the variety of patterns and forms it can take on. As Urry argues, he hardly 
takes into account expressions of collective action or social movements in 
processes of social change (Urry, 1991). This again seems to be a 
consequence of a too mechanistic understanding of agency, which, as outlined 
in the previous chapter, has also been a predominant feature of literature on 
social movements in the Global North. In doing so, it fosters a line of analysis of 
collective action based on a view focused to a large extent on identifying 
‘correlation of forces’. This has also tended to act as a research-filter by setting 
limits to the potentiality and diverse forms grass-roots agency can take. This 
means it side-lines especially those expressions of collective agency that fail to 
pursue or develop along conventional political and institutional channels.  
To address some of the weaknesses identified in Giddens’ framework, I will 
introduce aspects of De Landa’s (2006) assemblage theory to set up the 
analysis of collective agency presented in the second part of the thesis. His 
conceptualisation draws on a Deleuzian perspective and offers the chance to 
develop Giddens’ relational understanding. In doing so, it also overcomes some 
of the limitations of more conventional social movement approaches.10 
                                                          
9 The argument made by authors such as Stones (1996) or Chesters (2012) point in a similar 
direction by questioning Giddens’ willingness to engage in reflections on the epistemological 
framework underlying his methods. 
10 E.g. RMT, criticism of which has been outlined in the previous chapter.  
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Based on Deleuze’s challenge to conventional dualist ontologies, De Landa 
(2002, 2006) has advocated an understanding of a ‘flat’ and strongly ‘relational’ 
ontology. Social relations are viewed as “contingently obligatory” between 
“unique, singular individuals, different in spatio-temporal scale but not in 
ontological status” (De Landa, 2006, p.11). This conceptualisation builds on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) work to frame assemblages as units resulting 
from processes of assembly that interlink physical, biological and social entities 
in recurrent processes. They advance the idea of assemblages as a rhizomatic 
web of interactions between individual parts. Through interactions individuals 
become components of social assemblages at different scales, such as the 
community or the state. This aggregative framework of social assemblages 
offers a platform to integrate a notion of ‘relationality’ into the analysis of 
collective action that breaks with the linearity still present in Giddens’s 
understanding. In doing so, it aids to uncover the multiple layers of social 
complexity in contexts such as Guatemala. 
Since this thesis deals primarily with the social aspects of assemblages, it will 
focus on how individuals engage in relationships and form assemblages at 
different scales, such as the community, regional or national level. As De Landa 
(2006) states, social assemblages always exist in populations and consist of 
self-subsistent parts that are linked up through ‘relations of exteriority’. Contrary 
to ‘relations of interiority’, where components have no independent existence, in 
‘relations of exteriority’ parts may be detached and become a component of 
another assemblage (De Landa, 2006, p.10). Additionally, the properties of the 
component parts can never totally explain the relations, which constitute an 
assemblage. The agglomeration of elements or parts, allows the assemblage to 
develop properties of its own, thus constituting ‘emergent properties’ (De Landa, 
2006). 
When inserting this framework into the context of Guatemala for the analysis in 
the following chapters, it is difficult to outline a generalisable pattern for social 
assemblages. However, rural Guatemala is marked by collectivities, whose 
structure and intensity of relationships are predominantly determined by their 
social, economic and political interaction at the local level. The concept of 
‘community’ is usually used to refer to these collectives, which in Wolf’s 
influential work had been suggested as constituting closed, corporative social 
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units (Wolf, 1957). However, later anthropological work has at least partially 
contradicted this notion (Arias, 1992; Lutz and Lovell, 1992; Smith, 1992a). 
Instead, especially the economic and political features of communities have 
been highlighted as evolving in line with external influences and relationships 
despite maintaining a certain level of unity.  
De Landa’s assemblage theory provides a theoretical framework to further 
develop these anthropological understandings. In line with his view these 
communities can be seen as changing, aggregative bodies, which consist of 
individuals that converge into collectives or assemblages. At the local level 
social assemblages are formed based on families, neighbours and friendship, 
leading up to larger collectives such as the community. In the analysis of the 
collective processes around the defence of territory in this thesis, I will 
frequently be using the term of ‘community’ to refer to the organisational units or 
nodes. This means from an analytical point of view communities can be seen as 
social assemblages engaging in collective action. 
In the same vein meanings, discourses and practices produced by social 
assemblages or communities can be understood as an example for ‘emergent 
properties’ that stabilise these bodies of collective action and determine their 
degree of cohesiveness. This encourages a research perspective, which is 
sensitive to the distinctive character of each body of collective agency, while 
also emphasising their capacity to engage in organisational and knowledge-
producing processes. Escobar and Osterweil (2009) have emphasised this link 
between the idea of assemblages and their immanent, auto-poietic 
characteristics. In doing so, they prepare the terrain for an understanding of the 
co-existence and co-construction of multiple worlds that stands in contrast with 
ideas that tend to assume an over-codification of collectives and spaces. 
Instead, they provide elements to emphasise the capacity of local articulations 
to produce their own meanings and spaces. 
This links well with the emphasis of this thesis on the struggles of local 
communities to remain in control and having a voice over their immediate 
surroundings. The case study chapters (chapter 8 and 9) will highlight how in 
the defence of territory and natural resources, ‘community’ has constituted a 
signifier that has been revitalised in the course of the resistances and given way 
to ‘emerging properties’. However, the constantly evolving character and the 
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dynamic tensions immanent to ‘community’ also have to be recognised: A 
‘community’ established around shared ontological frameworks or meanings 
always risks disguising or overshadowing inequalities and differences within the 
respective assemblage. This also means periods of disintegration of the 
‘community’ can be followed by periods of collective convergence around 
determinate meanings and political practices. 
Additionally, De Landa (1998) advances a useful idea to frame the relationships 
between various assemblages or ‘nodes’ of agency by introducing a distinction 
between the different types of networks that are established: On one hand, he 
puts forward the idea of ‘hierarchies’, which are characterised by a degree of 
centralised control, ranks, overt planning as well as a tendency towards 
homogenisation, particular goals and rules of behaviour. They tend to operate 
under linear time and treelike structures that are most evident in social bodies 
such as the military, capitalist enterprises or bureaucratic organisations. On the 
other hand, he advances the concept of ‘meshworks’, networks based on 
decentralised decision-making, self-organisation and heterogeneity as well as 
established around non-hierarchical relationships that cannot be subordinated 
to the pursuit of a single, overt objective.  
De Landa emphasises the fact that it is hard to find pure cases of ‘hierarchies’ 
or ‘meshworks’ in social realities as the different phenomena are made up by a 
mixture and evolving combination of these two types of structure (De Landa, 
1998). Especially in the course of the case studies I will suggest that in the 
local, place-based assemblages I analyse, there is a tendency for establishing 
relationships and networks closer to the model of ‘meshworks’. This is in part 
due to the local scale at which they operate, but in part it can also be linked to 
their conceptual framing that emphasises the self-determination and autonomy 
of the different communities integrating the organisational processes.  
Drawing on the elements presented in this section, the assemblage approach 
brings into play two interlinked aspects for the analysis of collective agency in 
complex social realities: Firstly, it escapes a too rigid structure-agency 
framework in line with approaches that focus on the potential of agency as 
seeking to achieve a concrete impact on the polity. Instead, it emphasises the 
contingency of collective agency, the variety of forms and relations it engages in 
as well as the immanent characteristics it can develop in the course of 
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organisational processes. Secondly, by invoking greater ontological sensitivity, 
it also prepares the path for greater attention to the epistemological processes 
and ongoing production of meanings at work ‘within’ the respective 
assemblages. Accordingly, it provides a bottom-up perspective to examine how 
collectives or assemblages at a local scale escape coding by apparatuses of 
power to produce differential understandings and practices. These aspects will 
be revisited with more detail in the following section. 
 
Production of meaning and re-territorialisation: Defending ontological 
difference through collective action 
The previous section has sought to outline a contingent and relational 
understanding of agency, while also introducing the idea of assemblages of 
collective agency as emerging at a local level. This section examines two 
conceptual elements, ‘difference’ and ‘meaning’, in an attempt to provide more 
detail to the convergence of subjectivities into assemblages of collective action 
around differential meanings. 
Melucci’s work (1989, 1996) has proved influential in highlighting the role of 
meanings in processes of convergence into bodies of collective action. He 
emphasises how a variety of agents dispute the distribution not just of economic 
but also cultural or symbolic resources produced by dominant societal groups. 
Accordingly, the potential for conflict to emerge is constant since the production 
of these cultural resources or meanings involve relationships, symbols, and 
identities, as well as individual needs.  
This analysis of meanings in Melucci’s work helps address one of the 
weaknesses identified in Giddens’ agency-structure model in the previous 
section. It focuses on the evolving social relations, affinities and sense-making 
activities from which practices of collective action emerge, thereby 
demonstrating a greater sensitivity to issues related to ontological positions and 
the epistemological processes deriving from them. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, it also breaks with other traditions in social movement studies such as 
RMT, which to a certain extent expanded individual cost-benefit calculations to 
a collective level. Instead, Melucci’s framework around meanings emphasises 
the fact that collective action can emerge along a structure of various 
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incentives, which are not always motivated by the cost or benefit of acting nor 
the immediate availability of resources (Melucci, 1989). Together with other 
authors following this ‘cultural’ line of thought (e.g. Escobar, 1992, 2008; 
Álvarez, 1998; Dagnino, 1998), he argues that collective action represents 
attempts to re-appropriate meanings in the context of processes frequently 
promoted by dominant social actors that aim to define social and cultural 
objects. As this re-appropriation comes into conflict with impulses for integration 
or pressures to conform, collective action plays a central role in making these 
tensions manifest (Melucci, 1989, 1996). 
Melucci (1996) uses the concept of ‘antagonistic agency’ to frame this 
oppositional relationship. This conceptualisation continues to be based on the 
relationship between actors participating in the production of social resources. 
As he argues, this process can give way to conflictive situations that are 
generated by a “systems’ requirement of subduing any threat to structural 
integrity” (Melucci, 1996, p.52). Accordingly, collective action can represent a 
fundamental challenge to the imposition of social, economic or political 
meanings by a dominant section of society that aims to reconfigure social and 
cultural patterns. In many cases it is in the course of collective engagement that 
certain meanings are revitalised or acquire special weight, thus leading to 
struggles that highlight antagonisms.  
Although the main focus of Melucci’s work is on post-industrial societies in the 
West, I argue that aspects of his framework around differential meanings can be 
extended to expressions of collective agency in the Global South. On one hand, 
the impersonal character of power-relationships associated with post-industrial 
societies in the West tends to be less disguised in the Global South, where 
many societies are marked by a strong imbalance of power and hierarchical 
social structures. On the other hand, in societies of the Global South the 
conflictive dimension surrounding the meaning of words, symbols and objects is 
even more pronounced since in many cases it merges and correlates with these 
unequal power-relations. The emergence of articulations based on references 
to ethnic roots and differential cultural understandings that feature in many 
societies of the Global South seem to confirm this hypothesis.  
When looking towards the Global South and its expressions of collective agency 
this articulation of differential meanings has also been associated with a 
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challenge to dominant understandings deriving from western hegemony on the 
production of knowledge. Santos (2007, 2010) has challenged this hierarchy 
and argued for an ‘epistemology of the South’ to frame the construction of 
alternative meanings and knowledge: 
“In many areas of social life, modern science has demonstrated an 
unquestionable superiority in relation to other forms of knowledge. There 
are, however, other interventions in the real world that are valuable to us 
today in which modern science has played no part. There is, for example, 
the preservation of biodiversity made possible by rural and indigenous 
forms of knowledge which, paradoxically, are under threat from the 
increasing science-ridden interventions.” (Santos, 2007, p. 33) 
This means collective action is often embedded in processes that question 
power-relations underlying the production of knowledge. Santos points to the 
resistance led by indigenous movements in Latin America as the most 
convincing example of what he calls “post-abyssal thinking” (Santos, 2007, p.1). 
In his view this reflects a type of knowledge that overcomes the colonial divide 
and locates its epistemological perspective in the experience of the Global 
South. It indicates the importance of learning “from the South through an 
epistemology of the South” to overcome the basic assumption of supremacy of 
Western thinking over indigenous forms of knowledge (Santos, 2007, p.11). 
This challenge to established hierarchies of knowledge and differential 
production of meanings by assemblages of collective action will also be taken 
up in the course of the case studies (chapter 7 and 8). As they indicate, in the 
course of their resistance the respective assemblages contest central aspects 
of elite-promoted knowledge around development and the design of political 
processes by insisting on the production of their own meanings and 
epistemological processes. At the same time, I argue that this form of dispute 
through collective action cannot be limited to determinate identities, although 
the prominent role of indigenous and afro-descendent people in these struggles 
has to be highlighted. In Latin American literature a lot of attention in recent 
decades has focused on the challenges advanced by indigenous movements 
emerging from rural areas (Warren, 1998; Yashar, 2005; Diaz-Polanco, 2006). 
However, some authors (Porto Goncalves, 2001; Ceceña, 2008; Zibechi, 2007, 
2011; Dinerstein 2013, 2015) have also documented how collective action 
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among urban as well as non-indigenous population emerges to contest 
dominant economic and social understandings in a similar way.  
This signals the importance of not confining the potential for agglomeration of 
subjects into bodies of collective action and their antagonistic agency to a 
determinate set of biological, social or contextual characteristics. Instead, the 
challenge for research seems to be to de-construct the variety of aspects that 
allow certain meanings to gain importance and stimulate processes of collective 
convergence. Without doubt the constellation of rural, indigenous communities 
based on close social, economic and political relationships between their 
members represent propitious conditions for processes of shared and collective 
reproduction of meanings. However, as this research aims to show primarily in 
the course of the case studies, non-indigenous or urban population can also 
converge around the production of differential meanings and consolidate 
organisational bodies and spaces around these understandings.  
Deleuze’s (1994) understanding of ‘difference in itself’ provides an interesting 
framework to reinforce this idea of not submitting processes of production of 
differential meanings to specific or fixed identities. His conceptualisation of 
difference begins with a challenge to what he sees as a premise of western 
thinking deriving from Plato’s framing of the world as something certain and 
real. Following this line of thought, difference is attributed to the identical or 
whole, while identity is seen as ontologically prior to the systems of 
classification used to categorise social realities. Accordingly, difference 
becomes a negation or contrast to this real identity. Deleuze (1994) on the other 
hand argues for seeing ‘difference in itself’ rather than based on the 
differentiation from other ideal elements, thus rejecting a static and unchanging 
reality based on ideal forms or identities. Instead, he links difference with a 
relational approach that replaces a passive notion of identities with the idea of 
‘becoming’ to outline the constantly evolving character of subjectivities.  
This evolving notion can also be linked to the previously outlined understanding 
of collective convergence into assemblages and reinforces the contingent 
character of flows of agency. Additionally, it paves the way to imagine 
‘difference’ beyond an association with fixed ethnic identities. Instead, a 
constantly evolving notion of individuals converging around ongoing processes 
 64 
 
of production of meaning and the struggles for their re-appropriation is 
suggested. As Escobar and Osterweil signal,  
“any over-codification by any apparatus of capture such as capitalism or 
the state also unleashes simultaneous de-codified flows that escape from 
them e.g. the impulse of neoliberal globalisation to reduce to the market all 
aspects of social life, liberates many other forms of organisation and 
requirements of economic and social life, including some of them 
perverse.” (Escobar and Osterweil, 2009, p.146) 
Assemblages of collective action can be seen as engaging in this de-
codification through the production of differential meanings. In order to 
characterise the strategic and expressive characteristics of these assemblages, 
scholars examining collective action have resorted to a distinction between 
processes of ‘re-territorialisation’ and ‘de-territorialisation’ as developed by 
Deleuze and Guattari (e.g. Day, 2005; Chesters and Welsh, 2006; De Landa, 
2006). In their work, processes of re-territorialisation are seen as contributing to 
rigidify the identity of assemblages. They constitute a stabilisation of social 
systems that can occur through a series of mechanisms such as legitimacy 
provided by tradition in hierarchical bodies or coding of social realities promoted 
by governmental policies. On the other hand, de-territorialisation represents 
processes that break this rigidification and constitute processes of recoding and 
destabilisation of meanings (De Landa, 2006). 
Building on these ideas and in line with other authors (eg. Day, 2005; Chesters 
and Welsh, 2006; Escobar and Osterweil, 2009), the localised sources of 
agency under analysis in this research can be conceptualised as assemblages 
engaging in processes of re-territorialisation. In the course of these processes 
they can be seen as seeking to avoid the recoding or de-territorialisation of their 
spaces and practices through agents acting to impose their meanings onto this 
local level. As the case studies presented in this thesis will show, this implies 
that these local assemblages in some cases insist not only on their own 
production of meaning but also on designing their own patterns of political 
interaction, an aspect that will be developed in the fourth section of this chapter. 
Additionally, this insistence on control over processes oriented at the production 
and attribution of meanings seems to acquire special impetus when related to 
and situated in specific places. In order to link the collective convergence 
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around meanings with the struggles for the defence of territory, the next section 
will elaborate on the relationship with, and signification of, space. 
 
Production of the ‘local’, production of ‘differential’ space 
As indicated in the previous section, the outlined processes of re-
territorialisation and de-territorialisation can bear a spatial connotation. In their 
struggle to re-appropriate meanings, expressions of collective action engage 
with understandings of territory, autonomy and auto-determination, often 
contributing to theoretical and political innovation while doing so. In Latin 
America the articulation of indigenous movements around these ideas has been 
especially forceful. New frameworks of rights for autonomy and self-
determination for indigenous people accompanied their struggles and provided 
tools to advance an affirmation of difference, which also expresses an 
attachment to a specific territoriality. 
Additionally, the generation of antagonistic affinities as well as the accentuation 
and public convergence around meanings attached to territory has to be related 
to dynamics of spatial re-organisation in line with the incessant expansion of 
market-based capitalism. The exploitation of natural resources has constituted a 
central dimension in this expansion with Svampa (2013) indicating how a 
‘Commodity Consensus’ has followed the Washington Consensus to equip 
these dynamics with renewed impetus. This has translated into a consensus or 
passive acceptance by Latin American countries of their role in the international 
division of labour as a provider of raw materials, among them hydrocarbons, 
metals, minerals and food. She sees this ‘Consensus’ as being sustained by 
conservative or progressive/centre-left governments alike. In her view this 
indicates „the existence of an accord— tacit or explicit —around the irrevocable 
or irresistible character of the current extractivist dynamics, in response to the 
growing global demand for primary goods.” (Svampa, 2013, p.5) 
This rise in articulations around territorial rights on one hand, and the state-
promoted focus on natural resources on the other, has inevitably led to a clash 
of contrasting understandings of space and territory. Although the 
implementation of projects oriented at natural resources has taken on different 
modalities in various countries, in many areas it has coincided with patterns 
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outlined by David Harvey (2003) as ‘accumulation through dispossession’. 
According to Harvey, Marx had rightly highlighted the link between processes of 
capital accumulation and the use of predation, fraud and violence. However, he 
saw these features as limited to a primitive or original stage of capitalism. 
Harvey on the other hand considers these processes as very much part of the 
neoliberal era and exemplified in this strategy of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. Apart from the mechanisms identified by Marx, he has argued 
that a renewed enclosure of the commons is taking place as new measures to 
ensure accumulation are implemented. He sees this tendency as reflected in 
the enforcement of intellectual property rights on seeds or genetic material, the 
depletion of the global environmental commons, the commodification of cultural 
forms, histories and intellectual creativity as well as the privatisation of public 
assets (Harvey, 2003).  
Harvey sees the re-emergence of this ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as 
encouraged by the problem of over-accumulation, as redundant capital seizes 
on newly available or recently released assets and integrates them into the 
stream of capital accumulation. The expansion of capitalist logics is part of 
these patterns, as territories that had only marginally been integrated, are 
introduced into the flows of accumulation: 
“The implication is that non-capitalist territories should be forced open not 
only to trade (which could be helpful) but also to permit capital to invest in 
profitable ventures using cheaper labour power, raw materials, low-cost 
land, and the like. The general thrust of any capitalistic logic of power is 
not that territories should be held back from capitalist development, but 
that they should be continuously opened up.” (Harvey, 2003, p.139). 
In the context of neoliberal strategies of integrating, recoding and reorganising, 
the potential of previously disregarded rural territories and resources of the 
Global South are considered in strategies of accumulation. Accordingly, spaces 
are integrated that “have been affected and produced by European modernity 
but never fully subsumed nor instrumentalised” (Grosfoguel, 2009, p.29). As a 
feature common to many elite-dominated societies in the Global South, the 
economic integration of these rural territories through projects oriented at 
natural resources does not coincide with a political or social integration. In this 
sense, it bears similarities with a process Dinerstein labels “a subsumption by 
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exclusion” that continues to rely on strategies such as expropriation, 
displacement, invisibilisation and expulsion that combine with a misery, “that 
constitutes the everyday reality of both indigenous as well as non-indigenous, 
rural, urban workers’ people, alike.” (Dinerstein, 2015, p.220)  
However, the nature of these economic processes also engenders scenarios of 
incompatibility, which are especially evident in local contexts. They clash 
especially with those populations that engage in processes of production of 
meanings that do not or only partially correspond to the economic as well as 
social coding of realities promoted in line with a neoliberal rationality (Ceceña, 
2008). As a result of these encounters an accentuation of meanings around 
place and territory has occurred among local communities and collectives as 
they make manifest the conflict emerging around these contrasting 
understandings. The processes of collective action that have emerged to 
highlight these antagonisms in some cases reaffirm or revitalise existing 
collective assemblages, in other cases they encourage a convergence from 
which new bodies of collective action emerge. The aspects shared by many of 
these organisational processes are those of affirming notions of place, territory 
and the ‘local’ as an essential space for cultural and economic reproduction.  
In a differentiation that seems to echo the outlined Deleuzian ideas of re-
territorialisation and de-territorialisation, Escobar has summed up the two 
tendencies that in his view also encourage a renewed focus on the ‘local’ and 
place: 
“1. Strategies of global localization by capital, the state and technoscience. 
Capital, state and technoscience engage in a politics of scale that 
attempts to negotiate the production of locality in their own favour. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that these strategies are not place-based 
(even if locally articulated), they inevitably induce a de-localizing effect 
with respect to local places. … 
2. Subaltern strategies of localization by communities and, particularly, 
social movements. These strategies are of two kinds: place-based 
strategies that rely on the attachment to territory and culture; and glocal 
strategies through meshworks that enable social movements to engage in 
the production of locality by enacting a politics of scale from below.” 
(Escobar, 2008, p. 32) 
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A substantial body of literature has examined this second notion of place-
making by pointing to the bond collectives develop as well as the multiple 
strategies they engage in to defend local territories (e.g. Casey, 1993; Basso, 
1996; Swyngedouw, 1997; Escobar, 2001, 2008; Oslender, 2002). Accordingly, 
strategies of localisation or place-making express the relationship with particular 
places, as individuals and communities build around experiences and memories 
to develop profound sentiments of attachment (Oslender, 2002). Place-making 
strategies are attributed to a host of movements, organisations, communities 
and collectives as they oppose aspects of ‘production of space’ (Lefebvre, 
1991a) in accord with economic and cultural frameworks linked to global 
patterns of capital accumulation. As signalled in the previous section, the 
arbitrary manner and coercive strategies used to access new territories in line 
with Harvey’s understandings seem to encourage this accentuation of meanings 
and the agglomeration around discursive bodies that emphasise these local 
spaces. 
This is also reflected in the organisational patterns of collective action emerging 
in the context of states marked by the co-opted and criminal patterns as 
outlined in chapter 1. Given the reluctance of elites to provide openings or 
concede their control on access to formal political spaces, frequently the focus 
of engagement and dissent of non-elite actors is confined to local spaces. 
However, in many cases it also seems to correspond to a strategic choice of 
collectives and communities to engage in a “defensive localisation” (Escobar, 
2001, p.149). Thus the ‘local’ tends to offers more promise to determine and 
remain in control of their own production of meanings. As the case of 
Guatemala suggests, rather than broad movements, it is in these local settings 
that convergences occur and it ‘makes sense’ to challenge aspects of state 
policies based on concrete every-day experiences.  
Additionally, these expressions of collective action can coincide with attempts to 
consolidate movement-produced organisational spaces and local public 
spheres as they seek to respond to the imposition of elite-based decision-
making. Beyond the cultural or conceptual attachment that ties individuals and 
collectives to specific places and territories, Lefebvre (1991a) has emphasised 
the idea of ongoing political, economic and social practices that contribute to 
‘produce spaces’. His understanding echoes a socially constructed nature of 
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space around historical and natural elements embedded in political processes. 
Echoing the previously outlined ideas, he also introduces the idea of ‘difference’ 
in order to highlight contrasting practices and sense-making activities in 
determinate spaces. Instead of constituting closed and homogeneous spaces, 
resistance and contestation emerge around different moments of space11 to 
accentuate difference and produce differential spaces (Lefebvre, 1991b). 
This understanding also indicates how the constitution and development of 
practices of political interaction that contrast with those promoted by hegemonic 
actors are an integral part of collective agency. Again, this connects well with 
the outlined idea of processes of re-territorialisation. It inserts local agents and 
assemblages into political processes and encourages the analysis of their 
patterns in processes of deliberation or decision-making. In many cases this 
results in the ‘local’ being suggested as a space, where public spheres can be 
consolidated that are meaningful for the respective population (e.g. Spinosa, 
Flores and Dreyfus, 1997; Escobar, 2001). As will be argued in the course of 
the thesis, the antagonistic affinities generated among local population in 
response to the exploitation of natural resources in various regions of 
Guatemala, has also revitalised organisational practices aimed at consolidating 
local public spheres. In many cases these can operate in the shadow or 
alongside formal channels of participation as they seek to defend their 
immediate surroundings from the impact of processes targeting the exploitation 
of natural resources.  
Additionally, as Zibechi has indicated in the case of resistance to industrial 
processes of exploitation, the revitalisation of localised engagement can 
constitute a platform for ‘potentiating difference’ (Zibechi, 2011, p.160). It brings 
up new opportunities for exchange and relationships between marginalised 
agents, thus creating a platform for experiences, solidarity and knowledge to be 
exchanged and produced. It also paves the way to introduce other antagonisms 
such as discrimination around culture, race and gender into the respective 
                                                          
11 Lefebvre distinguishes three moments of space in his analysis: a) ‘Spatial practices’ refer to 
forms and mechanisms through which we use and perceive space. b) ‘Representations of 
space’ is the creation of an abstract space based on technologies and science in an attempt to 
create a ‘true space’. c) ‘Spaces of representation’ are the spaces created by social agents 
based on local knowledge and experiences, attempting to create a counter-space to the 
mentioned abstract space (Lefebvre, 1991b).  
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organisational patterns. This enables a mutual exchange of knowledge as well 
as an appropriation of the organisational process between the different 
expressions of agency, while also allowing them to discover and address their 
own internal contradictions. 
It is from these local spaces that assemblages of collective action insist on 
remaining in control, having a voice and role in processes of decision-making, 
especially when this involves their immediate surroundings. Accordingly, the 
next section will examine the meta-political implications of these expressions of 
agency and their challenges to dominant understandings of democracy. 
 
Reconciling democracy and difference? Multiculturalism and power in 
political practice  
The previous sections have outlined the connection between processes of re-
territorialisation and the different strategies of ‘producing space’ to highlight the 
ongoing struggles to determine the production of differential meanings in the 
course of collective action. This section will focus on the aspect of political 
practices by looking at institutional as well as non-institutional approaches to 
deal with difference and outline forms of structuring political processes and 
institutional relationships accordingly.  
Liberal democratic theory has sought to solve the tensions between ‘difference’ 
and democracy by conceptualising relationships around the idea of 
multiculturalism. Kymlicka has been influential in discussing these approaches 
on how to deal with diversity among the population within states. He indicates 
that the attempts to address the issue of minorities or ethnic groups first 
consolidated in the 70s in Canada and Scandinavian countries as a result of 
mobilisation, pressure and demands from these groups of population. This 
engendered a recognition that the “nations within” had failed to assimilate the 
dominant national culture and that it was instead “morally illegitimate to try to 
suppress the desire of national groups to maintain their national identities and 
their institutions.” (Kymlicka, 2002, p.72) In order to address this issue, 
Kymlicka has suggested a system of multicultural citizenship in a multinational 
federation as a model that allows states to deal with the demands emerging 
from minority and indigenous groups. This is framed around three group-
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specific rights: Special representation rights, self-government rights and poly-
ethnic rights. Accordingly, this approach maintains that the introduction of these 
collective rights would make it possible to reconcile these demands with the 
liberal guarantees of individual rights (Kymlicka, 1995, 2002). 
With the emergence of indigenous movements and their insistence on reframing 
their relationship with states in Latin America, multicultural demands were 
incorporated by supranational institutions such as the UN. Following the 
implementation of a Working Group on Indigenous People in 1982, decades of 
struggle and lobbying gave way to the expansion of a variety of bodies of rights 
up to the approval of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People in 
2007. Additionally, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), with the drafting 
of the convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People, established a normative 
framework that has since represented an important reference point to sustain 
demands in countries that are members of the ILO.  
While international laws represented a general framework for this body of rights, 
states have gone about integrating multicultural aspects into their national 
legislation. As a result, the respective laws have also been introduced into the 
demands and discourses articulated by indigenous movements and ethnic 
groups. Accordingly, the demands for self-determination, territorial autonomy 
and collective rights feature consistently in the defence of territory and 
resistance to the mentioned policies oriented at the exploitation of natural 
resources. However, frequently this has occurred with only limited success, 
especially in cases where the compliance with these rights collides with 
economic and political interests of influential elite factions.  
Additionally, in many countries this has coincided with what Hale denominated a 
“multicultural neoliberalism” that tends to drive “a wedge between cultural 
recognition and empowerment.” (Hale, 2002, p.510) He argues that powerful 
economic and political actors use the notion of multiculturalism “to affirm cultural 
difference” while retaining the privilege to decide which cultural rights are 
consistent with their interpretation of “liberal, democratic pluralism”, thus, in fact 
engaging in “a defence of the neoliberal capitalist order.” (Hale, 2002, p.491) A 
number of scholars (e.g. Žižek, 1998; Díaz Polanco, 2006) have expressed 
similar views, indicating how elites as well as international institutions such as 
the World Bank have remained receptive to some demands as long as they 
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don’t interfere with their core economic and political interests. In the same vein 
multicultural approaches can be seen as representing a key discourse to 
appease and integrate de-politicised forms of diversity that are often based on 
folkloric connotations.  
This means ‘difference’ in the multicultural understandings suggested by Taylor 
(1992) and Kymlicka (1995) becomes subject to recognition and interpretation 
by governing bodies. As Day states in his criticism of these top-down 
approaches, this implies that “self-governing communities would have some say 
in matters of society, economy, polity as well as culture, but they would remain 
under the ultimate control of the Euro-colonial state apparatus” (Day, 2005, 
p.86). 
Additionally, the particular limitations in the implementation of legal regimes in 
the context of states in the Global South as outlined in chapter 1 have to be 
taken into account in these debates. Thus, especially in social settings where 
legal frameworks and politics are subject to co-option by elite factions, in 
practice, the implementation and compliance with legal frameworks establishing 
these guarantees for indigenous rights has remained very limited. The space for 
interpretation tends to be significant and as the promotion of projects linked to 
natural resources shows, a hierarchy of laws favours the implementation of elite 
interests in detriment of local communities. The implications for the character of 
democratic relationships are exemplified by cases in which the local population 
has no say over projects that are being established in their immediate 
surroundings. 
Despite the gap between the intended scope of these laws and their 
implementation, even in contexts marked by state co-option such as 
Guatemala, the rights deriving from multicultural political frameworks continue 
to feature prominently among the demands of social and indigenous 
movements. Communities and movements can be seen as engaging in a 
bidirectional strategy: On one hand, they pursue the consolidation of local public 
spheres as well as the appropriation of decision-making processes, which carry 
a strong reference to notions of self-determination and autonomy. On the other 
hand, their articulation also engages with the institutional levels to push for a 
state-recognition of their autonomous production of meanings and practices, 
often as part of a multicultural legal framework.  
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As Dinerstein (2015) has argued, a contextualised understanding of the 
communities’ notion of autonomy and self-determination is required in order to 
understand their strategic orientation. Latin American social movements cannot 
necessarily be seen as emulating struggles “against the state” and advocating 
“an abandonment of the idea of the state as the main locus for social 
emancipation”, common to the organisational patterns of autonomous 
movements in the Global North (Dinerstein 2015, p.32). Instead, movements in 
the South can be seen as engaging in what at times seems a contradictory 
dynamic: As the case studies in this thesis (chapter 7 and 8) will demonstrate, 
the different strategies aimed at defending territorial spaces and carving out 
local spheres dominate in their articulations. However, simultaneously they can 
engage in strategic interactions with institutional spaces to demand recognition 
of these rights to self-determination in cultural, economic and political practices. 
Especially in the context of state co-option, these interactions can also be of 
strategic or protective nature, as collectives or communities seek to gain time in 
specific organisational moments or aim to deter the state from using violent or 
criminalising measures.  
Nevertheless, an analysis of this appeal to legal frameworks and search for 
recognition from the state also suggests that the conceptual problems linked to 
the administrative top-down attempts to integrate ‘difference’ persist. In line with 
Deleuze’s and Guattari’s (1987) work, one could argue that multicultural 
approaches and the recognition of regional autonomies would only translate into 
the constitution of a new majority in terms of elements at a lower scale.12 In their 
place, they advance the idea of “Minority as a universal figure, or becoming of 
everybody”, by linking it with a fluid, evolving understanding of ‘difference’ as 
outlined in the previous sections (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p.473). 
Accordingly, this idea of ‘becoming minoritarian’ emphasises the contingent 
characteristics of subjectivities engaging in resistance to processes that foster 
subordination to reductionist identities and meanings. 
                                                          
12 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) do accept that the mentioned legal frameworks represent 
important tools to underline demands for self-determination and autonomy and can be seen as 
worthwhile political ambitions. Nonetheless they argue for the awareness of other co-existing 
struggles that go beyond this.  
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In doing so, this ‘becoming minor’ addresses two conceptual problems that 
mark institutional approaches to multiculturalism: Firstly, echoing the notion of 
‘difference’ presented above, it does not restrict the possibility of ‘becoming 
minor’ to a specific ethnic group or minority. In doing so, it opens the possibility 
of affirmation of ‘difference’ to subjectivities that are not determined by a specific 
set of biological or social criteria. As Escobar has indicated, this also represents 
a feature of the mentioned processes of localisation: 
“Locality and community cease to be obvious, and certainly not inhabited 
by rooted or natural identities but very much produced by complex 
relations of culture and power that go well beyond local bounds. Most 
clear in the case of refugees and diasporic peoples, this condition affects 
all communities worldwide to a greater or lesser extent.” (Escobar 2001, 
p.147)  
I will also draw on this understanding of ‘difference’ as detached from specific 
identities to frame the case study of the RPLP in chapter 8, where indigenous 
as well as non-indigenous community members have converged in opposition 
to mining concessions. 
Secondly, the conception of ‘becoming minor’ implicitly directs attention to the 
question of power relationships and the different forms the ‘enactment of power’ 
can take among others, in processes of representation or decision-making. This 
understanding echoes the work of scholars that have sought to introduce a 
distinction between different strategies or ways of engaging with power. 
Foucault’s (1988) distinction between ‘power’ and ‘domination’, Lukes’ (1974) 
differentiation between ‘dominating’ and ‘non-dominating’ forms of power as 
well as Holloway’s (2005) proposition of an ‘anti-power’ to contrast forms of 
‘power-over’, can be highlighted in this regard.  
Again in preparation for the case studies in chapter 7 and 8, the 
conceptualisation suggests a framing of power relationships on the basis of 
patterns that combine an affirmation of ‘difference’ with attempts to introduce 
horizontal notions into processes of representation and decision-making. It 
points to a ‘recoding’ of the modes of political interaction predominant in 
institutional spaces, a process that has been ongoing among a variety of social 
movements and expressions of collective action over recent decades (Avritzer, 
2002; Van Cott, 2008). Up to a certain extent this also reflects attempts to 
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address the problems of vertical leadership and top-down structures that 
marked organisational processes during previous periods of revolutionary 
activism. Expanding on the differential production of meanings outlined earlier, 
‘difference’ is politicised by these movements, as they integrate an emphasis on 
horizontal political practices to reconceptualise the design of political 
interactions, processes of representation and decision-making. In doing so, they 
also take tentative steps towards addressing, without suffocating, the diversity 
‘within’ the respective collective articulation. 
In the ongoing processes of defence of territory, the participation, opening up or 
re-appropriation of decision-making processes tends to represent a central 
demand of assemblages of collective action. This seems to be especially 
relevant in contexts of state co-option as outlined in the previous chapter, where 
the features of democracy fail to surpass the procedural minimum, while the 
formal institutional channels prove to be inadequate to foster participative 
dynamics. In many cases the resulting vertical imposition of policies that leave 
the local population without a say in issues regarding their surroundings seems 
to stimulate this demand for the creation of local public spheres. As the case 
studies in the second part of the thesis will indicate, the fact that these 
deliberative spaces are embedded among people facing concrete experiences 
and problems has encouraged the appropriation of the organisational process 
as such among local community members. Additionally, it has encouraged them 
to articulate a more comprehensive critique of the dominant designs of political 
interactions and decision-making procedures. 
Accordingly, the defence of territory comes to represent the defence of 
differential meanings as well as the defence of autonomous spaces of 
democratic experimentation. Echoing Melucci, public spaces independent of 
institutions of government, the party system and state structures can open up 
new possibilities to democracy: “these spaces assume the form of an articulated 
system of decision-making, negotiation and representation, in which the 
signifying practices developed in everyday life can be expressed and heard 
independently from formal political institutions.” (Melucci, 1989, p.174) 
In complex environments marked by multi-ethnicity and co-opted state 
institutions, a multiplicity of local arenas can consolidate, at times based on 
contradictory patterns or even explicitly antidemocratic characteristics. 
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However, as the case studies will demonstrate, expressions of collective action 
that experiment around horizontal and participative features to make their 
everyday spaces more democratic can also emerge. They often do so by 
challenging institutional politics and organising outside its delineated spaces, 
thus disturbing hegemonic discourses and practices.  
As the organisational focus of expressions of collective action integrates these 
strategies seeking to appropriate decision-making, they contest the exclusion of 
their voices from the respective decision-making process. They also challenge 
the ways in which decisions within formal and institutional spaces are taken, 
while they consolidate local spaces to advance their own deliberative and 
procedural patterns. These expressions of collective action rarely intend or 
acquire the force to represent a democratising agency in a conventional sense, 
especially as state policies and complex societal constellations limit 
opportunities for broader convergences. Nonetheless, many of these local 
articulations can be seen as engaging in a shared quest to highlight 
antagonisms and imagine alternative ways of organising political processes in 
the wake of failed elite-guided transition and democratisation processes.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to outline elements of a conceptual framework to analyse 
collective agency in the context of elite-dominated and multi-ethnic settings, 
with Giddens’ structure-agency approach constituting an entry point. Despite 
acknowledging an important notion of relationality, this conceptualisation was 
still perceived as too mechanistic to frame the contingent character of collective 
agency and its focus beyond institutional structures. Additionally, Giddens 
failure to address ontological aspects results in the weaknesses of his approach 
in addressing the complexity of agency especially outside Western contexts 
(Stones, 1996; Chesters, 2012). 
De Landa’s (2006) interpretation of Deleuzian concepts in his assemblage 
theory provided a series of elements to address some of these shortcomings. 
Based on his understanding, expressions of collective action can be seen as 
aggregative bodies with different degrees of cohesiveness. This idea of 
assemblages also makes it possible to place an emphasis on the emerging and 
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immanent properties of collective action. With regards to this thesis, the 
framework can be linked to the revitalisation of community as a collective 
signifier, while its ‘evolving properties’ are reflected in discourses and practices 
aiming at the defence of territory.  
At the same time, I have argued for the importance of analysing processes of 
production of meaning to frame convergences into bodies of collective action. 
Based on Melucci’s work I have outlined how antagonistic action emerges to re-
appropriate meanings in the context of vertical processes that seek to redefine 
social and cultural objects. Collective agency develops to escape the coding by 
dominant economic and political actors and at the same time cannot be 
restricted to determinate or fixed identities. By introducing Deleuze’s (1994) 
understanding of ‘difference in itself’, the immanent as well as evolving 
characteristics of processes of collective action have been emphasised.  
The ‘consensus’ around the exploitation of natural resources (Svampa, 2013) 
as well as policies in line with Harvey’s (2003) understanding of ‘accumulation 
by dispossession’ have made it possible to integrate a spatial dimension into 
this conceptualisation of collective action. Accordingly, these processes of 
reorganisation of spaces uncover as well as revitalise networks of local 
production of meanings around place and territory that fail to or only partially 
correspond to a ‘re-coding’ in accord with neoliberal rationality. In line with 
authors such as Lefebvre (1991b) and Zibechi (2011), I have suggested that 
this local production of space is not just reflected at the level of meanings, but 
also by political practices that enhance their ‘difference’. 
Multiculturalism has represented the most prominent attempt to reconcile ethnic 
difference and democracy through legal frameworks by attributing special rights 
to minorities and ethnic groups. Obvious shortcomings in the implementation of 
these rights as well as conceptual limitations in these multicultural ideas were 
identified. As a result, in many contexts of the Global South, a binary notion 
seems to characterise articulations and their strategies. On one hand, there is a 
push away from the state towards carving out autonomous spaces and fending 
off vertically implemented policies. On the other hand, collective action engages 
in a strategic appeal to the state for recognition of their difference and autonomy 
on the basis of certain regimes of rights.  
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At the same time, I have indicated how expressions of collective action go about 
reconceptualising patterns of political interaction and decision-making, in many 
cases outside formal political spaces and institutional channels. Accordingly, 
collective action can combine its affirmation of ‘difference’ at the level of 
meanings, with attempts at re-appropriating decision-making processes as well 
as redesigning patterns of representation and political interaction. In doing so, 
they develop a more comprehensive critique of dominant understanding of 
democracy by creating local public spheres framed around people and 
collectives situated in specific experiences and problems.  
After having examined a series of conceptual elements to frame the analysis of 
collective action in elite-dominated societies marked by ethnic complexities, the 
next chapter will turn towards a crucial contextual aspect of this thesis by 
looking at the Guatemalan state-formation process and link it to the 
understanding of a co-opted state. By tracking its historical emergence up to its 
contemporary features, I will outline some of the central actors and processes 
defining its nature as well as constituting the context for the collective action 
analysed in the second part of the thesis. 
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3. Genesis of the state in Guatemala: An elite structured social order 
(1524-2014) 
In the previous chapter I set out the conceptual framework of the thesis by 
exploring some of the aspects that can provide an understanding for agency in 
elite-dominated and multi-ethnic settings. By referring to these contexts, I 
outlined the potential of collective agency to emerge on the basis of social 
aggregations and construct democratic processes in non-linear ways. I also 
emphasised the complexity and need for a contextualised understanding of 
these processes as they are embedded in local, grass-roots dynamics. After 
setting out the conceptual corner stones of the thesis, this chapter will approach 
the Guatemalan context by tracking the genesis of the state up to the current 
scenario of a state, whose functions and processes are reconfigured and co-
opted by different elite factions. This will provide the context to understand how 
elites, the state and their modes of governance have impacted on different 
forms of agency, which will be analysed in the subsequent chapters.  
Across different historical moments elites have represented the most influential 
agents of the Guatemalan state formation process, while the institutional 
framework of the state has acted to stabilise power relations in their favour. 
Therefore a large part of the analysis will centre on the role of elites, their 
interactions, their relationship with the state and their attempts to perpetuate a 
dominant societal position and strategies of accumulation. 
In the course of this chapter I will indicate how the elite’s drive to promote 
strategies of accumulation and capture rents has represented the central driver 
for this state-formation. Almost without interruption elites have been able to 
determine the nature of state policies and laws across the different historical 
periods. Authoritarian governance and repressive strategies backed by an 
alliance of economic elites with the military have predominated over large 
periods of time. However, the implementation of a transitional framework 
towards democracy in 1985 also engendered a gradual shift in strategies to 
maintain control over the institutional framework. This has given way to a 
scenario in which different elite-factions compete and cooperate as they use an 
array of formal and informal, legal and illegal mechanisms to reconfigure and 
co-opt institutional processes and functions. These mechanisms aim to 
guarantee particular interests and to benefit specific strategies of accumulation 
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in the short and long term by determining policies and laws. This has 
consolidated an institutional constellation very resistant to change, as elites 
control crucial decision-making processes and channels of participation 
following the transition to a formally democratic system.  
 
Laying the foundations: Guatemala’s colonial order  
The moment of the Spanish invasion obviously constituted a fundamental 
watershed for the territories that were to be conquered. At the same time, it 
represented the meeting point of two cultural frameworks in which the 
respective reading and structuring of reality was embedded. As de-colonial 
literature has argued with regards to Latin America, prior to this encounter, local 
modes of life and social organising was rooted in other ontological frameworks 
and life-worlds. This moment tied the fate of the indigenous population and that 
of the invaders for the centuries to come on the territory of what would become 
Guatemala. Contrasting forms of political, economic and social imagining of 
society met, each embedded in cultural frameworks and legacies.  
The ideas of the colonizers were translated into an administrative system and 
institutional apparatus as they sought to consolidate their control in line with 
their drive to secure revenues. The territory of Guatemala initially proved 
disappointing for the invaders compared to other regions of the Americas, given 
the absence of accessible natural resources such as gold and silver. However, 
this initial disappointment was soon overcome as the economic and social 
relationships were structured around the possession of land and the exploitation 
of indigenous labour. Additionally, as Martínez Peláez (1994) stated, “the land 
without indios was not worth anything”, which translated into the systematic 
enslavement of the indigenous population as the colonizers were determined to 
extract wealth from the colonial territory.  
However, this colonial ‘coding’ went beyond the consolidation of a racial 
hierarchy based on biological features to represent a transversal axis that cut 
across the different economic, social and political dimensions of society, as 
Quijano pointed out: 
“… along with America a new mental category was produced to codify the 
relations between conquering and conquered populations: the idea of 
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'race', as biologically structural and hierarchical differences between the 
dominant and dominated. … And since both terms of such a relationship 
were considered, by definition, superior and inferior, the associated 
cultural differences were codified as well, respectively, as superior and 
inferior by definition” (Quijano, 2000, p.216). 
The economic implications of this recoding were evident. In many cases it 
interrupted the economic modes of collective supply and distribution that had 
represented a guarantee for self-sufficiency of the indigenous communities. 
Collective units had been crucial to maintain a resilient economic and political 
balance during the strictly hierarchical, pre-colonial societies. With the arrival of 
the colonial powers the understanding of use of land was replaced by the notion 
of property, while the idea of sustainability, predominant among precolonial 
indigenous production, was supplanted by an understanding of production for 
gain (Brunner et al., 1993).  
A tribute-system based on the laws of Burgos from 1512, constituted the outline 
for the labour and tribute duties of the colonized population that was only 
slightly adjusted in the course of the colonial period. In rural areas land and 
indigenous communities were divided into socio-economic units, the pueblos de 
indios, with a certain amount of common land, the ejido, ascribed to them. In 
turn, through the system of the encomienda (entrustment) these units and their 
population were assigned to Spanish officials, the encomendero. This position 
was initially only granted for two generations. However, the crown soon gave in 
to the demands of the Spanish administrators and their descendants, the 
Criollos, by making it hereditary and handing over land for private possession, 
thus, consolidating their elite status (Martínez Peláez, 1994). In the Leyes 
Nuevas (New Laws) of 1542 the repartimiento (distribution) replaced the 
encomienda system without really altering its scope. It continued to play a 
central role in the legal frameworks that obliged the indigenous population to 
pay tribute through services, ditto forced labour, in these socio-economic units.  
In many cases this also left the growing number of ladinos13, the non-
indigenous, unable to acquire possessions of land. Instead, they were forced to 
                                                          
13 The term ‘ladino’ has had an evolving meaning. During the colonial period it referred to 
‘Spanish-speaking Indian’ and was then used to refer to people of mixed biological descent. 
While the term ‘ladino’ disappeared in the rest of Central America and was replaced by 
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work on the haciendas in exchange for a plot of land in usufruct or to seek a 
living at the cost of the pueblos de indios, the indigenous municipalities, mostly 
by usurping their land (Murga Armas, 2007). As Guzman Böckler (2002) 
indicated, in doing so, the ladinos on one hand complemented the economic 
model of the colonial society. They compensated for the reduction of the 
indigenous workforce that was decimated by epidemics and as a consequence 
of the work on the haciendas. On the other hand, it also created an intermediate 
stratum in the colonial society that reproduced the contempt and racism with 
regards to the indigenous population without recognizing their own condition of 
exploitation and subjugation in the colonial society (Guzman Böckler, 2002).  
In this context the situation of the indigenous population depended on the 
degree to which they were integrated into the model of agricultural production of 
the Criollos. Dispersion into the highlands proved one of the most effective 
ways to avoid integration into the colonial system and its workforce (Lutz and 
Llovell, 1992; Brunner et al., 1993). The autonomous structure of municipalities 
in the highlands also offered some protection. Although they constituted a 
system of enclosure and the land assigned to the pueblos was clearly 
insufficient or administered by arbitrary authorities, they still offered a certain 
space of movement and autonomy within the designated areas (Murga Armas, 
2007).14  
A renewed wave of pressure on indigenous land and existence would arise in 
the 19th century as the colonial elites’ thirst for profits ignited a renewed 
expansion of their haciendas. This coincided with the idea of independence 
gaining ground among different sections of the population. The initial drive 
came from smaller scale commercial and agricultural producers that saw their 
economic potential blocked by the monopolistic status of the big commercial 
warehouses and landholding elites. However, the Criollan elites soon also 
identified the opportunity to overcome the constraints the empire and its 
commercial rulings represented for the commercialisation of their production 
                                                                                                                                                                          
‘mestizo’, its use has persisted in Guatemala to refer to the non-indigenous population. 
14 As Lutz and Llovell argue, in many areas of the highlands even the introduction of an 
individual tax-system was unable to break down the community networks that tended to ease 
the weight of tribute. Instead, a variety of tactics such as temporary dispersion into the 
highlands were used to maintain this burden as low as possible (Lutz and Llovell, 1992).  
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(Murga Armas, 2008). Without ceasing to draw inspiration from Spain’s civilising 
approach they went on to take control of the move towards independence, 
which was finally achieved in 1824. 
After a brief period as part of a Central-American Federation the Guatemalan 
national territory was established. However, the competition to fill the gap left by 
the Spanish colonial administration persisted between two societal sections, 
both emerging from the upper strata of the societal hierarchy. On one hand, the 
liberal factions had originally emerged from young members of Criollan families 
inspired by the ideals of the French revolution. Their ranks were boosted by a 
group of medium scale agricultural producers as well as a section of 
landholding and commercial elites. They all shared the interest of expanding 
their property for agricultural use and modernising production methods to 
promote their links with international markets. On the other hand, the 
conservative factions of Criollan elites who were intent on maintaining the 
patrimony amassed in the course of the colonial period and unwilling to share 
their exclusive social status with emerging ladino elites (Brunner et al., 1993; 
Taracena Arriola et al., 2002).  
While these inter-elite tussles that marked the initial decades of independence 
did involve a certain level of mobilization of rural and indigenous workers, it did 
not alter their subordinate integration into the structure of the colonial society. 
Any lip-service to liberal ideals of equality was undermined in political practice 
as the liberal factions led by Miguel García Granados and Justino Rufino 
Barrios consolidated at the helm of the state in 1871. Their so-called ‘liberal 
revolution’ was promoted primarily by ladino factions consisting of agricultural 
producers, coffee-planters from the highlands and the western coastal region of 
Guatemala as well as regionally based merchants, whose attempts at 
promoting the new product, coffee, had been ignored by the conservative 
central authorities (Taracena Arriola et al., 2002). However, Criollan elites were 
soon reintegrated into an elite coalition, thus demonstrating the absurd nature of 
these inter-elite struggles. As a central feature of this elite alliance, networks 
based on kinship and marriages were established to guarantee their long-term 
access to rents that continued to be based on the possession of land and 
indigenous labour. These elite networks would also constitute a central building 
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block for their dominant position in Guatemalan society over the following 
century. 
Coffee represented the core component of the economy and led to a gradual 
expansion of the state and its institutional apparatus, which was structured in 
accord with the requirements for its production and exportation. Legal 
frameworks were periodically up-dated to guarantee the supply of indigenous 
labour15 to the landholding class and to ensure the concentration of huge 
extensions of land16 in the hand of the elites, thus translating into a “second 
conquest of the indigenous population” (Tischler Visquerra, 2001, p.55). 
Although these measures were not new, as Murga (2008) argues, it was the 
liberal state under Barrios that equipped them with a new legal and institutional 
efficiency by consolidating the hacienda system and promoting further 
expropriations of communal land.  
The political and economic elites continued to rely on the security of rents 
provided by their feudal status rather than engaging in productive investments 
to achieve profit. In doing so, it perpetuated features of primitive capitalism with 
profits not depending on an increase of productivity or rationally planned 
investment, but instead on the control of forced labour. Accordingly, the 
commercial patterns of the coffee economy merged with “pre-capitalist forms of 
                                                          
15 The regulation of day laborers (reglamento de jornaleros) established the obligation of the 
indigenous population to provide labour services. A local political chief was made responsible 
for coordinating their supply to estate owners. In 1878 this law was reinforced by the decree 
222, vagrancy act (ley de vagancia, also taken up under Ubico in 1934) that considered all 
people without a profession, access to rents, income, occupation or other legal means from 
which to live, a delinquent. Later, in 1894 these laws were replaced through a system according 
to which all campesinos were equipped with a control booklet in which labour obligations were 
registered (Murga Armas, 2008). 
16 The measures included 1.) a law obliging every campesino to register and buy his land by 
28th February 1877 with the price for unregistered land being fixed at 3% of its value which 
made it easy for landholders to amass enormous extensions of land; 2.) A law to declare land 
covered by the censo enfiteutico (long lease) as illegal, thereby ordering the registration of all 
properties to specifically target the communal lands of the indigenous communities. 3.) The sale 
of land held in state property as well as the confiscation of church properties. Additionally, it 
included the option to ‘denounce’ the existence of unused land and stake property claims to it. 
These properties were auctioned at derisory prices or often even conceded without pay to 
liberal allies (Murga Armas, 2008; Martínez Peláez, 1994). 
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exploitation.” (Tischler Visquerra, 2001, p.50) In this context the scale of profits 
was determined by external demand rather than an internal market or levels of 
national consumption (Torres-Rivas, 1975).  
The intense promotion of coffee production was accompanied by a gradual 
institutionalisation of coercive patterns, as elites recognised an increasing 
importance of establishing a regular army as part of the state, thereby replacing 
the previously operating militias. The indigenous population was exempted from 
the obligatory military service since their role was seen “in providing services of 
other nature” (Taracena Arriola et al., 2002, p.186). The liberal leaders were 
convinced that the national army should be integrated by individuals with a 
certain national vision. It was not until decades later that the army represented a 
mode of calculated ladinisation, as indigenous were allowed to join the army in 
exchange for cultural adaptation (Adams, 1995). 
A more authoritarian and militaristic pattern of governance emerged, as military 
caudillos headed governments for most of the first half of the 20th century, 
reflecting the growing importance of the military institution. One of the key 
responsibilities of the coercive arm of the state in the established economic 
patterns was to add a dimension of control over the labour that produced 
agricultural exports. The coercive mechanisms of the state were developed and 
strengthened, laying the foundation for the army to expand its control 
throughout the country while acting as a guarantee for the elite coalition's 
access to rents (Brunner et al., 1993; McCleary, 1999; Tischler Visquerra, 
2001). 
Ladinos were used strategically to multiply elites' domination especially in local 
contexts by taking over positions to control the workforce (contratistas), while 
laws such as the regulation for day labourers (ley de jornaleros) also assigned 
them a status as salary-dependent workers. This meant the indigenous-ladino 
polarity was maintained and a deterrent against an alliance between poor 
ladinos and indigenous workers was kept in place. In fact, the figure of the 
ladino, understood in a cultural perspective as the non-indigenous, would go on 
to establish himself as the prime agent of Guatemalan nation-building (Brunner 
et al., 1993; Taracena Arriola et al., 2002).  
The agriculturally based economy did gradually bring about changes in the 
urban economic system as trade-houses and banks consolidated private 
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economic power. However, the urban economy was equally determined by the 
rents produced by the national coffee-economy. The monopolies on commercial 
and financial capital as well as the agrarian orientation of the economic regime 
did not represent advantageous conditions for industrial modernisation. Those 
businessmen that did emerge, owed their position to the privileges the state had 
granted to them without coming close to a Schumpeterian prototype of 
businessman (Tischler Visquerra, 2001). This was reflected in various business 
areas as families such as the Castillo family in the beverage industry or the 
Novella family in the cement-production gained overwhelming control of the 
market. The advantageous tax and tariff conditions offered by the governing 
authorities had enabled them to eliminate any competition (Dosal, 2005). 
The last in the row of military caudillos, the dictatorship of Ubico, signalled how 
in the midst of the global economic crisis of the 1930s and the contraction of 
coffee exports, the coercive dimension once again became crucial to stifle 
growing social discontent in the urban areas. Ubico concentrated power around 
his authoritarian figure, with sixty loyal officers, the generalato, constituting the 
nucleus of his militaristic system. 
A strict regime of austerity was introduced as public spending was cut by 50% 
in 1933, while forced labour programmes were updated to guarantee the 
construction of infrastructure and road projects through the highways law (ley 
de vialidad).17 Additionally, the system of debt peonage for the agricultural 
economy was replaced with the vagrancy laws (ley de vagancia)18 in order to 
upgrade the system of forced labour, which targeted the indigenous population. 
At the same time a wave of repression was unleashed onto the urban worker’s 
organisations.19 
                                                          
17 According to the highways law every adult (not owning land and/or not exercising a 
profession) was obliged to either pay the equivalent of 2 Quetzales or work for two weeks in 
road construction. Since the large majority of the indigenous peasant population was not able to 
pay this amount they constituted the main work force.  
18 The vagrancy laws obliged all citizens without a registered land title or with small possessions 
to work between 100 and 150 days on the estates, which basically covered the harvest period 
on the coffee-plantations.  
19 The increase in vitality of the urban economy had unleashed organisational dynamics among 
the urban working class, leading to the formation of more than 90 union organisations between 
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These measures, however, failed to dissolve the crisis, with the changes in the 
urban landscape proving especially decisive in the downfall of the Ubico regime 
and opening a window of opportunity for democratisation in 1944. A 
fundamental contradiction had emerged between the logic of an economy 
dominated by agricultural exports and that of an urban social class that instead 
depended on the expansion of commercial relations and the modernisation of 
society (Torres Rivas, 1981; Tischler Visquerra, 2001). This seemed to pave the 
path for a historical break with the oligarchic structure of the state in a period 
that was also marked by an international economic crisis.  
As the crisis of the regime spread, despite the climate of repression and 
persecution in urban areas, students and teachers constituted the core of a 
popular, middle-class led movement that assembled around, Juan José Arévalo, 
to confront Ubico's government. At the same time a split within the army proved 
crucial. A group of young officers with democratic tendencies led by Colonel 
Árbenz was able to win the support of sections of the army disgruntled by the 
corruption and blocked opportunities for promotion represented by Ubico’s 
generalato. The various factors combined for a shift in power and paved the 
way for elections as well as the subsequent victory of Árevalo in 1944 (Tischler 
Visquerra, 2001). 
 
An urban, popular challenge to elite rule (1944-1954) 
The events of 1944 have often been referred to as a revolution, although as 
Torres-Rivas has signalled this perception only holds with regards to the 
national scale. Compared to an international level it seemed more a moment of 
catching up with time, given the magnitude of the social, economic and political 
backwardness that marked Guatemala (Torres-Rivas, 2011). The political 
turnover ignited by an urban popular movement with a middle class leadership, 
reignited discussions around the questions of national identity and on how to 
deal with the ‘indigenous problem’. Incidentally, the constituent assembly of 
1945 selected the term of ‘republic’ instead of ‘nation’ based on the conclusion 
that the social reality did not really comply with the perceived criteria for a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1920 and 1930. This constituted a shift from previous forms of organisation as well as an 
attempt to develop certain autonomy with regards to the state (Tischler Visquerra, 2001). 
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‘nation’ associated with a single culture and a homogeneous race (Taracena 
Arriola et al., 2004). 
Among the first steps with regards to the indigenous population, a National 
Indigenist Institute (Instituto Indigenista Nacional, IIN) was established in 1945 
to concentrate on the analysis and resolution of the ‘indigenous problem’. This 
constituted an attempt to investigate the reasons for the perceived “low cultural, 
social and economic development” of the indigenous population, their “tendency 
towards isolation” as well as the persistence of “traditions distinct from the 
dominant occidental culture” (Taracena Arriola et al., 2004, p.42). Implicit in 
these attempts to develop an understanding of the indigenous population were 
strategies to introduce and assimilate them to Western civilisation, which 
continued to be seen as the national culture and was exemplified by the ladino.  
Education was to play a key role in encouraging this process. The successive 
governments initiated campaigns against illiteracy and promoted the 
establishment of educational centres such as farm-schools to teach Spanish 
and to encourage the incorporation of the indigenous masses into the national 
culture. Nonetheless, as Brunner et al. (1993) and Taracena Arriola et al. (2004) 
indicate, the reach and success of these literacy programs were limited at best: 
The bad distribution of educational centres as well as the difficult economic 
conditions represented clear impediments as children failed to attend school, 
instead seeking to contribute to the family income. Additionally, in many cases 
parents were not convinced by the benefits of these initiatives, adding a further 
element to explain the meagre results of these hispanicising campaigns. 
At least in the short term the revolutionary governments did prove more 
successful in restructuring the Guatemalan rural economy. The agrarian reform 
and the Decree 900 represented key dimensions of their efforts to address 
inequalities and redesign access to land. As a result, a large number of tenants 
and day labourers went on to become lifelong owners of plots or formed 
cooperatives in estates. In addition, all forms of serfdom and slavery were 
prohibited, bans were implemented on unpaid services and schemes of paying 
off debts through work and the modality of the repartimientos was abolished 
(Taracena Arriola et al., 2004). 
The extent of the reforms and their impact is debated, but Tischler Visquerra 
signals that by 1954 a total of 1.002 estates with an extension of 1.901.073 
 89 
 
hectares (1 hectare equals 2.47 acres) had been redistributed. Additionally, 
plans were in place for a further 603.615 hectares of private land and 280.000 
hectares of national land to be redistributed (Tischler Visquerra, 2001).20  
However, as Handy (1992) indicates, these measures did not dissolve the 
persisting inequality between indigenous and ladino campesinos: Although from 
a total of 348,647 land owners about 65% were indigenous, they only controlled 
about 20% of the land. Meanwhile 35% of the land owners were in possession 
of 81.3% of the available land, with the average size of land to which ladinos 
had access to amounting to 35 manzanas (1 manzana equals 1.7 acres). The 
indigenous population on the other hand only had access to an average of 4.5 
manzanas (Handy, 1992). 
Another central dimension of reforms attempting to instil a democratising trend 
was the approval of a labour code seeking to sustain the defence of economic 
and social rights of the workers. In doing so, it was meant to introduce a basic 
regime of rights into the agrarian economy that up to that point had been 
determined by the different forms of slave labour and debt peonage. Similar to 
the agrarian reforms its implementation during the short period in power of the 
revolutionary governments proved arduous, since the urban world of reforms 
and governmental decrees in many cases remained distant from the realities of 
the estates. Nonetheless, as Taracena Arriola et al. (2004) indicate, the 
changes did engender collective organising among rural workers in some areas 
and began to redefine local power structures. Additionally, in some local 
contexts the clientelistic networks that had been established by the recruitment 
agents of estate owners, the habilitadores, were dissolved (Taracena Arriola et 
al., 2004). 
However, the various reforms also engendered an increasing polarisation 
between the societal factions close to the government and sections of the 
traditional economic elites, who were clearly opposing these reforms and 
unwilling to give up on any of their historical privileges. The increasingly 
aggressive stance of the US in the region added to the rising tension. Echoing 
                                                          
20 The United Fruit Company was strongly affected by the state-led confiscations. Their land 
benefited more than 100.000 peasants, while a further 30.000 were benefited by state-land. 
Tischler signals that this translated into a salary rise for the peasants while also enabling 
workers to negotiate their contracts on the estates (Tischler Visquerra, 2001). 
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Rueschmeyer et al.’s (1992) argument, in this context the landed elites, 
dependent on a large supply of cheap labour represented the most consistently 
anti-democractic force. As Árbenz won the elections in 1952 despite this 
growing national and international pressure, these conservative sections 
realised they would not be able to displace the revolutionary government in 
electoral competitions (Tischler Visquerra, 2001). Instead, they sought a 
strategic alliance to achieve their objectives and under the pretext of fighting 
international communism linked up with the US interests to promote a coup and 
topple the government. 
Árbenz’ abrupt resignation in 1954 in response to the plot of the CIA left his 
followers unable to react. Torres-Rivas (2011) indicates this scenario as 
exemplifying the limits placed by structures on the potential of agents. In this 
case the constraints were represented by the fact that the state, economy and 
society had not completed a shift towards modern capitalist patterns. The pre-
capitalist structure of agrarian production and the estate based economy 
continued to represent the predominant features and determined power-
relationships (Torres-Rivas, 2011). However, this situation also indicated the 
persistence of a conservative and unevolved ideological framework among the 
traditional economic elites. As they were unwilling to give up on any of their 
historically accumulated privileges, they used a favourable international context 
to re-establish their dominant societal position. 
Accordingly, democracy did not consolidate in Guatemala as the middle class 
and workers that had emerged on the basis of the urban economy were unable 
to defend the initiatives implemented in the course of this democratic interlude. 
This scenario revealed the multiple, parallel realities in Guatemalan society, 
exemplified by the persisting divide between the urban world of reforms and the 
rural realities. The latter had continued to remain very much detached from the 
patterns of this urbanely focused and middle-class led nation-building project in 
its economic as well as cultural dimensions. For large parts of the rural area the 
failure of this democratising attempt at a central level meant that the established 
patterns of production based on primitive capitalist mechanisms would continue 
to represent the dominant feature for the decades to come. The counter-
revolution of 1954 prepared the way for military factions to govern, most of the 
time in consonance with the main economic elites of the country.  
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Counter-insurgency and rent-seeking under a military state (1954-1982) 
The coup promoted by the authoritarian, oligarchic factions and supported by 
the US brought about a new constellation at the helm of the state. The military 
institution was converted into a counter-insurgent army and after overcoming 
internal opposition, moved towards taking control of the institutional framework. 
The regime instantly undertook steps towards reversing the reforms in 
agricultural and labour policies implemented during the democratic interlude. 
Following the trend of other Central American countries, the economy was re-
oriented towards an import-substituting industrialisation, building on the 
expansion of the Central American Common Market in 1960. Satisfied with the 
reversal of the reforms, the economic elites seemed happy to leave the military 
in charge of consolidating an anti-communist regime. Accordingly, the military 
positioned itself as the agent to implement the required policies, especially after 
Ydigorias Fuentes put into place a military cabinet in 1962. 
Following the counter-revolution, in 1957 the economic elites established an 
entity to represent the private sector interests at the national level, the 
Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial 
Associations (Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, 
Industriales y Financieras, CACIF). The CACIF was founded to represent a 
unified front and to fend off any government policies that could impact 
negatively on their interests. Over the coming decades it would evolve into a 
crucial organ to articulate and protect private sector interests against any 
perceived encroachment by governments. This became especially evident in 
fiscal policies, as the CACIF represented the prime organ to fend off any 
attempts by military governments to implement tax reforms that could have 
impacted negatively on their economic interests (ICEFI, 2007).  
The founding of CACIF also signalled a certain formalisation of elite networks 
without constituting an open-access organisation. Its exclusive character was 
based around the characteristics that had marked elite relationships over 
decades and would continue to do so in its representation of some of the most 
powerful elite sections. As Casaús Arzú (2007) has outlined, traditional family-
ties continued to be crucial to control access to these formal as well as informal 
elite networks. Marriage, geographic proximity, socio-racial aspects, the 
 92 
 
participation in political, religious or socio-cultural associations and an 
intellectual, ideological articulation constituted some of the criteria that allowed 
traditional elites to shield their exclusive networks (Casaús Arzú, 2007). 
Given these criteria military elites struggled to gain access to the circles of 
traditional elites. However, around the state a collaborative alliance between the 
military regime and the economic elites was formed. Accordingly, a political 
arrangement of “elected but appointed” was consolidated, which equipped the 
military institution, the private sector and their respective political parties with a 
veto with regards to government appointments and key decisions (Schirmer, 
1998, p.18).  
Opposition or reformist parties were prevented from participating in politics and 
a democratic façade was established through the holding of periodic elections. 
Repression against opposition groups in urban and rural areas became crucial 
as the military gradually deepened its control over the state and strengthened 
its presence in rural areas. For the economic elites the security issues that 
threatened to impact on their strategies of accumulation became a priority, 
especially after they had become alert to the danger posed by emerging 
guerrilla forces in the Eastern parts of the country. As Adams indicates, by the 
time Julio César Méndez Montenegro took over the government in 1966, it was 
already obvious that the military would be “free of civilian government controls” 
in its pursuit of the guerrilla forces (Adams, 1973, p.268). 
The existence of an armed oppositional force strengthened the military’s 
position at the helm of the state with the army elites also seizing opportunities to 
pursue economic benefits and create their own access to rents. As Handy 
(1994) argues, already the first steps aimed at reversing the agricultural reforms 
implemented during the revolutionary government provided these opportunities, 
as 79% of the land distributed during the Árbenz government was re-
confiscated. Out of a total of 74 national estates 11 were distributed among 
individuals close to Colonel Castillo Armas. Under the following government of 
Ydigorias Fuentes a further 28 were redistributed among allies. Accordingly, 
more than 170.000 manzanas of highly fertile land were handed over to 
individuals linked to the two army officials (Handy, 1994). 
The strongest impact on the indigenous world in the course of these measures 
was achieved by the reintroduction of the debt peonage system in December 
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1954 through the governmental decree 170. This re-established the pre-
revolutionary estate system, with physical labour established as a mechanism 
to pay off debts and/or gain access to small plots of land, so that by 1964 over 
100.000 people were again living in a situation of debt servitude on 5,217 
estates (Handy, 1994). 
This suggests that the link between the military and the economic elites was 
strongest in the field of the agricultural economy. The land-holding elite's 
dependence on a coercive apparatus to ensure cheap seasonal labour 
translated into their political and economic support for the counter-insurgent 
operations. The initial search for enrichment among military officials such as the 
development of estates in the northern regions of the country as well as the 
expansion of the military industry did not seem to enter into competition with 
that of the economic elites. In the meantime, the latter were content with the 
opportunities to expand their business interests in a favourable international 
context.  
As in other Central American countries, frictions in inter-elite relationships 
emerged as the industrialists began to demand a more active role in terms of 
restricting imports and setting up tariff barriers to promote their production. The 
agrarian elites, on the other hand, continued to advocate the role of the state as 
limited to its coercive tasks. These contrasting views of the different factions 
were nevertheless not as clear-cut as in neighbouring countries. In Guatemala a 
certain level of internal cohesion was maintained and reinforced through the 
mentioned networks based on family-ties and marriages. Additionally, the 
diverse range of business interests of different families also contributed to this 
union. In many cases the industrial elites continued to pursue a variety of 
interests including the field of agricultural production. In the short term this 
overlapping of business interests paved the path for a certain degree of 
cohesion among the different elite factions (Dosal, 2005).  
The military, however, established and projected itself through the institutional 
framework of the state and moved towards a gradual expansion of its 
competences beyond traditional functions. A spirit of nationalism was invoked 
as they sought to assert themselves as agents for the promotion of 
development and production, which was coupled with strategies aimed at 
eradicating “any type of collectivism”, associated with communism (Taracena 
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Arriola et al., 2004, p.75). The indigenous character of the population in rural 
Guatemala was left largely uncommented in their plans, with only implicit 
references to the “system of primitive life”, which was to be overcome in these 
rural areas (Ministry of Economy, 1966 quoted in: Taracena Arriola et al., 2004, 
p.76).  
According to this view modes of autonomous development in the highlands 
were not to be tolerated given that these areas could become susceptible to the 
influence of subversive ideas and agents. The promoted mechanisms of 
development such as state-guided cooperative systems and control on access 
to credit were intent on reducing the margins of autonomy and draw the rural 
population into a relationship of economic dependence. In turn, this acted as a 
guarantee for the reproduction of the elites’ strategies of accumulation, 
especially in the case of the estates.  
A racist coding of the population as well as their behavioural and cultural 
patterns represented a transversal aspect in the various security and economic 
mechanisms, thus reflecting the military and economic elites’ ideological 
framework. This was enacted through a simplistic mind-set, according to which, 
sections of the population that failed to comply with these programmes or 
embrace the military’s nationalist spirit, ran the risk of being associated with 
communism or the insurgency.  
As mentioned, the dual role of the military state in providing development and 
security also presented opportunities especially for higher ranking officers to 
develop their own strategies of accumulation and expand their own access to 
rents in the shadow of the state's institutional and territorial expansion. These 
aspirations increased in line with their attempts at gaining control over the 
national territory, while at times neglecting the military’s historical role of 
defending the privileges of the economic elites. Building on a favourable 
international context that gave the army a free hand to expand its campaign 
against insurgent forces, the military passed from controlling the monopoly over 
violence towards consolidating the institutional and personal interests of its 
members as part of the military state.  
Among the prime dimensions that illustrate this struggle to gain access to rents 
were: 
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1. Land-grabbing, among others in the course of the state-guided 
colonization programs to promote the use of uncultivated and state land, 
especially in the area of the Northern Transversal Strip (Franja 
Transversal del Norte, FTN) and the Petén region. In many cases these 
colonizing communities were later evicted and the property registered in 
the name of army officers (Adam 1973; Smith, 1990; Solano, 2005).21 
2. Military operations, rescue missions or the expansion of colonization 
programs tended to be accompanied by missions to explore the potential 
reserves of natural resources in form of minerals, oil or locations for 
hydro-electric projects, which left military officers in possession of 
strategic and privileged information (Solano, 2007). In addition to 
engaging in illegal mining activities and timber trading during the conflict, 
officials sought to strategically appropriate sections of land, where they 
suspected the existence of non-renewable natural resources such as 
petrol and minerals (Interview anthropologist, Guatemala City, 
03/10/2014)  
3. The expansion of the institutional apparatus of the state as the military 
started to acquire businesses, television stations, sections of the industry 
and insurance companies for army members. By the 1980s a clique of 
high-ranking officers had further elaborated these mechanisms and 
functioned as a central committee to create a financial network that 
consolidated the army’s economic interests within the state (Schirmer, 
1998; Keen, 2003; Dosal, 2005).22 Large scale infrastructural projects 
                                                          
21 Different legal frameworks accompanied these policies and paved the way for the 
accumulation of land. Among them was the derogation of laws for supplementary land titling, the 
registration of estate excesses situated on state-land as well as the governmental ‘Decree 60-
70’ issued under Arana in 1970 which declared the northern strip of the FTN a zone of national 
interest, thus nullifying any previous claims to private property or indigenous community lands, 
only to later distribute huge extensions of land among the military elites and allied sectors of the 
oligarchy. 
22 This was achieved by taking charge of some forty-three semi-autonomous state institutions 
with an active capital of US$119 million while virtually the entire budget of military as well as 
civilian state agencies was used to satisfy the demands for enrichment among the army ranks. 
The state budget almost tripled from Q355 million in 1974 to Q942 million in 1978. Among the 
enterprises and agencies created by the military were the National Institute of Electrification 
(Instituto Nacional de Electrificación, INDE), Guatel (telecommunication), Aviateca (national 
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such as the Chixoy hydroelectric project, the FTN road project as well as 
the Pacific Port project offered further possibilities to capture rents and 
redirect flows of capital towards military officers (Schirmer, 1998) 
4. The expansion of territorial control by the military as well as its 
responsibilities in border control, immigration and customs represented 
additional opportunities to engage in illicit activities under the cover of 
counter-insurgent operations. Important networks were established to 
organise drug-trafficking and contraband activities, directly involving 
high-ranking military and government officials (Interview Economist, 
Guatemala City, 02/10/2012). 
In contrast to the economic elites, the army officers’ access to the various 
strategies of accumulation and ability to capture rents depended primarily on 
their role in institutions and control of the state. Accordingly, military elites 
shifted from protecting the interests of the economic elites towards 
consolidating their modes of accumulation, while they increasingly sought to 
articulate their own vision of a state-project under military control (McClintock, 
1985). While a constant updating of legal frameworks provided a dimension of 
legitimacy for these dynamics, interests of the state and those of the military 
actors at its helm became inseparable. In turn the flow of rents towards military 
elites represented an incentive for the continuation of counter-insurgency as the 
modus operandi of the state and its war-economy.  
The economic elites accepted and backed the hard line of the military in the 
1970s, agreeing with the importance of containing the communist threat. Their 
backing for the formation of death squads that killed more than 700 union 
leaders and political activists between November 1970 and March 1971 
exemplified this consensus around repression and violence (Handy, 1984).  
Additionally, the representatives of the private sector continued to advance their 
own claims to government positions to ensure their influence in crucial decision-
                                                                                                                                                                          
airline), Housing Bank (Banco nacional de la vivienda, BANVI), Bank for Agricultural 
Development (Banco para el Desarrollo Agricola, BANDESA), Office for Agricultural Services 
(Dirección General de Servicios para la Agricultura, DIGESA), National Institute for Agricultural 
Transformation (Instituto Nacional para la Transformación Agraria, INTA), Petén Development 
Agency (Agencia para el fomento y desarrollo de Petén, FYDEP), National Financial 
Corporation (Corporación Financiera Nacional, CORFINA) (Dosal, 2005). 
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making processes. While agreeing in principle with the counter-insurgent 
orientation, frictions especially with regards to fiscal policies continued to 
appear between the army and factions of the economic elites. These increased 
after the collapse of the Common Central American Market in 1973 as the 
economic elites firmly opposed any expansion of the state public sector and the 
rising debt, while at the same time resisting tax increases. The disputes 
between the military and the economic elites culminated under the Lucas 
regime. The military regime’s decision to directly target specific elite-interests23 
and raise the tax on exports represented a tipping point and the traditional 
economic elites began to consider options to get rid of the regime (Dosal, 
2005).  
The Guatemalan state-formation process had once again approached a 
crossroad as the distribution of rents no longer sufficed to satisfy all elite 
sections and the military’s way of governance started to restrict aspects of the 
economic elites’ strategies of accumulation. This coincided with a renewed peak 
in repression and violence that left the regime increasingly isolated at the 
international level after the Carter government had imposed an embargo in 
1977. Accordingly, a number of actors, among them economic elites, the US 
administration, as well as dissenting military officials started to promote a shift in 
the leadership of the regime that occurred in 1982: The elections in March 1982 
at first seemed to indicate continuity as Anibal Guévara, a member of Lucas 
García’s high command was selected. However, he would only head the 
country for a couple of days before a military coup brought Ríos Montt into the 
presidential position in March 1982. 
 
Moving towards an elite-guided transition (1982-1996) 
Various factors contributed to this restructuring of the military state that 
culminated in the coup of March 1982: The rampant corruption and the focus on 
capturing rents among high-ranking military officers combined with economic 
mismanagement became too much to bear for the economic elites. They 
                                                          
23 Among others, the military command targeted one of the most prestigious families of the 
industrial elites, the Novellas and their monopoly on the cement production by creating a state-
owned cement company. 
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became especially restless as the consequences of inflation and sinking prices 
on the world market started to affect their own strategies of accumulation. The 
industrial factions of elites led this demand for a switch in state policies.  
The 1982 coup also shed light on the splits within the army, with struggles for 
power and economic wealth as well as disputes on the strategies of the 
counter-insurgent campaigns ongoing. The coup against Lucas García 
represented an attempt by some army factions to side-line the military 
structures inherited from the Aranismo and contain the rampant corruption and 
rent-seeking networks among its ranks. As a result, the entire high command 
and associated intelligence officers were dismantled and sent to commanding 
positions in rural areas, while a group of young officers took over key positions 
in the Ministry of Defence and the Army General Staff.24 The ousting of these 
high-ranking commanders, many with a strong counter-insurgent intelligence 
capacity also refocused but did not interrupt the pursuit of strategies of 
accumulation and rent-seeking networks. These officers went on to establish 
decentralised networks of organised crime, parallel to the state and often in 
competition with the networks established by their successors in the state 
intelligence structures (Interview sociologist, Guatemala City, 12/09/2012).  
This reordering of crucial positions within the military hierarchy was repeated 
periodically over the following decades setting out a pattern of revolving doors, 
as ousted officers returned to key positions under later administrations 
(Schirmer, 1998; Peacock and Beltrán, 2003). Rather than stable, hierarchical 
constellations, the balances of power between different networks and military 
factions tended to evolve constantly. Despite personal and historical animosities 
between individual military actors, the complex negotiations for positions, 
influence and rents brought about almost cyclical phases of overlap, 
cooperation and competition among different sections of the military networks. 
In addition, as the intensity of counter-insurgent operations diminished, the links 
of commanding military officers— especially those linked to army intelligence— 
with the protection and expansion of illicit modes of accumulation increased. 
                                                          
24 The newly constituted command under Montt together with an advisory council, the ‘juntita’, 
which was occupied by lower ranked officers, provoked concern among senior officers of the 
Army General Staff interpreting this as a breach of military hierarchy (Jonas 1991; Schirmer, 
1998; McCleary, 1999). 
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In the short term the shift in military leadership in 1982 also represented an 
attempt to revitalise the counter-insurgent approach. Economic elites as well as 
sections within the military had been getting frustrated with the inability of the 
Lucas García regime to design an effective strategy for an expansion of state-
control over territories and population in the rural areas. The newly introduced 
national security doctrine signalled the emergence of an ‘institutionalist line’ 
within the military. The influence of US-counter-insurgent experience in Asia 
and their think-tanks was reflected in this approach as the army set out to win 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population in order to grind them into the 
nation-building project envisioned and represented by the military. In this sense 
there was no place for cultural diversity or differential processes of signification 
outside the framework of military control.25  
These strategies were reflected in the attempts at reconfiguring indigenous life 
in the rural areas. The ideological re-education of the local population, the 
reshaping of local realities through model villages, the expansion of Civil Self-
defence Patrols (Patrulleros de Autodefensa Civil, PAC) throughout the country 
as well as the establishment of ‘poles of development’ were the main strategies 
to guarantee this cultural change. In doing so, the military aimed at the centre of 
the life-world of the local communities and confronted what they saw as their 
primitive nature and inclination to avoid military control. A 30/70 formula 
replaced the earlier 100/100 strategy, as 70% of the population were to be 
                                                          
25 The Ixil Operation, a plan elaborated in the course of 1981 reflected the new national security 
doctrine introduced in 1982 and indicated this approach of dealing with the local indigenous 
population. It advanced three options of how to implement these new counter-insurgent ideas in 
culturally complexity of the Ixil area: 
1. “To organise all efforts of the unit for civil development in order to comply with the mission 
to intensify the Ladinisation of the Ixil population in order for it to disappear as a strange cultural 
subgroup of the national way of being. 
2. Continue a policy based on the respect of the Ixil identity, its traditions and its language. 
3. Leave the cultural aspect as it is found at current moment in order to focus all governmental 
effort on improving the conditions of life of the Ixil population.” (Cifuentes 1982, p.38) 
While the plan recommends the second option, it goes on to underline that “whatever option 
one adopts it should include an intense, profound and well-studied psychological campaign to 
re-establish the Ixil mentality in order to make them feel part of the Guatemalan nation.” 
(Cifuentes 1982, p.45) The option put into practice during the following years continued to be 
closer to the first option.  
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recovered and integrated into a relationship of dependency from the state and 
its institutions through programmes such as ‘work for food’ (Schirmer, 1998; 
Rosada-Granados, 2011).  
These developmental strategies and their impact on local life complemented the 
coercive counter-insurgent operations and represented another expression of 
the genocidal character embedded in the campaigns.26 They implied a 
concentration of the population in a delimited space to put the state in a position 
to control its movements, while fundamentally disrupting links to culture, 
processes of signification, as well as physical reference points of time and 
space (Brunner et al., 1993; Schirmer, 1998; Taracena Arriola et al., 2004). 
At the level of inter-elite relationships, the sections of the traditional economic 
elites organised in CACIF had welcomed the Montt regime in 1982, seeing their 
interests as compatible with those of the military government. As a recent report 
by Rodríguez Pellecer (2013) suggests, this alliance between military and 
economic elites was framed around four elements: Firstly, four members of 
established elite families joined the Montt cabinet, a further six representatives 
were designated by the CACIF to participate in the Council of State, a body 
responsible for assisting and advising the government. Secondly, in exchange 
for an agreement with the Montt government not to go ahead with an agrarian 
reform and the nationalisation of the banking sector, the private sector pledged 
in a public statement to comply not just with its tax duties but to also contribute 
additional, specific funds to promote the ‘eradication of subversion’. Thirdly, the 
private sector engaged in lobbying activities in an attempt to reactivate 
diplomatic channels with Washington and guide Guatemala out of international 
isolation, following the embargo implemented by the Carter regime in 1977. 
Additionally, the economic elites put their own civilian airplanes and pilots at the 
disposal of the army for reconnaissance flights and rescue missions as well as 
bombardments (Rodríguez Pellecer, 2013). 
                                                          
26 According to official data between June and September 1983 106.000 Guatemalans were 
recruited into the counter-insurgent operations. At specific moments up to a million men were 
organised in patrols, which with a total population of 8 million constituted the de facto 
militarisation of the country (Taracena Arriola et al., 2004). Apart from the discursive shift 
towards the 30/70% formula, the brutal military campaigns reached a new peak under the Montt 
regime. During his time at the helm of the state 64% of the 626 massacres documented by the 
Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH) took place. 
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Despite this intense collaboration, relationships deteriorated as Montt went 
about implementing state-centred policies exemplified by the promotion of an 
economic package that included the introduction of VAT. Leaked information on 
an agrarian reform and plans for a state controlled oil company further 
increased fears among the economic elites over a nationalisation of the oil 
production, thus eroding ties between the private sector and the military 
(McCleary, 1999; Solano, 2005, ICEFI, 2007).27  
Splits also appeared within the army ranks as some factions supported a 
stronger economic role for the state as promoted by the Montt government, 
while other factions, especially those close to the land-holding elites, continued 
to oppose any expansion of the state’s functions. Additionally, the protagonist 
role of young, lower-ranked officers under Montt had provoked unrest within the 
hierarchy of the army. These factors combined and led to a military coup with 
general Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores replacing Ríos Montt on 8th of August 
1983. Importantly, he had gained the backing of the high command as well as 
the US, which was seeking to set the army en route towards a democratic 
opening. 
In this context the military high command also concluded that a certain degree 
of democratisation was inevitable, in large part due to the pressure of the US 
and the international financial institutions, who were conditioning the urgently 
required military and economic assistance (Schirmer 1998; McCleary, 1999). 
Even though reactionary factions among the army ranks persisted, the military 
project was soon heading for a democratic constitutional framework as outlined 
in the Plan of National Stability. 
Tensions between the military government and the traditional economic elites 
continued throughout this period especially over issues of taxation. However, 
when their interests were at stake, the latter managed to resist any increase 
based on their capacity to overcome internal splits and present a united front in 
key moments (Dosal, 2005). Among the industrial elites the influence of a new 
generation of elites was growing. They sprang on the bandwagon of neoliberal 
                                                          
27 Dosal also points to frictions even within the economic elites, as the agricultural elites 
supported the implementation of the VAT, an aspect which the neoliberal industrial elites 
opposed. At the same time the latter faction sought a devaluation of the Quetzal to increase 
their exports, an option the landholding elites firmly rejected (Dosal, 2005). 
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ideas seeking the elimination of protectionist measures and promoting a shift 
from an economic model based on the import-substitution towards gaining 
access to the lucrative North American and European markets. The agricultural 
export-sector soon joined this line by embracing free-trade agreements, while 
the CACIF consolidated its role as the most influential body in economic 
decision-making. 
Despite initial scepticism, the approval of the 1985 constitution left economic 
elites at ease as it integrated a series of safeguards, most crucially the absolute 
pre-eminence of private property, the confidentiality of fiscal information and the 
introduction of the Constitutional Court as a space that would allow them to 
legally challenge any attempts at fiscal reforms (Jonas, 1991; Gutiérrez, 2013b; 
ICEFI, 2014a). Accordingly, traditional economic elites felt increasingly 
reassured they could endure the introduction of a formal democratic state of law 
without major sacrifices, while identifying the opportunities it offered to gain 
access to global markets. 
However, the traditional economic elites also recognised the importance of 
remaining in control of the political system to preserve their influence and 
privileged societal position. Over the following decades with the 
institutionalisation of electoral contests, political parties would consolidate as a 
key mechanism to ensure access to public power. As Castillo (2008) argues, the 
timing and framework of the political party system in 1984 clearly favoured 
factions of the economic elites. They represented the only societal sections able 
to mobilise the necessary resources to finance political parties and campaigns. 
This meant that parties emerged on the basis of established elite-networks and 
at the expense of a broader participation of Guatemalan society. Their ability to 
keep control of the internal hierarchies of party structures (eg. through the 
definition of candidates) and uphold the dependence of parties on their 
resources contributed to consolidate their dominant societal position (Castillo, 
2008). This represented a platform from which to influence crucial aspects of 
the institutional framework and locate allied ‘operators’ in key positions in order 
to determine decision-making on policies and laws. In doing so, the economic 
elites also contributed to undermine the formally democratic character of state-
society relationships as outlined in the constitution, from the outset. 
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For the army elites, military intelligence was crucial to ensure it maintained its 
influence on the transitional process and remained in a position to safeguard its 
institutional and personal interests. This was exemplified under the first elected 
government in 1986, as key intelligence positions were filled with the officers 
who had served under Lucas García such as Ortega Menaldo and Callejas y 
Callejas.  Despite having been implicated in the G2’s28 most violent periods and 
having evident links with illicit activities they were swiftly reintegrated into the 
democratising project (Schirmer, 1998). The biggest challenge for the military 
was that of finding a level of internal cohesion between the multiple structures 
and networks competing for rents and positions of influence. Throughout the 
transitional period divides within the intelligence apparatus frequently became 
evident as different factions struggled for control over transitional governments 
to gain concessions and engender settings favourable to their own networks, 
often linked with illicit business interests (Interview sociologist, Guatemala City, 
12/09/2012).  
While the army as an institution gradually lost its central role in the state, the 
presidential election of Serrano Elias in 1990 was a clear indication of a 
renewed direct engagement of traditional economic elites in public roles. The 
nomination of a number of economic elites into the governmental cabinet 
reflected this shift as they sought to guarantee the implementation of neoliberal 
thinking and free market policies.  
Additionally, the coup by Serrano in 1993 offered the economic elites another 
possibility to raise their public political profile. As Serrano dissolved Congress 
and the Supreme Court and suspended the constitution, the economic elites 
strategically opposed the government as its popularity started to decrease. By 
opposing the coup, which was most probably induced by high ranking army 
officers, they not only highlighted their abilities as political operators, they also 
presented themselves as the agents to guide the democratic transition. After 
negotiations between the military and economic elites, De Leon Carpio, was 
selected as a successor. This calmed the fears of economic sanctions or 
restrictions on access to the international markets, while also enabling the 
finalisation of the peace negotiations. As the following section will outline, in the 
course of the Peace Accords and especially through the Socio-economic 
                                                          
28 G2 was the official code for the Guatemalan military intelligence section.  
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Accord various factions of the traditional economic elites were able to further 
consolidate their hegemonic position and reconfigure their strategies of 
accumulation.  
 
Neoliberal peace and state co-option (1996-2014) 
The transitional paradigm as well as the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 in 
Guatemala has to be contextualised within the broader political and economic 
changes taking place in this period. As the Cold War came to an end, 
neoliberalism represented the ideological paradigm to advance the insertion into 
a globalised economy. For the Global South this translated into the promotion of 
specific economic reforms in accord with the guidelines of the International 
Financial Institutions as economic elites embraced these adjustments of social 
and economic patterns.29 
In Guatemala policies were brought into line with the international prescriptions, 
which were presented as an appropriate response to the corruption and low 
efficiency that had marked the public administration under military rule. This 
newly promoted image of the state was meant to contrast with the model the 
military had sought to implement in its state-building project of the 1980s. 
Instead of centralising control and development tasks, the downscaling of the 
state as well as measures to further economic liberalisation were introduced. 
However, as the reforms of the 1990s reorganised state functions in line with 
these ideas, they also paved the way for a “second generation of public 
corruption” through a wave of privatisations30, concessions31 and contracts32 
that occurred in a highly non-transparent manner (Gutiérrez, 2012, p.15). 
                                                          
29 The 1989 Washington Consensus provided one of the frameworks with its well-known 
postulates of fiscal discipline; prioritisation and cutting back of public expenditure; widening of 
the fiscal basis and improvements in tax-collection; privatisation of public enterprises; de-
regularisation of the economy and liberalisation of external commerce and finance system, all 
measures that aimed to modernise the economies and promote their integration into a global 
market (Yaganova, 2010). 
30 E.g. Telephone service, railway service, postal service, electric energy. 
31 E.g. Concessions for mining, generation of electricity and construction of hydroelectric plants, 
airports and ports. 
32 E.g. A row of over-valued infrastructural contracts.  
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The privatisation of state assets constituted an important business opportunity 
for the private sector, giving it the chance to offer public services free from 
competition after a series of discretionary deals. These measures were 
implemented in an inconsistent fashion, for example, by promoting 
competitiveness without consolidating a regulatory framework to limit the power 
of monopolies. Similarly, political and financial decentralisation was undertaken 
without strengthening the administrative and financial capacities of 
municipalities or the planning of these processes (Palencia Prado, 2002). 
The various reforms were combined with the liberalisation of the external 
commerce and finance system as well as campaigns to attract foreign 
investments. As mentioned, industrial and commercial elites had recognised the 
importance of shifting from a protectionist to an export-oriented economy in an 
attempt to revitalise their strategies of accumulation. Aspiring to deepen their 
links with the lucrative markets of North America and Europe they advanced the 
necessary reforms hand in hand with the international financial institutions. This 
also completed the evolution towards policies in accord with neoliberal views, 
with the market representing the central axis for allocation of resources, the 
promotion of efficiency and improvement of general welfare.  
The Peace negotiations and Accords of 1996 did not interrupt these changes. 
They brought the armed confrontation to an end and at first appeared to 
represent an opportunity to set in motion a series of institutional and 
democratising reforms. However, their impact remained limited to advances in 
the expansion of legal guarantees by introducing frameworks aimed at the 
recognition of the indigenous population, the formal consolidation of political 
and civil rights as well as certain progress in the demilitarisation of public 
security by restricting the role of the military.33 
Especially with regards to socio-economic issues, the Accords ended up 
representing a ratification of the elite-designed modernisation project and set up 
a scenario marked by a combination of market fundamentalism and highly 
vulnerable state institutions. The institutional aspects were strongly 
compromised by the failure to break down the resistance of economic elites to a 
fiscal reform and to equip the state with sufficient resources to comply with its 
                                                          
33 The following chapter 4 will expand on this analysis of the Peace Accords. 
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basic functions and services (Palencia Prado, 2002; Torres-Rivas, 2006; 
Gutiérrez, 2012; ICEFI, 2014a). 
In turn, this left a state open to co-option and determination by elite factions, 
with a range of informal and illegal mechanisms being used to favour particular 
interests in the short and long term. As an interviewee argued, “the formal 
expressions of the state such as the political parties, the justice system, the 
MPs, they all function on the basis of financing, consent and protection. You 
owe (somebody) favours in order to be in the position you are in and that 
determines your margin of action. We have seen this permanently in all the 
governments and especially since the government of Arzú.” (Interview Human 
rights activist, Guatemala City, 02/10/2012)  
Accordingly, the transition to a formal democratic framework also consolidated 
the bi-directional patterns of state co-option in line with Garay and Salcedo-
Albaran’s (2012) understanding as outlined in chapter 1. Actors within the 
institutional framework also develop an interest in perpetuating the informal and 
illegal determination of policies and laws as they reap benefits from it. The state, 
its institutional functions as well as its decision-making processes’ are 
reconfigured by these evolving alliances between actors within, as well as elites 
outside the institutional framework.  
In this context the control over the political system and the channels of 
participation were crucial in reaffirming the elite-dominated societal structure 
(Mack et al., 2006; Castillo, 2008; Ortiz Loaiza, 2008). With regards to the 
relevant political parties this meant that internal party structures were based on 
hierarchical patterns that leave elites in charge of key decisions such as the 
nomination of candidates.  
An instrumental approach to political parties developed, reducing them to 
electoral vehicles that lost their importance straight after electoral processes. 
This is exemplified by the transfuguismo, the constant change of political party 
affiliation that follows elections as the focus shifts towards negotiations in 
congress.34 The volatility of political parties has meant they emerge just as 
rapidly as they disappear, while elites have resisted any institutionalisation or 
                                                          
34 In the past two legislative periods (2007-2011; 2011-2015), over 50% of the Members of 
Congress changed party in the course of their four-year mandate.  
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long-term electoral projection. The constant changes in the landscape of 
political parties contrast with the perpetual control of elite factions over them, as 
all relevant parties group around a conservative and neoliberal political 
consensus.  
The patrimonial management of political parties also influences the dynamics of 
the broader political and electoral system. The hierarchies within the political 
organisations reduce the role of citizens to voting in electoral contests while 
clientelistic relationships with the electorate proliferate. As Castillo (2008) has 
outlined, citizenship as well as militancy in parties becomes associated with the 
short term incentives that can be obtained either in the course of the electoral 
campaign or once the respective party reaches government. On the other hand, 
in order to obtain the right to be elected or to take up a public position, one has 
to gain access to the elite networks or have the financial capacity to fund a 
separate party (Castillo, 2008; Ortiz Loaiza, 2008). 
These patterns can be traced in the conduct of elected representatives, as 
reflected in a report by Plaza Pública in 2014 on the relationship between 
particular elite factions and Members of Congress. After having identified the 
degree of relationship between Members of Congress and the CACIF, analysts 
monitored the voting behaviour during decision-making processes in Congress. 
The result clearly highlighted how their voting was determined to a much higher 
degree by the relationship of Members of Congress with the CACIF, than by the 
relationship with their political parties (Herrarte, 2014).  
Over extensive periods in post-war Guatemala factions of traditional economic 
elites have had a determining influence over the orientation of public policies. 
As the main parties have depended on economic elites’ funding, this put them 
into a position to determine the individuals that take on key positions in the 
economic and financial ministries of the central government.35 This control has 
proved crucial for elites since these positions are equipped with certain liberties 
                                                          
35 As Gutiérrez outlines, it is also an open secret that since salaries of ministers tend to be lower 
than those of business executives, the salaries of ministers are topped up with bonuses paid by 
the business chambers or the big corporations. These patterns establish a guarantee for loyalty 
through the redistribution of rents as well as their social and economic reintegration into the 
different enterprises for the ministers once their career in public office comes to an end 
(Gutiérrez, 2013b). 
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to grant privileges such as the discreet award of business contracts, the 
concession of exemptions and reductions on tax for economic allies on a wide 
range of issues such as licences as well as the privatisation of state assets 
(Gutiérrez, 2013b). In doing so, they have been able to influence decisions that 
have provided important business advantages and consolidated a monopolistic 
status in various market sections (e.g. drinks, liqueurs, chicken, sugar, fertilizer, 
pasta, oil), often at the cost of small or medium-scale producers (Palencia 
Prado, 2012).  
This influence of traditional elite-networks prepared the path for the 
corporatisation of their business structures with financial capital playing an 
important role. The boom in the banking and financial sector, can in part be 
traced back to the constitutional reform in 1993, which prohibited the state-bank 
from acting as a lender for state-funds. This enabled elite-owned private banks 
to consolidate their status as sole lenders and equipped them with a key 
mechanism, the control of interest rates (Interview political scientist, Guatemala 
City 12/09/2012). By building on business advantages procured by their control 
over state policies, they have been able to take over and incorporate small or 
intermediate producers into their business structures and diversify their 
economic interests.36 
However, traditional economic elites have not been the only societal factions to 
determine the operations of the institutional framework and consolidate their 
strategies of accumulation, as a certain level of social mobility among elites can 
be detected. Analysts tend to identify three groups at this elite level. This 
distinction gives an indication of their origin, although the different factions 
clearly cooperate and establish alliances across these divides: 1. An 
established faction that maintains power quotas due to their tradition and social 
prestige, even if their economic power has declined over recent decades. 2. 
The successful oligopolies that have consolidated as transnational corporations 
in a variety of market sections. 3. Various emergent factions of elites involved in 
                                                          
36 The diversification and consolidation as transnational business corporations is reflected 
especially among the so-called ‘G-8’ families, seen as representing the economically and 
politically most powerful family-business groups in Guatemala: They include the Novella; 
Herrera Ibargue/Herrera Zavala; Torrebiarte Lanzendorf; Leal Pirabal; Castillo; 
Campollo/Codina; Botrán and the Bosch Gutiérrez.  
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legal and illegal activities with rapid growth (Gutiérrez, 2012; Interview 
journalist, Guatemala City, 03/09/2012; Interview sociologist, Guatemala City, 
12/09/2012). 
While the first two groups have established and consolidated their elite status 
on the basis of their historical privileges and trajectory, the third group has 
emerged at different stages since the transition from a counter-insurgent state 
initiated in 1985. Economic liberalisation, and a deregulated economy as well as 
thriving corruptive practices, created new opportunities for emerging elites to 
pursue strategies of accumulation or access sources of rents with potential for 
rapid growth. Some have done so by operating from within the institutional 
framework as such. They have been able to take advantage and reproduce the 
patterns by which traditional economic elites relate to institutions. This has 
made it possible for emerging actors to develop their own networks or link up 
and penetrate established elite networks around the institutional arenas of the 
state at a national and local level as they pursue their interests based on 
opaque negotiations or trading of favours.  
Various authors (Briscoe and Pellecer, 2011; Insight-Crime, 2011; Gutiérrez and 
Méndez, 2012; Waxenecker, 2015) have highlighted the role of privatisation and 
decentralisation policies in fomenting this emergence of new elite factions. In 
many cases this has coincided with the increased transfer of functions and 
funds to regional and municipal levels.37 A business area that has acted as a 
springboard for these economic and political shifts is the decentralisation of 
construction contracts, which led to the emergence of new regional contractors, 
who seized the opportunities of winning lucrative contracts through local state 
institutions. Economic decentralisation combined with the political 
decentralisation of the electoral system has engendered changes in quotas of 
political and economic power. A shift towards these regional actors can be 
perceived as they ‘invest’ in electoral campaigns of candidates for local 
municipal councils or regional members of congress in order to ‘win’ contracts 
once their allies take up their positions.  
As ICEFI argues in their analysis: “The objective of this financing of electoral 
campaigns coincides with that of the big and traditional contractors: Invest 
                                                          
37 The constitution of 1985 established 8% of the governmental budget to be assigned to the 
municipalities, a percentage that was later increased to 10%. 
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economic capital in order to gain quotas of economic power. The idea is that in 
the case of electoral victory of the sponsored individuals, they will return the 
favour.” (ICEFI 2014, p.102) This scenario gains complexity through the ability 
of many of these regional elite factions38 to forge alliances with centrally 
positioned elites and state officials. In many cases this engenders a dialectical 
relationship between central and regional nodes of power as the capacity to 
obtain funds from the centre depends on their ability to obtain a social backing 
at the regional level and guarantee electoral success.39  
This growing influence of emerging regional elites has also translated into a 
shift in the private financing of political parties as the proportion provided by 
traditional elites has diminished over recent years. As a recent report by the 
International Commission against Impunitiy in Guatemala (Comisión 
Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala, CICIG)40 indicates, while the 
elite groups linked to CACIF had for decades represented the main funders of 
the political parties, they are currently thought to be contributing only about 25% 
of the financial resources of political parties. 50% of this funding is instead 
provided by groups of state contractors linked primarily to emerging elites, with 
the rest proceeding from criminal structures, especially those linked to drug-
trafficking networks (CICIG, 2015).  
Construction is just one business area in which corruptive dynamics have 
                                                          
38 Waxenecker identifies 36 consolidated and emerging regional ‘power groups’ spread over 21 
national departments that have emerged on the basis of ‘winning’ state contracts (Waxenecker, 
2015).  
39 A study by Insight Crime (2011) has documented the mechanisms by which deputies for the 
northern department of Petén, were able to establish themselves as central nodes of regional 
networks using their position in congress to influence the distribution of state funds for 
infrastructure. Hence, extensive networks have established themselves around these sources of 
revenues and in search of lucrative contracts or rents while multiple actors including public 
officials as well as actors linked to organised crime integrate these networks. Additionally, drug 
cartels have linked up with these networks seeking opportunities for money-laundering as well 
as being involved in constant processes of negotiation within these networks to guarantee 
exemption from legal prosecution and seek guarantees for territorial control (Insight Crime, 
2011). 
40 The CICIG was created in 2006 as an independent UN-body to support the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office in high profile cases and investigations targeting illegal groups and 
clandestine security apparatuses.   
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thrived and that has paved the path for the emergence of elites. Similar patterns 
have developed around the Guatemalan Institute for Social Security (Instituto 
Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social, IGSS) one of the largest government 
agencies responsible for awarding lucrative contracts that are awarded via no-
bid contracts (Dudley, 2014). Accordingly, a generalised system of corruption, 
trading of favours and opaque negotiations has consolidated, with networks 
operating to consolidate specific strategies of accumulation and capture rents. 
To do so, the undermining and reconfiguring of institutions as well as their 
functions become key to guarantee the reproduction of this system. 
One crucial aspect in this co-option of institutional sections is the control over 
the judicial system. This inserts a ‘padlock’ to guarantee that anybody who 
participates in this system will not be prosecuted (Dudley, 2014, p.8). The main 
mechanism to ensure this is the determination of the nomination of judges, as 
different elite factions seek to guarantee the loyalty of justice operators at all 
levels up to the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. The nomination is 
controlled through the periodically constituted Postulation Commissions, which 
were set up in the constitutional framework of 1985 to select the candidates 
from a long list of applicants, before Congress makes the final selections based 
on a shortlist. A variety of factions struggle to determine who joins these 
Commissions, in order to control the court system. Instead of being selected on 
the basis of their record of service, experience or education, aspiring judges 
have to count on the backing of individuals within the Commissions, who in turn 
are linked to or engage in negotiations with different elite factions (Dudley, 
2014). The resulting co-opted system of justice has equipped emerging elites 
with quotas of power, as they have proved especially apt in getting ‘their judges’ 
elected and ensure their subsequent loyalty. It also highlights the important role 
of operators or “political fixers” (Bull, 2014, p.121) that move in grey areas of 
negotiation between individuals positioned within institutions and elites outside 
these frameworks.  
In the context of these struggles between elites to determine the operations and 
functions of different institutional aspects, an important dynamic is inserted by 
the links— primarily of sections of the emerging group of elites— with illicit 
activities and modes of accumulation. The transitional and post-war context has 
represented an ideal breeding ground for transnational and national crime 
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syndicates that have transformed the country into one of their platforms for their 
economic activities based on the illegal trafficking of drugs or other licit and illicit 
products (persons, goods). Estimates in 2009 believe that 90% of the cocaine 
moving towards the US-market passes through Guatemalan territory (UNODC, 
2012). 
In part based on the dynamics of the mentioned political and economic 
decentralisation, cells of former counter-insurgent structures have been able to 
reinvent themselves as part of local power constellations or more expansive 
rent-seeking networks. An important part of these groups has emerged from 
circles of army officers that were part of the counter-insurgent intelligence 
apparatus, initially referred to as Illegal Groups and Clandestine Security 
Apparatuses (Cuerpos Ilegales y Aparatos Clandestinos de Seguridad, 
CIACS).41 In many cases they lost relevance within the state institutions as the 
level of intensity of the armed confrontation descended in the course of the 
transition. In an attempt to guarantee their own access to rents these former 
intelligence officers have put their skills in coercive, security and espionage 
operations on offer to a variety of actors, including drug-cartels. CIACS take on 
a variety of forms as some have consolidated around local power structures or 
have constituted permanent and legal enterprises, while at the same time 
engaging in illicit activities. Others form sections specialised in coercive 
operations as part of larger corporative structures with long term objectives in 
commercial and political activities (Gutiérrez, 2013a).  
The evolving nature of these criminal structures has led the CICIG to develop a 
new conceptualisation of ‘illicit economic-political networks’, to reflect their 
spread across different political and economic arenas. Accordingly, these 
networks are seen as operating in a ‘grey zone’ between the ‘private’ and the 
‘public’, the ‘governmental’ and the ‘entrepreunerial’, the ‘licit’ and the ‘illicit’ as 
well as the ‘formal’ and the ‘informal’ as they pursue economic and political 
power, influence as well as impunity for illicit activities and modes of enrichment 
(CICIG, 2015).  
In a similar way, the separation between the above mentioned elite factions is 
fluid as they inter-relate as well as compete in a variety of institutional and 
                                                          
41 The concept of CIACs was used in the establishment of the original mandate for the CICIG in 
2006. 
 113 
 
economic fields. The competition is becoming especially evident between 
sections of the emergent and traditional elites. The latter elite faction continues 
to be superior in terms of its capacity to control governments and state 
institutions, primarily due to its ability to maintain a level of internal coherence at 
key moments (Gutiérrez, 2013b). Additionally, apart from the informal networks 
based on anonymous societies, family organisations and interest groups, in the 
CACIF, the traditional elites have a formal apparatus with a strong operative 
capacity to confront governments or other players when key interests are at 
play.42  
However, as traditional elites have consolidated a way of structuring 
relationships around and within the state, this has set up patterns that have 
been reproduced by recent generations of elite-factions. The reluctance of 
traditional elites to give up any privileges that in the short term could impact on 
their economic interests, has prepared the way for emerging elites to pursue 
their own licit or illicit strategies, often with an even higher potential for 
accumulation. The links between the different factions is evidenced in the 
financial sector, where the combination of anonymous societies, banking 
secrecy as well as the confidentiality of tax information has set up ideal 
conditions for money laundering (Interview human rights activist, Guatemala 
City, 18/09/2012).  
Additionally, some sections of emerging elites have added a more explicit 
capacity to organise or exercise coercion to ensure their interests. In doing so, 
they tend to innovate the repertoire of mechanisms to influence and capture 
state-functions in this post-conflict context. At the same time the different elite 
factions are interlinked not only through similar ways of operating but also on 
the basis of the inseparability of their flows of capital, which more often than not 
use the institutions of the banking system owned by traditional elites (Interview 
sociologist, Guatemala City, 12/09/2012). 
                                                          
42 It is also an open secret that since salaries of ministers tend to be lower than those of 
business executives the salaries of ministers are topped up with bonuses paid by the business 
chambers or the big corporations. These patterns establish a guarantee for loyalty through the 
redistribution of rents as well as their social and economic reintegration into the different 
enterprises for the ministers once their career in public office comes to an end (Gutiérrez, 
2013a). 
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The operative features of what one interviewee described as “anorexic state 
institutions” (Interview political scientist, Guatemala City, 14/09/2014), the 
consolidation of a culture of corruption and a willingness of state officials and 
politicians to cooperate from within the state institutions in the various strategies 
of accumulation have set up a complex constellation. The self-organising 
capacities of these constellations are not to be underestimated as these 
dynamics generate their own order and regularity, thereby structuring 
expectations and complying with many of the formal democratic requirements. 
Legal frameworks are unlikely to contain these dynamics as they only frame 
formal relationships and norms, whereas the majority of relationships develop 
on the basis of networks determined by their informality. As different elite 
factions are locked into competition and cooperation, a consensus around the 
informal and often illegal determination of economic and political relationships 
has consolidated and is reflected in social and institutional constellations that 
are highly resistant to change. The extent to which political parties, seen as the 
prime vehicles for democratisation have been co-opted into the same 
patrimonial patterns that mark economic relationships, exemplifies the 
entrenched and reproductive nature inherent to the Guatemalan social and 
political order.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has tracked the genesis of the Guatemalan state across different 
historic periods. The analysis of the colonial regime outlined how the encounter 
between the Western and indigenous cultural frameworks led to the imposition 
and to the structuring of economy and society in compliance with the colonial 
powers. A racial and cultural hierarchy was established based on a tributary and 
administrative system that was to guarantee the feudal and aristocratic 
existence of the colonial landowners and rentiers, the Criollos. Over the 
following centuries the elites’ strategies of accumulation based on the 
appropriation of territory and exploitation of indigenous labour laid the 
foundations for an oligarchic structure of the state. The short democratic 
interlude between 1944 and 1954 constituted the only attempt to break with 
these established patterns. Nevertheless, the reach of the integrative and 
reformist intentions met its limitations in the continued predominance of pre-
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capitalist patterns; the distance between the urban world of reforms and the 
rural hinterland; the economic elite’s conservative-authoritarian cultural 
framework as well as shifts in international relations that paved the way for 
decades of military rule. 
Development and counter-insurgency became the maxims that favoured the 
expansion of control over territory and institutions as the army took up a position 
at the helm of the state. With the support of the economic elites, the army 
engaged in a brutal counter-insurgent campaign that increasingly focused on 
the indigenous communities in the highlands, seeking to eliminate any potential 
for dissent or difference. At the same time aspirations to pursue their own 
strategies of accumulation and capture rents grew among army officers while 
consolidating at the helm of the state. However, international isolation due to the 
counter-insurgent excesses of the army, the failure to advance in the defeat of 
the insurgent threat as well as the fact that the distribution of rents no longer 
sufficed to satisfy the different military and economic elite factions, led to a 
gradual shift towards a transitional framework in the 1980s. 
Despite the military's attempts to hold on to power, the traditional economic 
elites close to CACIF consolidated their privileges in the 1985 constitution. They 
identified the strategic possibilities for modernisation and commercial expansion 
offered by accepting a formal democratic framework. As traditional elites 
embraced a neoliberal economic paradigm, which enabled them to innovate 
and expand their strategies of accumulation, this context also saw the 
emergence of new elites often with links to illicit activities. In the course of the 
transition to democracy elites consolidated particular ways of establishing 
relationships around the state as well as the political system that have at least 
in part, replaced previous authoritarian forms of governance. Instead of making 
concessions to an institutional framework beyond their control, they have used 
political operators or established alliances with individuals within the institutional 
framework and through an array of informal and illegal mechanisms determined, 
reconfigured and co-opted state functions and operative processes. Emerging 
elite factions have followed similar patterns as they compete and cooperate to 
determine policies and laws in order to consolidate specific strategies of 
accumulation and benefit particular interests. As the different elite factions are 
intent on maintaining an exclusive societal order and are locked into strategies 
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for accumulation, this has consolidated an implicit consensus around the 
informal and in many cases illegal determination of formal spaces and 
institutional mechanisms. 
Building on this genesis of the state and the tracking of elites across time, the 
following chapter will shift the emphasis towards examining different 
generations of non-elite agency. Accordingly, it will analyse how the historical 
and present context of the Guatemalan state has impacted on the forms agency 
has taken in different moments of this state-formation process. 
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4. Changing forms of indigenous agency: External challenges and internal 
differences 
In the previous chapter I tracked the genesis of the Guatemalan state from its 
colonial foundation up to its present character. I indicated how it has evolved 
from forms of authoritarian governance towards a situation of state co-option, as 
different elite-networks co-opt and reconfigure state functions and its modes of 
operating. In this chapter I will look at a number of non-elite expressions of 
agency, referring to agency emerging especially from those sections of society 
that have been marginalised from the elite-guided state-building process. 
Accordingly, in many cases they have not had the possibility to influence 
political and social processes in ways that impact at a broader societal level. In 
doing so, I will highlight some of the constraints and challenges this agency has 
faced in its relationship with the state and the military as well as the elites and 
how this has marked its evolution. It will also analyse some of the internal 
organisational features of community based, revolutionary and democratic 
activism.  
I focus on the decades following the military coup of 1954, which as outlined in 
the previous chapter, interrupted the ongoing attempts to break with the 
oligarchic structure of the state. I do not assume to be providing anything close 
to a complete overview of the multiple expressions of agency that have 
occurred over these decades. Instead, I intend to focus on those articulations 
that have gained a certain level of public projection and help to explain some of 
the challenges agency for social change has faced. This is in line with the 
central research interest of the thesis which is to determine the particular 
characteristics the current expressions of agency take on in the context of a co-
opted state, which will be explored in the following chapters. 
The chapter is divided in four sections focusing on different forms of agency. 
The first section focuses on a community-based agency emerging in the 1960s 
in the highland areas of the country. The following section will explore the 
revolutionary struggle of the guerrilla forces. The third analyses the emergence 
of a Mayan articulation in the shadow of the insurgent project in the 1980s. The 
last section will look at indigenous attempts to articulate demands from within 
institutional spaces. These divisions only aim to offer a general structure to the 
chapter as they obviously do not do the continuous flows of agency justice, as 
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different expressions of agency overlap, relate and emerge from one another.  
In the course of the chapter I will argue that the different generations of agency 
have been marked by two crucial challenges: The external constraints imposed 
by the state and elites through coercive, legal and co-optive mechanisms during 
the different periods of counter-insurgent and elite-controlled rule, and the 
sacrifice of the complex cultural character of the ‘local’ by democratic and 
revolutionary activists for a project aimed at the transformation of a national 
state. This has come at the cost of consolidating sustainable expressions of 
agency for change from the community level.  
 
Community activism and autonomous development in the central 
highlands 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the Árbenz government in 1944 
represented an attempt at breaking with the authoritarian regimes that had 
dominated the Guatemalan state. The temporary shift in power initiated a period 
of reforms based on the introduction of a number of legal frameworks such as 
the Guatemalan Agrarian Reform Law, decree 900, aimed at reorganising the 
rural economy and addressing the unequal societal structure. This democratic 
opening spurred organising processes among the rural as well as urban 
population. In the rural area large sections of the population were integrated into 
local agrarian councils, which in turn were affiliated to a national peasant union, 
the Liga Campesina (Handy, 1992). Similarly, in the urban areas the laws 
allowing the formation of unions and the introduction of the Labour Code paved 
the way for a quantitative and qualitative increase of union organisations. They 
also represented one of the main support bases for the governments of this 
democratic interlude (Yaganova, 2010).  
The spread of peasant unions and increasing presence of political parties in 
local elections did put certain pressure on the community institutions in the 
indigenous highlands. However, as scholars have been keen to point out (e.g. 
Handy, 1992; Smith 1992a), they did not dissolve the indigenous communal 
organisation and their organisational forms were not fully appropriated at this 
grass-roots level. Instead, in the highland communities’ electoral politics were 
frequently strategically defined in accordance with their own local interests. The 
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affiliation with peasant leagues and parties was seen as a strategic choice with 
local goals in mind such as getting rid of a repressive mayor or ensuring the 
redistribution of local estates, while the community continued to represent an 
oppositional pole to the state (Handy, 1992; Watanabe, 1992). This indicated 
the extent to which the communal framework continued to represent the most 
trusted and important reference frame for collective organising among the 
indigenous population. It also reflected the distance between the urban world of 
reforms and the rural areas as well as the limited success of attempts to 
promote the integration of the indigenous population into a national culture and 
state-building project guided by an urban, middle class leadership. 
The geographical and political distance also meant the military coup of 1954 
and the almost immediate reversal of the reforms implemented by the Árbenz 
and Arevalo governments had a much stronger impact on the urban areas. 
Here aspects such as the prohibition of union affiliation for public employees, 
the annulment of the Labour Code as well as restrictions to the right to strike 
had an immediate effect. Given the union’s demands towards the state, they 
rapidly became targets of the military regime's repressive operations and 
experienced a closure of organisational spaces.  
In rural areas on the other hand, the military state's attempts at establishing 
control were initially more gradual and discontinuous, thus, also leaving more 
space for organisational dynamics to continue. Additionally, the drive to seek 
distance from a gradually expanding state and its agents, who were directly 
associated with the sustained periods of repression, forced labour and the 
imposition of cultural frameworks, was stronger among the rural communities. 
This displacement and dispersal had over centuries been a constantly recurring 
pattern among the indigenous population as they sought to guarantee collective 
economic and cultural survival. Starting in the 1950s, this translated into the 
search for land by the highland communities. In most cases the colonization of 
land was directed towards inhabited areas, far from central administrative 
control. Religious organisations such as the US Maryknoll missionaries as well 
as the Catholic Action (Acción Católica, AC)43 played an important role in the 
                                                          
43 The Acción Católica was originally founded in 1946 by the church hierarchy as a conservative 
reaction to policies implemented by the reformist government of Árbenz. While originally aimed 
at furthering Christian conversion in the communities, the work of many missionaries challenged 
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revitalisation of the communal framework that merged well with the collective 
understandings rooted in Mayan worldview and language.   
Encouraged by the organisational dynamics instilled by the religious 
organisations in the areas of Quiché and Huehuetenango, a new leadership 
emerged among the communities. In many cases this resulted in an adjustment 
of power relationships within the communal framework. Traditional community 
elders that were seen as being linked to the interests of political parties or 
economic interests of the estate-owners and contractors lost their privileged 
positions (Warren, 1978; Falla, 1978; Le Bot, 1995). This power shift within the 
communities provided incentives especially for the younger generation among 
the communities in the highlands to join this search for unsettled land and target 
the areas in the northern parts of Quiché and Huehuetenango.  
While individual decisions were behind the impetus for this displacement, the 
community continued to represent the main reference point. Thus, members of 
the community that decided to move towards new lands normally continued to 
build on the support and to maintain close ties with their communities of origin 
(IRRMH, 2013). This displacement also offered an opportunity to escape the 
exploitative conditions community members faced working on the plantations 
and offered a solution to the limited availability of land suitable for cultivation in 
the highlands. On the newly colonised territory families from different 
communities, ethnicities and a ladino minority converged in places such as 
Santa María Tzejá, Xalbal and Cuarto Pueblo (Le Bot, 1995; Manz, 2005).  
The influence of the religious associations was evident in these dynamics of 
community-based empowerment, in some areas taking on paternalistic 
features, as charismatic priests dominated the social, political and economic 
interactions within the communities (Le Bot, 1995; Manz, 2005). However, they 
also bridged an organisational vacuum by linking the indigenous communities 
with markets and local institutions (Iniciativa de Memoria Historia, 2007). The 
use of chemical fertilisers, the availability of loans, the formation of cooperatives 
and campesino associations as well as the extension of schooling and radio-
                                                                                                                                                                          
not just traditional Mayan hierarchies but also the systems of social control benefiting ladinos. 
This in many cases stimulated a revitalisation of the community framework as well as 
challenges to what were perceived as repressive and exploitative relationships (Warren, 1978; 
Falla, 1978; Le Bot, 1995). 
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stations had a strong impact on these developments. Accordingly, the 
modernising notion was clearly present in these processes, thus, also reflecting 
the evolving characteristics of indigenous communities.  
The model of community-based development expanded and a network of 
cooperatives was established, which gradually integrated not only the newly 
colonized northern parts of the country but also the southern parts of the Quiché 
region (Smith, 1992b; Iniciativa Memoria Historica, 2007). As Manz (2005) 
mentions, by 1967 there were 145 rural cooperatives in the country involving 
more than twenty-seven thousand peasants. A later study by US-AID revealed 
that a total of 510 rural cooperatives in eight large federations with a combined 
membership of 132,000 people had established themselves by 1976, 
underlining this rapid expansion (Cabanas, 1992). 57% of the cooperatives 
were established in indigenous areas of the highlands. This meant they were 
having a strong impact on the organisational dynamics of the indigenous 
population, their market strategies and techniques of agricultural production 
(Davis, 1988). Additionally, these processes engendered an intense 
revitalisation of communal frameworks, where despite casting off some 
traditional religious beliefs and adapting to the contextual changes, Mayan 
language and thinking persisted.  
As indicated in chapter 3, by the 1960s the military was firmly in power and was 
keen to consolidate its role at the helm of the state in close alliance with the 
landholding elite. The latter were especially focused on reversing the reforms of 
the democratic interlude and re-implementing mechanisms to guarantee the 
supply of labour they required. At the same time the decrease in seasonal 
labour migration from the highland areas to the Costa Sur between 1969 and 
1977 had started to become apparent. This implicitly questioned the local power 
structures under control of local ladino contractors and regional estate owners, 
who in many cases also possessed plantations in the area of the Southern 
Coast. In the urban departmental centres, the unease of ladinos and the small 
fraction of indigenous merchants grew, as the expanding cooperatives 
increasingly represented competition for them (Manz, 2005; Iniciativa Memoria 
Historica, 2007).44 
                                                          
44 The consequences of these shifts and stratification of the regional economies were 
highlighted by the developments in the Ixil area, where a strong network of cooperatives had 
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Additionally, the national military and economic elites started to follow up on the 
economic potential identified in the area of the Northern Transversal Strip, 
targeting the land where the colonizing and cooperative movement had settled 
(Solano, 2005). They had recognised the ideal conditions for the production of 
agricultural crops, the establishment of extensive cattle ranches and potential 
presence of natural resources in the form of oil and minerals. As a result, a 
variety of measures were promoted to take control of the areas and bring an 
end to the community organising in the northern highlands of the country: 
A first reaction was the publication of a governmental decree by the Arana 
government in 1970 that declared the FTN a zone of ‘national interest’ and put 
an end to the possibilities of acquiring land titles in the area (IRRMH, 2013). 
In addition, with the financial support of US-AID and Israeli technical advice, a 
separate colonizing project was established, leading to the foundation of 
communities, which aimed to copy Kibbutzim modelled villages and established 
communities such as Nueva Jerusalem, Sinai and Belén in the area of the FTN. 
In contrast to the local and regional model implemented by the cooperative 
movement, the agricultural output of these newly-founded villages was oriented 
towards exports to international markets. This state-promoted colonisation 
project aimed at providing a counter-weight and limiting the space available to 
the previous community-based colonizing project (Manz, 2005; Iniciativa 
Memoria Historica, 2007). 
In southern parts of the Quiché region a further counterweight to the communal 
development model was implemented by US-AID through a network of 
cooperatives. Given their superior financial capacities the community 
cooperatives were unable to compete and in many cases were pushed towards 
bankruptcy (Dioceses del Quiché, 1994).45  
                                                                                                                                                                          
been established around the parish of Nebaj. Here over 400 members of AC were involved in 
the promotion of a network of local production that resulted in people and communities being 
able to avoid the influence exercised by the local ladino structures that had traditionally 
dominated trade and production in the area (Le Bot, 1995). 
45 In a report the dioceses of El Quiché accused these new cooperatives of seeking to 
undermine the former cooperative movement, which had been developed by the communities. 
Additionally, the pressure of economic shifts at a national level such as the inflation in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis of 1973 is likely to have played a role (Arias, 1992). 
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In the Ixil region the state responded with the establishment of military control 
posts in two of the largest local land-estates, La Perla and San Francisco in 
1968. While it seems probable that this initial movement of troops occurred in 
response to requests by local landowners, these demands for military presence 
were publicly voiced in 1973. At this point the indigenous mayor together with 
local contractors, representatives of the indigenous bourgeoisie and land-
owners of Nebaj directed a letter to President Arana alerting him to the 
presence of communists in the region and calling for the intervention of the 
army (Arias, 1992; Le Bot, 1995; González, 2011).46 
The respite the rural areas had enjoyed from the coercive strategies, which the 
military and allied paramilitary death squads had already been employing 
against political dissidents and union organisations in the urban areas, was 
over. Apart from the urban area of Guatemala City, the military operations had 
up to that point focused on the eastern departments of Zacapa and Izabal, 
where the first major guerrilla faction, the Armed Rebel Forces (Fuerzas 
Armadas Rebeldes, FAR) had opened fronts in 1963. However, in the 1970s 
this coercive attention turned towards the highland region, with repressive 
strategies being employed even before the presence of guerrilla forces in the 
area. The initial violence and orientation of the military operations in the 
highlands was clearly targeted at interrupting the consolidation and expansion 
of the community-based model. This translated into the massive disappearance 
and detention of community leaders, cooperative members and organisers of 
the church organisations and had a devastating impact on the organisational 
dynamics. By 1980 alone in the Quiché region 400 catechists had been 
murdered, ultimately leading to the withdrawal of the Catholic Church from El 
Quiché in 1980 (Cabanas, 1999).  
Primarily in the area surrounding the departmental capital, Santa Cruz del 
Quiché, the first wave of repression also spurred the formation of a new 
campesino organisation, the Peasants Unity Committee (Comité Unidad 
Campesina, CUC) in 1978. In specific areas of the region, this organisation 
inserted itself into the dynamics of the ongoing community based organising. 
Confirming the overlapping characteristics of the different forms of agency, most 
                                                          
46 Given that at the time there was no guerrilla presence in the area the ‘communist’ label was 
clearly used to refer to the cooperative movement and its leadership.  
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scholars (Le Bot, 1995; Palencia and Holliday, 1996; Payeras, 1997; Bastos 
and Camus, 2006) see a strong link between the founders and initial leadership 
of the CUC and one of the major guerrilla factions, the Guerrilla Army of the 
Poor (Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres, EGP) almost from the outset. As will be 
analysed in the following section, a handful of members of the EGP had started 
to operate in the region in the mid-70s. 
Accordingly, the coercive expansion of the military represented a response to 
the challenge the autonomous organisational patterns among the communities 
posed to the strategies of accumulation of the economic and military elites. In 
the context of an increasingly repressive and violent response by the state, new 
organisational forms inserted themselves among the indigenous communities, 
as the EGP sought to consolidate its operational base in the area. 
The growing levels of confrontation started to draw two distinct projects closer, 
a community-based, indigenous project that was emerging from a period of 
intense revitalisation of their collective framework and autonomous notions, as 
they sought to escape the centres of exploitation and domination, and an 
insurgent project with the objective of taking control of the institutional centres of 
power in order to rebuild society (Le Bot, 1995). As the military regime stepped 
up the intensity of their counter-insurgent campaigns, they did not differentiate 
between the guerrilla factions and the indigenous populations of the highlands 
at a discursive or operational level. This generated a complex and evolving 
relationship between communities and the insurgent factions.  
 
The revolution and the indigenous people: Encounters and dis-
encounters 
The initial emergence of the guerrilla factions can be directly linked to the 
context of the counter-revolution of 1954 that ousted the Árbenz regime. The 
military coup fundamentally impacted on the field of political organising in 
Guatemala with labour and urban organisations close to the outlawed 
Guatemalan Communist Party (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT) 
dominating these first attempts to respond to the newly implemented military 
regime. Over the following decades three main guerrilla factions would emerge: 
The FAR represented a first guerrilla group founded by dissenting army officers 
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in 1962. In part as a result of internal splits from this first group, two further 
factions, the aforementioned EGP and the Revolutionary Organization of the 
People in Arms (Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas, ORPA) 
were eventually formed. Since the initial insurgent activities were rapidly 
isolated, the operational strategies of the guerrilla operations were based 
primarily on the foquismo, which Jonas describes as “a strategy of irregular 
warfare leading to popular insurrection, with the ‘subjective conditions’ being 
created by the exemplary actions of a revolutionary vanguard” (Jonas, 1991, 
p.67). This approach based on small, mobile units launching attacks on targets 
followed by an almost immediate withdrawal also indicated the attempts among 
the leadership to replicate the strategies that had led to the success of the 
Cuban revolution in 1959. Efforts to establish a territorial project would be 
limited to the EGP’s operations in the highlands.  
It is generally acknowledged that none of the guerrilla factions acquired 
sufficient logistical capacity or manpower to threaten to overthrow military 
power, despite the fact that military intelligence and state propaganda 
strategically sought to exaggerate the strength of the guerrillas (Torres-Rivas, 
2006). There were obvious military constraints as the guerrilla factions faced 
one of the best equipped armies in Central America, which also counted on the 
constant logistic and tactical support by the USA. However, it is the analysis of 
the internal structure and relationship with the sections of the indigenous 
population that also reveals conceptual and practical limitations of the 
revolutionary project of the guerrillas. These are especially reflected in their 
failure to adequately address the complexity of the population and their 
organisational forms. This added to the previously mentioned constraints posed 
by the military state as well as its allies and would go on to influence patterns of 
later agency.  
The first references made to indigenous demands by the urban PGT were 
largely implicit and based on the assumption that the fight against the rule of the 
dominant classes would also engender the liberation of the indigenous people 
from cultural oppression. Intellectuals such as Joaquín Noval, Otto René 
Castillo and Luis Cardoza y Aragón were keen to underline the priority of 
maintaining national unity and advocate an alliance among the subaltern 
classes in this confrontation (Escobar Urrutia, 2013). This tendency continued 
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as the first major insurgent faction, the FAR, was formed.47 The direct 
participation of indigenous people in these initial insurgent attempts was limited 
and often restricted to specific tasks. Within the PGT scepticism prevailed with 
regards to indigenous integration into the revolutionary struggle, as they 
remained unconvinced by what they perceived as a passive political attitude 
among the indigenous peasants (Guerra Borges, 1964).48  
However, within one of the emerging guerrilla factions that later integrated the 
FAR, the Frente Guerrillero Edgar Ibarra (FGEI), voices did begin to emphasise 
the importance to reflect on the ethnic composition of the country. This role of 
advocating the indigenous revolutionary potential has been largely attributed to 
Ricardo Ramírez and Aura Marina Arriola. They attempted to consolidate the 
idea that indigenous members should be able to integrate the guerrilla factions 
under the same conditions as ladinos in order to lead their own struggle against 
inequality and oppression (Escobar Urrutia, 2013).  
Their views would also be key to a strategic shift of insurgent operations 
towards the north-western highlands of the country. They identified this area as 
more apt for the guerrilla's operations due to its rugged geographical conditions, 
the weak presence of the state as well as the predominance of semi-proletarian, 
indigenous population (Escobar Urrutia, 2013). Failing to find space for their 
opinions within the FAR, Aura Marina Arriola and Ricardo Ramírez withdrew 
and went on to participate in the foundation of the EGP.49 This opened a new 
chapter in the relationship between the indigenous population and the insurgent 
forces as the EGP sought to establish a much closer bond in the highlands.  
While the EGP went on to become the numerically largest guerrilla faction to 
establish itself in indigenous territories, another group emerging from the FAR 
went on to form ORPA. The latter’s ideological line was influenced by Jean-
Loup Herbert and Carlos Guzmán Boeckler, who had generated considerable 
                                                          
47 The FAR emerged from three smaller insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Movement 13th 
November, the Frente Guerrillero Edgar Ibarra (FGEI) and the Guerrilla of Concuá. 
48 As Escobar Urrutia points out this corresponds not just to the typical racist position of the 
ladino petty bourgeoisie but also to the classic Marxist view that attributed a conservative 
character to the indigenous campesinos (Escobar Urrutia, 2013) 
49 They first formed the New Revolutionary Organisation of Combat (Nueva Organización 
Revolucionaria de Combate, NORC) which would go on to be called EGP. 
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debate through their work that introduced the idea of “internal colonialism” into 
the relationship between indigenous and ladinos.50 
When comparing the attention paid by the insurgent organisations to the 
relation of the indigenous population with the revolutionary projects, ORPA and 
EGP stand out as the guerrilla factions seeking to develop a conceptual 
understanding that would allow their integration.51 The command of ORPA 
identified racism as a central element of the economic production processes 
and not just as an effect of the economic superstructure. They saw it as having 
extended into every aspect of public and private life, thus becoming a natural 
component in the exercise of power and oppression (ORPA, 1978). In contrast 
to other guerrilla factions, ORPA did have indigenous members in commanding 
positions almost from the beginning. However, despite contributing to stimulate 
the debate on racism among the revolutionary organisations, they fell short in 
integrating aspects such as internal colonialism into their articulation (Macleod, 
2013). 
The EGP followed the line of Latin American Marxism in its analysis of the 
ethnic-national dilemma with a leading role in its analysis attributed to Mario 
Payeras.52 While recognising the cultural specificities of the indigenous people it 
also stopped short of including an analysis on colonialism or highlighting the 
subordinate position attributed to indigenous culture. However, this faction did 
take tentative steps towards recognising the multinational constellation of the 
country. Accordingly, the EGP sought to address two interlinked objectives: On 
one hand, it highlighted the importance of class struggle, on the other it also 
issued a call to end the oppression and discrimination against the indigenous 
                                                          
50 By ‘internal colonialism’ Guzmán Böckler and Herbert (2002) refer to a process of historical 
and continued submission of the indigenous sections of the population not just to the Criollan 
factions. Instead they see this racist, colonial submission as also being reproduced by the 
ladino sections of the population. 
51 The PGT would also seek to consolidate a framework around the ‘indigenous question’ in the 
70s to address issues of discrimination and exploitation of the indigenous population. However, 
they continued to see their integration as the solution to the ‘ethnic-national problem’. As such 
the alliance between proletarian and semi-proletarian ladinos and indigenous was maintained 
as the overwhelming objective in the confrontation against the dominant classes.  
52 Most reflections on this topic are found in Payeras’ work “The indigenous people and the 
Guatemalan revolution” (Payeras, 1997). 
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people by the dominant class, aspects that constitute the “ethnic-national 
contradiction” (EGP, 1982, p.22).  
Nevertheless, as Macleod (2013) indicates, the EGP also attempted to reduce 
this ethnic-national contradiction to cultural expressions that did not interfere 
with the economy by differentiating between cultural elements they perceived as 
valid and those that should be abandoned. This was based on the assumption 
that racism or cultural oppression would automatically disappear with a change 
in the economic relations of production. It also attributed the role of deciding 
what aspects and rights of the indigenous people were acceptable or not to the 
high command of the organisation. As Macleod emphasises, this assumption 
becomes especially problematic given the practically non-existent 
representation of indigenous in the high command of the organisation (Macleod, 
2013). 
Among the different guerrilla factions, the prime motivation to address the 
indigenous issue was clearly down to the strategic goal of uniting forces in their 
struggle against the military government. Few attempts were made to develop 
an understanding of indigenous conceptual frameworks or knowledge. While 
the proposition of integrating the indigenous population into the revolutionary 
project represented an acknowledgement of their position as an excluded and 
repressed societal section, it did not necessarily imply a recognition or 
appreciation of their difference. Instead, the command of the revolutionary 
factions was intent on keeping control of the debates and potentially diverging 
opinions on the conceptualisation of the relationship between the indigenous 
population and the guerrilla forces. This can in part also be linked to the 
militaristic character of the insurgent factions, with the nature of state violence 
making a hierarchical structure a necessary condition to sustain their own 
operative patterns. However, the militaristic hierarchy was clearly also 
reproduced at the level of conceptual debates. 
The attempt to keep control of internal debates was evident in the reaction to a 
statement that had been elaborated by the Indigenous Movement Tojil, a group 
of Kaqchikel and K'iche members of the EGP. They had sought to highlight the 
weaknesses of an approach focusing exclusively on class struggle and pointed 
to the importance of integrating anti-colonial perspectives into the revolutionary 
framework. As part of this stance they also introduced the idea of autonomy for 
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the Mayan nations. These ideas clearly went beyond the conception of a 
multinational country as had been proposed by Mario Payeras and were 
strongly rejected by the command of the insurgent factions. Instead they 
accused the members of the Movimiento Tojil of causing divisions by 
overemphasising the ethnic dimension.  
These indigenous members ended up being marginalised with authors such as 
Macleod (2013) and Dary (2013) arguing that this approach of keeping control 
over conceptual debates contributed to an alienation of indigenous members. 
They also highlight this aspect as preparing the ground for the split between 
Mayanist and popular organisations. This divide that will be analysed in the 
following section would continue to mark patterns of indigenous organising 
especially in the course of the 1990s.  
Apart from the analysis of these debates at a conceptual level, as the guerrilla 
factions sought to address the indigenous population, there have also been 
attempts to analyse the relationship on the ground to establish the degree of 
indigenous participation in the insurgent project. Within these discussions two 
general lines of literature can be identified: One has interpreted the war and the 
conflict as external to the culture and interests of the indigenous and sees them 
as having been caught between two opposed armed sections (e.g. Stoll, 1993; 
Le Bot, 1995).53 The second strand of literature has tended to highlight a more 
active role played by the indigenous population during the war. It suggests an 
alliance with the guerrilla forces as the indigenous people identified them as a 
way to address their situation of exploitation and oppression (eg. Smith, 1992c; 
Grandin, 1997; Hurtado Paz y Paz, 2011; González, 2011; Gutiérrez, 2011) 
Covering this debate would clearly breach the objectives of this chapter as 
geographical differences and diverging modes of operating of the different 
insurgent factions and indigenous groups add a huge complexity to this 
relationship. But following up on the agency presented in the previous section, a 
short overview of the dynamics in this relationship in the Northern Quiché can 
give a sense of its complexity. This seems to suggest the need for a nuanced 
                                                          
53 More recent work also indicates a more nuanced approach by highlighting how groups who 
criticized the guerrillas' reluctance to deal with issues of culture ended up being accused of 
being traitors by members of the guerrilla (Bastos and Camus, 2003; Brett, 2007) 
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approach to grasp the trajectory of organising and resistance ongoing among 
the indigenous population in the area. 
In the case of the Northern Quiché, where the biggest guerrilla faction, the EGP, 
sought to establish itself, the wave of repression against the indigenous 
communities and its leaders had already begun before the presence of the 
guerrilla in the area. The persecution of the cooperative movement obviously 
contributed to fuelling the antagonistic relationship of the indigenous 
communities with local and state elites. Accordingly, the increase of repressive 
strategies against the communities drew them closer to the revolutionary project 
as Gurriarán states in the case of the Ixil people: 
“The Ixil people had a long trajectory of struggle, for a long time and it was as if 
two rivers united in a common struggle. There are wrong ideas about how the 
Ixil (people) got involved with the guerrilla. The people think it was the guerrilla 
that sought the Ixil (people) but the history I know is that the Ixil (people) went to 
seek the guerrilleros who were in Ixcán, looking for a way of entering the Ixil 
territory. Two traders from Cotzal (Town in the Ixil region) after a meeting with 
Acción Católica were sent by their communities to talk with the guerrilla.” 
(Gurriarán quoted in González 2011, p.45)  
While this clearly restores the initiative with the indigenous population, this did 
not result in the revolutionary project absorbing the indigenous communities. 
Instead, the relationship of the communities and the insurgent forces continued 
to be relational. As Le Bot (1995) points out, this was in part also due to the 
diverging organisational logics inherent to their reading of realities: While the 
guerrilla was aiming to constitute and present themselves as a quasi-state or a 
counter-state, the indigenous communities were directed at goals embedded in 
their everyday relationships such as land, community and survival. Additionally, 
the guerrilla movement’s hierarchical notions and its idea of forcing the course 
of history stood in contrast to the processes of communal decision-making and 
the long-term thinking integral to the sense-making activities of the indigenous 
communities. 
The revolutionary project and many of its intellectuals failed to take into account 
the existing levels of communal organisation that marked the area previous to 
the insertion of the guerrilla forces. Instead, as Payeras critically pointed out, 
the insurgent factions considered themselves as playing an avant-guardist role 
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and as bearing the responsibility of “bringing revolutionary conscience” to the 
indigenous population (Payeras, 1998).  
In the region the tolerance and support for the guerrillas' presence among many 
communities increased with the rising levels of repression. The decision by 
community members to take up arms and join the guerrilla ranks was in many 
cases not taken just at an individual level. Instead, in many cases it was backed 
by the community if its members saw this as concordant with community 
interests. This in turn tended to strengthen the bond between the insurgents 
and the communities, whose members had integrated the guerrilla ranks 
(Interview anthropologist, Guatemala City, 04/10/2014).  
However, as the cases of many communities in the Quiché region showed, 
even at the height of the military operations they remained wary of external 
imposition and the community represented the most trusted entity from which to 
establish strategies of resistance. As the EGP attempted to foment its own 
organisational dynamics in the course of the 80s by expanding the peasant 
organisation CUC into the areas further north of the regional capital Santa Crúz 
del Quiché, this was frequently rejected by communities. At the same time “the 
call for arms for protection from the military operations among the communities 
was a permanent one, however these arms were never provided” (Interview 
anthropologist, Guatemala City, 04/10/2014). 
Even in areas of intense collaboration, the community structures never ceased 
to give up a certain degree of organisational and functional autonomy with 
regards to the hierarchical structure of the insurgent project. This can be 
attributed to the fact that the EGP never developed the logistical and 
organisational capacity to incorporate broader sections of the population into 
their struggle. However, the collective sense of the communities as well as their 
organisational logics required a space for the reproduction of this communal life 
that the insurgent project could not offer. In the context of the violence this 
translated into forms of agency in the shadow of the insurgent project, often far 
from the public spotlight, while the army showed no intent to differentiate 
between the communities and the insurgents. 
A recent analysis (IRRMH, 2013) sheds light on the patterns of dispersion into 
the highlands that as mentioned constituted a frequently returning strategy of 
resistance among the indigenous communities. In the Quiché area this was the 
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case of thousands of people who for years lived in constant displacement in the 
mountains to form the Communities of Population in Resistance (Comunidades 
de Población en Resistencia, CPR). Although in many cases this brought them 
closer to the insurgent factions, the relationship was also constantly marked by 
tension.54 Thus, the communities sought to preserve a degree of autonomy and 
the organisational patterns they trusted most to evade political and military 
control by the state (Cabanas, 1999; IRRMH, 2013; Interview community 
activists, Nebaj, 06/11/2013).  
However, in areas that became the focal points of counter-insurgent campaigns 
and state penetration, the chances for the indigenous communities to struggle 
as communities against the state diminished. Between 1978 and 1985 601 
massacres would occur murdering tens of thousands of unarmed civilians and 
destroying over 400 villages, the majority of them in the western highlands 
(CEH, 1999). As the military began to expand its territorial control, the sections 
among the indigenous communities collaborating with the army increased, even 
though in most cases this represented an attempt to guarantee survival or 
responded to imposition. This was especially the case after the shift in military 
strategies following the 1982 coup by Rios Montt indicated in chapter 3. Thus, 
the brutal waves of repression were complemented by the militarization of the 
country with the forced introduction of PAC units and the expansion of military 
controlled ‘poles of development’. In this context any dissent was brutally 
eliminated and the impact on community networks was severe as they were left 
disrupted and penetrated by the state's attempt to redefine them. 
By 1984 the guerrilla forces were practically defeated, although they held on for 
another 12 years until the formal Peace Agreements were signed in 1996. As 
the chances for peace between the military and the guerrilla forces increased, 
the framework of the community seemed to pale into insignificance. New forms 
of agency appeared more appropriate to articulate demands and indigenous 
understandings. Additionally, a new indigenous leadership had emerged in part 
from within the ranks of the insurgent groups and increasingly questioned the 
subordinate role they were playing in the revolutionary project. 
 
                                                          
54 Payeras (1998) also provides a series of accounts of these tensions between indigenous 
communities and the guerrillas.  
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Emerging Mayan discourses in the context of the Peace Accords 
As indicated in the previous section an important part of the indigenous 
organising during the armed conflict took place in the shadow of the insurgent 
groups often distant from the public spotlight and without being absorbed by the 
revolutionary project. Other patterns of agency such as the CUC were directly 
stimulated by the guerrilla factions, especially the EGP. Although originally 
founded and promoted by non-indigenous intellectuals in the capital, the 
organisation was able to establish itself in certain areas of the highlands. This 
was especially the case in the areas around Santa Cruz del Quiché in the 
southern Quiché region, where it benefited from the previous communitarian 
organising (Le Bot, 1995; Velasquez Nimatuj, 2008). Following the patterns of 
AC, it initially aimed to incorporate communities into an organisational 
framework to counter the state’s offensive that was undermining the autonomy 
of the communities and violently targeting their leadership.  
While the CUC’s expansion in some areas of the highlands such as the 
northern parts of the Quiché and Huehuetenango was restricted as its 
organisational forms clashed with the communal structures55, it did consolidate 
as the biggest campesino organisation at a national level. It proved especially 
influential in the Southern coast amongst the permanent and seasonal workers 
on the plantations in organising their demands for higher pay and better working 
conditions. At the same time their members became a target for political 
persecution and after the occupation of the Spanish embassy in 198056 as well 
as the protagonist role in the strikes in the plantations of the Southern Coast 
during the first months of the same year, the organisation was forced to go 
                                                          
55 Hurtado Paz y Paz (2011) comments on the unsuccessful attempts of the CUC to expand in 
Huehuetenango by arguing its failure was due to the fact that the initiative for this expansion 
had not come from the communities. Instead it occurred on orders of the EGP. Interviews in the 
Ixil area echoed this view.  
56 On the 31st of January 1980 a group of indigenous peasants associated with CUC and 
students had occupied the Spanish embassy, seeking to echo their denunciation of the ongoing 
massacres and persecution in the highlands. However, security forces stormed the embassy 
killing 37 people leaving only two survivors, among them the Spanish ambassador. The other 
survivor, a peasant from the Quiché area was kidnapped the same day, tortured and killed. The 
events have remained a crucial symbolic aspect in indigenous consciousness for resistance and 
would also remain a crucial aspect of later mobilisation.   
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underground. In this period the links between many members of CUC and the 
armed struggle of the EGP were strengthened. 
Forms of non-violent collective action practically played no role in the 
implementation of a democratic constitution in 1984. The ferocity with which the 
counter-insurgent strategies targeted any dissent meant public popular 
organising was practically non-existent and no mobilisation preceded or 
accompanied this first step towards a formal transition (Brett, 2006). As outlined 
in chapter 3, this clearly constituted a top-down driven transition that coincided 
with a reformulation of military counter-insurgent strategies and the pressure of 
economic elites, who were keen to access international markets and attract 
foreign investment.   
However, in the midst of the continuing political and military confrontation of the 
80s a new indigenous leadership emerged from within or close to the ranks of 
the insurgent organisations. This was accompanied by a growing attention to 
indigenous people and their rights at an international level, the Declarations of 
Barbados (1971, 1977, 1994), the increasingly public demands of indigenous 
people, as well as the creation of indigenous frameworks within the UN’s 
institutional body (Rangel Romero, 2013).57  
As analysed in the previous section, the growing attention to indigenous issues 
around identity, language and spirituality also impacted on internal discussions 
of the insurgent groups. While the indigenous positions within the EGP were 
primarily articulated by the Movimiento Tojil, other organisations close to this 
guerrilla faction were also involved in the publication of the so-called 
‘Declaration of Iximché’. The presentation of the Declaration in February 1980 
at the Mayan ruins of Iximché has been identified by some authors as the 
foundational moment for a new generation of indigenous agency that would 
emerge over the following decades (e.g. Vela 2008; Esquit 2010; Macleod 
                                                          
57 The attention to indigenous people at a national and international level also continued over 
the following decades: The approval of the convention 169 of the International Labour 
Organisationa (ILO), the international year of indigenous people in 1991, the Nobel Peace Prize 
for Rigoberta Menchú in 1992, the Declaration of the First International Decade of Indigenous 
People from 1994-2004, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Questions in 2000 as well as the 
nomination of a Special Rapporteur for Indigenous People constituted an ideal framework to 
promote similar demands. 
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2011). Its content was primarily aimed at denouncing human rights violations 
perpetrated by the army and the massacre in the Spanish embassy, while also 
issuing a call to the indigenous people to rise up against the oligarchic state. It 
also integrated novel elements such as explicit steps towards re-vindicating the 
Mayan cultural heritage and denouncing the historic racism to which the 
indigenous people were subjected (Declaración de Iximché, 1980).  
Accordingly, the fact that the indigenous communities and their territories had 
become the focal point of state repression translated into calls for a stronger 
position within the insurgent factions and demands for more attention to be paid 
to the aspect of ethnic difference. Macleod (2011) argues the Declaration 
seemed to correspond to a strategy by the indigenous members of CUC and 
EGP to seek alliances outside these organisations in order to strengthen their 
demands within the EGP. At the time they were still wary of breaking with the 
insurgent groups (Macleod, 2011). Nonetheless, a divide would consolidate, as 
a number of organisations pushed towards gaining independence and limiting 
the influence of the guerrilla factions that by 1982 had united under an umbrella 
organisation the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad 
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG,).58  
This revitalisation of organisational patterns beyond the guerrilla organisations 
would increase in the course of the 1980s and was also linked to contextual 
changes. The military and restrictive counter-insurgent policies continued to 
play a crucial role in governance, the context of the transitional framework, 
which as mentioned in the previous chapter, was formalised with the 
constitution of 1985. It did however also leave more space for other types of 
civil organising. This fomented new kinds of social activism and was crucial for 
the ability to denounce human rights violations that led to the emergence of 
organisations such as the Mutual Support Group (Grupo Apoyo Mutuo, GAM) in 
1984, the National Coordination of Guatemalan Widows (Coordinadora de 
Viudas de Guatemala, CONAVIGUA) in 1988, the National Council of Displaced 
Persons of Guatemala (Consejo Nacional de Desplazados de Guatemala, 
CONDEG) in 1988 and the Permanent Commissions of Refugees (Comisiones 
Permanentes de Refugiados) in 1989.  
                                                          
58 The URNG represented an attempt to increase coordination among the four most important 
insurgent factions (EGP, FAR, ORPA and PGT). 
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The URNG continued to exercise strong influence on a section of emerging 
popular organisations during the end of the 1980s and reinforced the attention 
to socio-economic issues among them. The articulations of popular groups such 
as the union organisations Unit for Union and Popular Action (Unidad de Accion 
Sindical y Popular, UASP) and the Guatemalan Trade Union Confederation 
(Union Sindical de Trabajadores de Guatemala, UNSITRAGUA) followed in the 
line of traditional left policies and were concentrated in the capital and the 
Southern Coast. However, these union organisations soon lost impetus, 
whereas the popular movements proved more capable to adapt to the changes 
in the political landscape as the peace process approached and the formal 
negotiations were taken up in 1990 (Brett, 2006).  
In this context the debates on the role of ethnicity also led to a deepening divide 
within the organisational spectrum: ‘Culturalist’ groups emerged to challenge 
the guerrilla movements due to their neglect of ethnic dimensions of oppression 
and exclusion. They went on to emphasise demands related to linguistic and 
cultural identity as well as the preservation of Mayan cosmovision. Conversely, 
a ‘popular’ wing of organisations emerged with closer ties to the URNG and a 
continued focus on socio-economic issues (Howell and Pearce, 2001; Bastos, 
2010; Dary, 2013; Macleod, 2013).  
As Howell and Pearce (2001) indicate, this did not imply unity within the 
respective organisational wings. Instead divisions and rifts would continue 
between the different organisations and factions within these camps, as they 
fought over the representation of the indigenous people. International dynamics 
such as the congress for the anniversary of 500 years of indigenous resistance 
and the Nobel Prize to Rigoberta Menchú did not reconcile these cleavages 
within indigenous organising. Instead the divide between the ‘popular’ and 
‘culturalist’ indigenous organisations was consolidated as the negotiations for 
the Peace Accords were formally initiated in the 1990s. The cultural wing 
formed the Asamblea Permanente del Pueblo Maya as a coordinating body, 
while the Instancia de Unidad y Consenso Maya was formed as the 
representative entity for the groups with closer links to popular organisations. 
The split of the National Coordination of Indigenous Peoples and Peasants 
(Coordinación Nacional Indígena y Campesina, CONIC) from CUC in 1992 was 
seen as symbolising a further push towards ethnic aspects, this time within the 
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peasant movement. CONIC attempted to integrate an ethnic perspective into 
their struggle for land by placing emphasis on the central role of land in 
indigenous culture. Additionally, this move represented a definitive break with 
the command of the EGP, which continued to have a strong influence on CUC 
(Brett, 2006; Velásquez Nimatuj, 2008). 
The organisational patterns entered a new phase in 1994 as the creation of a 
Civil Society Assembly (Asamblea de Sociedad Civil, ASC) was brokered by the 
UN to act as a consultative body in the peace negotiations. The ASC was to 
elaborate proposals on the most important aspects of the peace process such 
as refugees and displacement, human rights, indigenous rights, socio-economic 
reforms and demilitarisation. Multilateral institutions such as the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the Inter-American Development Bank 
were also embracing the idea of enhancing non-governmental programs as an 
alternative to the discredited political parties (Howell and Pearce, 2001). This 
meant the participation of the ASC was primarily down to the pressure 
exercised by these international actors, who were able to convince economic 
and military elites to accept some kind of societal involvement.  
However, this international influence went beyond facilitating these spaces for 
participation, given that virtually all organisations taking part in the negotiations 
were funded by international donors. It consolidated conditions and criteria for 
the organisations and in many cases led them to embrace de-radicalised 
discourses validated by the international institutions. The indigenous leadership 
was increasingly professionalised and institutionalised, aspects that were 
reflected in their demands that ceased to be directed at seeking societal 
backing for their demands. Instead, in many cases, their attention shifted 
towards seeking to develop specific activities or projects with the support of 
international donors (Biekart, 1999; Bastos, 2010). Accordingly, as Howell and 
Pearce argued with regards to the increase of organisations, “foreign donors 
rather than real social processes were behind a great deal of the growth, which 
was divorced from grass-roots organising in rural communities and rural 
consciousness.” (Howell and Pearce, 2001)  
As indigenous leaders were invited to be part of the ASC, the different 
coordinating bodies of the popular and Mayanist organisations had reunited in 
1994 under the Coordination of Organisations of the Mayan People in 
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Guatemala (Coordinación de Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala, 
COPMAGUA) to put forward their delegates. Accordingly, COPMAGUA united 
over 100 indigenous organisations with the mandate to develop drafts for the 
Aggreement on Identity and Rights of the Indigenous People (Acuerdo sobre 
Identidad y Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas, AIDPI).  
One feature of this evolution in the context of the peace negotiations was that 
the articulations began to place a stronger emphasis on a broader identity of the 
indigenous people around the term “Maya”. This evolved into a concept that 
built on the understandings of difference based on criteria such as language, 
rights and spirituality. At the same time, it proved to be an attempt at advancing 
a broader identity and finding common elements among the 21 different 
linguistic Mayan groups (Bastos, 2010). COPMAGUA represented a space for a 
wide range of perspectives and expressions of indigenous struggles to 
converge, while also adding the discourse of indigenous rights to the 
articulations of the different organisations. By emphasising these aspects, it 
also consolidated the separation of the organisational processes around ethnic 
demands from the class-focused approaches that had dominated social 
articulations up to that point (Brett, 2006; Ba Tiul, 2009). 
However, de facto participation and influence of the indigenous organisations 
on the writing of the Accords was marginal. Only a limited number of proposals 
presented to the ASC by COPMAGUA actually reached the negotiating parties 
(Dary, 2013). Despite this vacuum in indigenous participation the Accord on 
Identity and Rights of Indigenous People (AIDPI) was initially perceived as 
surprisingly progressive in its formulations and as paving the way for a more 
inclusive nation-building process. However, as a closer examination indicated, 
the strong influence of international conventions such as the convention 169 of 
the ILO also translated into weaknesses. Based on international conventions, 
the Accord does outline reforms to ensure constitutional recognition and 
mechanisms to guarantee the participation of indigenous people, however, its 
formulation remains vague (Dary, 2013). Additionally, polemic issues such as 
territorial control and the demand for autonomy based on the administration of 
indigenous territories through the designation of their own authorities, forms of 
organisation and participation, were not incorporated. Indigenous organisations 
failed to gain the support of the URNG and civil society groups for this idea of 
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regional autonomy for ethno-linguistic communities, as the idea of ‘national 
unity’ remained central to the Accord (Costello and Sieder, 1996; Bastos and 
Camus, 2003; Brett, 2006; Bastos, 2010;).  
The impact of civil society organisations on a second crucial part of the Peace 
Agreement, the “Accord on Socio-economic aspects and the Agrarian 
Situation”, was even more restricted. From the outset the agrarian elites made 
sure their core interests would not be affected, while the peasant organisations 
had to concede that they would not be able to press for a substantial agrarian 
reform. As a result, the Accord stipulated market-based approaches such as the 
allocation of credits, technical and commercial assistance instead of 
redistributive measures. The broader influence of neoliberal policies in the 
context of the post-war period seemed to provide no space to question the 
liberalisation mechanisms or market-based approaches with regards to the land 
issue (Brett, 2006).  
To ensure the implementation of the Accords a number of parity commissions 
were set up. Government officials and representatives of the indigenous 
organisations of COPMAGUA were meant to elaborate proposals aimed at 
changes in legislation and making them adequate to the requirements of the 
Indigenous People. However, as Arzú’s government took office in 1996, 
decision-making power and high-ranking government officials were withdrawn 
from the commissions. This indicated a strategy to weaken these spaces that 
had been set up to guarantee civil participation in policy formulation (Ba Tiul, 
2009). Additionally, the dynamics of the parity commissions had followed logics 
similar to those of the ASC, as the participants were not delegated by a larger 
collective or sections of the indigenous people. Instead, they were selected 
according to individualising modes of representation that continued to 
undermine their link with the grass-roots communities (Interview community 
activist, Guatemala City, 17/07/2012).  
Accordingly, the indigenous organisations had been drawn towards spaces and 
mechanisms, although the economic elites had already taken control of the 
institutional framework as such. This is reflected in the sarcastic comment of a 
government official to a member of a permanent commission, “don’t worry, even 
if you elaborate a proposal it will not be passed in Congress” (quoted in Bastos 
and Camus, 2003, p.177). This suggests that a large part of the decision-
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making on functions, policies and laws was undermined by informal 
determination and opaque negotiations, as the co-optive mechanisms of elites 
were already firmly in place to ensure their core interests would not be at stake. 
A further set-back for indigenous issues followed in the referendum of 1999 in 
which a series of reforms that had been negotiated as part of the Peace 
Accords were rejected. These reforms had been meant to at least formally 
redefine Guatemala as a multicultural, ethnically plural and multilingual nation, 
but failed to gain the necessary support, with only 19% of the registered voters 
participating. Additionally, political parties linked to economic elites and sections 
of the army had been efficient in using scare tactics, alleging the risk of 
‘balkanization’ and ‘reverse racism’ if the reforms were passed (Warren, 2002). 
The dissolution of COPMAGUA, which occurred at the same time, seemed to 
bring the indigenous organising within a civil society framework to an end. 
However, another pattern of indigenous articulation would gain impetus as 
some leaders persevered in their focus on institutional participation.   
 
Institutional representation and electoral participation: Indigenous leaders 
entering an elite-dominated state 
As indicated in chapter 3, following the transitional framework implemented in 
1985 political parties had been established as the prime vehicles for 
participation and formulation of political agendas. In 1995 for the first time a left-
leaning party, the New Guatemala Democratic Front (Frente Democratico 
Nueva Guatemala, FDNG) took part in the electoral contest, supported by 
sections of the left as well as indigenous organisations close to Rigoberta 
Menchú.59 As they achieved 8% of the votes and 6 seats in congress, some 
saw this as an important advance for indigenous and popular participation in 
electoral contests. Additionally, a number of civic committees participated in 
                                                          
59 Rigoberta Menchú, is the daughter of Vicente Menchú, a member of CUC, who was killed in 
the massacre of the Spanish embassy in 1980. She rose to fame after her story was published 
in 1985 by Venezuelan Anthropologist Elizabeth Burgos, “My Name is Rigoberta Menchú and 
this is how my conscience was born”. Since, she has campaigned for human and indigenous 
rights issues and has been involved in court cases aiming to bring members of the Guatemalan 
political and military establishment to justice. In 1992 she received the Nobel Peace Prize. 
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local elections and resulted in Rigoberto Quemé Chay remarkably winning the 
mayoral position in Quetzaltengo, Guatemala’s second largest city (Brett, 2006). 
However, the first electoral processes reflected a low indigenous involvement in 
party activism in the midst of a general apathy towards electoral contests. As 
the electoral processes failed to spark a political appropriation among large 
sections of the indigenous population this situation also played into the hands of 
elites as they took charge of the institutional framework of the state. Especially 
the referendum of 1999, which was designed to measure support for a range of 
reforms, among them those dealing with indigenous issues, gave an early 
indication of the elite's capacity to strategically mobilise the necessary sections 
of the electorate. In this case the abstention rate of 81% indicated how the 
distance between the institutions and especially the rural communities, worked 
to their benefit in electoral competitions. 
It also highlighted how the participative impetus of the ASC in the context of the 
Peace Accords had not gone beyond the directly participating organisations and 
leadership. Instead, they were drawn into elitist patterns of exclusive 
negotiations and decision-making, while at the same time undoing the link with 
broader society. The rejection of the referendum and the proposed reforms that 
were meant to initiate a multicultural reformulation of the country were followed 
by the break-up of COPMAGUA, bringing this attempt at coordinating and 
articulating a broader Mayan organisational spectrum to an end.  
Despite the fact that the process of the ASC and the referendum had illustrated 
the detachment of the indigenous leaders especially from the rural communities, 
this did not bring about a definitive shift in their strategies. Instead, a new 
chapter of interaction with formal institutional spaces began as individual 
leaders accepted offers to occupy state positions. These institutional positions 
were taken up despite the fact that the respective governments were controlled 
and dominated by factions of the economic elites and held a clearly antagonistic 
view to indigenous issues. Rigoberta Menchú, Otilia Lux and Demetrio Cojti 
were only some of the indigenous leaders that went on to take up positions 
under the different governments in the aftermath of the Peace Accords.  
A variety of authors (Bastos and Camus, 2003; Quemé Chay, 2008; Ba Tiul, 
2009; Brett, 2010) have questioned this involvement signalling it as 
representing an individualised entrance into politics that lacked strategic vision. 
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They have argued that while the indigenous leaders' role in terms of political 
impact and presence has been marginal they played an important symbolic role 
for the various governments. Accordingly, they contributed to legitimate the 
respective government and their supposed commitment to the promotion of 
indigenous issues, although they were actually assigned to marginal ministries 
that were left without resources or subordinate positions within the state 
dependencies.  
On the other hand, the discourses pronounced by the indigenous functionaries 
from the so-called ‘indigenous windows’ (Cojti, 2005) contained maximalist 
notions and were framed around the concept of the Maya as a civilizational, 
original identity. This meant the Mayan identity was linked primarily to cultural 
aspects such as the promotion of bilingual education and Mayan languages as 
well as the protection of sacred Mayan sites. Underlying these attempts to 
access institutional power and penetrate traditional elite circles, was a rather 
naïve assumption that “the actions of a small group of professionals would have 
the capacity to solve the problem of exclusion of the entire indigenous people” 
(Bastos, 2010, p.26).  
However, this indigenous institutional participation coincided with economic 
policies of the respective post-war governments that were in effect furthering 
exclusion and inequality especially among the rural indigenous communities. 
This meant the indigenous presence in the government’s ranks enabled them to 
participate in a discursive definition of Mayan identity and a multicultural 
approach from power. In doing so, they rubber-stamped policies Hale (2002) 
has signalled as representing a form of ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ expressed in 
a combination of democratic opening and persistent authoritarian practices. He 
points to the sophisticated modes of operation this form of multiculturalism 
takes on as it articulates from an institutional level while reaching out to the 
indigenous communities. In Hale’s view the democratic opening goes just far 
enough to discourage frontal opposition without allowing substantive change, 
thus differentiating between cultural recognition and empowerment. This also 
seems to represent an attempt to erode any political connotation to ethnic and 
cultural difference. Instead a politically un-problematic, folkloric meaning is 
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celebrated that does not pose a challenge to the political and economic 
interests promoted by the elites.60 
On the other hand an institutionalisation of public mechanisms with regards to 
the rights of indigenous people in order to attend issues related to racism, 
discrimination and access to justice for indigenous people has been 
acknowledged: The Unit for the Defence of the Rights of the Indigenous People 
part of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Defence of the Rights of Indigenous 
women (Defensora de la Mujer Indígena, DEMI), the Commission against 
Discrimination and Racism (Comisión contra la Discriminacion y el Racismo, 
CODISRA), the Advisory Council for of Indigenous People for the Vice-
presidency are only some of a total of 30 dependencies. However, the 
inefficiency of these mechanisms and institutions has been persistently pointed 
out. Accordingly, the vague and complex formulation of their mandate, strong 
limitations on funds, unqualified staff as well as the thriving corruption and 
general shortcomings of the Guatemalan state-bureaucracy have contributed to 
impede any significant results (Interview human rights activist, Guatemala City, 
12/09/2012; Dary, 2013).  
Additionally, the various institutional mechanisms to promote indigenous issues 
seem to have fomented a tendency to focus agency on reformulating and 
reforming legal aspects. The field of legislation has been an aspect in which 
considerable progress has been achieved. Thus, decrees and accords have 
been approved for a range of issues such as the recognition of indigenous 
identity, indigenous organisation and costumes, indigenous mayors as well as 
the right for consultation of indigenous communities and authorities. However, 
this strong focus on creating a legal basis has also fomented a type of “legal co-
option” (Ba Tiul, 2009), which means that all demands and struggles are 
oriented at becoming legally binding through ministerial accords or 
governmental law. At the same time their implementation remains highly 
deficient, reflecting the power constellation surrounding the state institutions 
and their functions. Accordingly, as an interviewee stated, “even if the state 
wanted to concede these rights, elites make sure it does not really have the 
                                                          
60 Bastos (2010) provides an example for the state’s appropriation of the definition of ‘Maya’ by 
pointing to the fact that Mayan spirituality is even used to legitimate mining projects in 
indigenous territories.  
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capacity to guarantee their implementation.” (Interview human rights activist, 
Guatemala City, 02/10/2012) 
Apart from the outlined integration into institutional spaces another dynamic was 
injected into indigenous organising by the electoral participation of Rigoberta 
Menchú in 2007 and 2011. It soon became clear that there would be little 
support among rural popular organisations and communities, where this 
decision was perceived as having been taken by urban indigenous leaders. 
Instead of consolidating a broader movement, this renewed attempt at 
articulating a political project contributed to deepen divides among the different 
indigenous organisations and recently emerging coordinating bodies such as 
Waquib Kej. Although it drew some support among sections of indigenous 
peasant organisations such as CONIC, Menchú’s initial nomination had again 
tended to follow the pattern of top-down decision-making and failed to relate or 
build on the participation of the rural communities she was seeking to represent. 
Additionally, in 2007 Rigoberta Menchú decided not to launch her campaign 
around an indigenous platform and instead formed an alliance with Encuentro 
por Guatemala, a party that had no links to indigenous organising. 
The disenchantment was reflected in the electoral results of 2007 and repeated 
in 2011 as Rigoberta Menchú undertook another attempt to run for presidency, 
this time as a representative of a leftist coalition, Winaq which included the 
former URNG. In both electoral participations the errors of the 1999 referendum 
were repeated, as the support at an international level was mistaken for that of 
popular backing (Bastos, 2010; 2013). As an interviewee stated: “One asks, 
how it is possible that in the village of Rigoberta (Menchú), Rigoberta achieved 
17 votes? That means not even the people affiliated to the party voted for her. 
She was not capable of deciphering the codes that make active the participation 
of the people that are frequently political and not ethnic. They are pragmatic and 
are so from the local, therefore to understand them, you have to be with the 
people. These are the dimensions of the distance between the current 
leadership or ‘Mayan elites’, with regards to the rest of the population.” 
(Interview UN-official, Guatemala City, 24/09/2012) 
The discourses failed to link with the experiences of every-day life in the rural 
hinterlands. In these areas the indigenous communities were already mobilising 
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around the opposition to exploitation of natural resources, an aspect Menchú’s 
campaign hardly addressed. 
However, building on the elements presented in the previous chapter, the 
electoral dynamics had been inserted into a context in which elites had taken 
control of the institutions. Political parties had a clear instrumental purpose to 
access institutions and favour determined strategies of accumulation and 
political interests. The establishment of clientelistic relationships with potential 
voters rather than political processes became crucial for electoral success, 
while the dependence of political parties on the financial resources of elite 
factions was upheld. Accordingly, the electoral arena was converted into a 
framework for competition between different elite factions seeking access to 
state institutions in order to determine institutional functions, policies and laws in 
line with their strategies of accumulation.  
This generation of agency based on institutional and electoral participation 
faced various limitations: Firstly, it was confronted with a post-war state firmly 
under control of traditional and emerging elites, intent on reconfiguring and co-
opting the institutional functions and operations. In this context spaces for top-
down changes were clearly restricted by the elites’ dominance, which was 
primarily based on the informal and illegal determination of formal spaces and 
decision-making processes.  
Secondly, in the course of the various attempts at institutional participation the 
detachment of the indigenous leadership from the grass-roots communities had 
increased. This was not just reflected in the distance between the urban 
institutional spaces and the rural communities but also in their discourses that 
failed to speak to the communities and the problems they were facing. 
Accordingly, this approach was unlikely to overcome the historically 
consolidated and widespread suspicion with regards to the state and elites, 
especially among the highland indigenous communities. As the following 
chapter will outline, this distrust was further fuelled as the reconfiguration of 
rural territories in line with policies oriented at the exploitation of natural 
resources, gained pace.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to present a general overview of different forms of 
agency over time in Guatemala by focusing on the period following the 1954 
counter-revolution. As stated initially, this analysis does not pretend to represent 
a complete overview of these social challenges. Instead, it has focused on a 
number of expressions that have achieved a certain level of public projection 
and in order to highlight some of the challenges they have faced in their inter-
relationship with the state and elites.  
In the course of the chapter I have paid special attention to two aspects that 
mark the different generations of agency. Firstly, the constraints imposed by the 
state and the various coercive, legal and co-optive mechanisms used during the 
different periods of counter-insurgent and elite-controlled rule. Secondly, the 
ability of the different forms of agency to address the culturally complex 
composition of the population and grant space for local community-based 
organising.  
In the case of the community-based organising of the 1950s as well as the 
insurgent factions, the coercive and repressive mechanisms of authoritarian 
military rule represented the obvious external constraint. While it practically 
terminated the public community-based organising by eliminating its leadership 
or forcing it to go underground, it drew the communities closer to the insurgent 
guerrilla factions. This did not resolve the tensions between them that were 
based on their contrasting organisational logics with the communities and a 
tendency to escape the state and its integrative mechanisms, and the insurgent 
factions that followed an orthodox logic of targeting power at a central state 
level. Thus, the communities required a space for the organisation and 
reproduction of communal life that the hierarchical and militaristic insurgent 
project based on an economistic lens could not offer. 
The expressions of indigenous agency emerging from sections within or close 
to the insurgent forces shifted their focus more explicitly towards the aspects of 
indigenous culture and the struggle against discrimination. This shift was in part 
also due to the fact that the indigenous population took the brunt of the military 
repression that led them to demand more attention to issues of ethnicity as well 
as the struggle against discrimination. As the communities’ articulation was 
drawn into the context of the Peace Accords, the international community 
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played an important role in facilitating and ensuring their participation in the 
negotiations. However, this participation also had an impact on the trajectory 
this agency would follow as it cemented the geographical and discursive 
distance between the indigenous leadership and the grass-roots communities 
as well as drawing this leadership closer to institutional spaces, where they 
were confronted with elites and their co-optive mechanisms. This also explains 
the minimal political impact of indigenous leaders that were integrated into state 
positions under different governments after the Peace Accords. As these forms 
of indigenous representation lost their societal backing in their constituencies, it 
enabled the state under control by different elite factions to simulate a 
commitment to multi-cultural rights and discourses. The electoral participation of 
Rigoberta Menchú in 2007 and 2011 also confirms that this generation of 
indigenous agency had clearly underestimated the control of elites over the 
state and electoral contests on one hand, and their own detachment from the 
grass-roots communities on the other.  
The rural communities were already facing new challenges and problems as 
they were confronted with policies promoting the exploitation of natural 
resources. As they risked losing control over their territories and resources a 
new form of agency emerged in defence of territory. The context of the policies 
targeting natural resources as well as the emergence of communities to defend 
their territories will be introduced in the following chapter. 
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5. Antagonisms around the relationship to space: Exploitation of natural 
resources and the defence of territory 
In the previous chapter I outlined how different forms of agency have evolved 
over time in Guatemala. In doing so, I focused on their relationship with the 
state and elites to arrive at an understanding of how the coercive, authoritarian 
and co-optive mechanisms have impacted on and constrained these forms of 
agency. I also examined their internal organisational patterns to show how 
especially the forms of revolutionary and recent indigenous democratic activism 
failed to speak to and grant space to the cultural complexity of the rural grass-
root communities.  
In this chapter I will explore a more recent form of agency emerging around the 
defence of territory, as rural communities challenge the implementation of 
projects linked to the exploitation of natural resources. I will offer a general 
overview of the conflicts emerging around natural resources in Guatemala and 
insights into processes operating at different scales to indicate how actors and 
policies interrelate to respond to demands of global, regional and national 
markets. 
I will start by outlining the global dynamics linked to the extractive economy and 
provide a review of some of the literature analysing the cultural, political and 
economic implications surrounding the natural resource issue. I then focus on 
the specific implementation of the policies oriented towards the exploitation of 
natural resources in Guatemala. In doing so, I will outline some of the central 
characteristics of the elites’ economic modernisation project. This will also lead 
me towards the agency in defence of territory and natural resources that has 
emerged as the most sustained form of agency in different parts of post-war 
Guatemala to contest various dimensions of this project. Accordingly, I will 
analyse some of the general features of these nodes of agency that will be 
examined with more detail in the case-study chapters later on. 
In the course of the chapter I will highlight how national elites have reproduced 
and integrated the economic potential of natural resources into their strategies 
of accumulation. The state is used to promote an elite-designed modernisation 
project for the rural areas which fundamentally reorganises territories and 
spaces in line with particular interests. However, these policies have clashed 
with locally embedded meanings and an antagonistic agency from rural 
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communities that has emerged into the public. As argued in chapter 2, 
antagonistic agency emerges around incompatibilities or a dispute over the 
production of meanings and can engender processes of collective convergence 
that challenge the imposition of meanings through dominant societal actors. In 
the current context of a co-opted state the organisational processes around the 
defence of territory led by rural communities take on forms that are different 
from expressions of revolutionary and democratic activism outlined in the 
previous chapters. They surface from the margins of society and outside the 
political centres and engage only in strategic interactions with the institutional 
framework, while they remain locally centred, as communities attempt to remain 
in control of their immediate social realities. 
 
Neoliberalism and the commodification of natural resources 
A consensus has emerged that neoliberalism can be seen as representing the 
most influential conceptual framework for the reordering of economic and 
political relationships over recent decades. It has done so by emphasising the 
self-regulating power of markets as well as by linking the freedom of the 
individual to markets. As Connolly argues, neoliberalism should not be equated 
with laissez-faire capitalism, as the former requires “careful protection and 
nurturance by states and other organisations” (Connolly, 2013, p.20). While its 
initial promotion is largely attributed to the Thatcher and Reagan governments, 
state after state has embraced a version of neoliberal theory or adjusted at least 
some of their policies to its guidelines. Accordingly, it has established itself as 
the dominant school of thought at the level of discourse as well as political and 
economic practices. This has occurred to an extent that it is incorporated into 
“the common-sense way we interpret, live in and understand the 
world.”(Harvey, 2007, p.22) As its social and economic dimensions have spread 
across the globe penetrating even the most remote corners, “no place can claim 
total immunity” (Harvey, 2007, p.22).  
Hardt and Negri (2000) have analysed the power dynamics central to the 
establishment of this set of global relationships by pointing to the role 
supranational institutions and transnational enterprises play in consolidating this 
new world order. They label this constellation of de-territorialised and de-
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centralised sovereignty a modern form of imperialism, ‘Empire’, as these supra-
national structures are seen as playing a crucial role in its reproduction:  
“The U.N. organizations, along with the great multi- and transnational finance 
and trade agencies (the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT, and so forth), all 
become relevant in the perspective of the supranational juridical constitution 
only when they are considered within the dynamic of the bio-political production 
of world order. The function they had in the old international order, we should 
emphasize, is not what now gives legitimacy to these organizations. What 
legitimises them now is rather their newly possible function in the symbology of 
the imperial order.” (Hardt and Negri, 2000, p.31) 
Accordingly, the importance of these institutions lies in their role to design and 
influence rules of engagement in accord with neoliberal frameworks that are 
reflected in a horizon of values, mechanisms of accumulation, and means of 
circulation and language. Hardt and Negri (2000) point to the fact that this 
intervention occurs not only at the level of production of commodities, but also 
in forming subjectivities to determine their needs, social relations, bodies and 
minds. 
A number of authors, (eg. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 
2007; Escobar, 2008) have been keen to emphasise the cultural dimension 
embedded in this reconfiguration, as capital and capitalist valorization becomes 
the prime operational mechanism of modernity and spatial reorganisation. 
State, capital and a discourse of development are seen as introducing 
hierarchies and transforming the nature of workforce, the function of land and 
gender or ethnic identities (Escobar, 2008). Additionally, the expansion of 
neoliberal capitalism through globalisation is presented as an inevitable and 
natural process, which will ultimately translate into the production of a global 
marketplace. In line with this objective, the limitations and restrictions national 
states have historically exercised over societies are to be overcome by 
transnational corporations and their representatives. They are seen as the ideal 
agents to promote the expansion of these dynamics across the globe (Urry, 
2003). 
In this context, territories and natural resources in the Global South have come 
under increasing scrutiny as economic agents in the Global North seek to 
revitalise their cycles of capital accumulation (Gudynas, 2009; Svampa 2012; 
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Brand, 2012). As mentioned in chapter 2, Harvey (2003) outlined a geopolitical 
understanding of this link between accumulation and territory as countries in the 
North have approached a crisis of capital over-accumulation. Given an excess 
in available labour or capital, ways are sought to overcome this crisis through 
temporal61 or spatial displacement. The latter, spatial dimension is especially 
relevant for the purpose of this research as it refers to the incursion into new 
territories, encouraged by foreign investments in an attempt to avoid stagnation 
on capital gains. This scenario is completed by the convergence of external 
investments with local interests and the formation of investment alliances in 
order to ignite a phase of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2003; 2007). 
As Harvey argues, the wave of privatisation of state assets and services in the 
1990s can be identified as constituting a first generation of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’. The acquisition and concentration of territory as well as natural 
and strategic resources constitute the most recent expression of this trend. 
Transnational corporations in a multilevel alliance with national governments 
and elites are seen as the main drivers behind these policies (Seone, 2006; 
Svampa, 2013). 
As a result countries in the Global South are locked into reproductive patterns 
centred around the market, while the criteria for satisfying material demands is 
progressively displaced towards the financial sphere and ‘markets of the future’ 
(Ceceña, 2013).62 This leads to the predominance of a logic of “fictitious, 
potential and excessive amounts” that results in the satisfaction of global market 
demands exceeding real values (Ceceña, 2013, p.110). The need for a constant 
expansion and revitalisation of strategies of accumulation takes over, with the 
                                                          
61 The temporal displacement refers to investments that do not immediately enter the realm of 
production or consumption. Instead, these investments target long term capital projects (eg. 
Infrastructure, power-generating capacities) or social expenditures (eg. Education, research) 
(Harvey, 2003).  
62 Ceceña (2013) points to a mechanism that encourages this displacement towards the 
financial sphere in countries of the Global South: To continue with the norms and modes of 
production of the dominant technological and productive paradigm, it is absolutely necessary to 
obtain foreign currency, which in turn allows these countries to obtain technology. This keeps 
them locked into the same patterns of production, as a failure to do so would result in a loss of 
competitiveness in the global markets.  
 152 
 
race for the exploitation and commodification of nature representing a central 
dimension of this process (Ceceña, 2013). 
The analysis of natural resources in the context of the Global South is not new 
to social science with an extensive body of literature examining the implications 
and relationship of resource abundance or resource scarcity in relation with 
conflict and civil war. Scholars emphasising the link between ‘scarce’ resources 
and ‘war’ put forward the hypothesis that people or nations will fight each other 
to secure access to the resources necessary for their survival. Accordingly, the 
more ‘scarce’ the resource, the higher the probability of violence (Bennett, 
1991; Renner, 1996; Suliman, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999). On the other hand, 
within this body of literature the idea of a ‘resource curse’ has been widely 
discussed. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) put forward the hypothesis that the 
availability and the export of primary commodities increase the likelihood of civil 
war. This is substantiated in the so-called ‘greed thesis’ that builds on rent-
seeking theory in an attempt to explain causal mechanisms behind conflicts in 
many areas of the Global South. Rents deriving from mineral resources are 
seen as acting as a motivator to capture the state and provide the means to 
finance rebellions (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Collier, 2000). 
This literature has been subjected to considerable criticism, referring especially 
to its inability to adequately historically and socially contextualise conflicts in 
settings with ethnic, regional or religious cleavages (Di John, 2008). On the 
other hand, the expansion of an economistic rational-choice model based on 
‘greed’ and individuals focused on promoting their self-interest has been 
criticised as too simplistic to grasp the multiple motivations of actors in resource 
conflicts (Pearce, 2005). Apart from these conceptual limitations, the problem of 
this body of literature seems to be the inability to offer an adequate framing for 
the typology of current conflicts around natural resources emerging in Latin 
America.  
In the region an increasing amount of conflicts can be observed in which the 
opposing parties are not struggling over the distribution of economic resources. 
Instead, as the case studies in the following chapter will also demonstrate, 
conflicts are marked by a constellation in which one party opposes their 
appropriation and exploitation. In line with the argument presented in chapter 2, 
to frame these conflicts adequately, attention has to be paid to the cultural 
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dimension of production of meanings. This dimension becomes crucial to 
understand the antagonisms that emerge as a result of the reconfiguration of 
local life-worlds through practices or policies such as projects linked to the 
exploitation of natural resources.  
A significant body of literature has emphasised the antagonistic character of 
collective action around the issue of natural resources (eg. Martínez Alier, 2002; 
Escobar, 2008; Zibechi, 2011; Svampa, 2013). Within this body of literature 
Escobar has been especially prominent in framing the conflicts not just in terms 
of a conflict over the distribution of resources or on the basis of a material 
threat. Instead, he highlights the existence of a “cultural distribution conflict” with 
expressions of collective action emerging to contest a colonization of local life-
worlds (Escobar, 2008, p.14). Political ecology has been influential in this line of 
research by emphasising the dimension of ‘ecological distribution’. It has 
indicated how the control over and access to natural resources represents a 
source of subsistence and is linked with costs of environmental destruction. 
People and collectives are seen as mobilising against the destructive effects 
resulting from globalisation, as subjectivities representing particular cultures, 
economies and ecologies (Martinez Alier, 2002; Escobar, 2008; Svampa, 2011). 
63 
In Latin America the surge in conflicts around natural resources can in part be 
linked to the economic potential that has been identified in the region: In its 
territory 25% of the forests, 40% of global biodiversity, a third of the global 
reserves of copper, bauxite and silver, 27% of coal, 24% of oil, 8% of gas and 
5% of uranium are estimated to be found. This panorama is completed by the 
                                                          
63 At this point it is also important to indicate another field of literature that has emerged around 
the issue of natural resources through the work of scholars such as Arellano Yanguas (2011) 
and Bebbington (2012). Based on particular case studies they have made an important 
contribution in signalling differences among the conflicts surrounding mining projects. 
Accordingly, Arellano Yanguas has highlighted cases in which the local population use 
contentious tactics not in outright opposition to the project but in order to strengthen their 
position to negotiate a larger share of profit from the mining operations. This seems to represent 
an important dimension particularly in order to analyse the evolving nature of conflicts, 
especially after initial opposition to projects ends up divided or quashed. However, while there 
are conflicts in Guatemala that have taken on similar traits, the oppositional, antagonistic 
dynamic still seems to be the predominant constellation and features in the case studies 
analysed in this research. 
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water resources as the continent’s rivers are believed to represent an estimated 
35% of global hydro-energetic potential (Seone, 2006). 
As global and national strategies of accumulation are being revitalised these 
resources are being targeted for exploitation and in the process converted into 
commodities. In turn, countries are integrated into the global economy in a role 
as suppliers of primary goods such as minerals or agricultural products. 
Echoing Mignolo’s view, an ‘idea of Latin America’ is promoted that coincides 
with a view of the region as an enormous surface of land, rich in natural 
resources and cheap labour. Understandings that equate natural resources with 
capital and measure the range of potential profits predominate despite 
remaining a ‘hidden transcript’ in the discourses of the global institutions such 
as IMF, the World Bank and the Washington Consensus. Instead, in public Latin 
America is presented “as a region in waiting of its development” (Mignolo, 2007, 
p.38).  
In the case of Latin America this ‘idea’ linked to the exploitation and 
commercialisation of natural resources has been primarily operated through two 
processes: The concession of resources to big transnational enterprises that 
take charge of the extraction and the introduction of the resources into global 
markets, and the exploitation operated by state or national enterprises in a 
process that in some cases alter the degree of participation in the distribution of 
profits. Despite these differences, as scholars such as Ceceña (2008), Gudynas 
(2009) and Svampa (2013) have indicated, this latter modality does not alter the 
predominant economic matrix of focusing on exploitation without taking into 
account its environmental and social impact. Instead, it continues Latin 
America's particular integration into a world economy and paves the way for a 
redefinition of territories and people in accord with the global flows of capital. In 
the process, the international division of labour is upheld as the rural territories 
of the Global South are converted into a space dedicated to the extraction of 
hydrocarbons, minerals, biodiversity and food (Galafassi, 2008; Gudynas, 2009; 
Svampa, 2013). 
Echoing this argument Svampa (2013) has argued that in Latin America a 
‘Commodity Consensus’ has followed the Washington Consensus. This has 
translated into a passive acceptance by governments of their role in the 
international division of labour as a provider of raw materials, among them 
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hydrocarbons, metals, minerals and food. She sees this consensus as being 
sustained by conservative or progressive/centre-left governments alike and 
indicates “the existence of an accord- tacit or explicit- around the irrevocable or 
irresistible character of the current extractivist dynamics, in response to the 
growing global demand of primary goods.” (Svampa, 2013, p.5) This implies a 
political and ideological agreement as even left-wing governments in Bolivia or 
Ecuador argue in favour of extractive policies by indicating their importance in 
generating income and foreign currency for the national economy. Accordingly, 
the support for the exploitation of natural resources is upheld, although obvious 
differences in the distribution of profits and extractive policies have to be 
acknowledged.  
Despite the distinctive features this model takes on in national contexts, the 
state has been highlighted as playing a crucial role in reproducing and 
facilitating the economic redefinition of national territories in line with the 
exploitation of natural resources (Diaz Polanco, 2006; Gudynas, 2009; Svampa, 
2013). This is not just the case in countries with left-leaning governments that 
favour a redistribution of income and an expansion of social programmes. 
Instead, it is also a feature of conservative regimes as the state and the 
institutional apparatuses act to stabilise power relationships and encourage 
strategies of capital accumulation that favour a particular constellation of 
national or local elites. Urry (2003) has suggested a reinterpretation of Hardt 
and Negri’s concept of ‘Empire’ to emphasise this multi-scale reproduction of 
global dynamics: While Hardt and Negri had conceptualised the world order 
around the dynamic properties of global relations, Urry has attempted to fill the 
vacuum left by their failure to explain the role of national states and societies in 
the context of these de-centred and de-territorialised dynamics. He puts forward 
the idea of “societies … becoming more like empires” as they are reconfigured 
by globalisation processes (Urry, 2003, p.129). This idea seems to describe 
current patterns more adequately by highlighting the tensions between 
relationality and autonomy reflected in the operations of these states. 
Accordingly, they are drawn into reproducing as well as re-interpreting certain 
characteristics of ‘Empire’. As the rise in the criminalisation of protest 
movements, an increase in militarization as well as a closure of public space 
indicate, the coercive and authoritarian aspects embedded in this reproduction 
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are also very much part of the reconfiguration of strategies of accumulation 
(Seone, 2006; Zibechi, 2011).  
 
The history of exploitation of natural resources in Guatemala 
As outlined in chapter 3, the drive to expand and perpetuate strategies of 
accumulation as well as capture rents have represented processes integral to 
the genesis of the Guatemalan state. Based on these patterns the institutional 
framework has at different moments played a key role in providing legal, 
political and coercive advantages for elites in the pursuit of their interests. The 
international context dominated by neoliberal economic policies and the political 
openings following the formal transition to democracy enabled national elites to 
revitalise their strategies of accumulation and enhance their links with global 
markets. There has also been a renewed focus on ensuring access to rents by 
promoting foreign investments as well as establishing alliances with foreign 
capital around a variety of projects targeting the rural areas of Guatemala. The 
economic potential of natural resources on national and global markets has 
over recent decades clearly added to this renewed impetus in focus on the rural 
areas.  
Historically, opportunities to link up with foreign investors and international 
markets in the field of the exploitation of renewable as well as non-renewable 
natural resources in Guatemala first presented themselves at the start of the 
20th century as the first oil fields were established. By the 1920s two oil 
companies based on a combination of national and foreign capital had set up in 
Guatemala. Further concessions to companies were granted during Ubico’s 
reign with the transnational company Shell among the enterprises to obtain 
licences in 1937 and 1938. However, the revolutionary governments of Arévalo 
and Árbenz (1944-1954) imposed their own nationalist line on the extractive 
industry by establishing that hydrocarbons could only be exploited by the state, 
by Guatemalans or by companies operating on the basis of a minimum of 50% 
Guatemalan capital. This legal restriction on the oil extraction and production 
was reinforced by the governmental decrees 648 and 649 approved in 1947 
and 1949. These decrees also made the companies subject to increased royalty 
and tax regimes as the governments attempted to bolster state finances.  
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While this resulted in a gradual withdrawal of the US-oil companies it did not put 
a definite halt to their interest. With the start of the Cold War, the search for 
alternatives to oil from the Middle East continued to represent a central 
dimension of US-foreign policy. These interests also encouraged a 
convergence between the natural resource companies and some traditional 
elite factions such as the Skinner-Klee or Arenales families. They had identified 
the promising investment opportunity the mining and oil sector represented. 
Other elite factions also showed interest since their industrial production 
processes such as the Novella’s cement-company depended on the supply of 
crude oil. This reaffirmed their objective of expanding the oil-industry and 
encouraged their opposition to the nationalist policies the revolutionary 
governments were implementing (Dosal, 2005; Solano, 2005; Casaús Arzú, 
2007). 
The counter-revolution of 1954 and the consolidation of a military regime initially 
reversed the nationalist approach with regards to the exploitation of natural 
resources: Changes in legislation lifted the restriction of oil-extraction to 
companies with 50% Guatemalan capital, extended licences for exploration and 
perforations for periods of 44 years with the option of a 20-year extension and 
assigned 60% of profits deriving from the production to the respective oil 
company. This led to a number of transnational companies returning or initiating 
operations in Guatemala not just in the petroleum but also in the mining sector 
(Solano, 2005).  
The traditional economic elite factions with interests in the promotion of the oil 
extraction had been supportive of the initial constitution of the military state and 
grouped around the right wing party, the National Liberation Movement 
(Movimiento de Liberación Nacional, MLN,). However, as outlined in chapter 3, 
the frictions between a strongly expanding, interventionist military state and the 
elites, in favour of an extractive industry without state participation, steadily 
increased.64 The latter were also central in providing the finances and founding 
the University Francisco Marroquin in 1972 to guarantee the supply of ‘social 
capital’ required in the different areas of natural resource exploitation. This 
                                                          
64 As outlined in chapter 3 this tension was especially evident under the Lucas García and 
Arana Osorio governments leading to the inter-elite tensions between military and economic 
elites. 
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University established itself as a think-tank to promote free market ideology with 
the training and education for engineers as well as other professionals relevant 
for the extractive industry constituting a central aspect. 
With the consolidation of the military at the helm of the state, the economic 
dimensions and the exploitation of natural resources also started to become 
central to their designs for national development. Military elites increasingly 
viewed the oil and mining sector as strategic to capture rents and negotiate 
directly with foreign investors, much to the dismay of the economic elites 
(Solano, 2005). As indicated in previous chapters, the FTN exemplifies the 
military’s attempt to set in motion a territorial reorganisation in line with its 
interests. In doing so, the army’s engineer corps played a pivotal role in 
gathering privileged information on the potential of renewable as well as non-
renewable resources in different parts of the country (Solano, 2012; IRRMH, 
2013; Rogers, 2013).  
The field of renewable energy production in the form of large scale hydroelectric 
plants soon became an issue of state interest and a priority on the military’s 
economic agenda with a number of projects being designed in the 1970s, 
although the construction of many projects never went ahead.65 One of the 
plans to be implemented at the time was the Chixoy hydroelectric dam project in 
the Verapaz region. Its construction also reflected the means the military state 
was willing to employ in order to achieve its economic objectives. For military 
officers it represented a golden opportunity for personal enrichment as the 
primarily international funds were executed without any degree of transparency 
(Schirmer, 1998). The construction process continued for 8 years between 1975 
and 1983, driven by the financial support of the Inter-American Development 
Bank and the World Bank.  
However, the project also resulted in the displacement of 23 Maya Achi villages 
with more than 6.000 people losing their land due to the flooding of the area 
                                                          
65 Among the large-scale hydroelectric dam projects designed at the time were the Serchil, 
Chulac and Xalalá projects. In recent years the search for investments for the different projects 
have been intensified. In the case of the Xalalá feasibility studies have already been conducted, 
however it has met local opposition as the controversial dam project would mean the flooding of 
an extensive area affecting more than 50 communities. More information on the Xalalá project 
can be found in CIFCA (2008) and Solano (2009). 
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(CEH, 1999). Brutal violence, massacres and repressive measures 
accompanied the different phases of the construction. What started with the 
execution of community leaders in the 70s gave way to a series of massacres 
executed by military and PAC, the worst taking place in the community of Río 
Negro in March 1982, killing 70 women and 107 children. These operations 
were officially justified in the context of the counter-insurgent campaigns and 
any population that could potentially constitute an opposition to the construction 
of the hydroelectric project faced ruthless repression and execution (CEH, 
1999). The CEH identified the massacres in the area as a clear example of the 
state-guided genocide campaigns. Its report outlines how acts of resistance to 
administrative decisions, even though pacific, were considered a priori as 
guerrilla actions and confronted with repressive violence (CEH, 1999). 
Additionally, the implementation of this project also exemplifies how the 
‘mandate’ of engaging in counter-insurgent operations in many cases 
camouflaged the pursuit of strategies for personal enrichment promoted by the 
military elites. 
However, it was the context of the Peace Accords that provided the impetus for 
elite factions to push for the opening of the country and its natural resources to 
foreign investment and in doing so, multiply opportunities to revitalise their own 
strategies of accumulation. As signalled in chapter 3, a first round of 
privatisations through the selling and concession of state companies initiated 
this trend (Palencia Prado, 2002; Gutiérrez, 2012). The liberalisation of trade 
through the elimination of taxes on imports and exports, the privatisation of the 
banking and telecommunication system, the reorientation of agricultural 
production towards new crops as well as the planning of a series of large scale 
tourist projects constituted some elements of this trend. The distribution rights 
for electricity, up to that point owned by INDE, also featured among this wave of 
privatisation and concentrated the electricity generation among a reduced 
number of companies.  
Initially, electricity production tended to be based on petroleum products, 
leading to some of the highest electricity prices in Latin America. However, over 
the following decade sugar refineries and large landowners entered into this 
energy market, by shifting their production towards crops convertible into agro-
fuels, or by setting up their own electricity generating plants. Under the Berger 
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government (2004-2008) a definite shift in the energy production would occur 
with the planning of hydroelectric projects, the promotion of plantations for the 
production of agro-fuel, as well as the extension of new licences for the 
exploitation and production of crude oil (Solano, 2009). A series of large-scale 
infrastructural projects were to enhance the various dimensions, as elite 
factions used their control over state policies to reconfigure Guatemala’s social 
and economic realities.  
The renewed focus on rural areas means the Guatemalan context bears 
similarities with what scholars have identified as the creation of a ‘New Rurality’ 
(Echeverri and Ribero, 2002; Schejtman and Beerdegué, 2003; Ramírez-
Miranda, 2014). The accelerated insertion of rural economies into globalisation 
processes, the dissolution of borders and orientation towards global food 
markets as well as the requirement of global competition posed to rural 
economies mark this process. Additionally, a distinction is introduced with 
regards to rural spaces by identifying “efficient”, cultivable territory on one hand, 
and territories that can be “emptied of social life” or “sacrificed” for its natural 
resources by being placed under control of private companies on the other hand 
(Svampa. 2011, p.191).  
As part of a general modernising shift, since Alvaro Arzú (1996-2000) 
consecutive governments have gradually brought into place an institutional 
framework oriented to a highlighting and promoting of Guatemala as an 
investment opportunity. This is framed by a discourse of entering a globalised 
economy, in which the requirements of competitiveness and efficiency 
represent the crucial conditions for development. The creation of the National 
Program of Competitiveness (Programa Nacional de Competitividad, 
PRONACOM)66 exemplified this trend of bringing the state institutions into line 
with these objectives with a mandate to encourage “the development of 
competitiveness of entrepreneurial and human capital in order to generate 
investments” (PRONACOM, 2014). This has been complemented by the 
agency Invest in Guatemala, whose tasks are focused on engaging with 
potential investors and advertising the investment opportunities in close 
coordination with bodies of the institutional framework such as the Ministry for 
                                                          
66 The Program was formally established in 1999, although its mandate was reformed twice in 
2002 and 2004.  
 161 
 
Energy and Mining (Ministerio de Energía y Minas, MEM), the National 
Commission for Electric Energy (Comisión Nacional de Energía Eléctrica, 
CNEE) as well as the National Institute for Electrification (Instituto Nacional de 
Electrificación, INDE) (Solano, 2009).  
De la Torre, Economy Minister summed up these priorities in the context of the 
yearly investment summit 2013: “The strategy to attract investments is 
aggressive, following clear objectives not only of the government but also of the 
private sector, especially the Industrial Chamber of Guatemala. We want to 
prove that by working together big things and excellent results can be achieved” 
(quoted in: El Pais, 26/06/2013). The openings towards the global economy and 
the search for investment has translated into a clear increase of Foreign Direct 
Investments (FDI) over the last decade: In 2003 the FDI amounted to $217 
million, by 2014 the FDI had reached a total of $1080.6 million. Of this 
investment, 30.6% targeted the areas of agriculture, mining and quarries, and 
18.4% was directed towards the energy sector (Banco de Guatemala, 2014). 
In a variety of dimensions, the ‘production of space’ in line with the interests of 
national and transnational elites has gained pace. This is reflected in the 
implementation of mining projects, the growth of the energy sector which 
includes hydroelectric plants, electric transmission grids, oil production as well 
as the reorientation of agricultural production towards crops for agro-fuels. This 
panorama is completed by a number of large scale infrastructural projects. The 
following section will examine with more detail some of the dimensions of this 
neoliberal design focusing on rural Guatemala. 
 
The dimensions of neoliberal order in rural Guatemala 
As already mentioned, the reorientation of the national energy matrix, 
expressed in the search for new energy sources, as well as the plants for the 
generation of energy constitutes a central dimension of the modernisation 
project in Guatemala. In line with international trends aimed at a reduction of 
energy production deriving from fossil fuels, the promotion of renewable 
sources has gained importance and that has translated into an increasing 
number of hydroelectric projects being planned and constructed. Currently, 
there are 21 hydroelectric plants operating in Guatemala, with the process of 
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granting licences and construction of a further 44 projects ongoing (MEM, 
2015a).  
Regional integration has been important in this expansion of the energy supply, 
with the Projecto Mesoamerica67 representing a framework for the connection of 
the Central American electricity markets aimed at reducing electricity prices. 
This reduction is seen as crucial to attracting investments for a variety of 
development projects and in part explains the promotion of hydroelectric 
projects in the region. As part of these measures to stimulate Central American 
integration, the Initiative for the Interconnection of Energy has outlined four 
projects: 1. The Project for the System of Electrical Interconnection of the 
Central American Countries (Sistema de Interconexión Eléctrica de los Países 
de América Central, SIEPAC), 2. The Project for the Interconnection of 
Guatemala and Mexico, 3. The Interconnection of Guatemala and Belize, and 4. 
The Interconnection of Panama and Colombia (Proyecto Mesoamerica, 2014). 
In Guatemala, these plans translate into an ambitious project aimed at 
interconnecting five national electricity grids68 and contemplate the construction 
of networks stretching across 817,9 kilometres at a cost of 350 Million US$ 
(Solano, 2009). 
Accordingly, the Plan for the Expansion of Electric Transmission (Plan de 
Expansión del Sistema de Transporte de Energía, PET) was designed to 
connect all hydroelectric plants with a national network and is vital for the supply 
of the main industrial centres, trading and service infrastructure, agricultural 
industry, mining, and ports of the country. Analysts have been keen to point out 
that a number of the hydroelectric plants are to be constructed in the main 
mining areas of the country, while mining companies represent some of the 
biggest consumers of electricity (Interview economist, Guatemala City, 
12/07/2012).69 Additionally, the oil extraction, maquilas, industrial zones, the 
                                                          
67 The Project Mesoamerica succeeded the Plan Puebla-Panama as a framework to outline the 
initiatives aimed at furthering Central American integration. 
68 The current electricity network consists of 5 grids called Metropacífico, Hidráulico, Atlántico, 
Oriental and Occidental. 
69 As Ilescas (2013) indicates, mining companies feature among the top energy consumers in 
Guatemala. Montana Exploradora, the company operating the Marlin Mine in San Marcos is 
registered with a yearly consumption of 16,113kw, one of the 5 top industrial energy consumers 
in 2012. Two other non-metal mining projects operated by the cement company, Cementos 
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planned construction and modernization of a series of infrastructural projects 
such as ports, airports, railway line and highways such as the FTN all require 
substantial energy supply.  
Additionally, significant profits can be made from the export of electricity, thus 
representing another incentive for producers and investors in the energy sector, 
as the regional interconnections enable the transmission towards other sections 
of the Central American Market. A look at the actors involved reveals that 
important factions of the Guatemalan economic elites such as the Gutiérrez-
Bosch, Ayau, Arenales and Castillo families have invested into this business 
sector. In some cases they have sought to implement their own projects, in 
other cases they have established alliances with international investors. 
Transnational companies such as the Italian company Enel or the US Company 
Duke Energy International are already operating hydroelectric projects and have 
acquired licences for further projects. Additionally, following the privatisation of 
the distribution rights under the Arzú government, they have since been in the 
hands of transnational companies, with the British investment fund Actis 
acquiring the rights for the main distribution network for electricity from the 
Spanish company Union Fenosa in 2011.   
In different moments the state institutions have promoted the different interests 
linked to the hydro-energetic and electricity market, beginning with the General 
Law on Electricity approved in 1997 that paved the path for the subsequent 
privatisation by separating the different activities of generation, 
commercialisation, distribution and transmission. Future governments have 
used legal and institutional mechanisms to promote the different aspects. In 
recent years the coercive role has been increasingly called upon, as the 
respective governments sought to address the conflicts generated at the local 
level by the various projects. The case of a hydroelectric project in the 
municipality of Santa Cruz Barillas, in the Western region of Huehuetenango, 
where the local population had rejected the project in a community referendum 
in 2007, is only one among various examples. After protests followed the 
murder of a community leader by a private security guard who had been hired 
by the company involved in the construction of the project, a state of siege was 
declared. Military forces were deployed and multiple arrests of community 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Progreso, also feature among the top five energy consumers (Ilescas, 2013). 
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leaders followed, with state prosecution as well as local judges playing a key 
role in ensuring sanctions and the criminalization of members of the local 
protest movements on the basis of questionable evidence (UDEFEGUA, 2013, 
2015). 
The reorientation of the energy matrix has also had its effect on the use of land 
and agricultural production as the expansion of crops of sugar cane and African 
palm indicate. The production of sugar cane to generate sugar, sugar cane 
molasses and alcoholic drinks has a long tradition in the country. The 
plantations of African palm on the other hand have emerged over the last 
decade and were initially oriented towards industrial production and the food-
market. However, the recent expansion of these plantations, which is linked to 
the growing market for international bio-diesel and ethanol, has engendered a 
further appropriation of land and the displacement of peasant communities 
(Actionaid, 2010; Alonso-Fradejas et al., 2011). 
The announcement of the European Union in 2006 establishing that in the 
future 20% of its energy supplies should derive from renewable sources with a 
minimum of 10% coming from agro-fuel, reflects the relationship between global 
dynamics and local spaces. As part of this agenda the EU also started to 
directly promote the production of agro-fuels in countries in development.70 The 
US decree on energy independence and security from December 2007 further 
stimulated this trend, by mandating a production of 36,000 million gallons of 
agro-fuels by 2020. This represented five times the amount produced in 2007, 
as agro-fuels were seen as crucial in the attempts to reduce dependence on oil 
imports from the Middle East (Alonso-Fradejas et al., 2011) Even if at this stage 
the palm oil is not used for the production of biodiesel, the range of profit on the 
global markets is high.71 The cultivated area dedicated to palm oil in Guatemala 
has quadrupled over the last decade expanding to an estimated 110,000 
hectares, while the volume of palm oil production has doubled between 2003 
and 2008 (Guereña and Zepeda, 2013).  
                                                          
70 This policy framework is currently under revision. 
71 In 2013 on the international markets the price for a tonne of palm oil was $845, which means 
a hectare of palm plants generates $5,915 US dollars. Accordingly, an estate of 45.12 hectares, 
which is a common size in the FTN region, generates a profit of approximately $2.66 million per 
year (El Enfoque, 2013). 
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In the intersections of this production with global markets the strategic character 
of the free-trade agreements comes to the forefront: The framework of the 
Central American Free-trade Agreement allows an unlimited export of ethanol at 
a 0% tax rate among countries that are part of the agreement. Similar 
conditions have been negotiated with the European Union as part of the 
Association Accords. At a national level the Strategy of Sustainable Energy for 
Central America 2020, which was negotiated in 2005 was integrated into the 
National Agenda for Competitiveness under the Berger government with the 
aim of substituting 15% of the petrol and diesel consumption in public and 
private transport through agro-fuels by 2020 (Alonso-Fradejas et al., 2011).  
The impetus for these strategies derives from multiple levels as reflected in the 
supporting role of the International Financial Institutions. They have provided 
vital financial support to promote the framework of the Projecto Mesoamerica 
and influence the orientation of regional development plans.72 At a national level 
a variety of actors intervene to directly or indirectly promote the expansion of 
plantations for the production of agro-fuels. A program of the Land Fund (Fondo 
de Tierras, FONTIERRAS) and the Register of Catastral Information (Registro 
de Información Catastral, RIC) offering legal registration of land and together 
with a number of NGOs has persistently echoed a discourse insisting that 
collective property represents an obstacle to development. In the areas 
identified as adequate for palm plantations this is combined with different 
strategies to pressure local producers into selling land and expand palm 
plantations (Interview economist, Guatemala City, 12/07/2012). These 
strategies were evidenced in the Ixcán area as programs such as PROPALMA, 
providing credits to potential producers, were integrated into governmental 
agricultural policies while companies offered orientation for local producers. 
                                                          
72 With regards to the palm industry Alonso-Fradejas et al. (2011) highlight a series of measures 
in terms of the role of the international financial institutions: 1) The loan of $408,000 to 
Guatemala in 2008 for feasibility studies. 2) The BCIE funding of $26 million for the transport, 
construction and planting of the ethanol producer Guadelupe in the Polochic region and 
donation of $100,000 as part of the project Mesoamerica to cover the costs of installation of a 
agro-fuel plant donated by Colombia. 3) The World Bank through its International Financial 
Corporation issued a loan of more than $60 million to the producer Pantaleón as well as further 
30$ million for the construction of four production plants in Brasil, Colombia and Guatemala to 
the joint venture Pantaleón Sugar (Alonso-Fradejas et al., 2011). 
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However, after the first amount was paid, the successive payments were 
suspended, leaving more than 300 independent producers in a vulnerable 
situation and struggling to keep hold of their land (Actionaid, 2010; El Enfoque, 
2013; Guereña and Zepeda, 2013). 
The shares of this market are concentrated in the hands of a limited number of 
business groups: The sugar cane industry and the production of ethanol is 
dominated by 5 producers, each business group is composed by families that 
are part of the traditional, agricultural elites, among them the Herrera and 
Botrán families. Similarly, the production of palm oil is divided among 6 
business groups which again are integrated by families of traditional economic 
elites such as the Maegli, Weissenberg Campollo or König Vielman families 
(Actionaid, 2010; Palencia Prado, 2012). 
The turn towards renewable energy sources does not mean that the production 
of non-renewable energy sources has been side-lined. This also fuels 
suspicions that the general reorientation of the energy matrix is not down to 
concerns for environmental issues or a shift towards more sustainable 
development models. Instead, the potential for profits in the renewable energy 
sector explains its attraction. The different post-war governments have been 
intent on promoting the expansion of oil extraction and attracting foreign 
investment, with the current government of Otto Pérez Molina (2011-2015) 
following this line by announcing the intention to multiply production. By 2020 a 
production of 50 thousand barrels a day, five times the current amount has 
been outlined. In this context licences for seven additional oilfields have been 
offered in the Petén and the FTN region and are promoted in an intensive 
campaign to attract the required investment. 
The controversial renewal of extraction in the Xan oil field operated by the 
Anglo-French company Perenco in 2010 reflects the collusion of private and 
institutional interests around the extractive industry. The renewal of the contract 
for the oil field that is being operated in the centre of a National Park in the 
Petén region, Laguna del Tigre, had been signalled as illegal and contrary to 
national legislation,73 even sparking the resignation of the Environment Minister 
                                                          
73 Civil society organisations such as Centro de Acción Legal y Ambiental Social (CALAS) took 
legal action to question the legality of the renewal primarily by referring to article 64 of the 
constitution that establishes the protection and conservation of national parks as of ‘national 
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Ferraté in 2010. However, with the Constitutional Court rejecting all legal action 
against the contract renewal, President Colom’s government brushed aside 
concerns over the renewal and extended the extraction for a further 15 years.  
In this case an important mechanism to stifle dissent in the area seems to have 
been the strategic use of royalties as established in the Law for the Fund of 
Economic Development of the Nation that outlines the Petroleum Fund (Fondo 
de Petroleo, FONPETROL). Accordingly, funds are distributed in the following 
manner: 20% to the local Development Councils of the municipalities in which 
the oil production is operating; 5% to the respective Departmental Councils and 
3% to the public entities responsible for the conservation of the protected areas 
(Decree 71-2008, Ley FONPETROL). This has made it possible to consolidate 
clientelistic networks in the area, while turning a blind eye to the presence of 
powerful agents linked to illicit economic activities in the region, where at least 
two of the biggest national drug-trafficking networks, the Lorenzana and 
Mendoza families, operate (InsightCrime, 2011).  
Mining constitutes a further dimension in the projection of economic interests 
into the rural areas. According to information by the MEM by January 2015, 79 
licences for metal mining had been granted. Of these licences 44 were at an 
exploratory stage, while 35 are in the extraction-phase (MEM, 2015b). Profits in 
the mining sector had risen from 3,269.1 million Quetzales in 2006 to 10,512 
million Quetzales in 2011 (ICEFI, 2014b). However, in terms of tax revenues, in 
2013 the mining sector was still only contributing 1.8% of the GDP (ICEFI, 
2014b). 74 
This is largely down to the lenient fiscal regime in the mining law approved in 
1997 by the Arzú government. Yaganova et al. (2012) emphasise three aspects 
in this legislation that contributed to the increase in mining over the following 
decades: Firstly, it introduced a recognition phase to create a three stage model 
in which the companies pass from a recognition phase, to an exploration phase 
before reaching the stage of exploitation. By inserting this first phase the licence 
                                                                                                                                                                          
interest’. Nonetheless all legal recourses were rejected by the Constitutional Court. 
74 The drop of 36% in production levels registered in 2012 is largely down to an order issued by 
the Inter-American Court against the Guatemalan State given the concerns about the violation 
of human rights of the local population due to the impact of the Marlin Mine in San Marcos. This 
forced the company to temporarily halt its operations. 
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holder can investigate broader extensions of territory and based on its results 
decide on the eventual number of licences for exploitation. Secondly, the law 
introduced a reduction on the percentage of royalties which passed from 6% to 
1%. Thirdly, the need for a written permit from owners of the land targeted by 
the mining activity was abolished, thus creating an advantageous framework for 
mining companies to gain access to rural territories (Yaganova et al., 2012). 
Primarily in reaction to the multiple situations of conflict emerging in areas 
targeted by mining companies, the government of Otto Pérez Molina (2011-
2015) has promoted attempts to reform the mining legislation. He shocked the 
economic elites grouped in CACIF and the Board of Extractive Industries 
(Gremial de Industrias Extractivas, GREMIEXT) in 2012 by putting forward the 
proposal of creating a state-mining company that would participate in up to 40% 
of the profits from mining projects. However, the government soon retracted 
from this initial plan and instead submitted a reform-proposal of the mining 
legislation whose most controversial aspect consisted in a slight rise in the 
percentage of royalties for the state and local municipalities. According to 
analysts this had clearly been agreed in advance with mining companies and 
constituted an attempt to appease local discontent (Interview environmental 
activist, Guatemala City, 11/11/2013).  
Since then debates over reforming the mining legislation as well as the 
percentage of royalties have continued. In December 2014 congress approved 
a renewed increase in the context of the debates for the 2015 budget and 
approved a reform of article 63 of the mining legislation, which outlines the 
amount and distribution of royalties. This most recent reform outlines an 
increase in royalties by establishing different categories: 10% on the 
exploitation of minerals and construction materials; 5% on Nickel, 6% on Jade. 
9% of the royalties are to be directed at a national Common Fund and 1% 
attributed to the municipalities, where the respective project is operating (Ley de 
Presupuesto, 2015).75  
These adjustments to the fiscal regime have done little to dissolve the concerns 
around the environmental impact of both, mining as well as oil extraction. The 
                                                          
75 However, various legal appeals have been submitted to challenge the constitutionality of the 
reforms outlined in the budget proposal 2015, among them the mining legislation. Therefore, the 
implementation of the respective reforms is still on hold. 
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complicity of the state institutions responsible for the approval of the 
Environmental Impact Studies that constitute the basis for the granting of an 
exploitation licence, has been repeatedly pointed out by civil society 
organisations. The limited human and financial resources dedicated to this 
body, the absence of a clear legislation to halt extraction in cases of 
environmental degradation, as well as the failure to establish clear 
responsibilities for the control, evaluation and monitoring of extraction have all 
been signalled as contributing to undermine its operations (Yaganova et al., 
2012). 
The scenario linked to the exploitation of natural resources is complemented by 
large-scale infrastructural projects that constitute the links between the different 
aspects of the elite-guided modernisation. Among them the FTN represents a 
revival of a project designed under military rule. Its construction has been 
ongoing since 2009 with a variety of licences for resource extraction in the area 
making the highway a vital interconnection for transport routes (Solano, 2012; 
Rogers, 2013). Additionally, since December 2009 preparation for the 
construction of a Technological Corridor that will cross four of the eastern 
departments has been under way. The project is meant to constitute an 
alternative to the Panama Canal and a similar canal project that is being 
constructed in Nicaragua. In Guatemala, it is planned to include a motorway, a 
railway line, an oil pipeline as well as a system of cables for optical fibre 
communication.76  
In sum, driven by national and international elites a complete reconfiguration of 
territories and places in line with neoliberal designs is underway in the rural 
parts of Guatemala. The approval of legal frameworks to spur the 
implementation of projects, the use of public forces and paramilitary structures 
against opposition, the co-option of decision-making spaces in state institutions 
as well as the creation of clientelistic networks around the promotion of the 
different projects, feature among the strategies used. While this creates an 
                                                          
76 In August 2015 the project of the interoceanic corridor was put on hold after the NGO meant 
to administer the funds and the implementation was found to be fraudulent. On the other hand, 
plans for the construction of an oil-pipeline administered by a different private entity along the 
same route received initial approval in November 2014. This case also reflects the disputes 
between different factions of emerging and traditional elites over the implementation of the 
project. More information in Solano, 2015. 
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extremely difficult environment for collective action and social mobilisation, as 
the following section will outline, the emerging antagonisms have nonetheless 
been highlighted and contested by local communities in a variety of local 
contexts. 
 
The defence of territory in Guatemala: Antagonistic agency in local 
spaces 
Before 2003, challenges to projects aimed at the exploitation of natural 
resources were promoted primarily by environmental organisations and often 
restricted to specific areas, such as the Izabal region. In that region the 
company Exmibal had acquired a permit to extract Nickel, and while close to 
Lake Izabal a licence for oil extraction had also been conceded. At least in the 
short term, the oppositional groups consisting primarily of environmental 
organisations and local Q’eqchi’ communities were successful as their pressure 
translated into the cancellation of the licence for oil extraction in 2002.77  
At the time the broader context was marked by a general frustration over the 
absence of advances in democratisation and the failure to address the 
persisting structural inequalities. Public protest actions and mobilisations were 
dominated by established peasant, indigenous, women’s and labour 
organisations often with links to urban NGOs, without a broad, sustained 
articulation emerging from these movements. These organisational processes 
were primarily oriented at challenging the liberalising policies which post-war 
governments had been promoting, supported by transnational agreements such 
as the Puebla-Panama Plan and the DR-CAFTA. Issues around the exploitation 
of natural resources became part of the agenda of social organisations from 
2003 onwards, as information on the first mining concessions began to emerge. 
Although the licences in various parts of the country had been conceded in 
previous years, the secretive way of operating of governments and mining 
                                                          
77 Environmental activist Magalí Rey Rosa describes in an interview with Martínez Alier how 
local environmentalists and Quepchí communities organised in an attempt to stop the 
installation of an oil field by Basic Resources in Izabal based on the experience of the negative 
impact of the Exmibal nickel mine in the area. The license for oil extraction was cancelled by 
Portillo in 2002 (Martínez Alier, 2003). However, a number of further mining licenses have since 
been conceded in the area. 
 171 
 
companies meant rural communities had in most cases not been aware of the 
planned projects in their surroundings. One of the first mining licences to be 
conceded in this post-war period, the Marlin Mine in San Miguel Ixtahuacán, 
San Marcos, highlighted these in-transparent procedures. No information had 
been provided to the local population while the company had over years gone 
about acquiring the land alleging it would be used for agricultural projects (Van 
de Sandt, 2009). This land would go on to constitute the area for the up to date 
biggest mining project in Guatemala, operated by Montana Exploradora, at the 
time subsidiary of Glamis Gold Inc., today Goldcorp Inc. 
A range of local and national organisations played an important role in 
spreading initial details on the existing licences and potential environmental 
impact of these projects among the indigenous communities surrounding the 
mining area. In February 2004, a first protest march took place with 500 people 
protesting in the municipality of Sipacapa against the proposed mining project in 
San Miguel Ixtahuácan. The failure to consult the population on the project, the 
possible environmental damage and the violation of municipal autonomy were 
among the main concerns raised by the protesters (Yaganova et al., 2012). The 
fact that the majority of these initial mining licences were being granted in areas 
populated primarily by indigenous people also influenced the discourses 
developing to contest the exploitation of natural resources. Led by indigenous 
organisations, the articulations were framed around the defence of territory and 
linked to national as well as international legislation on indigenous rights. 
By 2005 the issue of exploitation of natural resources had already consolidated 
as an important point of convergence for grass-roots organising in various 
regions of the country. The antagonistic dimension inherent to the issue was 
evidenced in the course of confrontations that took place in January 2005. As 
the mining company operating the Marlin Mine sought to transport a cylinder 
required for the extractive activities towards the mine in San Marcos, this 
engendered a stand-off over various days as community members from Sololá 
and Totonicapán blocked the road to stop the convoy from passing. As the army 
and police were called in to free the road blocks, dozens of people were left 
injured and one community member died in the course of the confrontations. 
While this gave an indication of the conflictive potential around the mining 
projects, the implementation of hydroelectric projects was also gaining pace and 
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communities were mobilising in order to halt their construction. Over the 
following years multiple nodes of resistance emerged as environmental, social 
and human rights organisations encouraged the spread of information on the 
various aspects of this post-war elite-guided modernisation project. A variety of 
tactics began marking the organisational processes with the challenge to the 
official decision-making processes, which paved the way for the implementation 
of the projects, increasingly gaining weight. In doing so, communities especially 
highlighted the violation of the legal obligation to consult the local population in 
the affected territories as established in international and national legislation. 
Accordingly, local community members challenged the implementation by 
developing their own locally embedded procedural mechanisms to politically 
enact and highlight their dissent. A non-indigenous area, in Río Hondo, Zacapa, 
represented one of the first areas where sections of the local communities 
converged in 2005 to exert pressure on the municipality to organise a 
community consultation on a hydroelectric project. The prime concerns leading 
the communities to reject the project were linked to the environmental impact, 
the diminishing of water supply as well as the failure to consult the local 
population. Based on a slightly different legal framework, in June 2005 the 
indigenous communities of Sipakapa also held a community consultation to 
reject the San Miguel mining concession.78 
This represented the starting point for a process that up to date has been 
replicated in over 70 municipalities where community consultations have been 
held. This has consolidated as a key dimension of the oppositional agency with 
the consultations in the different areas sharing certain features: Firstly, all 
referendums involved a preparatory phase consisting of meetings and 
assemblies usually held at a community level in order to share and debate 
information on the projects to be implemented in the area. This is also a phase 
during which accompaniment and inputs are sought from a variety of 
organisations specializing on environmental or legal aspects. Secondly, the 
consultations are based on local issues and problems identified by community 
members that drive the organisational process independently from central 
                                                          
78 The community referendum in Sipakapa was held as a good faith consultation based on the 
ILO convention 169 while the community referendum in Rio Hondo was held as a municipal 
neighbourhood consultation based on Municipal Law. 
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government institutions or political parties. In some cases and to a varying 
extent, local municipal councils have supported the organisation of the 
consultations. Thirdly, the holding of the consultation represents a step towards 
formalizing and voicing local dissent to state policies. Accordingly, this 
appropriation of decision-making processes among the local community 
members represented an attempt to counter measures aimed at narrowing 
down participation or to co-opt individual and collective decision-making 
processes. In all cases the referendums were linked to legal frameworks. In the 
case of indigenous communities, references to the ILO convention 169 (articles 
6, 7, 15.2) that outlines the right of indigenous people to be consulted on issues 
affecting them or their territories predominated.79 In the case of non-indigenous 
areas, consultations were held on the basis of national legislation such as the 
Municipal law (Decree 12-2002, articles 63-65) that outlines the consultation of 
residents on issues affecting the whole municipality.80  
The trend of consolidating these processes of community consultations as a 
crucial feature of the defence of territory have continued despite a decision by 
the Constitutional Court in May 2007 that declared the process of organising 
and holding consultations as ‘valid’ but ‘not binding’ for government authorities. 
However, these community consultations have constituted just one among a 
number of strategies to voice demands in a limited public space. Direct action 
including road blocks, protest marches, community assemblies, workshops and 
visits to congress has constituted an important part of these organisational 
practices, which are embedded in a discourse emphasising the defence of 
territory. 
The different dimensions of this organising have been driven primarily by the 
local communities and their members. As a result, changes in the landscape of 
collective organising in Guatemala can be perceived: The historic campesino 
organisations and primarily urban human rights NGOs had achieved a certain 
protagonism in the civil society framework of the Peace Accords and had 
dominated articulations in the public space during the post-war context. They 
                                                          
79 The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous People represents a further 
international legal framework establishing the right to consultation.  
80 In national legislation references have also been made to the Law on Urban and Rural 
Development Councils, article 26. 
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continue to play a role in accompanying the local nodes of agency during the 
current organisational processes, often by supporting them on logistical or legal 
issues or aiding the coordination of broader, joint actions on specific legislation. 
However, a large part of the organisational energy and protagonism has been 
appropriated by the communities faced with the respective projects and has 
consequently been transferred into these local spaces. As Sieder and Bastos 
(2014) indicate, former activists of the URNG as well as Mayan organisations 
continue to play an important role in these processes. Nevertheless, they tend 
do so through their communities and in most cases “without the organic 
presence of the organisations in which they had been educated” (Sieder and 
Bastos, 2014, p.159). While the communities draw on ties with national 
organisations, in many cases there is an emphasis on guarding the autonomy 
and specific character of the respective organisational process, as their prime 
focus is determined by the local problems and experiences. 
In most areas the incentives for the convergence at the local level are found in 
the incompatibility of the projects— even before their implementation— with 
locally embedded meanings and the everyday life of the community members. 
Accordingly, the engagement in ‘defence of territory’ indicates an attachment to 
specific places that at the same time develops a socio-political expression. In 
this sense ‘territory’ comes to represent more than just physical surroundings 
and is instead filled with associations and meanings to represent a life-world. In 
turn, this has generated the focus of the organisational processes on the 
constitution of social and political ‘relationships’ within determinate spaces. In 
the different processes of defence of territory this relational notion has 
consolidated primarily around two aspects. On one hand, by undoing the divide 
between ‘nature’ and ‘humans’ to understand ‘nature’ as part and not external to 
the social agent. On the other hand, it has also enhanced a view of relationality 
that emphasises the link between the ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ dimension, 
which is reflected in the revitalisation of the ‘community’ as a collective signifier 
and the focus on re-embedding decision-making in this collective dimension. 
Although this ‘relational’ notion can be seen as a general feature of processes 
engaging in defence of territory, the particular assemblages of collective action 
develop their own interpretations and strategies around it. As the case studies 
in chapter 7 and 8 will indicate, in indigenous communities these relational 
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meanings are mostly rooted in traditional features of language and cosmovision. 
In communities with less or no indigenous influence, these relational 
understandings tend to be the result of more instinctive experiences based on 
rural life, which are activated in relatively short-term processes and linked with 
diverse sources of knowledge.  
Additionally, the implementation without local consultation or providing 
information has contributed to fuel a sense of injustice and in turn stimulated 
solidarities and a sense of collective belonging among rural community 
members. These sentiments and the emergence of these antagonistic nodes of 
agency also have to be linked to the established, historical patterns of state-
society relationships. Especially among the rural population, these relationships 
have consolidated deeply embedded levels of distrust and wariness with 
regards to the elites, state institutions and their policies. These perceptions are 
reinforced as the current integration of territories under an excluding economic 
logic fails to coincide with the search for local consent. The community based 
responses have often taken on a dispersed character and the differences 
between the nodes of agency reflect the complex constellation of the 
population. Additionally, they have implied a “defensive localisation” (Escobar 
2001, p.149), as most resistances focus their challenge on the respective local 
context. However, this reflects how in the context of a co-opted state the ‘local’ 
is seen as the prime platform of interaction as well as the most efficient and 
trusted arena for resistance to be constructed. 
In May 2012 the Human Rights Ombudsman’s office identified 82 potential 
sources of social conflict in 13 departments, which are related to the failure of 
communities to accept the establishment of companies promoting mining, 
hydroelectric projects, electricity grids or large-scale plantations in their 
territories (Interview human rights activist, Guatemala City, 25/07/2012). An 
increase in the intensity of confrontations can be perceived as infiltration, 
provocation as well as the revitalisation of historical divides within communities 
figure among the strategies used to favour the implementation of the respective 
projects. The use of paramilitaries and public forces in combination with the 
declaration of states of ‘siege’ or ‘prevention’ represent further measures aimed 
at containing the resistance of community members.  
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Another aspect that links directly with the co-optive patterns surrounding the 
institutional framework is the strong rise in the criminalisation of human rights 
defenders. Over the last years more than dozens of activists engaging in 
struggles linked to the defence of territory have faced detention orders, legal 
charges and prosecution, in the overwhelming number of cases on the basis of 
questionable evidence. The aim of these strategies is to “convert social activists 
into criminals” and subsequently into “political prisoners with the complicity of 
the security and justice apparatus.” (Sieder and Bastos, 2014, p.169) This also 
reflects crucial aspects inherent to contexts of state co-option outlined in 
chapter 3, as the functions of the institutional framework, as well as state 
prosecution and the decision-making of judges, act in line with the promotion of 
particular elite interests. Actors behind the implementation of projects transfer 
conflicts into institutional arenas and courts where they can count on these 
instances to contribute at the very least, by stalling resistance processes and at 
best, by dismantling its leadership (Interview human rights activist, Guatemala 
City, 12/09/2012). In addition, patterns of coercion reminiscent of counter-
insurgent periods continue. This is reflected in a surge in direct attacks on 
human rights defenders and the increase in human rights violations that has 
accompanied the different dimensions of this elite-guided modernisation.81  
Despite this climate of repression, it is at the level of these grass-root 
communities that the interests promoted by elites in line with global cycles of 
accumulation encounter the most sustained friction. The antagonistic agency 
led by the communities has represented a profound questioning of the vertical 
imposition of policies that accompany the different projects. Additionally, the 
specific character of each node of resistance has to be acknowledged as they 
reflect the complex demographic composition. In order to provide a better 
impression of some of the specific characteristics of these nodes, chapters 7 
and 8 will look at two expressions of collective action that have emerged around 
the defence of territory. 
Chapter 7 will analyse a community movement in the Northern Quiché region, 
which has formed among indigenous community members from the 
municipalities of Cunén, Sacapulas, Nebaj, Chajul and Cotzal. It has 
                                                          
81 UDEFEGUA (2015) registered 813 attacks on human rights defenders in 2014, a persistent 
rise from the year 2000 when 59 attacks were registered. 
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consolidated as a loose network of communities around the defence of territory 
in response to a series of mining licences, hydroelectric plants as well as the 
construction of electric transmission lines as part of the PET program. Over 
recent years they have taken to the public space through a series of 
statements, by putting questions to ministers in congress, by organising 
community consultations and community assemblies as well as by engaging in 
direct action through road blocks or protest marches. While focusing on the 
issues of their own localities, relationships of solidarity and mutual 
accompaniment based on the phrase ‘same situation, same resistance’ have 
developed among the different Quiché, Ixil and Sacapulteco communities.  
While the resistance of local communities has tended to be most sustained in 
indigenous areas, oppositional dynamics have also emerged in areas with a 
predominantly ladino population. This has been the case of the RPLP, which 
involves residents from the neighbouring municipalities of San José del Golfo 
and San Pedro Ayumpuc located in the outskirts of Guatemala City. Here, the 
ladino and Kaqchikel communities have responded to the concession of a gold 
and silver mining project operated by the company Kappes, Cassiday & 
Associates. In March 2012 the communities established a protest camp in the 
place known as La Puya, blocking the entrance to the mining project as a signal 
of dissent. Since then various strategies have been used to oppose the project 
including strategies of direct action to avoid evictions, round-table talks with 
government officials, as well as legal action to challenge the environmental 
feasibility study.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined how the exploitation of natural resources has been 
integrated into the modes of capital accumulation at a global, regional and 
national level. External investors establish coalitions with national governments 
to reproduce neoliberal policy frameworks in order to reinforce strategies for 
capital accumulation. The role of international institutions as well as the state 
needs to be highlighted in this process of consolidating the commodification of 
nature and natural resources. Accordingly, Latin America’s territories are being 
reordered in line with economic interests as global patterns of accumulation are 
reproduced and reinterpreted at the nation-state level. For the different 
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countries on the continent this translates into a role as suppliers of primary 
goods for global markets. 
In Guatemala the Peace Accords represented the contextual framework for an 
opening towards external investment as well as integration into global markets. 
Since that time institutional bodies have been put in place to enhance 
competitiveness as elites used the state to implement their vision for rural 
Guatemala. A combination of extractive projects, large scale infrastructural 
projects and a variety of projects oriented at expanding the production of energy 
have since consolidated as the central aspects of this elite-designed 
modernisation project. The co-option of state-institutions, the approval of 
adequate legal frameworks, the use of governmental programs and coercion 
have featured among the mechanisms to reconfigure spaces in accord with 
determinate economic interests. 
This chapter has also emphasised how the penetration of rural territories 
through the different projects focused on the exploitation of natural resources 
has activated multiple nodes of resistance at the local level. They have 
represented a new generation of agency that has emerged to highlight the 
incompatibility of these projects with locally embedded meanings. Accordingly, 
in the various communities a contestation of the elites’ plans for rural areas has 
surfaced. This challenge is based on meanings that express an attachment to 
specific physical spaces and question the view of ‘territory’ as restricted to an 
exploitable resource. Instead, across the different organisational processes, a 
relational notion that questions the divide between ‘humans’ and ‘nature’ on one 
hand and emphasises the link between ‘individuals’ and the ‘collective’ or 
‘community’ on the other hand, has gained importance. 
Additionally, the process of implementing projects without consultation or 
providing information has fuelled a sense of injustice among community 
members and in turn stimulated solidarities and collective convergences at this 
local level. Dissent has been expressed through a variety of strategies, among 
them the local appropriation of decision-making processes through the 
organisation of community referendums. At the same time, it is the local 
problems and experiences that dominate the orientation and strategies of these 
nodes of agency, while the complex constellation of the population is reflected 
in the differing patterns of their organisational forms. 
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Before exploring two specific expressions of agency that have emerged firstly, 
among the communities in the Northern Quiché Region and secondly, among 
community members in the municipalities of San José del Golfo and San Pedro 
Ayampuc, the following chapter will outline the methodological framework used 
to research these case studies. Accordingly, I will indicate how this exploration 
moves at the interface of methods associated with anthropology and political 
science to determine the specific characteristics of these organisational 
processes, while exploring their implications for democracy.  
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6. Methodological framework 
Having set up the context and some of the general features of the agency that 
has emerged around the defence of territory, this chapter will outline the 
methodological framework used to approach the research objectives linked to 
the specific characteristics and implications of two organisational processes that 
will be analysed in chapter 7 and 8. I will begin by explaining my relationship to 
the field and how this influenced the data collection process. This will be 
followed by a presentation of the type of data collected during my fieldwork in 
Guatemala. Next, I will outline my methodological approach as ‘political 
ethnographic’, moving at the interface of methods used for political science and 
anthropology. Subsequently, I will reflect on my selection of the case-studies 
that have constituted one of the central aspects of the research before covering 
the limitations of my research. 
Relationship with the field 
The data collection for this thesis involved several stretches of fieldwork in 
Guatemala. The four field-visits of varying length encouraged a constant 
process of refining the research framework. My research interest was directed 
at understanding the forms collective action takes in the context of states with 
characteristics similar to those marking Guatemala, among them strong social 
asymmetries, a large and diverse rural population as well as an institutional 
framework co-opted by elite factions. Following an initial analysis of different 
types of historic and present agency in Guatemala, I identified the community-
based agency engaging in the defence of territory as representing the most 
sustained type of action to command collective allegiance and challenging state 
policies. This led me to focus on the characteristics and specific features of the 
local nodes of agency emerging among historically marginalised sections of the 
population to engage in the defence of territory. The inductive process was 
complemented by another aspect of my research that emerged in the course of 
this exploration and which led me to examine the implications of this collective 
agency for debates around democratisation.  
A first exploratory field-visit of three weeks was undertaken in October 2011 and 
involved initial conversations on the general ideas of the research project. 
These were held with a number of contacts from my previous work in 
Guatemala, most of whom were working with different human rights and social 
 181 
 
organisations, academic institutions or community based movements. This was 
followed by a second period of field research between May and October 2012, 
which constituted the main period of data collection. A third and fourth field trip 
of three weeks each were undertaken in October 2013 and September 2014 to 
gather additional data as well as discuss initial results with colleagues and key 
contacts in Guatemala. 
As the sequence of field trips may suggest, rather than following a clear pre-
structured plan, the research has evolved along the journey of this thesis. 
During the different stages, the research questions have been refined and 
adjusted on several occasions based on discussions with my supervisor as well 
as the insights gained in the course of the engagement with the research. 
Throughout this process my previous and current engagement with Guatemala 
on human rights related issues had an obvious influence on the research design 
as well as my acting in the field. My previous relationship with Guatemala had 
been that of an activist, volunteering in an international accompaniment 
platform, Accompaniment of Guatemala (Acompañamiento de Guatemala, 
ACOGUATE) in 2005 and then taking over a permanent position within the 
coordinating body of the same organisation between 2007 and 2010. My 
engagement with ACOGUATE was followed by several months of work with a 
Historical Memory Initiative (Iniciativa Memoria Histórica, IMH) in the second 
part of 2010 focusing primarily on the Northern Quiché. Members of this 
collective had already been working in the region for decades and had initiated 
a process of collective reconstruction of memory with local communities. Even 
after starting my research project in October 2010, I continued to engage with 
Guatemala from an activist perspective by collaborating with the Peace 
Brigades International project in Guatemala. 
My most extensive engagement in Guatemala was that with ACOGUATE, a 
platform consisting of 10 different international solidarity committees, which 
provides international accompaniment to individuals and collectives, who have 
received threats or were attacked due to their work in defence or promotion of 
human rights. My role involved coordinating aspects of this program that 
includes among others physical accompaniment and advocacy work as well as 
periodic drafting of reports, newsletters and appeals for urgent action directed at 
the international community. These tasks required constant communication and 
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coordination with a number of activists, organisations and movements involved 
in a variety of human rights and social struggles. This proved to be an 
invaluable experience and learning opportunity as I was able to gain insights 
and accompany different organisational processes, among them struggles for 
land, demands for an end to impunity for crimes of past and present as well as 
resistances to different projects linked to the exploitation of natural resources. 
Apart from the strictly work-based relationships, my stay in the country also 
meant I established personal relationships and friendships with a range of 
people engaging in different struggles for social change. This previous 
experience of living and working in Guatemala constituted a central incentive for 
me to continue my relationship with the country and its people. I felt a research 
project would allow me to explore in depth some of the complexities and 
contradictions I had encountered during my time in the country. Especially as a 
steady increase in conflicts around the exploitation of natural resources became 
evident, I felt that the resistance of the local communities highlighted some of 
the crucial contradictions at the heart of the Guatemalan state and society, thus 
offering an intriguing field of research. 
While my previous experiences in Guatemala enabled me to get insights into 
everyday lives and challenges faced by people and communities in rural and 
urban areas, it also generated certain scepticism with regards to the role played 
by the state and elites. This critical position was based on their historical role in 
perpetuating exclusion and violence, while it was also encouraged by the 
negative impact and conflictive situations I could perceive as resulting from 
some of the economic policies which were being promoted. However, I was 
intent on making sure these previous perceptions did not act as a bias in setting 
up the research and that my views were developed on the basis of observations 
and the investigative process as such.  
The previous spells of working in the rural areas of the country also gave me a 
feel for the evolving complexity among the population. The population consists 
of four main ethnic groups that can be divided into Mestizos, Garifuna and 
indigenous Xinca as well as 21 linguistic Mayan groups, with the indigenous 
population making up about 60% of Guatemala’s total population. This cultural 
diversity and the inter-ethnic relationships marked by racism and discrimination 
are a defining aspect of Guatemala’s past and present. Reinforced by centuries 
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of racialised exercise of power and in recent history, the armed conflict and its 
legacy, this creates multiple layers of local histories, tensions and excluding 
relationships that persist in the current societal constellations. As I was able to 
confirm during my field-trips, in many cases deep communal divisions as well as 
conflictive environments especially in the rural area, mark a context in which the 
struggle for a living and survival constitutes the main daily challenge for large 
sections of the population. The features of the highly unequal society are 
reflected in data provided by the United Nations Development Programme 
(Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, PNUD), according to 
which 62.4% of the population live in poverty (PNUD, 2012) 
Already during my work as part of the coordination of Acoguate, I had 
established close links with the IMH, which was working on the recovery of 
historical memory in the Northern Quiché region. It consists of a small group of 
ladino activists based in Guatemala City and over 40 indigenous community 
members from the Northern Quiché region. I accompanied them in their work as 
part of my role in Acoguate between 2007 and 2010 and then continued to 
collaborate with the Initiative during various months in the second half of 2010. 
Over the years their focus on memory and collective reconstruction in areas 
strongly affected by the armed conflict was adjusted to incorporate the 
contemporary challenges the communities were facing. This meant the issue of 
natural resources was introduced and gained increasing importance as part of 
the process of the IMH. In recent years many of the community members of the 
IMH would also become key drivers of the network among communities that 
developed in the Northern Quiché Region and which I analyse in my case study 
presented in chapter 7. My relationship with the IMH continued throughout the 
research process as I supported different aspects of their work in the region, 
which in turn was crucial to increasing my understanding of the present and 
past of these communities. Additionally, this engagement and the long debates 
and discussions with members of the group were also crucial in recognising the 
limits to my ability to understand and decode the complex social and cultural 
relationships in the area (outlined below). 
My previous work in Guatemala as part of the international accompaniment 
project as well as during my collaboration with the IMH also equipped me with a 
degree of sensitivity with regards to local processes. I became well aware of the 
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danger of reinforcing hierarchies of knowledge and practices that could in many 
cases occur just on the basis of the perception of my western origin. Therefore, 
when the opportunity arose, I was intent on underlining my respect for the 
autonomy of the organisational processes and acknowledge the communities’ 
own knowledge production. Despite this respect for the local forms of 
organising, I was also determined to develop a critical lens. Accordingly, in the 
course of writing the thesis I have attempted to reflect the fragility, limitations 
and imperfect nature of the processes of collective agency I was analysing.  
The years of relating with community-based processes had led me to reflect on 
the importance of understanding these expressions of agency, which despite 
their localised and often disperse dynamics represent one of the most persistent 
forms of agency in Guatemala. This encouraged me to try to get an in-depth 
understanding of these nodes of agency that in most cases don’t develop along 
the institutional channels of the political system. In doing so, I realised they 
were in many cases engaging in a more radical critique of Guatemala’s deficient 
formal democracy by operating outside institutional spaces and putting into 
practice alternative ways of designing political interactions at this local level. 
This is reflected as they draw and insist on the relevance of their localised 
production of knowledge and meanings. Additionally, this is evidenced in their 
struggle to appropriate decision-making processes, redesign political 
interactions and create local public spheres that by integrating participative 
elements become meaningful to the local population.  
The possibility to engage in an in-depth investigation of the organisational 
processes in the Northern Quiché region was clearly facilitated by my continued 
engagement with the IMH. Their work in the region was continuously oriented 
towards accompanying community-based processes, while putting an emphasis 
on their collective and grass-roots character. As mentioned, many of the local 
community members participating in the IMH had become key actors within their 
communities, as they started to contest the interests linked to the exploitation of 
natural resources in their territories. The relationship with the IMH as well as the 
respective local community members was crucial during my field-trips, since it 
enabled me to accompany them on visits to the rural parts of Guatemala as well 
as access, participate in and observe numerous community meetings and 
assemblies. 
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The selection of the case studies for this thesis was also based on the idea to 
offer a reflection of the previously mentioned complexity of Guatemala’s social 
actors. My initial plan had been to focus only on the organisational patterns of 
the Northern Quiché, where I had worked over several years. Nonetheless, in 
the course of my field-work in 2012 the RPLP was formed in response to the 
concession of a mining licence. As I had the chance to meet some of its 
members, it represented an opportunity to also integrate an examination of an 
organisational process among primarily non-indigenous communities and insert 
a comparative dimension into my research design. 
I continued with this plan to include the RPLP in my research despite the fact 
that the previous links with the Historical Memory Initiative, the communities in 
the Northern Quiché region, as well as the contextual insights accumulated in 
previous years meant that there would be an obvious imbalance in terms of the 
level of information and in-depth understanding between the two case studies. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the RPLP’s formation was a much more recent 
organisational process that I could track practically from its emergence in 2012 
inclined me towards including it in my analysis. Additionally, the proximity of the 
protest camp to the capital city, where I was based during the field work, 
facilitated the research: Firstly, it meant that it was easier for me to visit and 
access the protest camp. Secondly, the proximity to the capital city also meant 
that the process enjoyed a much higher coverage by mainstream as well as 
alternative media. In turn this made it easier to stay up to date with ongoing 
developments even when I was not in the country. 
Following the first exploratory visit in Guatemala I developed the main criteria 
for the selection of the case studies in line with my research framework: 
They reflected ongoing processes of collective action; they constituted 
localised, community-based and promoted processes; their articulations were 
based on an antagonistic stance that challenged elite promoted notions of 
development and discourses around the natural resource issue; their 
organisational patterns were marked by attempts to re-appropriate local 
decision-making processes. 
The two processes selected for my case study represented two examples 
among a number of expressions of agency that had emerged to highlight the 
antagonisms resulting from the policies targeting natural resources in rural 
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areas. Their focus on local and immediate issues exemplified by the defence of 
territory reflected characteristics they share with multiple nodes of agency 
across the country. The insistence on remaining in control of their immediate 
surroundings by seeking an appropriation of decision-making processes 
represents another common feature of this generation of agency that has 
emerged in historically marginalised spaces. 
Additionally, I felt that both processes were reflecting on the design of internal 
political interactions and attempting to emphasise collective and horizontal 
understandings. This indicated that they did not just represent purely 
oppositional strategies of resistance. Instead, they were also seeking to 
revitalise and develop an affirmation of difference around organisational 
patterns. This meant I was also able to explore the implications of these 
localised expressions of agency for meta-political issues, not just due to their 
challenge to elite-designed policies, but also due to their experimentation 
around different ways of organising and engaging in politics. By insisting on the 
determination of their local spaces and on having a voice in policies regarding 
their territories, they both put forward a crucial condition for alternative ways of 
imagining democratic processes. 
 
Type of data collected in the field 
Primary data 
As mentioned above, a central source of data gathered were the 40 face-to-face 
semi-structured interviews that were conducted during the field-trips to 
Guatemala. While the main period of fieldwork took place between April and 
October 2012 other visits were combined with trips I was undertaking due to my 
collaboration with Peace Brigades International. I was able to extend some of 
these visits to Guatemala to complete my data-collection. The first stay in 
October 2011 represented an opportunity for an exploratory visit to discuss the 
main ideas of my research project. Accordingly, I held conversations with a 
number of people working on issues close to my topic, whom I knew from my 
previous experiences in Guatemala. The second field-visit between May and 
October 2012 was centred on the actual process of data-collection. I had the 
opportunity of further trips to Guatemala in October 2013 and September 2014 
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to complement existing data and share initial results with key contacts. 
Accordingly, the majority of interviews and participant observation was 
conducted during the 2012 field-work, while the following visits allowed me to 
bring my data up to date with the rapidly evolving processes and context in 
Guatemala. To achieve a variety of perspectives on the central issues of my 
research the people interviewed included members and representatives of a 
number of NGO’s engaging in a range of topics around social, labour, economic 
and human rights issues; members and representatives of indigenous, 
community and campesino movements; members of think tanks and academics 
specialising on issues around social movements, democratisation and the state; 
current as well as former state officials. The initial interviewees were selected 
on the basis of the contacts I had made during my previous stays in Guatemala. 
In the course of the interviews I was introduced to other potential interviewees 
or received advice on who to contact based on my research interests.   
The interviewees for the semi-structured interviews were selected in accord with 
two of the central levels of analysis of the thesis: The nature of the state, its 
central policies and internal organisational patterns, the role of institutions, the 
key actors surrounding it, as well as its economic policies. In doing so, I was 
paying special attention to the issues surrounding policies oriented at the 
exploitation of natural resources and the insights this aspect provided on the 
nature of the state as well as state-society relationships. The second emphasis 
was placed on the different social articulations emerging over recent decades 
and their organisational patterns; the conflicts and agency around the defence 
of territory as well as their implications for broader, meta-political issues such as 
the construction of democratic processes. As part of this second aspect the 
case studies obviously received a significant amount of attention. 
Accordingly, the focus of the interview tended to vary slightly according to the 
perceived expertise of the interviewees. Many interviews also tended to shift 
towards ongoing events such as newly emerging conflicts related to natural 
resources developing in Totonicapán, San Rafael las Flores, Monte Olivo or 
San José del Golfo. Other themes featuring in the interviews were the nature of 
the state and its strategies to control the articulations in rural areas or to map 
areas of resistance and conflict. The interviews with individuals related directly 
to the processes examined in the case studies, were focused primarily on the 
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respective organisational dynamics and the context in which they were 
operating. 
Apart from the formal interviews, numerous informal conversations were held 
with friends and former colleagues, mostly activists engaging in a variety of 
organisations. Due to my close relationship with the IMH and my continued 
engagement with this collective, the research process was filled with extensive 
debates on current political developments, analysis of events and media 
coverage as well as meetings with different organisations related to activities of 
the IMH. The group was also working on a publication on the Northern Quiché 
area that was based on numerous years of working on a collective process of 
reconstruction of memory, which I had accompanied during my previous work in 
Guatemala. In the course of writing-up for this publication, topics which in many 
aspects related to my research were constantly debated among the group. A 
further valuable source of information during the writing process was the field-
diary in which I recorded my reflections and analysis almost on a daily basis 
during my fieldwork in Guatemala. 
In addition to collecting primary data through written documentation and oral 
communication, participant observation played an important role in 
complementing this data. It constituted an important part of my visits to the 
areas where the organisational processes of my case studies were based, 
among them the visits to the Northern Quiché area. They were primarily 
conducted together with the members of the IMH. A series of meetings with 
community representatives in Nebaj, Cunén and Sacapulas, community 
assemblies at a municipal level as well as visits to specific communities 
featured among these journeys into the rural areas. During this process I was 
intent on limiting my role to observations as well as engaging in tasks for the 
IMH, such as writing up notes for the meetings or participating in elaborating 
preparatory materials. Following the same patterns, I engaged in participant 
observation in my visits to the protest camp of the RPLP, during which group 
and individual interviews as well as a series of informal conversations with 
community members were held. 
A further aspect of this dimension of participant observation were the events, 
such as book presentations, press and thematic conferences which I attended 
during my stay in Guatemala. This information complemented the data collected 
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in interviews and participant observation by providing detailed information on 
ongoing events. Additionally, my links with a group of activists that had formed a 
Centre of Independent Media (Centro de Medios Independientes, CMI) allowed 
me to attend events such as a series of panel discussions between experts 
which they had organised. They had invited a number of activists and 
academics to debate and analyse some of the key aspects of ongoing 
economic and political developments. A large part of these debates that were 
recorded and later posted online, focused on the exploitation of natural 
resources. The observation of these discussions as well as the informal 
conversations around them again contributed interesting inputs for my research. 
In the research process I clearly viewed the analysis of qualitative data as 
crucial to addressing my research objectives. This data was nonetheless 
complemented with a limited number of sources of quantitative data to add 
some statistical and economic information. For example, data from institutions 
such as the UNDP or the World Bank have been used in order to strengthen the 
qualitative analysis that constituted the main dimension of the research project. 
However, I felt that in order to uncover the outlined aspects of cultural 
complexity and the multiple socio-historical layers encountered in the field, the 
core analysis of the thesis would have to be based on qualitative data.  
 
Secondary data 
In order to complete the contextual understanding and to stay up to date with 
the rapidly evolving situation in Guatemala, secondary sources were consulted 
to frame the different aspects of the research project. Books and journal articles 
of scholars made up the core parts of the contextual as well as theoretical 
background. This was complemented by a continuous review of Guatemalan 
newspapers, primarily the daily editions of Prensa Libre, El Periódico, La Hora 
and Siglo XXI. Intermittent publications of El Observador as well as the Institute 
of National Problems of the University San Carlos (Instituto de Problemas 
Nacionales de la Universidad de San Carlos, IPNUSAC) with their analysis and 
review of ongoing events were further reports that were part of the body of 
literature used in the course of the thesis. 
Online versions of Plaza Pública and alternative media-blogs such as 
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Comunitariapress as well as the CMI constituted further sources of information. 
They were especially important in providing a different perspective on ongoing 
social and political occurrences to the coverage offered by the main-stream 
media. Additionally, due to my links with individuals from the CMI, I also had 
access to video-material and recordings of events the organisation had covered 
while I was not in the country, such as the dialogue meetings between the RPLP 
and the government. This strategy of recording meetings and interlocution with 
state representatives has become relevant to the organisational processes as 
such. It enabled them to transmit the complete information on the ongoing 
negotiations to other members of the RPLP. Additionally, it made sure they 
would have graphic evidence of the claims and results of the negotiation 
process, in order to ensure government officials and company could not retract 
from them or issue false public claims. In a context where the mainstream 
media was in many cases directly nurturing a criminalising discourse against 
activists and communities, the importance of these alternative media sources 
has grown by creating a counter-discourse which is at least in part based on 
graphic evidence.   
 
Methodological and ontological framework 
Throughout the research process I was working on refining the research 
objectives, thereby implementing a ‘problem-induced’ research approach 
(Shapiro, 2005). Accordingly, I was focused on employing methods and theories 
best suited to explore the problem at the centre of the research. This approach 
bears strong similarities with the understanding of ‘political ethnography’ put 
forward by Schatz. As he argues, “the term political ethnography implies a 
creative tension. Ethnography suggests a particularising impulse, a desire to 
avoid premature empirical generalisation, and a preference for inductive 
thinking. … Political suggests a willingness to bracket aspects of what we see, 
to simplify for analytic coherence and to seek to produce generalisations.” 
(Schatz, 2009b, p.306) 
Accordingly, my research was moving at the interface of methods ascribed to 
political science and ethnography. This seemed to represent the appropriate 
combination for me as a trained political scientist who was also aiming to get to 
grips with the local complexities and cultural differences which I continued to 
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find in the field. Therefore, I saw my engagement with methods closer to 
anthropological understandings as indispensable. This was reflected by my 
interest in the characteristics of specific nodes of agency, the ongoing 
processes of production of meaning as well as their procedural and 
organisational understandings. The research was also examining meta-political 
implications of this agency by seeking to determine the implications of localised 
and non-linear articulations for issues at the heart of political science, such as 
the inter-relationship with institutions, the nature of the state as well as their role 
for understandings of democracy. 
By engaging with social actors, community leaders and activists I was also 
intent on generating a bottom-up perspective on the research problem, which 
was encouraged by the ethnographic tools of data collection such as participant 
observation as well as interviews. In this line I aimed to take the complexity that 
was represented by the particular characteristics of these nodes of agency and 
their locally embedded processes of production of meaning as a starting point. 
By rejecting simplistic understandings of a supposed over-codification by 
modernity I argue for the importance of engaging with a range of 
methodological tools. This is crucial to generate a bottom-up perspective and 
grasp the complexity that in states with features like Guatemala is reflected in 
these localised responses and the understandings they articulate. 
As Wedeen points out, ethnographic tools such as participant observation 
constitute “a good way to gain insight into actor’s lived political experience, to 
observe how people make sense of their worlds, to chart how they ground their 
ideas in everyday practices and routines and to analyse the gap between the 
idealised representation and actual apprehension of events, people, and 
political orders.” (Wedeen, 2009, p.85) Accordingly these tools were essential to 
exploring the localised understandings that are being advanced by communities 
around the defence of territory. Participant observation was especially crucial in 
getting these insights on the meanings that are produced in the course of their 
organisational processes. 
By taking into account the methods of political science as well as borrowing 
from methods primarily associated with anthropological research I was able to 
relate this local agency with the context of a co-opted state. This linking of 
perspectives allowed me to put forward the idea of organisational processes 
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taking on specific features in this kind of context. Instead of engaging along the 
conventional channels of participation, they seek to appropriate decision-
making processes and carve out spaces in which their ‘difference’ at the level of 
meanings and in terms of organising political processes can be kept alive. 
Rather than producing clear-cut conclusions or generalisations around their 
implications for macro-political issues, the research attempts to introduce new 
ways of seeing and understanding the particular features of this collective 
agency. This coincides with Schatz’s view of one of the central contributions of 
political ethnography. He highlights its ability to contextualise theory and 
consider alternative ways of understanding determinate aspects of empirical 
realities (Schatz, 2009a). 
The engagement in contexts that are very much outside the area of influence of 
Western epistemologies also required an ongoing reflection on how my 
‘conceptual baggage’ (Kirby and McKenna, 1989) as a Western researcher 
plays into the process of construction of knowledge in the course of the thesis. 
From the outset I was conscious of the fact that my research would represent a 
subjective interpretation of ongoing developments in Guatemala. Since the 
process involved translating my findings into meanings, I attempted to maintain 
a level of flexibility with regards to my conceptual framework in order to adapt it 
to the social realities on the ground. This aspect was especially important in 
establishing an assertive link with the analysis of the case studies during which I 
sought to integrate indigenous understandings and pay attention to the 
epistemological processes developed by local communities in the course of 
their resistance. While the thesis was always going to represent an 
approximation to social realities enacted through processes of interpretation, 
translation and production of meaning, I was intent on finding concepts and 
ideas that could reflect the movements and central understandings of the 
articulations and their own readings of social realities. 
In the case of Latin America authors emphasizing the importance of de-colonial 
approaches have been influential in developing research that emphasises 
multiple worldviews and the epistemological processes deriving from them. 
Additionally, I have also engaged with a number of concepts developed by 
western scholars, whose conceptualisations are not specifically oriented 
towards the context of the Global South. In this line I have chosen to recur to 
 193 
 
Deleuze’s work since it grants space not just for different epistemologies but 
also places an emphasis on different ontologies. As outlined in chapter 2, this is 
evidenced in his understanding of ‘difference’. This enables to frame the 
assemblages of collective action examined in this thesis with an immanent and 
auto-poietic understanding that evolves from different ontologies. ‘Difference’ in 
this sense does not only set up the assemblage engaging in collective action in 
an antagonistic stance, but also provides space for ontological difference as 
well as the epistemological processes evolving from it.  
Based on these ideas I have also drawn on authors who have developed an 
understanding for a ‘flat’ and strongly ‘relational’ ontology that has been 
implemented in the analysis of collective action.82 Scholars like Escobar and De 
Landa have argued for this ontological shift based on Deleuze’s challenge to 
the conventional dualist ontologies that these authors see as having dominated 
social science (e.g. De Landa, 2002, 2006; Escobar, 2008; Escobar and 
Osterweil, 2009). Instead, they propose a flat ontological position that implies a 
perspective based on “unique, singular individuals, different in spatio-temporal 
scale but not in ontological status.” (De Landa, 2002, p.41) 
This prepares the terrain for an understanding of the co-existence and co-
construction of multiple worlds that stands in contrast with ideas that tend to 
assume an over-codification of collectives and spaces. Instead, these authors 
provide elements that allow analysts to emphasise the capacity of local 
articulations to produce their own meanings and spaces. This is supported by 
ideas that point to the ‘lines of flight’ or ‘patterns of re-territorialisation’, which 
are operated by and from different nodes of agency. In doing so, they constitute 
a route for escape from the attempts of dominant actors to recode people and 
territories in accord with determinate interests (De Landa, 2006; Chesters and 
Welsh, 2006; Escobar and Osterweil, 2009). 
In the course of my attempts to reconcile political science perspectives with 
methodological approaches such as participant observation that tend to be 
associated with anthropological research, I was also encouraged to reflect on 
my role with regards to the social actors at the centre of my research. 
                                                          
82 This has been treated more extensively in chapter 3. In this section I just mention the general 
features that have implications for the methodological aspects of the thesis. 
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Scholars such as Hammersley and Atkinson (1995), Burnham et al. (2004) have 
advocated the importance of maintaining a level of social and intellectual 
detachment while in the research context, in order to guarantee the production 
of viable analytical work. These positions stand in contrast to social movement 
scholars that criticise attempts to position research “outside or above the 
circular observer-actor game” (Melucci, 1996, p.396). As Chesters (2012) 
argues, this gives way to the danger of converting expressions of collective 
agency into objects of knowledge with the sole objective of enhancing a 
researcher’s career. Instead he has argued for an ethical responsibility to 
respect the “ontological and epistemological frameworks of knowledge 
production that emerge from social movements” (Chesters, 2012, p.158).  
The research relationship with the subjects in the field was an aspect I was 
confronted with in various interviews. A number of interviewees expressed their 
frustration over the flood of researchers coming to seek data for their respective 
research projects. While agreeing with the perspective outlined by Chesters 
(2012), in the course of my research project I found it difficult to balance some 
of the formal requirements of a research process for a thesis with the 
possibilities of engaging in a co-production of knowledge. As such I felt that the 
process of real co-production would demand a much more continuous and fluid 
relationship with the communities and actors. This, however, was met by 
logistical, financial as well as temporal constraints.   
In line with the experience deriving from my previous roles as well as the ethical 
dilemma of seeing social actors as exploitable objects of knowledge, I 
attempted to ensure that my research project could flow alongside the 
organisational processes. This meant that my data collection methods should 
not interrupt or influence their strategies or objectives. In many spaces of 
participant observation this was made easier by the already consolidated 
relationship, based on my previous role in Guatemala.  
In particular, the collaboration with the IMH in their work of providing 
accompaniment and support to the communities in the Northern Quiché area 
enabled me to introduce certain elements of a co-production of knowledge. In 
addition to support in specific tasks such as preparing materials or taking notes, 
on various occasions I was able to share my analysis or provide points for 
discussion during meetings and workshops. In the course of my fourth visit to 
 195 
 
Guatemala the preliminary results of my research were shared and discussed 
with members of the two organisational processes that figure in the case 
studies of the thesis. Furthermore, with individuals linked to these case studies 
communication over Skype and email were continued and the chance for 
feedback on translated sections of the thesis was provided. Accordingly, a 
dimension of participative inquiry and co-production was inserted into the 
research process and enabled me to ensure a certain flow of information and 
analysis back to the communities. 
 
Research Limitations 
One of the main limitations in the course of the research was linked to my 
position as a western researcher examining a non-western context with the 
above-mentioned cultural and political complexities. Especially in the 
indigenous Northern Quiché region I was aware of limits on being able to 
adequately observe and interpret events. Despite the patient explanations by 
friends and community members from the Northern Quiché, I would struggle to 
develop a profound understanding of their thinking, views and ongoing 
production of knowledge. 
The local Mayan languages (Ixil, Quiché, Sacapulteco) clearly represent a 
central element in guaranteeing the reproduction as well as evolution of cultural 
codes. My very limited knowledge of these languages that hardly went beyond 
the odd word or phrase has obviously represented barriers in terms of my 
capacity to de-construct and understand their sense-making activities. On the 
other hand, the fact that conversations between the different linguistic groups 
were often held in Spanish meant I was able to follow a large part of the 
conversations and meetings that took place between the different groups. 
Members of the Historical Memory Initiative, many with decades of experience 
in the region, were tireless in providing explanations and a translation across 
cultural barriers of events and discourses. At times the presence of ladino 
members of the IMH as well as myself was taken into consideration and 
discussions held in Spanish. However, especially at the small scale community 
meetings, the respective local Mayan language was predominantly used. 
Additionally, even in the communication in Spanish between the different 
communities across ethnic barriers, I am aware that much more was 
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communicated than verbally expressed. 
I was faced with similar limitations with regards to the Mayan cosmovision: 
While I was able to gain insights in the basic ideas of this world-view, achieving 
a profound understanding would have required a prolonged and much more 
focused immersion in the field. This is also due to the fact that cosmogonic 
knowledge and linguistic structures as well as their reproduction among the 
population are constantly evolving. Even in the case of the predominantly ladino 
communities in the region of San José del Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc I 
realised the limitations in grasping the ongoing local processes of production of 
meanings and organising. Additionally, in this case the limited period and 
specific focus of my research meant I would obviously be missing many 
contextual elements that would add to a better comprehension of community 
members and their organisational patterns. 
Although the significant differences and complexities between organisational 
processes stand out in Guatemala they also share features, especially with 
regards to the complex environment in which they are acting. This is marked by 
exorbitant rates of impunity and violence. This combines with widespread 
conditions of poverty, marginalisation and persisting expressions of racism to 
create an extremely difficult environment to exercise any kind of political or 
social agency. These contextual features also meant taking into account the 
safety of local interviewees and members of the organisational processes I was 
visiting. These considerations were crucial since the visit or participation in 
meetings of a foreigner was likely to attract attention that could have negative 
repercussions for the respective interviewees or participants. In some cases this 
led me to abandon ideas of holding interviews, while in other cases the context 
put certain restrictions on my movements in Guatemala City as well as the rural 
areas I visited. 
As my research progressed I also realised that I would struggle to come to 
clear-cut, generalised conclusions for meta-political issues based on the 
restricted number of cases I had focused on during my fieldwork. Among the 
different nodes of agency that have consolidated around the defence of 
territories strong differences in their production of meanings, their organisational 
patterns as well as strategies are evident. As such the case studies I analysed 
cannot be seen as representative for the various nodes of agency that have 
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emerged in different parts of the country. However, this absence of 
generalisable conclusions also represents a research finding in itself, as it 
identifies the importance of dealing with differences as well as the complexity of 
localised processes and their understandings as a condition for any deepening 
of democracy. 
The next chapters will turn towards the case studies that reflect the analysis of 
some of the main data collected in the course of the research. Accordingly, the 
following chapter will focus on a network of communities that over recent years 
has emerged around the defence of territory in the Northern Quiché. The 
analysis of this case study will also reflect the political ethnographic approach 
outlined here, by examining the production of antagonistic meanings and 
organisational patterns and also exploring how the communities relate with the 
elite-dominated institutional framework and how this has impacted on their 
agency.  
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7. ‘Difference’ in meaning and political practice: Community-based agency 
in the Northern Quiché region 
In the previous chapter I outlined the methodological approach used in the 
research process for this thesis. I indicated the importance of combining 
anthropological and political science research perspectives in order to grasp the 
complex nature of non-linear social interactions and examine their relevance for 
the construction of democratic processes. In this chapter I will turn towards the 
analysis of some of the central aspects of the data collected in the course of the 
research process. I will seek to deconstruct some of the specific characteristics 
of ‘assemblages’ of collective action that have emerged in defence of territory 
by looking at a particular organisational process located in the Northern Quiché. 
After outlining the contextual aspects and the projection of elite interests in the 
region, I will examine the response to projects targeting natural resources which 
these local communities have generated. In doing so, I will develop a more 
detailed understanding of some of the key characteristics of this localised and 
community-based agency operating in the context of a co-opted state.  
During the analysis of the organisational processes I will explore how the elite-
guided modernisation project has encouraged the communities to highlight 
antagonisms related to two interlinked aspects: Firstly, at a symbolic level of the 
production of meanings, which are rooted in evolving linguistic and cultural 
frameworks that persist despite strong external pressures. Secondly, I will 
outline how based on the influence of meanings rooted in indigenous culture, 
the communities have also sought to organise political interactions in ways that 
contrast with those predominant in the formal political system.  
In the course of the chapter I will argue that this elite-guided modernisation 
project has accentuated meanings around territory among the local community 
members that lie at the heart of their cultural reproduction and sense of 
collectiveness. Based on culturally rooted meanings, this has engendered a 
revitalisation of the ‘community’ that has acted as a signifier for the resistance 
and its political processes, in some cases overcoming divisions left by the 
legacy of the armed conflict. Additionally, the community members have added 
an explicit political notion to their ‘difference’ as these meanings translate into 
attempts to redesign political interactions and a struggle to re-appropriate 
decision-making processes. In doing so, they emphasise the voice of the ‘local’, 
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its differential production of meanings and autonomous decision-making as an 
alternative way of organising political processes. 
 
Elite-designed modernisation in the Northern Quiché 
This chapter focuses on an organisational process engaging in the defence of 
territory among communities in the Northern Quiché region. In the course of this 
thesis I use this geographical denomination to refer to the area of 5 
municipalities, Nebaj, Cotzal, Chajul, Cunén and Sacapulas. They do not 
constitute an administrative region and are 5 of a total of 21 municipalities in the 
department of Quiché. However, among the community members of the 
network, it is the most commonly used term to refer to the space in which their 
organisational process has developed. Over 90% of the population in the 
mentioned municipalities is indigenous Maya, belonging to the Quiché (Cunén, 
Sacapulas), Ixil (Nebaj, Cotzal, Chajul) and Sacapulteco (Sacapulas) ethnic 
groups. 
In the previous chapters I have already touched upon the region at various 
moments to point to its history of state repression and violence, while also 
indicating the trajectory of ongoing resistances in the area. Violence repeats 
itself throughout the Guatemalan state-formation process taking on multiple 
forms. In the region it has frequently complemented patterns of exploitation, 
such as forced labour for local estate-owners or the pattern of seasonal 
migration to the Southern Coast to work on the plantations. The strongest 
coercive impact in the region is linked to the armed conflict, which drew 
unprecedented levels of repression to the area. Additionally, the legacy of this 
period left large parts of the region militarised as different strategies of 
controlling and concentrating population sought to reconfigure cultural, social 
and economic relationships. However, as indicated in chapter 4, the region also 
has a history of acts of resistance, among them uprisings against the colonial 
and post-colonial administrations, the flourishing of cooperative networks in the 
50s and 60s as well as the different strategies seeking to counter military control 
during the armed conflict. The various moments reveal the existence of latent 
networks of grass-root organising and coordinating— usually based on the 
framework of the community— that in certain moments appear in the public 
limelight. 
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As in other rural areas of Guatemala, the communities represent the 
predominant collective framework in the Northern Quiché region. Many are 
situated in the highlands of the region, withdrawn and only loosely connected 
with the urban centres. As discussed in chapter 2, based on Wolf’s (1957) 
understanding, the concept of ‘community’ has often been suggested as 
constituting a ‘closed, corporative social unit’. However, various scholars (Arias, 
1992; Smith, 1992a; Lutz and Lovell, 1992) have emphasised the fact that 
communities should not be seen as ‘closed’, especially when looking at their 
economic or political relationships. Instead, this literature has indicated the 
tendency of communities to reconstitute themselves in relation to changing 
historical circumstances. This may explain a certain persistence in their unity, 
while also indicating their evolving nature, which is reflected among other 
changes in their economic orientation towards artisanal or commercial activities. 
Presently, strong differences among the various local constellations have to be 
acknowledged as they have developed by relating and responding to the variety 
of external impacts and contextual features. 
As outlined in the definition presented in chapter 2, from an analytical point of 
view communities constitute aggregative bodies of individuals grouped into 
collectivities or ‘assemblages’ in De Landa’s understanding. Varying degrees of 
social cohesiveness mark each unit. In Guatemala, anthropological literature 
has been keen to point to the relationship with the state as determining this 
level of cohesiveness. Accordingly, Smith has argued, “community relations 
remain strong, … not because of the dead weight of the past, but because of 
the continuing importance of community relations to an oppressed people ruled 
by an extremely repressive state (Smith 1992a, p.20).  
While as mentioned, constantly evolving characteristics have to be taken into 
account, it is especially when shared meanings are activated by collectively 
perceived acts of injustice or threats. This can be the case when communal land 
or water is under threat, thus engendering a strengthening of the degree of 
cohesiveness as it ‘makes sense’ to act as a ‘community’. A renewed 
convergence can be perceived in areas of the Northern Quiché region in the 
context of the struggles in defence of territory, even though the level of state 
repression has left many networks disrupted and penetrated by the counter-
insurgent attempts to reconstitute ‘community’ in accord with the military’s view. 
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The ‘emerging properties’ developed in the course of processes of convergence 
or ‘assemblage’, such as the discursive capacities, an increase in interactions 
or the articulation of shared cultural meanings, further stimulate a collective 
sense of belonging. This is reflected in the current struggles to defend local 
territory that has translated into a revitalisation of the evolving collective signifier 
of the ‘community’. Given the contextual features of the region, the rural local 
population perceive it as the most efficient and trusted space from which to 
develop strategies of resistance and organise political interactions.  
Despite constituting the primary framework of collective identity in the area, the 
communities in the Northern Quiché cannot be seen as idyllic social units. 
‘Community’ represents a constant, dynamic tension and always risks to 
camouflage and repress internal differences or to stabilise certain hierarchies. In 
many cases the legacy of the 36 years of armed conflict continues to be 
reflected in the internal distribution of power and structure as perpetrators and 
victims share common spaces. In other cases, principales (elders) have 
consolidated a hierarchy to dominate decision-making processes within 
communities. Often this also constitutes a legacy of the past and a 
consequence of the redrawing of communal power-structures during the armed 
conflict. Other influences, such as the revitalisation of the role of indigenous 
authorities through funds and programmes led by international donors have also 
in some cases created tensions between different competing community 
authorities.  
Additionally, the influence of the expansion of the market economy can be 
perceived even in remote areas of the region, constituting a further aspect that 
contradicts the notion of ‘closed communities’. Instead it reflects the multiple 
layers of relationships communities and their members are embedded in. 
Especially, social programmes and projects targeting micro-societal levels and 
aimed at enhancing individual economic entrepreneurship in the communities, 
have added pressure on the collective framework.  
In many communities the significance of shared cognitive and ethical 
understandings has also diminished as other identities are embraced and 
compete with the community identity. The association with one of the thriving 
evangelical or Pentecostal religious groups, many of which were originally 
introduced in the 1980s as part of counter-insurgent plans, feature among these 
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identities ‘on offer’. Furthermore, the recruitment into one of the numerous 
NGOs that have entered the region during the post-conflict period, with different 
aid and development programs in many cases also encourage a tendency to 
disregard the collective community framework.  
The complexity and variety of the communal organisations is also reflected in 
the formal political representation of the communities in the Northern Quiché 
region. Leadership tends to be conferred on traditional community authorities as 
well as authorities elected in line with the Law on Urban and Rural Development 
Councils. This legal framework was implemented in 2003 corresponding with 
the decentralisation policies outlined in the Peace Accords. Giving communities 
the right to nominate the members of the Communal Development Councils 
(Consejos de Desarrollo, COCODE) as well as their community representative, 
the alcalde comunitario o auxiliar (community or auxiliary mayor), was meant to 
ensure a stronger participation of communities in municipal policies. 
However, in many areas of the region the Development Councils have been co-
opted by municipal authorities, who have insisted on nominating favourable 
representatives as members of COCODEs and community authorities to avoid 
opposition to municipal policies. This has often engendered the constitution of 
new hierarchies, with some representatives claiming a status of a “COCODE for 
life.” (Interview community activist, Sacapulas, 03/10/2012) In some cases this 
has also led to the consolidation or revival of power-structures that were 
established during the armed conflict within the communities with former military 
commissioners or members of PACs being nominated. 
Community members voiced their scepticism with regards to these 
decentralisation policies that set out the Development Councils:  
“The decentralisation laws have represented an arrow in the heart of 
communal autonomy and in many cases prepared the path for their (the 
communities’) division. They have instilled a dynamic in the communal 
network that subordinates the internal decision-making as well as the 
internal search for solutions to problems. ... Instead, the communities are 
re-oriented towards the municipalities to look for projects, which in turn 
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makes them vulnerable to the clientelistic policies that dominate the local 
level.” (Interview community activist, Sacapulas, 26/09/2014) 83  
In the view of these community members, instead of empowering communities, 
these policies have encouraged processes of vertical integration of the rural 
communities into municipal structures. These have in turn in many cases been 
co-opted by local strong-men or national party networks that tend to undermine 
the autonomy of the community. A proliferation of patterns that makes 
community members vulnerable to short term electoral purpose can be 
perceived. In contrast to the original ideas, the role of many COCODEs has 
become limited to providing a type of democratic legitimacy or symbolic 
approval for municipal policies based on foregone decision-making. 
In addition, the municipalities of the region have come to represent an important 
axis in rent-seeking activities with political parties acting as a web for 
relationships to transcend scales and link local groups with structures operating 
at a departmental or national level. Within these networks the multi-level links 
are crucial to guarantee the implementation of projects and contracts at the 
local level, since they ensure the transfer of funds for the municipal budget. This 
process on one hand allows rent-seeking networks and actors attempting to 
promote particular strategies of accumulation to consolidate around the 
municipal councils. On the other hand, it also ensures the implementation of 
projects essential for the consolidation of a clientelistic party following, which is 
required for local electoral success.  
At the local level these networks involve a variety of agents including company 
representatives, municipal authorities, local estate owners, contractors, former 
local military commissioners, military officials or former commanders of PAC 
units.84 The consolidation of political and economic networks rooted in the 
                                                          
83 In other areas such as Nebaj, the competition for community representation between the 
municipality and the communities has been strongly disputed over recent years. The former 
mayor (2007-2011) had nominated his community representatives, while the communities had 
nominated their own representatives, thus creating divisions and strong tensions within the 
communities. In some cases, even two years after the elections of 2011 the former COCODEs 
had refused to give up their position as community representatives.  
84 Historical and army connections are key to link local actors with regional and national 
networks. One is represented by the so-called ‘promotion 108’, which is integrated by former 
army members close to the current president of Otto Pérez Molina (2011-2015) and his party, 
 204 
 
counter-insurgent past is especially strong in the Ixil, given the level of military 
penetration of the area. To a lesser degree, it also characterises the other 
municipalities of the Northern Quiché. However, the tensions brought to the 
communities by the organisational dynamics and structure of political parties 
represents a common feature. Especially in the context of electoral processes 
the divides and conflicts within the communities tend to peak. This constitutes 
the period when the national political parties arrive to distribute presents and 
bribes among the communities. Truckloads filled with cheap clothes, cans of 
food, fertilizers and in some cases even cash are distributed among the 
communities to win votes. Although the parties are promptly abandoned by 
voters after elections, this practice has often done enough to divide 
communities or bring processes of social organising to a halt (Trentavizi and 
Cahuec, 2012). 
Similar to other parts of Guatemala, the region’s natural resources have 
become the target of national and transnational actors. The renewed 
employment of coercive, economic and cultural strategies to advance these 
interests has led many local community members to highlight the link between 
the present penetration of the Northern Quiché region and the previous 
promotion of strategies of accumulation and rent-seeking embedded in the 
counter-insurgent campaigns. The IMH, a collective which has been working in 
the Quiché area since 2003, has undertaken an exhaustive analysis of this 
phenomenon in the region: 
“In the communities we know and recognise the military has never left our 
areas. They have always been there, some permanently, others arriving 
(later) to claim rights over land, we have no idea of how they achieved 
them (property rights) unless they represent spoils of war. Now, as the 
companies came to implement their hydroelectric projects they again did 
so hand in hand with the military. In the Ixil area the military people 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the Partido Patriota. In the region the most visible, high-profile actor is the Member of Congress 
and former military official, Estuardo Galdámez. In line with the dynamics outlined in chapter 3 
he has benefited from a series of contracts for his construction companies while in turn ensuring 
‘projects’ for local constituencies. Additionally, his involvement in acts of corruption and other 
illicit activities has been repeatedly signalled. For more information, see Palma (2012); Corvo 
(2014). 
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prepared their access. Subsequently, they went on to give them security, 
they created their security firms for the companies to control the dissenting 
and resisting population.” (Resistencia de los Pueblos, 2008, p. 8) 
The potential in terms of natural resources has long been identified by different 
sections of military and economic elites. However, as outlined in the previous 
chapter, the transition to a formally democratic framework as well as the global 
consensus around neoliberal policies has provided renewed impetus to set in 
motion this reorganisation of spaces in accord with the elites’ interests. The link 
with the recent counter-insurgent past is reflected by the local actors that 
surround the implementation of the project. This is especially evident in the Ixil 
area, where landowners with a close connection to the military, former military 
commissioners and officers, as well as former PAC members have been crucial 
in paving the path for transnationals such as the Italian energy company Enel to 
establish itself in the area. Some of the historic landowners in the region have 
sold or leased their land in lucrative deals with companies. Other actors linked 
to a counterinsurgent past act as testa-ferros (frontmen) to acquire the plots of 
land required for the respective projects or provide security for the operations of 
the respective companies (Interview community activists, Nebaj, 08/11/2013). 
The modernisation project in the region is expressed in concessions for mining 
and projects for hydroelectric power generation, the expansion of electric grids, 
as well as pressures to adapt local production to the demands of external 
markets. Hydroelectric projects such as the Xacbal or Palo Viejo projects are 
partly already in operation, others are under construction or awaiting 
authorization. Similarly, a number of mining licences have been granted for the 
exploration and exploitation of a variety of natural resources, ranging from oil 
and nickel to minerals such as barite.85 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the transport and commercialisation of 
energy goes hand in hand with the exploitation of natural resources through 
mining or hydroelectric projects. It represents a lucrative business opportunity 
through electricity-exports to other Central American countries. Additionally, 
                                                          
85 Apart from the officially granted licenses, community members cited a number of unregistered 
extraction sites as well as exploration processes ongoing in the region. One was spotted by 
community members in Nebaj in November 2013 with subsequent investigations indicating that 
the company was operating illegally in the area. 
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supplying electricity represents a crucial pre-condition to enable the 
implementation and operation of projects aiming to exploit natural resources. 
Thus, the construction of an extensive network of electric interconnections and 
grids in the area represents a further, very visual dimension of the ongoing 
reorganisation of territories and spaces. In the region they are implemented 
through the governmental programs, the Programme for Rural Electrification 
(Programa de Electrificacion Rural, PER) and the mentioned PET, which are 
being executed by the Colombian company Transportadora de Energía de 
Centroamérica (TRECSA).86 
These programmes aim to establish a grid to connect more than 10 
hydroelectric projects planned for the region and their implementation in ways 
that are similar to the promotion of hydroelectric and mining projects: Rights to 
previous information and consultation of the local communities are side-lined, 
while the governmental institutions seek to speed up their implementation 
through the approval of legal frameworks. The expansion of the electricity grid 
reflects this interplay between different scales, as the governmental accord 145-
2013 was approved in 2013 to declare the implementation of the PET and PER 
a matter of ‘national urgency and public necessity’. In doing so, restrictions on 
access to private and communal land to install posts and the transmission lines 
were abolished and instead legal frameworks were brought into place, which 
grant companies the option of a free usufruct of properties and land for a period 
of 25 years.  
As the different dimensions of this modernisation project are based on 
legislation, which is often rushed through congress without debate, national 
elites frequently link its implementation to a discourse of governance and 
respect of the state of law. As an analyst commented, this represents an 
opportunity to appeal for the “preservation of governance from the centre of 
economic power, while the places where processes of resistance take place are 
deemed to be ungovernable. The intention is to reorder and organise territories 
in line with elite interests.” (Interview human rights activist, Guatemala City, 
25/07/2012) Additionally, the discourse on governance is accompanied by an 
explicit threat to use force in order to guarantee the rule of law. In the regional 
                                                          
86 TRECSA is the Guatemalan subsidiary company of the Bogotá Energy Group, one of the 
biggest electricity companies in Latin America operating in Colombia, Peru and Guatemala. 
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context this is reflected by patterns of militarisation, such as the temporary 
establishment of military posts in the local municipalities of Cunén in 2009 or 
Cotzal in 2012.  
In addition to the concession of licences for natural resources, the projection of 
elite interests into the rural spaces also includes strategies targeting a micro-
societal, individual level as pressure for changes in social behavioural patterns 
is exercised. This is especially persistent in agricultural production, which 
represents the prime source of survival and a crucial aspect of everyday life 
among rural communities. Community members are encouraged to ‘modernize’ 
by deepening their links with the broader market economy. A variety of 
governmental and non-governmental programmes— the latter in many cases 
linked to international development agencies— seek to pave the path for the 
integration of local campesinos into the national and global markets. A flood of 
international loans, grants and projects based on the premise that „prosperity 
can best be achieved through unfettered capitalism” seek to spurn this shift 
(Toruño, 2010, p.150). 
The constant increase of institutions offering micro-credits as well as centres for 
social entrepreneurship for training and technical assistance to the local 
producers are part of this trend.87 In the different programmes, orientation is 
provided to ensure local production corresponds to the demands of an external 
market. However, the exposure to the perils of climate, the lack of experience in 
growing unfamiliar crops as well as the cost of gaining access to markets has in 
many cases halted this evolution at an early stage. Instead, as community 
members have signalled, it has left large sections of the local population faced 
with a mounting level of debt (Interview community activist, Sacapulas, 
26/09/2014). 
The aspects highlighted in this section are only some of the dynamics that 
impact and reconfigure social, economic and cultural relationships in the 
Northern Quiché. Some features of this elite-guided production of space focus 
                                                          
87 Fundación Agro, one of the institutions that has been identified by the local community 
members as promoting these changes in production in the Ixil area, is especially paradigmatic 
due to its historic continuity in the area. Its work advocating changes in production patterns has 
been ongoing for decades with links to counter-insurgent strategies in the area during the 
1980s. 
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on the individual level, seeking to instil entrepreneurial habits in the rural 
population. Others, such as the approaches linked to the exploitation of natural 
resources, due to their scale, impact at a collective and community level. The 
interests targeting natural resources introduce important shifts in the regional 
socio-political constellations, not only due to the reordering of local realities but 
also due to the resistance they have generated among local communities. 
Antagonisms have been highlighted as contrasting perspectives on how to 
organise social, economic and cultural relationships meet. As the following 
sections will indicate, it is especially in cases where the collective, community 
level is targeted that oppositional agency emerges.  
 
‘Same situation, same resistance’: Establishing a network in defence of 
territory 
As the projection of interests linked to the exploitation of natural resources in 
the region have gained pace, this has spurred collective organising as 
community members reacted to the penetration of their territories. The most 
intense coordination and exchange of information has occurred between 
community members within the same municipalities, which have also 
consolidated as the prime local focus points for their agency. However, at the 
same time a network was established with communities from neighbouring 
municipalities. 
The case of Cunén, a small municipality about 68 kilometres north of the 
departmental capital of Santa Cruz del Quiché can be seen as an example of a 
seemingly spontaneous emergence of communities. A period of rising 
discontent over different aspects of municipal policies was followed by the 
militarisation of the municipality at the request of the mayor. This constituted a 
turning point and in January 2009 an estimated 4,000 community members 
gathered to establish a road-block on a regional highway passing close to 
Cunén.88  
The emergence of these protests was unexpected since it constitutes an area 
with a limited tradition of social protest. It is part of a region which was marked 
by strong, local PAC-units that had kept control of the area during the armed 
                                                          
88 This place is known as the ‘Entronque’, the junction. 
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conflict. The events of January 2009 did however reveal latent community 
networks that were solidified in the face of a series of collectively perceived 
injustices and threats. Accordingly, the protests represented a specific moment 
of an organisational process that had been preceded by meetings and debates 
at a community level to prepare for this taking to the public space.  
In the course of this mobilisation a series of demands were put forward by the 
communities that became known locally as the ‘Accords of the Entronque’ in 
reference to the place where the mobilisation took place. Multiple demands and 
concerns were featured in the document among them the chaotic and overly 
bureaucratic process to obtain new Personal Identification Documents, 
promoted by the National Registry of Persons (Registro Nacional de las 
Personas, RENAP); the withdrawal of the military from the municipality; the 
rejection of the presence of the National Police Force, as the population had 
grown tired of a series of incidents reflecting abuse of power and corruption; the 
increase in public transport costs; the high electricity fees charged by Union 
Fenosa, a Spanish transnational company at the time in charge of the 
distribution of electricity; concerns about privatisation of water due to a 
proposed governmental reform on the legislation on water; the communities’ 
rejection of a mining licence in municipal territories, granted without consulting 
or informing the local population. 
Over the following years it was especially the demands around the defence of 
territory and natural resources that consolidated as the central aspect of the 
organisational processes of the communities of Cunén. Together with other 
communities in Northern Quiché, they have gone on to constitute nodes in a 
loose network as community members in the neighbouring municipality of 
Sacapulas and the three Ixil municipalities of Nebaj, Chajul and Cotzal also 
developed organisational strategies around the defence of territory to respond 
to the penetration of policies and agents targeting the exploitation of natural 
resources. In most localities of the region the community represents the central 
organisational framework of interaction, decision-making and mobilisation. In 
areas, where inter-communal division persists, it is sections of the community 
that converge into assemblages of collective action and like other communities, 
go on to constitute nodes in a broader, regional network. This means the 
community-based organising at the municipal level has been complemented by 
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a loose network of alliances across municipal borders under the slogan of 
‘same situation, same resistance’. As part of the network, community delegates 
have engaged in periodic coordination and exchange of information to frame 
their resistance to the elite-designed policies targeting their territories and 
natural resources.  
“It started with a frequent exchange of information which became very 
important for the respective communities, it is the moment where you 
realise that we all face the same situation and resistance. As we were 
exchanging information, we said, come over and struggle here with us as 
well, accompany us and it is this mutual accompaniment that has really 
strengthened and encouraged people to carry on.” (Interview community 
activist, Nebaj, 25/09/2014)  
Over the years the mutual visits and the presence as an act of solidarity and 
political support in the different activities of the communities have consolidated 
as a crucial part of the network, thus determining the movement of people and 
information across municipal and linguistic borders of the Quiché, Sacapulteco 
and Ixil communities. Despite this integration of the communities into a regional 
network together with other communities facing similar challenges, the 
orientation of the different nodes is determined by the respective local 
antagonisms. Similar to the outlined process in Cunén, in Sacapulas, 
community members of Parraxtut, one of the largest hamlets in the municipality, 
had already formulated a statement that was sent to the then President Oscar 
Berger in 2006 to reject a mining licence. They reinforced their position by 
seeking an alliance with other community members from Sacapulas, as well as 
neighbouring municipalities to demand the cancellation of the concessions in 
their areas.  
The strongest ties were established with the above-mentioned neighbouring 
communities of Cunén and the Ixil region. This means the network is marked by 
a bottom-up perspective as the local collectives seek alliances motivated by 
their respective needs and understandings.  
“When the communal framework is used as a mobilisational framework it 
is automatically characterised by a horizontal understanding and a bottom-
up dynamic, because they work on the basis of a constant search for 
internal balance and ideas of collective deliberation that are not always 
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there but are integral to an understanding of a functioning community. ... In 
this sense they contrast with the organisational models promoted by the 
state.” (Group interview community activists, Guatemala City, 07/11/2013) 
Accordingly, the network of communities has been careful not to establish an 
internal hierarchy, specific format or central structure. Instead, it constitutes 
connections closer to what De Landa (2002) defines as ‘meshworks’: networks, 
based on decentralised decision-making, self-organization and heterogeneity. 
The different communities engage on the basis of their reading of social and 
political realities and while taking on a networked shape, the organisational 
process has sought to avoid the emergence of any hierarchical leadership 
structure. 
These organisational processes also indicate that despite strong pressure on 
the communal framework by the different dimensions of the elite-designed 
modernisation project, these policies have in many cases failed to completely 
dissolve feelings of collective belonging or to reconstitute communities in accord 
with external interests. Just as there are factors that contribute to the breaking 
down of collectivities, “there is always the potential of a return to the community 
as other temporary identities lose their function or attraction. This means 
communities can in some cases re-consolidate and overcome deep divides.” 
(Group interview community activists, Guatemala City, 31/10/2013)  
The cases of Cunén and Sacapulas indicate how past divides between 
communities or community members can be overcome. This is at times even 
possible in cases of deep divisions and mistrust created by the participation of 
sections of the population in PAC units, while other community-members were 
victims of state and patrol violence. The antagonisms linked to the pressures on 
territory and natural resources instil dynamics into the Northern Quiché that 
encourages sections of the population to re-frame their sense of belonging 
around the community.  
The drive of the communities to engage in interactions beyond the ‘local’ is, at 
least in part, down to the difficult contextual features outlined in the previous 
section. In doing so, they seek to avoid remaining isolated as they face powerful 
interests ready to engage in multiple strategies to ensure the implementation of 
their projects. The logic of the network with other communities has helped local 
community members gather information on planned projects in their territories. 
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It has also allowed them to seek support from human rights organisations with 
better access to institutions and the ability to give a broader resonance to their 
messages:  
“The accompaniment and relationship with organisations is central to our 
struggle, while the communities have to remain at the heart of the process, 
this allows us to echo their voices and denounce our situation to a national 
public, so nobody can say they did not know about it.” (Interview 
community activist, Cunén, 24/07/2012)  
They have repeatedly used these connections to echo their demands linked to 
frameworks on indigenous rights to a national audience by visiting congress or 
seeking alliances with other communities engaging in struggles to defend their 
territories.  
In turn, the exchanges and alliances with other organisations and collectives 
beyond the region have also nurtured the strategies and discourses of 
communities in the Northern Quiché. One influence is the increase in 
references to and appropriation of legal language, such as indigenous rights. 
The legal frameworks represent useful tools to translate the struggles around 
the defence of territory into institutional understandings and add a notion of 
legality to their articulation. This link with legal frameworks to demand respect 
for communal autonomy and decision-making on issues regarding their 
territories is also reflected in most of the statements issued by the communities 
who form part of the network.89  
Even though the knowledge of the exact legal framework can be vague among 
the community members there is a generalised conscience around the 
importance of demanding the compliance with laws as a strategy to defend their 
                                                          
89 An example for this link with legal frameworks is their prominence in statements such as the 
one issued by the communities of the Northern Quiché region in 2010: “That the word, opinion, 
decision and auto-determination of communities over their own lives, their own projects and 
their own lands be respected. In the same way we demand from the authorities that they 
exercise their functions in accord with those established in the political constitution of the 
Republic of Guatemala, the municipal code, the Law of Urban and rural Councils of 
development, as well as the International conventions and Treaties ratified by the Congress of 
the Republic of Guatemala, where they guarantee self-determination for the present as well as 
the future of the original people of the country.” ‘Memorial of Memorials’ of the communities of 
the Northern Quiché Region, 06/05/2010. 
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territories. Legal references link well with the sense of injustice felt in the face of 
the external imposition of policies without consultation promoted by public and 
private actors. Additionally, in their discourses, the community members place 
an increasing emphasis on the fact that the indigenous people are subjects of 
rights. Therefore, their territorial claims should prevail over the respective 
national laws that regulate the exploitation of natural resources (Trentavizi and 
Cahuec, 2012). The embedded claims for self-determination also indicate how 
these interactions with the institutional framework as well as legal demands 
continue to be made with the ‘local’ and its problems in mind.  
In the course of their organisational processes ‘community’ has acted as a 
signifier to revitalise resistance and highlight this antagonism emerging around 
the issue of natural resources. However, the analysis of the contrasting 
perspective between the communities and the actors seeking to implement the 
various projects cannot just be framed as a dispute over territorial borders and 
the distribution of resources. Instead, as the following section will indicate, it is 
important to take into account the symbolic aspects of action, where meanings 
and motives of behaviour are constituted. This provides an underlying 
explanation for this community-led agency based on the production of 
differential meanings and its rootedness in cultural and linguistic 
understandings.  
 
Locally embedded meanings and cultural difference in the defence of 
territory90 
“When the communities and peoples lose control over their own natural 
resources they at the same time give up their local and communitarian 
autonomy, therefore they also lose their internal democracy, their spaces 
of survival, their food security and the dependence from the outside 
begins. ... It is more, it interrupts the thread that connects the present life 
with that of their ancestors and their interpretation of reality.” (Interview 
community activist, Cunén, 25/09/2014) 
                                                          
90 Many of the conceptual elements presented in this section are a result of ongoing 
conversations and interviews with members of the Historical Memory Initiative, during 
November 2013 and September 2014. 
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As this statement of a community leader from Cunén indicates, in the course of 
the struggle around the defence of territory a conceptual framework of locally as 
well as culturally based meanings comes into play. Although continually 
evolving, in these processes of production of meanings a link between past and 
present is maintained and reflected in a reproduction of certain meanings, 
understandings and organisational patterns. Consequently, as community 
members stated, attempts to suppress elements of this conceptual framework, 
are perceived as an attempt to dissolve a collectively perceived root, which is 
reproduced in different aspects of language and thinking.  
In the local Mayan languages of the Northern Quiché region there is no exact 
equivalent term for community and often the Spanish term is used. However, in 
the languages of the region the most common term to refer to a collectivity 
would be the term corresponding to a ‘people’, in Ixil ‘tenam’, in Quiché ‘tinamit’ 
or ‘tujaal’ in Sacapulteco. The meanings attached to these terms contrast with 
Western understandings and are based on a holistic notion of ‘a people’ that 
includes land, humans and all other cosmic elements sharing a determinate 
space. Accordingly, even when the term community is used, it refers to the 
‘c'omon’, a more specific or geographically and numerically reduced notion of ‘a 
people’ with the same holistic understanding embedded in it. 
These holistic understandings are reproduced in different linguistic features in 
the Northern Quiché Region and represent a central aspect of Mayan 
cosmovision and feed into their everyday practices. In Quiché ‘jun k'abal’, 
(literally one house) constitutes a term to refer to this unit or constellation of 
origin, which is made up of different cosmic elements. This origin is 
conceptually expanded into different scales going from the jun k'abal on to the 
k'alebal as the next unit integrating different jun k'abal. This leads to the next 
scale represented by the c'omon, the concept closest to the community, which 
in turn is followed by the tinamit, a people.  
In an ideal-typical model the various spatial and political scales are framed 
around a matrix of time and space, which is characterised by a constant search 
for an equilibrium based on the complementarity between the different and 
diverse elements. This means within these conceptual frameworks elements 
are not distinguished according to their quality but according to the function they 
play or acquire as part of the respective unit. According to this understanding, 
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every element is indispensable and the current defence of territory in the 
Northern Quiché region represents a struggle not just for a determinate piece of 
land. Instead, it constitutes the defence of an integral part of a holistic 
constellation and understanding of reality. This conceptual framework at the 
same time maintains the link with the origin of a people and the failure of its 
reproduction would endanger a collective future or ‘becoming’91 of the people. 
As part of this differential production of meaning, the local communities put 
forward an understanding of territory and space tied to the four cardinal 
directions. The dynamic properties of space are reflected in the fact that 
physical as well as social realities are framed as vectors not as fixed points. 
These directional coordinates derive from the passage of the sun with both, 
time and space being mapped along these axes. Accordingly, the east has a 
directional as well as a temporal connotation, constituting a moment ‘where’, as 
well as ‘when’ the sun ‘comes in’. The west on the contrary represents the 
moment ‘where’ and ‘when’ the sun ‘goes out’ (Watanabe, 1983). This means 
they do not represent two points frozen in abstract space but instead constitute 
two moments in the sun’s movement through physical space. As Watanabe 
indicates: “Space is only defined in reference to time, the diurnal and annual 
movement of the sun, and horizontal spatial directions themselves are more 
accurately conceptualised as vectors between or along the eastern and western 
horizons rather than as points in abstract space.“ (Watanabe, 1983, p.718)  
Among the communities of the Northern Quiché, space and time maintain these 
dynamic properties, with the four vectors combining with a cyclical view of time 
to constitute a matrix into which the everyday social and political realities of the 
communities are woven. The different moments and elements within this matrix 
are located and filled with meanings, thus constituting a symbolic framework 
charged with meanings that are attributed to moments, locations as well as 
physical objects. Seemingly trivial aspects such as rocks, mountains or trees 
can acquire key meanings and associations according to their functions in this 
collectively constructed cobweb.92 
                                                          
91 ‘Becoming’ here bears similarities to Deleuze and Guattari’s coining of the term that rejects 
the idea of fixed, static identities. Instead they emphasise the relational character of elements 
resulting from a generative process of influences (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). 
92 This conceptualisation is close to an understanding put forward by Tischler Visquerra in his 
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This framework continues to develop in order to come to terms with the 
evolution that is integral to cultures and identities. The introduction of Spanish 
words into the local languages represents a clear example of this constant 
process of actualisation. On the other hand a link with traditional meanings is 
maintained over time and the revitalisation of these meanings acts as a 
guarantee to stimulate a sense of collective belonging. Despite its evolution, 
language seems to continue to have a stabilising effect on the collective sense-
making activities and encourages a shared coding of social realities despite 
strong pressure on the collective processes of production of meaning.  
The consciousness of the fact that their individual and collective reproduction 
depends on the territory feeds into the revitalisation of collective communal 
frameworks:  
“The territory is the environment that surrounds us, the mountains, air, 
water and all the hills. The earth is our mother that provides us with food to 
survive in our everyday life. She is also the mother of animals and trees. 
To join our community and struggle as a community to defend our territory 
is the only option left for us to do.” (Community meeting Nebaj, 
27/12/2012) 
Additionally, as Trentavizi and Cahuec outline, the meanings attributed to land 
are not that of a source of enrichment or an opportunity to exploit:  
“Space is not objectified as a resource, territory constitutes the life-space. 
The identification between land and life is a personal and collective 
relationship that attracts the individual but also the collective in its totality. 
The threat to the territories represented by the extractive licences and the 
concessions are seen and felt as a direct threat to the life of the 
communities ….” (Trentavizi and Cahuec, 2012, p. 64). 
Accordingly, in the course of the engagement around the defence of territory the 
attachment to land and territory accentuates cultural, political as well as spiritual 
meanings that are embedded in Mayan cosmovision. These processes can be 
seen as a reaffirmation of trust in the knowledge produced by the indigenous 
people and their ancestors, thereby contributing to upholding the connection 
                                                                                                                                                                          
essay „La memoria ve hacia adelante. A propósito de Walter Benjamin y las nuevas rebeldías 
sociales.” (Tischler Visquerra, 2010). 
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and inter-dependence between land and the collective identity of the 
communities. It is seen as having been transmitted over generations and 
representing the most reliable framework to enable their survival:  
“It is also a political and historical fact that in Guatemala the real 
administration and control of the natural resources has been in the hands 
of the peoples and communities of the country. It is thanks to them and 
their knowledge that the peoples have been able to survive until today.” 
(Interview community activist, Sacapulas, 26/09/2014)  
As the policies around the elite-guided modernisation target the local 
communities or ‘c'omon’ as a holistic unit, they are also seen as side-lining the 
production of knowledge and meanings around which their collective dimension 
evolves. As a member of the IMH indicated: 
“The central dimensions are the collective and the exchange of forms of 
knowledge, they mix, change and correct themselves. From this 
experience “words” (or meanings) emerge but they constitute a type of 
knowledge that the state does not value, it seems irrational to the state. 
Nevertheless, it is this knowledge that has guaranteed the survival of the 
peoples and therefore they prefer to trust in it.” (Interview community 
activist, Sacapulas, 26/09/2014)  
These references to knowledge bring up parallels to the ‘epistemological divide’ 
(Santos, 2007)93 that has been highlighted between different forms of 
knowledge production, as local community members resist the hierarchies of 
knowledge that are very much part of the vertical imposition of development and 
policies. 
Accordingly, the defence of territory led by local communities also addresses a 
symbolic level closer to the Deleuzian notion of ‘reterritorialisation’ outlined in 
chapter 2, as they contest dynamics that interrupt their production of meanings 
or constitute a threat to crucial aspects of their holistic understandings and 
                                                          
93 This is based on Santos' work framed around the idea that western thought has attributed the 
universal distinction between true and false to modern science, granting it a monopoly on 
epistemological disputes between scientific and non-scientific truth. This occurs at the cost of 
marginalising other forms of knowledge such as those based on epistemologies of the South 
(Santos, 2007). 
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epistemic processes. This means their struggle also becomes a struggle to 
defend a relational conceptualisation of reality which, on one hand links the 
‘individual’ to the ‘collective’, and on the other hand, relates ‘humans’ to ‘nature’. 
In turn, these understandings act as a collective reference to indicate a common 
root or the ‘origin’ of a people. The collective perception of the threat at this 
symbolic level posed by the elite-guided modernisation projects has added to 
this revitalisation of the communal framework, leading them to take to the public 
space in order to articulate their dissent. While this increasingly public character 
of their articulations has contributed to make their ‘difference’ at the level of 
meanings more evident, it has also given indications of how these culturally 
rooted meanings contribute to alternative ways of organising politics, thus 
politicising their ‘difference’. 
 
‘Difference’ in political practice: The community consultations in the 
Northern Quiché 
As mentioned in the previous section, the threat posed to the local territories 
has contributed to a revitalisation of the conceptual framework and accentuated 
meanings for communities to engage in the defence of territory. This section will 
examine to what extent this difference in meanings has also translated into 
political patterns in the course of the organising processes among the 
communities in the Northern Quiché region.  
These processes have led to the organisation of community consultations94 in 
Cunén and Sacapulas. Two crucial aspects have been associated with these 
consultations. Firstly, the internal aspect to discuss and consolidate a position 
that ensures the support of the community members for the articulation of the 
defence of territory. Accordingly, an inclusive process of decision-making on the 
basis of ‘good information’ is seen as a guarantee for the sustainability of the 
organisational process by emerging from specific needs and problems faced by 
                                                          
94 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the consultations with regards to the exploitation of 
natural resources had consolidated as a practice of struggle following the first consultations in 
the municipalities of Sipakapa and Rio Hondo in 2005. Although historically constituting part of 
communal decision-making in indigenous territories, the format of municipal and communal 
consultations has been revitalised by the organisational patterns of communities in resistance to 
the exploitation of natural resources across the country.  
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the community. Secondly, as an external aspect, the consultations also 
represent a symbolic act to convey a political statement to society and the state 
institutions. They highlight the capacity to create public spheres on the basis of 
the communities’ realities, their participation and conceptual understandings in 
an attempt to appropriate decision-making on issues that have a transcendental 
impact on their territories.  
As one community member stated:  
“The community based consultations grow from the needs and problems 
of the communities, as we try to determine how we shall go about 
defending our communities as well as our territories and natural resources 
that are part of them. This is not a matter of political parties, it is not a 
question of struggling for power, it is a question of protecting our 
communities and emphasising their own legitimate right to decide on how 
we shall march as peoples.” (Meeting of community delegates, Nebaj, 
07/06/2012) 
Additionally, the conceptual framework presented in the previous sections 
continues to feed into these ways of designing political decision-making and 
deliberation:  
“The community assemblies that are being held by the people of the 
Northern Quiché result from the needs and views of the communities that 
are under threat. They are based on our ways of understanding the world 
that have always been part of the peoples’ decision-making even though 
they have been weakened in many cases. As community members it is 
our role to guarantee that they represent inclusive processes to agree on a 
consensus and find decisions for common responses and solutions to our 
problems.” (Meeting of community delegates, Nebaj, 23/07/2012)  
In Cunén, the proposal to hold a Good Faith Community Consultation95 was first 
brought up during a series of community assemblies which represented the 
                                                          
95 As indicated in the previous chapter the Good Faith Community Consultation is one of the two 
types of municipal referendums that have been held in different parts of the country with the 
Neighbourhood consultation representing the other. The main difference is the legal frameworks 
they are based on: While the Good Faith Community Consultation is based on international 
conventions such as the ILO convention 169 the neighbourhood consultation is based on 
national legislation such as the Municipal Law.  
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follow-up to the mobilisation of community members in January 2009 
(mentioned in section 2). In the course of this community assembly, local 
authorities and state officials were called to respond to the population's 
demands with over 1,000 community representatives taking part in the 
meetings. At the same time immediate solutions to certain demands were 
sought, such as the withdrawal of the military from Cunén. The intervention of 
the military had been called upon by the municipal authorities in response to the 
growing unrest preceding the mobilisation. 
Additionally, in the aftermath of the protests, a Community Council was formed 
and 16 community leaders were nominated with a mandate, “to defend territory, 
land and natural resources of Cunén” in line with the ideas of representation 
outlined in the previous section. In doing so, the communities created a body 
parallel to the formal municipal institutions, tasked with monitoring municipal 
policies. On the other hand, it was also equipped with a mandate to echo the 
voice and decisions of the communities, especially with regards to the 
opposition to the exploitation of natural resources.  
The subsequent assembly of all the communities of the municipality in July 
2009 was already oriented towards the preparation of a Good Faith Community 
Consultation. Different organisations and experts were invited to explain legal 
and political dimensions of the community referendum as well as analyse the 
potential environmental impact of the planned projects oriented at the 
exploitation of natural resources. In the course of these assemblies the 
communities also consolidated a network of organisations and actors -
specialising in indigenous, human rights or environmental issues- to provide 
accompaniment, logistical support as well as observation in the course of this 
community-led process.   
The patterns of Cunén were up to a certain point replicated in neighbouring 
Sacapulas, where since the beginning of 2009, information on the different 
plans for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources through mining 
and hydroelectric projects had begun to reach the communities and sectors of 
the municipality. A provisional committee was created to promote a community 
referendum and on 7th February 2011 the communities established the 
Coordination of Communities of Sacapulas in Resistance and in Defence of the 
Natural Resources and the Environment. This was integrated by community 
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delegates with a similar role to that of the Community Council of Cunén. As in 
Cunén, in Sacapulas the Coordination played a key role in distributing and 
facilitating information to the communities in the period leading up to the first 
general assembly of communities held on the 9th of April 2011. It was in the 
course of this assembly that the organisation of the Good Faith Community 
Consultation for the 20th of May 2011 was approved by more than 2000 
delegates from the different micro-regions and sectors of Sacapulas.  
These general community assemblies brought together community delegates 
from the entire municipality as well as delegations from neighbouring regions. 
They played an important part in strengthening the role of the Coordination of 
Communities of Sacapulas as well as the Community Council of Cunén with 
regards to the municipal authorities, who continued to question their role and 
representativeness. In this context the capacity of the community delegates to 
mobilise the communities around the defence of territory represented a show of 
strength. Thus, the assemblies were often held in presence of thousands of 
community representatives and residents, adding pressure on the local 
authorities to respond to the communities’ demands or at least not to stand in 
the way of their organisational processes.96 
The Good Faith Community Consultation in Cunén was held on 27th of October 
2009 with a total of 18.924 people of a total population of 32.903 participating in 
the voting, representing a turnout of 58% of the population, of which 11,116 
adults and 7,808 minors rejected the presence of national or foreign companies 
                                                          
96 As a result, in the case of Cunén the mayor and the municipal council in 2009 adjusted their 
position not towards leading or organising the process but by validating it and the relationship 
with the Council of Communities even if only temporarily, improved. In Sacapulas, the 
communities had strategically waited for the newly elected major to take up his position before 
outlining their strategies regarding the defence of territory and natural resources. However, the 
relationship with the municipal council continued to be tense. Nevertheless, the reiterated 
mobilisation of the communities did in this case also create openings and the municipality gave 
in to the pressure of the communities by publishing two municipal accords, one to call for the 
referendum, the second to validate its results. In the case of Sacapulas the Catholic Church 
also constituted an important ally, as it acted as a platform to strengthen the coordination and 
exchange of information between community leaders, while also constituting an important 
symbolic backing for the community based movement. 
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and/or individuals that appropriate and exploit the natural resources of Cunén.97 
In Sacapulas the consultation was held on 20th of May 2011 with 103 
communities and a total of 28,209 people participating in the consultation to 
emphasise their rejection of the mining and hydroelectric activities proposed by 
the central government.  
As the numbers indicate, the degree of participation in the assemblies, 
organisational processes and consultations around the defence of territory 
easily surpasses participation in formal electoral contests. This signals a 
different kind of appropriation of these processes as they are framed around 
needs and demands emerging from the community members. It also indicates 
the potential for meaningful public spheres to emerge at this local level, when 
they are embedded in the production of meaning and spaces of the 
communities. 
Following these consultations, a series of further municipal assemblies have 
been held in Cunén and Sacapulas to re-emphasise the ‘voice of the 
communities’ and the decision taken. In the Ixil region, given the weaker 
organisational patterns due to the contextual reasons outlined in the previous 
section, no municipal consultation was organised up to date. However, a series 
of consultations at a community level have been organised. Additionally, in April 
2013 a municipal assembly, in the presence of almost all communities was 
held, to re-emphasise their position around the issue of the defence of territory 
and the different dimensions linked to the exploitation of natural resources.  
The various municipal assemblies in the Northern Quiché have had an impact in 
solidifying the organisational processes and mutual recognition among the 
communities. They have constituted a platform for participants from the 
communities to engage in an exchange of experiences and information, 
collectively frame their articulations as well as consolidate spaces of solidarity 
and mutual support. Additionally, it is important to not just take into account the 
more public events at the municipal centres that often take place with 
thousands of participants. All the municipal assemblies and consultations were 
preceded by dozens of preparatory meetings and assemblies within the 
                                                          
97 While a number of consultations had been held in other departments, Cunén represented the 
first case in the Quiché region and has since been followed by others. Accordingly, it acted as 
an incentive for other municipalities in the region to promote consultations.  
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communities that at the same time constitute the central deliberative arenas. It 
is also at this level that the attempts at re-conceptualising representation or 
creating more inclusive processes of decision-making are initiated.   
As part of the struggle for the defence of territory, among the communities in the 
Northern Quiché the model of a community ‘delegate’ as elected and 
legitimated by the community assembly has been promoted. In an attempt to 
counter the co-optive practices of the institutional nomination process, the 
‘delegate’ is submitted to the collective decisions of the community. This is seen 
as a way of revitalising understandings of community authority “not as an 
authority but as providing a service to the community.” (Interview community 
activist, Cunén, 25/09/2014) The community delegate’ is seen as receiving the 
faith of the community assembly to transmit their ‘word’ with regards to a certain 
problem without being equipped with decision-making power. The most 
important aspects in the nomination of community representation are the merits 
and services in the name of the community as well as the degree of 
representativeness in the eyes of the community members. 
The community delegates who form part of the mentioned coordinating bodies 
in Cunén and Sacapulas played a crucial role in the preparatory process as well 
as in the follow-up by bringing information to the communities to ensure it 
constitutes part of the decisions at the community level. At the same time the 
‘word’ of the community, i.e. the decisions and demands are then brought to the 
general, municipal assemblies through the respective community ‘delegate’. A 
similar process is followed after the general assembly, as the ‘word’ of the 
assembly is brought back to the communities by the community ‘delegate’ and 
the information shared. This circular dynamic that has been highlighted by 
Trentavizi and Cahuec (2012) in the case of Cunén, has been promoted among 
all the communities participating in the network of communities in defence of 
territory in the Northern Quiché region.  
As mentioned, the delegates are not equipped with decision-making powers 
when they take part in meetings outside the community space since the 
information has to be presented, discussed and validated by the community. It 
is in these communal spaces, where the decisions are taken which means that 
they can represent laborious and time-consuming processes, as the different 
stages have to be respected in order to reach a decision. Often this lengthy 
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decision-making process can cause friction with formal institutional spaces that 
demand immediate decisions to be taken and implemented. However, within the 
network there has been an insistence on the fact that any decision with a 
potential impact on the community has to be taken by the community-plenary in 
order to guarantee a consensus is shared and sustained within the community.  
While these measures of inserting participative dynamics into decision-making 
processes clearly represent steps towards organising political processes in a 
more inclusive way, there remain many challenges. A crucial challenge can be 
identified with regards to the gender balance. The large majority of delegates 
elected by the communities continue to be male, even though a considerable 
part of the participants in the respective community assemblies are female. To 
develop a deep understanding and get to the ground of the complexities of 
gender relationships especially within the communities obviously surpassed the 
possibilities of this research. However, patriarchal patterns that constitute such 
a dominant aspect of Guatemalan society also clearly feature in social 
interactions within the communities in the Northern Quiché.  
On the basis of insights gained during the visits and conversations in the 
communities, I was able to identify two dynamics: On one hand, the 
interiorisation or reproduction of patterns on behalf of female community 
members within the communities that the roles of representation and taking part 
in meetings should be assumed by men. On the other hand, the little 
encouragement on behalf of male community members to break with these 
established patterns that consolidate a certain masculine dominance in the 
communities. Although community members emphasised that the prime space 
of decision-making was that of the community assembly, where the participation 
tends to be inclusive, there still seem to be limitations in terms of an approach 
to promote a greater degree of inclusiveness with regards to female 
participation. These aspects also underline that ‘community’ cannot be 
romanticised. Just as in any other social assemblage it is always marked by 
dynamic tensions and risks hiding or stabilising internal differences and 
hierarchies.  
Nevertheless, the various moments of these decision-making processes still 
indicate how the ‘difference’ deriving from their production of meanings is also 
translated into a ‘difference’ in political practices. Hence, by emphasising 
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participatory and inclusive aspects, ‘difference’ translates into practices and 
equips their antagonistic stance with an explicitly political notion. Additionally, 
within the communities of the network there is a strong feeling with regards to 
the irreversibility of a position that has been articulated. This means that once 
the decision has been consulted, discussed and taken, it is to be respected and 
implemented by the responsible authorities.  
This stance is also maintained in their interrelationship with state institutions 
and national elite factions as the communities have sought national platforms to 
echo their position. In the course of the process surrounding the community 
consultations, community delegates from the Northern Quiché have repeatedly 
visited congress to present demands of the communities as well as the results 
of the community consultations by putting emphasis on the decision that has 
been taken: “... we have to bring the word of the communities of the Northern 
Quiché … the word of the communities has already been spoken, the 
government and the ministries are not the ones to decide, we already told them 
no, which comes from the peoples, the communities.” (IRRMH, 2013, p.431)  
In this sense the engagement with legal frameworks as well as a link with state 
institutions constitutes an inevitable part of the communities’ strategy in defence 
of their territories. As an analyst stated:  
“They won´t find any responses there (with the institutions), they find their 
responses in the communities. The state on the other hand will try and 
even use force to introduce the communities into a different logic. There is 
a certain recognition involved in them arriving at congress but the idea is 
to seek the necessary information in order to be able to take decisions and 
react on the basis of it. Additionally, it represents a strategic 
rapprochement so they can´t just wipe them out by force.” (Interview 
anthropologist, Guatemala City, 03/10/2014)  
Hence, the relationships with the institutional framework can be seen as part of 
a strategy to avoid falling into the trap that can await antagonistic agency. In line 
with Melucci (1996), Chesters and Welsh (2006) have indicated that some kind 
of engagement with institutional spaces and political representation is key to 
avoid an “expressive escapism” or zero-sum constellations that elevate the risk 
of violence in the conflict (Chesters and Welsh 2006, p.118). The communities 
of the Northern Quiché recognise they are walking a thin line given the 
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characteristics of a co-opted state, and that elites will use informal mechanisms, 
the support of state-officials, legal frameworks and public security forces to 
challenge the potential opposition. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
established patterns of criminalising communities and activists constitute a 
crucial feature of these dynamics. 
The communities move between different levels and discourses in their 
articulation as they seek to carve out spaces that can guarantee the future and 
difference of their communities. The engagement with national arenas such as 
congress or national institutions is far from the trusted space of the community. 
However, this inter-locution with the centres of policy and decision-making is 
promoted with the ‘local’ in mind and to advance a message to the national 
public by stating their dissent with the patterns of neoliberal reordering targeting 
their territories. In the process they also seek to deepen their spaces of 
coordination with communities from other regions facing similar situations and 
with urban organisations with the legal know-how to translate their demands 
into the language of the state. Accordingly, crucial organisational energy is 
oriented towards carving out local spaces and appropriating decision-making 
processes. Though there is also a demand towards the state on the basis of the 
respective legal frameworks to recognise their right to self-determination and 
the existence of autonomous practices. 
This means in the course of their organisational processes to contest the elite-
guided modernisation project, the communities also outline a crucial condition 
for the framework of democracy in Guatemala. It is in these local spaces where 
meaningful public spheres can be established that enable the integration of 
these differential meanings and practices into political processes. The 
communities signal that the voice, spaces and rights of the communities as well 
as their difference, which up to date have been ignored, are to constitute a 
starting point for different ways of imagining democratic processes. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on expressions of community-based agency in the 
Northern Quiché region that have emerged over the last decade to contest an 
elite-designed reordering of spaces and territories. The various aspects of the 
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modernisation project for the area include concessions for mining and 
hydroelectric power generation that go hand in hand with programmes for the 
expansion of electric grids. Due to their scale, these aspects impact at a 
collective and community level, while other features, such as programmes 
seeking to instil entrepreneurial habits among the local population, also target 
the individual level. Especially in cases where the collective, community level is 
targeted, antagonistic agency has emerged into the public space.  
Over the last decade the communities of the Northern Quiché region have gone 
on to consolidate a loose network with different spaces of coordination in their 
struggle in defence of territory. These activities involve meetings to discuss and 
analyse information, coordination for the organisation of events and public 
action, mutual accompaniment and solidarity in demands to local authorities as 
well as the joint framing of demands directed at national institutions. In the 
course of their agency the community members face a complex environment as 
they overlap and share spaces with the divisive influence of political parties as 
well as networks with a counter-insurgent past that in many cases have 
connected to and promoted interests around natural resources.  
In order to conceptualise the resistance of the local communities, I have argued 
for the importance of taking into account their culturally rooted meanings that 
are reproduced in language and thinking. These meanings have been 
accentuated in the course of organisational processes and framed around the 
community, which has been revitalised as a collective signifier around which the 
defence of territory and various strategies of resistance have been constructed. 
The revitalisation of meanings around ‘community’ and ‘territory’ has also 
nurtured the forms of local political practices as evidenced in the organisation of 
municipal and community consultations that rejected the exploitation of natural 
resources in the region. Based on understandings of ‘delegates’ instead of 
‘representatives’, the ‘circular’ flow of information, and by promoting the 
community assembly as the centre of decision-making, the communities have 
sought to introduce modes of political interaction that contrast with dominant 
institutional patterns. While challenges remain, from their local spaces the 
communities contest elite patterns of decision-making as they signal that the 
voice, spaces and rights of the communities as well as their difference are to 
constitute a starting point for democratic decision-making. 
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To give an understanding of the particular character of each organisational 
process engaging in the defence of territory, the following chapter will turn 
towards analysing an expression of collective action that has emerged among 
primarily non-indigenous communities in the municipalities of San José del 
Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc. The chapter will highlight how ‘difference’ at the 
level of meanings and political practices can be constructed not just by being 
rooted in cultural traditions. Instead it indicates how this antagonistic stance can 
be developed in relatively short-term processes and draw on the demographic 
complexity found in local contexts. 
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8. The defence of territory as an affirmation of life: The Pacific Resistance 
of La Puya 
In the previous chapter I focused on an expression of collective agency that has 
emerged among indigenous communities in the Northern Quiché Region. I 
highlighted a revitalisation of culturally rooted meanings as crucial to the 
organisational process and as translating into attempts at redesigning political 
interactions at this local level.  
This chapter will offer a detailed account of another expression of collective 
agency that has emerged around the defence of territory. It examines an 
organisational process involving community members struggling against a 
mining project in a region, where the influence of ethnic difference is less 
apparent: The composition of the communities in the municipalities of San José 
del Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc is marked by a majority ladino population, 
although there is presence of Maya Kachiquel population concentrated primarily 
around the community of Nacahuil. Accordingly, a significant part of the local 
community members opposing a mining project, Progreso VII Derivada, El 
Tambor, located in an area between the two municipalities, is non-indigenous. 
They have converged into an assemblage of collective action, the RPLP and 
have established a protest camp at the entrance to the prospective mining 
project. This camp has since consolidated as an important space of reference 
for their struggle and has been maintained by community members since March 
2012, despite various eviction attempts by public security forces.  
In the course of the chapter I will argue that in the case of the RPLP their 
antagonistic stance or ‘difference’ has consolidated as a result of a short-term 
process, in which a physical and symbolic space for the community members to 
engage in collective sense-making activities was created. In doing so, the RPLP 
has drawn on a diversity of meanings as well as knowledge that draws on the 
experience of rural life as well as the complex constellation of the local 
population. Additionally, similar to the previous case study, a political notion has 
been added to their ‘difference’ and is reflected in their central demands: In their 
struggle to contest vertically imposed decisions, the community members have 
also introduced a deliberative arena and horizontal political practices into their 
organisational processes that contrast with those predominant in institutional 
spaces.  
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Municipalities beyond the outskirts: San Pedro Ayampuc and San José 
del Golfo 
The municipalities of San Pedro Ayampuc and San José del Golfo as well as 
the respective communities that form part of their administrative unit are located 
in an area between 15 and 30 kilometres from the capital, Guatemala City. Too 
withdrawn to form part of the capital city they are nonetheless too close not to 
be affected by its dynamics. The municipalities are often referred to as the 
dormitories of the capital due to the number of residents that commute to the 
capital on a daily or weekly basis. This also means that some communities are 
almost deserted during week-days with a flux of returning residents revitalising 
them during week-ends and holidays.  
In the country’s recent history, the area was spared from large-scale violence 
during the armed conflict. The region was largely under control of the military 
due to the proximity to the capital, which meant it could displace itself swiftly into 
the area when required. Additionally, a well organised network of PACs 
stretched across the area, exercising its own control in the municipal centres as 
well as in the surrounding communities. In the course of the post-war period this 
network has since been reactivated on various occasions as different political 
parties have promised to meet their demands for compensation-payments for 
their services during the war in exchange for electoral support.  
Over the decades following the Peace Accords the official political interactions 
were dominated by the urban centres of the municipalities with the main 
national parties competing for control over the municipal councils in the 
electoral contests. As in many other parts of the country this has led to local 
figureheads being in power for lengthy periods with local and regional rent-
seeking networks consolidating around the municipal governments. These are 
intent on promoting their business interests and negotiating access to rents 
primarily through construction contracts and municipal funds. The longevity of 
mayors in the respective positions combines with their frequent change of 
political parties as they seek to ensure their permanence in power in line with 
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the predominant patterns in the national political landscape.98  
One of the most obvious rent-seeking networks based on local power structures 
in San José del Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc has been set up around Alfonso 
Medrano, mayor in the neighbouring municipality of Chinautla since 1986, 
referred to as the Medrano-network. Through a range of over 24 private entities 
and companies he is seen as a powerful influence in municipal governments of 
the area, primarily by brokering contracts and public funds for infrastructural 
works.99 As a local community member stated “over the last decades the local 
mayors have constituted little more than Medrano’s puppets.” (Group interview, 
San Pedro Ayampuc, 24/09/2012) While his direct control over the municipal 
council of San Pedro Ayampuc seems to have diminished slightly since the 
2011 electoral contest, his influence in San José del Golfo, where he possesses 
a number of properties remains strong. 
Zamora quotes a cynical comment made by Medrano, which sums up the 
clientelistic dynamic integral to these networks: “No way, once one comes to 
power one will be giving work and assign projects to his enemies...They have to 
be for relatives, friends, employees and fellow party members.” (Zamora, 2014) 
The operations of this network have largely remained unperturbed by state 
institutions. When public investigations are stepped up this is usually down to 
alterations in the political equilibrium, with negotiations behind the scenes 
determining if cases are dropped or not. Recent evidence for this trend was the 
arrest of Medrano and Elzer Palencia, the mayor of San José del Golfo in April 
2013 under charges of corruption and money-laundering, only to be released 
hours later.100 Despite facing various legal claims and allegations on corruption, 
money laundering and influence peddling, up to date Medrano and his allies 
have been able to avoid prison sentences.101  
When looking at contextual aspects of the expression of collective action that 
                                                          
98 E.g. in the case of San Pedro Ayampuc Eduardo Ávalos had been mayor for 22 years until 
the elections of 2011 brought Roberto Amparo Aquino Catalán to power. The mayor of San 
José del Golfo, Elser Fidelino Palencia Mayen is currently serving his third period in office. 
99 More information in Gamazo (2012). 
100 More information in Montenegro (2014). 
101 In July 2015 the CICIG indicated a reactivation of the case against Medrano and publicly 
called for a preliminary trial to be set up. 
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has emerged in the area, the composition of the local population has to be 
taken into account. The predominant part of the population in the two 
municipalities is ladino, although San Pedro Ayampuc has a considerable 
proportion of Kaqchikel indigenous population, especially in and around the 
community of Nacahuil.102 Historically in the region, a presence of Xinca people 
has been identified (Campbell, 1972). However, different generations of 
movements to and from the region have clearly diminished the Xinca self-
identification and an explicit collective reproduction of this root among the 
population. In the case of Nacahuil on the other hand, the tightly knit community 
network as well as the internal organisational patterns have sustained a strong 
sense of ethnic belonging despite the constant flow of migration to the close 
lying capital by its inhabitants (Pixtún Monroy and Sales Morales, 2009). As the 
following sections will indicate, this presence of indigenous population in the 
area of San Pedro Ayampuc adds social and political complexity as their sense-
making activities feed into the characteristics of the discourses and patterns of 
the collective agency that has emerged in the area. 
The organisational processes which have surfaced over recent years around 
the defence of territory in response to the mining project were initially led by the 
community members living on the outskirts of the urban municipal centres. Their 
relationship with the urban centres has mirrored that of many other rural 
communities in the country. The municipal council tends to represent the central 
counterpart for public funds and national politics, while also constituting the 
centre of local decision-making, as municipal policies are dictated to the 
surrounding communities. In the eyes of a community member it represents “the 
submission of the community to a municipal structure it should respond to and 
which in turn permits the reproduction of national politics.” (Interview community 
activist, Guatemala City, 13/11/2013) 
Similar to the patterns outlined in the previous chapter, here too the co-option of 
processes for the nomination of community representatives has represented a 
key mechanism to undermine communal participation in municipal affairs. The 
election of communal authorities in many communities fails to follow the legal 
frameworks that outlines their election through the communities. In doing so, it 
                                                          
102 According to data from 2011 provided by the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadisticas, INE) 27% of the population is indigenous. 
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erodes the participative dimensions outlined in the laws for decentralisation. 
Instead, the municipal mayor tends to nominate the majority of the community 
representatives.  
However, this trend is not followed in all communities, with Nacahuil 
representing the most evident exception. Here the tightly knitted community 
network and an insistence on nominating their own authorities has enabled it to 
contest specific aspects of municipal policies. In Nacahuil similar 
understandings to those outlined among the indigenous communities in Quiché 
in the previous chapter can be identified. The role of community authorities is 
linked to a view of offering a service to the community and based on a notion of 
power that stands in contrast to the vertical imposition enacted from the 
municipal centre. Instead the obligation of constant consultation of the 
community members as well as the community assembly dominates decision-
making processes. In turn, the backing and support of the community members 
for the community representative is ensured while his role is closely monitored 
to detect any abuse of power. 103 
The patterns of internal organisation of Nacahuil to counter the role of the 
municipal council had not been reproduced in other communities in the area 
which were marked by weaker internal networks. The mixed composition of the 
population means racism and prejudices played a role in determining the 
relationships between the different communities as well as their members. This 
was especially the case in San Pedro Ayampuc, where the indigenous 
community members of Nacahuil were singled out as the prime source of 
troublemakers and distrust. As a community member indicated, “the municipal 
centre has always looked towards Nacahuil with contempt, Nacahuil was and 
has been a population that has never been subordinated and they have always 
seen us as a ‘bochinchera’ (troublemaking) community.” (Interview community 
activist Guatemala City, 13/11/2013)  
However, the dismissive attitude of the urban centres of the municipalities has 
                                                          
103 A collective land-title in the case of Nacahuil seems to have played an important role in 
reproducing meanings that see the community as the most trusted framework of reference 
(Pixtún Monroy and Sales Morales, 2009). In this sense the defence of communal autonomy 
remains at the heart of its organisational patterns and even led to the community taking legal 
action against the municipal council, on accusations of racism.  
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not just been a feature of its relationships with the indigenous population. 
Similar patterns of subordination were perceived by the ladino communities in 
the area:  
“The mayor has always seen the communities as of second category, for 
example La Choleña … they always see us as if we were stupid, sleepy. 
The people of the town have always sat on the side of the mayor and 
there is a discrimination, I have lived it when I studied in primary school 
they called us barefoot Indians and I will never forget to show them that 
one can be barefoot but reason better and with more dignity than they.” 
(Group interview community activists, San Pedro Ayampuc, 24/09/2012) 
Another aspect of inter-communal tension in the area is down to geological 
features: The area of the municipalities of San José del Golfo and San Pedro 
Ayampuc are located in what is called ‘the dry corridor’. This represents a 
corridor marked by constant shortage of water and constitutes one of the driest 
areas of the country. Accordingly, the water distribution was also a constant 
source of disputes as community members felt certain communities were being 
favoured over others especially during the dry season, as some communities 
have water only two or three times a week. This meant tensions between the 
communities as well as disputes with the municipal councils were frequent. The 
concern for water has obviously been exacerbated by the threat of a mining 
project in the area and consolidated as one of the central dimensions of the 
oppositional agency.   
The projection of mining interests into the area has seen an introduction of new 
interests and economic dynamics into the local context. It has demonstrated 
how rent-seeking agents at different scales converge to promote the mining 
project. Emerging elites linked to the national subsidiary company and 
traditional elites such as the sections of the Novella family, which are close to 
the Chamber of Extractive Industry (Cámara de Industrias Extractivas, CIG), 
combine efforts to ensure the implementation of the mining project. On the other 
hand international capital plays a central role in the different stages to obtain the 
licence and in the exploitation as such, with the US-company Kappes, Cassiday 
&Associates, acquiring 100% of the property rights in 2012. Currently the 
project Progreso VII Derivada is the only metal mining project in the 
municipalities of San Pedro Ayampuc and San José del Golfo. However, the 
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company with the licence for this project has a further 4 exploratory licences in 
the area. Apart from this and seen in a wider regional perspective a total of 18 
licences (14 exploratory, 4 exploitation) have been conceded. This suggests 
that this project only constitutes a starting point from which further mining 
projects are to be implemented. 
As indicated for the Northern Quiché Region the expansion of the electricity grid 
accompanies the concession of the first mining licences in the area of San 
Pedro Ayampuc and San José del Golfo. Especially in the course of 2014, the 
Colombian company, TRECSA, on various occasions has attempted to enter 
machinery to start its work in various communities of the area as part of the PET 
project.104 However, it was faced with a context in which local community 
members had already mobilised to contest the implementation of the mining 
project. As early as 2010 the news regarding the concession began to spread 
and organisational patterns to search for information, organise meetings and 
discuss findings had been injected into the local context. This on one hand 
created conflict but on the other hand also provided a platform for new 
convergences and relationships that will be analysed in the following sections.  
 
Resistance in practice: The protest-camp of the RPLP 
Information claiming that a mining licence had been granted in the area began 
to spread in 2010 and unleashed inquisitive dynamics among local community 
members as they attempted to verify the nature of the potential project. Links 
were established with NGOs from Guatemala City and through contacts with a 
Member of Congress, Carlos Mejia. In 2011 official information was sought 
under an act guaranteeing public access to official information.105 This resulted 
in the first official data on the project being handed over to the community 
members confirming the news and indicating that the first exploratory licence in 
the area had been granted as early as 1999. Following this concession, the 
                                                          
104 In fact, in April 2015 community members of the canton La Laguna in San Pedro Ayampuc 
initiated a second point of resistance in the area by establishing the protest camp of the Pacific 
Resistance La Laguna. This was established with the objective of impeding the construction of a 
local power-station that is part of the Plan for the Expansion of Electric Transmission (PET), 
which is seen as a crucial precondition for the mining operations in the area.  
105 Law of Access to Public Information (Decree Number 57-2008). 
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company had been working silently on exploring territories in the municipalities 
of San José del Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc without the communities’ 
knowledge. The first underground tunnels in the area of the mine were already 
built as early as 2005.  
Local residents would recall how over the last decade they had seen strangers 
in the area taking samples of earth or rocks and loading them onto pick-ups. 
Individuals linked to the company had started to rent parts of the land which had 
previously been rented by community members to cultivate crops. Most of these 
sections of territory were then acquired by the mining company as people 
appeared to make offers, often paying well over the odds to acquire 
comparatively valueless land: “If the campesinos said they wanted 2 million 
Quetzales for a piece of land the representatives of the mining companies, 
without mentioning these companies would offer more, 5 or 7 million Quetzales 
over the initial price and buy the land.” (Quoted in Hernández and Ochoa, 2012) 
Over a decade had passed without anybody in the area knowing about the 
Tambor project and the 14 licences that had been granted for exploration. In 
1999 the Ministry of Energy and Mining had granted the exploratory licence to a 
joint venture of the Canadian company Radius Explorations and the South 
African company Gold Field, giving it permission to examine the soil in a 
geographical area of 107,072 hectares. An area locally known as La Puya was 
subsequently granted for extraction in 2011(0.15 hectares) and has since 
represented the centre of the conflict around the mining activities. 
The initial incredulity among local community members soon gave way to a 
process of collective framing as people started to discuss the project and the 
potential impact it would have on the area. Information was shared with the 
communities and make-shift film-screenings on other regions such as San 
Marcos, where a mining project had already been implemented, were organised 
on community-squares and in village halls. In the second half of 2011 protest 
marches were organised and in preparation for the elections a forum was held 
with the mayoral candidates in the two municipalities. This represented an 
attempt to ensure they would oppose the mining project if they reached office.  
However, with the government ignoring their initial expressions of dissent by 
granting the licence for exploitation in November 2011, the preparatory activities 
associated with the mining project were gaining pace. This was reflected in an 
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increase in transit and movements around the area known as La Puya. In this 
context the oppositional strategies were also taken to a new level with the 
establishment of a protest-camp which was not part of a previously planned 
strategy. Instead, it was result of a spontaneous act of rebellion in March 2012 
as a local resident saw huge machinery and workers near the entrance to the 
mining project along the road between San José del Golfo and San Pedro 
Ayampuc.  
In a first reaction she blocked their path by stopping her car in front of the gate 
leading to the mining compound thereby preventing machines and workers from 
entering the compound before calling other community members for support. As 
the community members responded, a collective decision was taken to 
establish a permanent protest camp at the entrance to the mining compound. 
The aim of the camp would be to impede the transport of materials and 
machines into the mining compound by blocking the entrance, a task the 
community members succeeded in for over 2 years. In doing so, they 
consolidated the space that would become a reference point for the expression 
of collective action that emerged as the RPLP. 
Shifts were established to guard the entrance with alternating groups taking on 
a shift of 24 hours 7 days a week to guard the entrance. This made it possible to 
combine the task of controlling the entrance to the mine with the communities' 
every-day life. Fittingly, a member of the communities likened the dynamics at 
the protest- camp to that of a bee-hive:  
“It is not necessary for everybody to be here all the time, there are times 
when there are only a few of us present but just like with a bee-hive, when 
something happens we all arrive.” (Interview community activist, 
Guatemala City, 20/09/2012) 
This movement mirroring the dynamics of the bee-hive was called upon on 
various occasions in the course of the years as the mining company resorted to 
various strategies to advance in the implementation of the project. Direct action 
has represented a key aspect among the strategies the group developed to 
defend the space occupied at the entrance to the mine. Additionally, this space 
acquired a profound meaning for the community members by symbolising their 
struggle for the defence of territory, environment and life. 
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A first attempt to overcome the protesters' blockade at the entrance to the mine 
in La Puya was undertaken on the 8th of May shortly after midnight as a convoy 
of heavy machinery approached the mine accompanied by over 30 police cars 
and 100 members of the anti-riot police. This represented a first evidence that 
the government was not going to be receptive to the demands of the RPLP and 
was willing to use public security forces to ensure the implementation of the 
mining project. However, the local community members responded swiftly to the 
call from colleagues on shift that night and turned out in hundreds. By forming 
rows to peacefully block the narrow road leading to the mining compound they 
were able to ensure the machinery could not pass. The mining company as well 
as the police, obviously surprised to find the opposition turn out in numbers and 
unsure of how to deal with the situation, were forced to withdraw a few hours 
later.   
After this initial success in fending off the mining company and hindering it from 
stepping up operations, the company increased its efforts through its national 
subsidiary company Exploraciones Mineras de Guatemala (EXMINGUA) to 
ensure the implementation of the project.106 Locally, a wave of attempts to de-
legitimise members of the opposition group through public defamations and 
rumours were ongoing.107 A local company run by a number of former military 
officials had been contracted and was to prepare the terrain for the 
implementation of the project. In an initial attempt to infiltrate the RPLP, they 
had approached its members claiming to oppose the mining project. However, 
soon the former army officers Mario Figueroa Archila, Pablos Silas Orozco and 
José Arias Méndez turned out to be directors of Servicios Mineros de Centro 
América which had been contracted by the national subsidiary company of the 
mining project, EXMINGUA. They would play a key role in attempts aiming to 
disintegrate and weaken the RPLP.  
Strategies to implement the project turned violent as Yolanda Oquelí, one of the 
                                                          
106 Incidentally the legal representative of EXMINGUA, Selvin Morales, was Minister for Energy 
and Mining under the Colóm government until December 2010, which had granted the license 
for the Tambor project. This gives another indication of the intimate links between mining 
companies and governmental representatives. 
107 The rumours spread ranged from claims that resistance members were receiving money to 
allegations on the private lives of members targeting especially the female members of the 
RPLP. 
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leaders of the resistance suffered an assassination attempt on June 13th 2012. 
She had been at the protest camp but went to fetch petrol for the small electric 
plant to supply light to the community members on shift. A few minutes later she 
was ambushed and shot three times. As members of the RPLP heard the shots 
they rushed to the scene and she was rapidly taken to hospital, surviving the 
assassination attempt with a bullet still lodged in her body. Ultimately among the 
members of the RPLP the indignation over the company and its strategies 
seems to have prevailed over the initial shock and furthered the consolidation of 
the resistance. This became a feature of all the aggressions on members of the 
RPLP: Instead of weakening the movement they stimulated feelings of injustice 
and solidarity that in many cases enabled the RPLP to connect with other 
sections of the population who had not been participating as actively. 
The slow progress in the implementation of the project had its implications for 
the ownership of the project, with the Canadian company Radius Gold selling its 
participation in the Tambor mining project. Its president stated this represented 
part of a “corporative strategy to sell its problematic shares allowing the 
company to concentrate capital and experience in less conflictive areas with 
regards to development in the region.” (La Hora, 07/12/2012) The RPLP on the 
other hand, interpreted this as a signal that their persistence had paid off and 
led to these changes.  
At the level of ownership, Kappes, Cassiday &Associates, a US company, which 
up to that point had played a subordinate role as an investment partner has 
since acquired 100% of the property rights. Together with the national subsidiary 
company EXMINGUA it has represented the public actor behind the mining 
project.108 The agglomeration of interests around the project became clearer 
with an increasingly public role of Rodrigo Maegli Novella,109 acting as the US-
                                                          
108 Kappes, Cassiday &Associates paid approximately $ 400.000 with a quarter of this amount 
being transferred at the moment of signing and the rest due at the start of the gold extraction at 
the mine. Additionally, as part of the agreement Kappes, Cassiday & Associates agreed to make 
four-monthly payments to Radius Gold depending on the amount of gold extracted from the 
property (La Hora, 07/12/2012). 
109 Rodrigo Carlos Maegli Novella represented the US-company Kappes, Cassiday & 
Associates in meetings with the government. The Maegli family is one of the traditional elite 
families today heading the business corporation Grupo Technico Universal (Grupo Tecun) which 
has established itself across Central America in a variety of business sectors but primarily 
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company’s representative. This provides an indication that some of the most 
powerful sectors of the national elites are also behind the implementation of the 
mine. 
In the second half of 2012 the pressure and efforts by the mining company to 
get operations under way continued to rise. This was in part due to a clause in 
the national mining legislation according to which companies risk the 
cancellation of their licence, if exploitation has not begun within one year of its 
concession. Tensions culminated in November 2012 as in the course of a new 
offensive the promoters of the mining company sought to organise a group of 
alleged employees and break through the RPLP that was blocking the entrance 
to the mine. This led to a first stand-off on 22nd November as the retired military 
official Pablo Silas led a group of alleged workers— with youth gang members 
among them— towards the RPLP, hurling insults and threats at their members.  
The presence of the representatives of the Human Rights Ombudsman, 
national and international human rights organisations as well as journalists from 
alternative media that documented and registered the ongoing events, were key 
in preventing the use of physical violence. Especially, the decision to call upon 
the CMI proved to be highly strategic. They were able to document the 
aggressive strategies and create a counter-discourse to that of the corporate 
media, which in its coverage depicted the community members as manipulated 
and radicals. Despite the fact that the journalists were forced to withdraw given 
the level of pressure and threats, their presence clearly had a dissuasive 
impact.110 Additionally, the coverage of the stand-off through alternative media 
                                                                                                                                                                          
focusing on agro-industrial business. Through marriage in 1954 the Maegli family has also 
established links with the Novella family another of the powerful traditional elite families and has 
since been part of the board of directors of the cement company, Cementos Progreso. The role 
of Rodrigo Carlos Maegli Novella in the promotion of the mining project Tambor indicates the 
elites’ interest in its implementation is probably down to investments of elite factions in the 
project. More information in Solano (2011). 
110 Three journalists of the CMI filed a case based on the events. On the basis of the graphic 
evidence they provided, the retired military officials Pablo Silas Orozco Cifuentes and Juan José 
Reyes Carrera were condemned to a two years’ prison sentence for threats and coercion. The 
sentence was commuted to payments of Q25 per day. The court proceedings also indicated the 
networks surrounding these actors as Fernando Linares Beltranena, a lawyer well known for his 
defence of high-profile clients such as Ortega Menaldo in cases of corruption, drug-trafficking 
and money-laundering acted as their defence attorney. More information on the case in: De 
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made it possible to circulate a discourse in the web that contrasted with that of 
the main-stream media. This means there was an iterative effect, as the images 
of the arrogant and aggressive behaviour of the mining company and its 
employees spread at a national and international level.  
These developments also gave an indication of the measures the different 
actors were prepared to take, to ensure the implementation of the respective 
projects. Legal as well as illegal strategies constitute an integral part of their 
mechanisms, with the company contracting ‘professionals of violence’ such as 
the former army official Silas and a known member of youth-gangs, Franklin 
Francisco Moratava, to provoke a violent confrontation (Bastos, 2012). 
Additionally, the private sector led by CACIF was urging the government to set a 
precedent against the RPLP, accusing them of breaking with the state of law 
and alienating potential international investors (Vásquez, 2012). 
On 22nd November a few days after the confrontation with supposed employees 
of the mining company, the state responded to these calls as the protest camp 
came under siege from public forces underlining the governments' support to 
the project, as reflected in a statement by Interior Minister Bonilla:  
“As a state, Guatemala has the responsibility to comply with its legal 
framework and contracts. It is unthinkable that the government is calling 
for national and international investment, if we are not able to comply with 
the contracts established by law. … this is not a game and the intervention 
we are undertaking is to guarantee that the mining operations can 
recommence.” (Quoted in Prensa Libre, 09/05/2012) 
This time hundreds of members of the Police Special Forces approached the 
blockade intending to evict the protest camp without a judicial eviction order. 
However, through desperate, last minute negotiations the community members 
had gained enough time for staff from institutions such as the National Human 
Rights Ombudsman, the Representative of High Commissioner of Human 
Rights of the United Nations to arrive and the eviction was ultimately aborted. 
Instead an agreement on a dialogue between state and the RPLP was reached 
with the System of National Permanent Dialogue (Sistema Nacional de Diálogo 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Leon 2013. 
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Permanente, SNDP)111 responsible for scheduling meetings and seeking a 
solution to the conflict (this will be revisited in the 4th section of this chapter). 
The different coercive approaches to evict the protest camp and ensure the 
implementation of the project were complemented by strategies aimed at 
criminalising members of the RPLP. As mentioned in chapter 5, the use of this 
strategy against activists engaging in defence of territory has been on a steady 
increase over recent years (Sieder and Bastos, 2014; UDEFEGUA, 2015). 
Cases were initially filed against a total of nine members of the RPLP, accused 
of having illegally detained and threatened workers of the mining company in 
May 2012. After months of hearings, three members of the RPLP were 
eventually sentenced to three years in prison, though the jail time can be 
waived if a fee of $4,212 is paid. As mentioned in chapter 5, the cases evidence 
a significant level of collaboration between private interests and state 
institutions, especially the state prosecution, in seeking to target, disrupt and 
weaken the RPLP as well as their organisational process. 
Despite the strong pressure from state and private actors behind the mining 
project, the RPLP was able to defend the protest camp and consolidate it as a 
symbolic and physical reference space for the resistance. On one hand, it 
constituted a space where resistance was put into practice, with direct action 
playing a key role in the course of their articulation. On the other hand, it also 
constituted a framework in which knowledge and understandings were 
discussed to consolidate a collective stance with regards to the mining project. 
The following section will look into these processes of collective framing 
resulting from their antagonistic agency.  
 
Collective framing: Towards a position of difference 
Two interlinked aspects can be highlighted as the overriding discursive 
elements that frame the resistance of the RPLP: The concern for the 
environmental impact of the mining project which is linked to a discourse 
highlighting an affirmation of life. Especially fears of an exacerbation of the 
                                                          
111 The SNDP was initiated as a governmental platform by the Pérez Molina government (2011-
2015), in an attempt to deal with the growing number of social conflicts in different parts of the 
country. 
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water problems have acted as one of the prime motivations behind the 
antagonistic agency. As a community member stated, local community 
members are aware of the consequences a project could have in terms of the 
water supply in the area which is located in the so-called dry corridor: 
“One of the main concerns is the use of water in an area that is part of a 
dry corridor, as for many communities, water supply is already limited to 
twice a week as its distribution is rationed. ... At one stage they diverted 
the water for the mine from a fountain that supplied the communities, but 
the people realised and occupied the fountain as the communities would 
not be supplied with water until after midnight while they were bringing 
truckloads for the (mining) companies and to the Turi-centre112 during the 
day and the people would have to get up at night to receive it. … Now they 
have requested an area of 20 square kilometres to exploit for 25 years and 
after this how will the communities end up? We can live without gold, but 
not without water.” (Group interview community activists, San Pedro 
Ayampuc, 24/09/2012)  
The RPLP’s discourse and concerns around the environmental impact have 
also been nurtured by listening and learning from the experiences of other 
communities in Guatemala that have been affected by mining projects, such as 
San Miguel Ixtahuacán.113 These exchanges were not only crucial in getting first 
hand reports of the impact on local communities but also offered insights and 
lessons on the challenges of engaging in resistance to the project once the 
mine is installed and operating. Although the perceptions of most members of 
the RPLP are not rooted in a holistic framework similar to that of the indigenous 
communities in the Northern Quiché region, a relational perspective with 
regards to the environment also marks their discourses. Based on the everyday 
experience of the rural life, the communities are aware of their dependence on 
                                                          
112 The Turi-centre consists of a waterpark that is owned by the mayor of Chinautla, Arnoldo 
Medrano, mentioned in the previous section. 
113 The decision to engage in dialogue only with the state and to focus on its compliance with 
legal responsibilities instead of engaging in negotiations with the company was one of the key 
lessons the RPLP took from the resistance in San Miguel Ixtahuacán, San Marcos. In the area 
these negotiations are seen as having contributed to division among communities and 
organisations who had originally opposed the mining project. (Interview community activist, 
Guatemala City, 17/11/2013. 
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their natural surroundings and their incompatibility with a mining project in the 
area. One community member signalled that the receptivity to these concepts 
that express a relationality with environment and surroundings is also down to 
an activation of certain meanings that persist in the everyday practices of the 
local communities, even though links to their ethnic roots have in many cases 
been strongly weakened:  
“In their practices the people maintain many principles and values that 
relate with nature and the environment as well as a clear view that the 
network of life depends on nature, although many community members do 
not have a link with an indigenous identity. Nonetheless, this goes beyond 
an issue of ethnicity, it is an issue of common sense among rural 
communities that here, life is at risk.” (Interview community activist, 
Guatemala City, 13/11/2013)  
At the same time the RPLP has sought to complement locally embedded 
knowledge based on the experience of rural life as well as the debates in and 
around the protest camp with technical arguments by seeking support from 
environmental organisations and experts. At the RPLP's request, US engineer 
and environmental specialist, Robert Robinson, undertook an analysis of the 
official environmental impact assessment report and signalled a number of 
deficiencies:  
“The mine Progreso VII is a high risk mining project. … In the first place, 
there is the presence of extremely toxic arsenic in the rocks, the surface 
water and the ground water. Furthermore, the mining will probably release 
additional concentrations of arsenic into the environment. Secondly, the 
EIA contains grave deficiencies in information, planning and guarantees 
for recuperation. The deficiencies in the EIA do not provide any confidence 
in the capacity of the owners to implement the mining in a way that 
protects the public health and environment.” (Robinson and Laudeman, 
2013, p.2) 
The specialist report echoed and provided a technical perspective on some of 
the concerns identified by the communities. The information linked to the impact 
on the water administration in the area as well as the details questioning the 
data provided on the project, further eroded the trust in the public authorities. 
This has led the RPLP to question the neutrality behind the technical 
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procedures and scientific discourses on the basis of which the state decided to 
grant the licence for the mining project. The community members are keen to 
highlight the relationships of power and the collusion of interests involved in the 
definition of terms and the promotion of the process. Together with the use of 
force, the misleading manner that has accompanied the implementation from 
the start has clearly contributed to stimulate the antagonistic stance among the 
community members: 
“There are some fundamental problems of how the company entered the 
communities as it has not done so in the right way. It is one thing to fulfil 
the demands for the Environmental Impact Analysis but it is another thing 
to proceed in a legitimate way. Here the communities are in resistance 
because it has not been done in the right way, we have never been 
correctly informed of anything.” (Member of the RPLP during meeting with 
National System of Permanent Dialogue 25/06/2013) 
However, despite the perception of illegalities and the feelings of injustice that 
have been exacerbated by the coercive strategies used to implement the 
project, the RPLP has not shifted from a second crucial dimension of their 
struggle. Based on their discursive affirmation of life they have insisted on the 
pacific nature of their resistance. As a local community member explained: 
“We have always tried to understand the pacific struggle as the best way 
to obtain objectives. There will always be provocations that aim to cause 
problems. They attacked our colleague 500 metres from here, they wanted 
the people to have fear and leave from here. They also thought we would 
be infuriated by the attack on our colleague and would go and burn their 
machines or offices. But if the struggle is understood as being for life, we 
have to defend life and not take away life as they do, therefore the 
centrality of the pacific struggle.” (Group interview community activists, 
San Pedro Ayampuc, 24/09/2012)   
The idea of attributing this central role to the pacific nature of their struggle had 
originally been inspired by the ongoing exchange of information, projected 
videos on non-violent resistance such as Gandhi as well as advice they had 
received from human rights organisations.114 This dimension of their struggle 
                                                          
114 With regards to the pacific aspect in the struggle of the RPLP, Christian religious beliefs are 
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has been maintained throughout the organisational process of the RPLP 
despite the constant provocations, threats, attacks and violent evictions.115 
Additionally, women have played a central role in the implementation and 
encouragement of this non-violent dimension, an aspect that is also 
acknowledged by the male members of the RPLP:  
“The fact that we have not had any dead or more serious problems than 
the ones we have faced, is down to the participation of the women. It has 
been a bit difficult for us men to learn this, because in Guatemala we have 
a history of violence, eviction and repression and our instinct is to treat 
somebody the way we are treated. But here the women have played a 
very important role because they have helped us to understand and 
integrate these pacific actions and not to fall into the provocations of the 
company.” (Interview community activist, San Pedro Ayampuc, 
29/09/2014) 
Accordingly, this protagonist role of women has been reflected in two ways. 
During the stand-offs and situations with risk of eviction, women represented the 
first row of members of the RPLP in confronting the respective threat. This was 
in part as they were seen as less likely to react to the provocations of the 
adverse agents. Also, given the fact that many men leave for work during the 
day, women have been central in taking on the weight of the shifts in the camp 
                                                                                                                                                                          
also likely to have played a role. The majority of the community members are part of religious 
groups, in part catholic, in part evangelical. Priests of the Catholic Church have been especially 
explicit in their support for the resistance and frequently celebrate mass at the protest-camp. 
Additionally, it has been a feature for the local community members to defiantly sing prayers and 
hymns during the different evictions or confrontations. 
115 In the course of this chapter not all attacks and security incidents have been mentioned, in 
many cases it is difficult to establish a proven link with actors promoting the mining project. For 
example, the murder of 11 community members in Nacahuil on the 7th September 2013 and the 
successive pressure to establish a military post in the community has been interpreted by the 
members of the RPLP as well as analysts as a strategy to militarise the area and prepare the 
ground for the planned mining operations. In the aftermath Nacahuil engaged in an exhaustive 
process to reject the presence of the military in the community and instead implemented a 
community led security program that sets up specific conditions for the work of the police in the 
community, who had been linked to the crime. In the eyes of members of the RPLP, the process 
of de-militarising Nacahuil “was a highly important contribution to the process of resistance in La 
Puya.” (Interview community activist, San Pedro Ayampuc, 29/09/2014)   
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as well as guaranteeing the supply of the members of the shifts. They are 
widely acknowledged as representing the ‘heart of the RPLP’ and guaranteeing 
a long-term vision of the struggle:  
“It is very difficult to balance the struggle as well as taking care of family 
and children. However, it is especially for our children that we struggle 
because I do not want them to suffer problems due to the mining project. 
This is where being a woman puts us in a specific situation and at the 
same time makes taking part in the struggle a lot more difficult for us.” 
(Interview community activist, Guatemala City, 20/09/2012) 
An important detail to add in the analysis of this important level of engagement 
of women that stands in contrast to many other social articulations in 
Guatemala is the key role women have played in the leadership of the 
resistance.  
This acknowledgement of the crucial role women are playing in the struggle of 
the RPLP has also strengthened a notion of horizontality among the different 
community members. This is also reflected in another crucial feature of their 
organisational patterns, that of drawing on the local demographic complexity. 
This has up to a certain extent allowed the RPLP to overcome the constraints of 
ethnic divides, often seen as a central challenge in previous generations of 
agency in Guatemala (as outlined in chapter 4). From the start some central 
elements for the collective framing of the organisational process had been 
established:  
“It is important to understand that the work against the mining project 
already started in 2011, before the establishment of what would become 
the protest-camp La Puya. But from a start the participation occurred 
following certain principles and one was that we would not be using an 
ethnic banner, this is not of ladinos, indigenous or Xinca, the struggle is 
collective because we have united under the banner of life and water and 
no sector is to be excluded, instead it was based on the knowledge of all 
the peoples.” (Interview community activist, San Pedro Ayampuc, 
29/09/2014) 
This means the closer relationship between different sections of the population 
in the course of the process has altered previously established negative 
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perceptions and prejudices. They have been replaced by an attribution of 
importance to the various contributions that are seen as nurturing the RPLP. 
This view indicating changes in the inter-cultural relationships is echoed by a 
member of the RPLP from a non-indigenous community by seeing the defence 
of territory as an “opportunity for a sensibilisation of human values” that allows 
“a community to be consolidated.” (Group interview community activists, San 
Pedro Ayampuc, 24/09/2012)  
The process of collective framing has enabled community members to identify 
similar understandings as well as appreciate the different contributions made to 
the resistance by the various sections of the population.  
“The problem of mining has created a social cohesion due to the need to 
demand and exercise rights and it is a question that transcends issues of 
racism or patriarchy because one sees how the things men do can 
complement with those of women, and the things women do complements 
with those of men. In this political, public and social space there is a clarity 
of the complementarity of engagement towards the same objective, 
without it being important if they can read and write, whether they are 
Mayans or not.” (Interview community activist, San Pedro Ayampuc, 
29/09/2014)116 
The idea of drawing on diversity is also reflected in the cultural and linguistic 
elements of indigenous communities that have influenced RPLP in different 
dimensions. This is reflected in the discourse where symbolic language and 
concepts such as ‘Mother Earth’ are taken up and incorporated by non-
indigenous community members. It is also evident in certain organisational 
patterns, such as the emphasis on a collective dimension as well as internal 
processes of consultation and decision-making processes that draw on 
practices of indigenous communities (this aspect will be outlined in the following 
section.)  
At the same time the organisational dynamics are part of an open-ended 
process, as a community member stated: “we are constructing something from 
                                                          
116 At the same time, as the members of the RPLP recognise, this does not mean that the 
problems of discrimination and patriarchal relationships have been resolved eg. within families 
in the area. Nonetheless, within the space of the Puya there is a firm stance of not tolerating 
these patterns. 
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bottom-up, it is in the process that we are learning and we never know how it 
will end up.” (Interview community activist, San Pedro Ayampuc, 29/09/2014) 
However, this bottom-up process has provided the opportunity to create an 
autonomous physical and symbolic space, independent from government and 
political parties. Accordingly, the RPLP has represented an organisational 
framework, which has allowed the community members to address features that 
are deeply embedded in the behavioural patterns of Guatemalan society, such 
as the persistence of racist and patriarchal patterns. In doing so, it has 
consolidated their antagonistic position of ‘difference’ with regards to the public 
and private actors seeking to implement the mining project. As the following 
section will show, they have also sought to link this ‘difference’ at the level of 
meanings with changes in procedural patterns in order to consolidate these 
inclusive patterns in their resistance.  
 
Revealing antagonistic political practices: The dialogue with the state 
In the previous chapter on the communities in the Northern Quiché Region the 
revitalisation of mechanisms emphasising communal decision-making had been 
signalled in the course of their organisational process. The contextual features 
of the RPLP represent clear differences to the relatively consolidated and 
homogeneous communities in Quiché. As has been indicated in the previous 
section, it has still been possible to consolidate as a space in which diverse 
knowledge and meanings from the various sections of the population are drawn 
upon. This approach of dealing with the complexity of the population while 
consolidating a collective position of ‘difference’ to contest the mining project 
has also been mirrored in their organisational features. 
In the course of their resistance an assembly, which is made up of all the 
community members participating in the RPLP, has consolidated as the central 
space of deliberation and decision-making. The integration of these patterns 
was a result of a search for measures that would allow community members to 
strengthen the appropriation of the process among the community members. A 
shift in emphasis from expert knowledge to giving a voice to the ‘common’ 
members of the resistance is part of this process that translates into a 
recognition of the contribution and potential of marginal actors in 
transformational processes. As members of the RPLP confirmed, the 
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consolidation of the space of the assembly is also a reflection of the influence of 
organisational traditions and knowledge of indigenous communities. 
Accordingly, it is not just at the level of discourse and understandings that this 
inter-cultural dimension feeds into the process. Instead this interplay of diverse 
sources of knowledge is also reflected in the political practices. As the collective 
character of the struggle has consolidated as a central feature of the RPLP, 
their attempts to make the decision-making processes as inclusive as possible 
are seen as a constant challenge.  
The integration of participative spaces of deliberation and decision-making into 
the process of the RPLP also means placing trust into the collective dimension 
of the process and the ability of the assembly to reach adequate decisions:  
“If the resistance decides to hand over to the mine, well, it is their decision, 
this process of collective participation, the collective consensus I believe is 
one of the biggest challenges that we have not just in the case of La Puya 
but in many processes which apparently are based on the taking of 
consensual decision but in reality are not. … It has a lot to do with the 
managing of power. If we do not start this change of conscience and 
procedures in things, they can appear as good ideas but the way in which 
one proceeds takes away the legitimacy from these processes.” (Interview 
community activist, Guatemala City, 13/11/2013) 
Among many communities in the municipalities of San Pedro Ayampuc and San 
José del Golfo in recent decades there has been little experience with this type 
of collective decision-making. However, at least in part drawing on the 
experiences of the indigenous communities in the area, here too, attempts at 
restoring power to the local communities are ongoing. In contrast to the process 
in the Northern Quiché the process of the RPLP did not start off with an explicit 
reference to the ‘community’ as an organisational framework. Nonetheless, 
current dynamics indicate how the resistance feeds back into the communities 
as they are injected with dynamics based on the reformulated patterns and 
relationships developed in the space of La Puya. The approach of changing 
organisational patterns has been easier in the communities, where the support 
for the opposition to the mining project is strong. A number of communities have 
taken up the modality of nominating their own representatives in a community 
assembly, thereby countering a consolidated tradition in municipal policies 
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according to which the mayor nominates favourable community authorities or 
COCODEs (Interview community activist, Guatemala City, 13/11/2013). 117 
This means the ‘legitimate’ community representatives, as the community 
members refer to them, have started to represent another channel to exercise 
pressure on the municipal council. Especially in the case of San Pedro 
Ayampuc, based on communal decisions, a number of COCODEs have since 
begun to create a strategic counterweight within the formal system to reject the 
mining project.  
These changes in political practices also seem to have deepened the 
antagonistic character with regards to the public and private actors behind the 
mining project. This incompatibility became especially evident in the interaction 
with the institutional framework of the state. As mentioned earlier, following the 
incursion by the police forces in November 2012 a dialogue guided by the 
SNPD was set up between the RPLP and the state.  
Although the mechanism has only recently been institutionalised, given the 
unsuccessful history of dialogue between social actors and the state in the 
country, the RPLP maintained a sceptical position with regards to potential 
gains for the communities. As a member of a civil society organisation close to 
the movement analysed:  
“All the governments from Portillo to now have always sought to set up 
dialogue rounds. This has represented a way to entertain people and to 
seek to diminish the strength of the movements of the people. This has 
been one of the main objectives of the government, while at the same time 
convincing people that the mine will bring benefits etc. The movement has 
seen it as a moment in the struggle, a form of struggle. They know they 
will not gain anything from the negotiating tables but it allows them to 
catch their breath, because opposing a mine in a place so close to the 
                                                          
117 Nonetheless, even the election of their own authorities does not always guarantee 
communities a voice and participation in municipal matters showing the deeply rooted traditions 
of exclusive decision-making in formal institutions. Some communities have insisted on 
nominating their authorities only to find out that they are not taken into account or consulted on 
certain matters. Instead issues are dealt with at the level of the Consejos Municipales de 
Desarrollo (Municipal Council of Development) even if this contradicts Municipal Law that 
establishes the COCODEs as the prime organ for decision-making. 
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capital city is difficult.” (Interview environmental activist, Guatemala City, 
11/11/2013)  
In this sense the acceptance of engaging in the dialogue constituted a strategic 
dimension in the struggle of the communities and indicates the ambivalent role 
of time and the determination of its flow for the resistance. On one hand, the 
passing days represent a physical, mental and economic burden for the RPLP 
to endure and maintain its organisational patterns and presence at the protest 
camp. On the other hand, the increasing duration of the standstill does not 
favour the interests behind the implementation of the project, since the fluidity of 
capital can also encourage impatient investors to seek other opportunities. The 
corporative media for its part does not cease to highlight the financial losses 
incurred by the company due to the standstill in the mining activities.118 
The meetings with the authorities also represented an arena in which the 
communities were able to highlight antagonisms, contradictions and their 
counter-positions to the views of the institutional actors. In the course of the 
meetings the incompatibility of their conceptions around ‘territory’ and 
‘development’ and also with regards to the procedural patterns became 
increasingly evident.  
Already the first meetings indicated a strong asymmetry between the two 
parties in the dialogue: 
“When we started the process of dialogue it became clear that we needed 
minimal conditions, a central one is to have equality in conditions when 
dealing with the different aspects…. But in the course of the initial dialogue 
we realised there is a total asymmetry in the dialogue and in the 
relationship between the community and the state. In their discourse, in 
their attitude, in their gestures they continued to affirm that they are the 
ones to take decisions and be in control.” (Interview community activist, 
San Pedro Ayampuc, 29/09/2014) 
As a result, in the course of various meetings with institutional actors, the 
                                                          
118 The biggest national newspaper, Prensalibre pointed out that during the first year alone in 
which the company had not been able to operate, it had lost $3 million. Additionally, the report 
argued that the state had lost between $8 and $10 million in terms of royalties although it is 
unclear how these calculations were made, e.g. Prensalibre 23/05/2014. 
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communities and their representatives sought to counter what they perceived as 
institutional arrogance in the face of the resistance by setting up their own 
conditions for the dialogue. Even as high-level talks with President Pérez Molina 
and members of the cabinet were set up, the communities remained unfazed. 
They made their participation conditional on a series of demands in line with 
their own organisational patterns that emphasised the collective and horizontal 
characteristics of their struggle. 
Firstly, they insisted on an adequate representation of the communities during 
the high-level meetings, rejecting the government’s position of only inviting two 
representatives. Even as they ultimately agreed on only a slight increase on 
delegates participating in the meetings, dozens of community members 
accompanied them to the location and waited outside. As such they sought to 
counter the strategy of the government to identify and isolate a leadership which 
would make them vulnerable to co-option. 
Secondly, they insisted on the presence of journalists from the CMI and the 
invitation of honorary witnesses. The former were to record the entire meeting 
and ensure that the information could be transmitted as complete as possible to 
the communities. This was meant to prevent the government from using the 
dialogue to distort information on any agreements or discredit the 
representatives. The invitation of honorary witnesses from civil society with 
experience in human rights issues as well as representatives of national or 
international human rights bodies were an additional mechanism to ensure the 
transparency of the meetings.  
Thirdly they refused to meet or enter into any dialogue with the mining company 
or its representatives,119 forcing the government to ask the company 
representatives to leave the room during the meetings. As a community 
representative indicated: 
“We were clear we did not want to commit similar mistakes to the ones 
made by the communities in San Miguel (Ixtahuacán). Initially, in San 
Miguel the company and the state had been included (in the dialogue), 
                                                          
119 As mentioned Rodrigo Carlos Maegli Novella represented the US company Kappes, 
Cassiday & Associates in these meetings with the government. More information see footnote 
104. 
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then the state withdrew from its responsibility and the conflict developed 
between them, leaving the communities to negotiate with the company. As 
a people we did not concede any licence, it was the state, so if anybody 
has an issue to resolve with the company it should be the state.” (Interview 
community activist, Guatemala City, 17/11/2013) 
A further condition was related to decision-making in the spaces of dialogue. 
Even under pressure by the government to reach immediate agreements during 
the dialogue, the ‘delegates’ of the RPLP rejected possessing any decision-
making power. Instead, they insisted on the consultation and debate with the 
communities before any agreement could be reached. 
“The idea was to listen to their petition and not give any response and to 
take the information to the communities for them to decide, in this space 
we did not have a voice or vote to decide. … They gave us their petitions 
at the level of a proposal and we accepted them at the level of a proposal 
to consult with the communities. They did not allow a representative of 
each community to come, so we will have to go back to them for 
consultation.” (Interview community activist, Guatemala City, 17/11/2013)  
This represented a pattern similar to the circular dynamic identified in the 
Northern Quiché: The delegates are not equipped with any decision-making 
power, instead they are responsible for transmitting decisions agreed by the 
communities as well as returning the information from the institutional spaces to 
the assembly for discussion and decision-making. Again this brings up the 
temporal tension and incompatibility as this form of inclusive but more arduous 
decision-making meets with institutional patterns.  
The last dialogue meeting was planned to take place on May 20th. However, as 
the community representatives arrived at the Presidential Palace they were 
denied access. The authorities alleged that the presence of journalists from the 
CMI represented a breach in security regulations although their presence had 
obviously been agreed during previous meetings.120 Three days later, on May 
                                                          
120 The members of the RPLP suspect that the decision to deny access to the members of the 
CMI was only an excuse. They believe the government had received information that an 
environmental expert, Roberto Moran was accompanying the representatives of the RPLP for 
the meetings in order to point out the deficiencies in the EIA which risked to further undermine 
the weak technical arguments supporting the implementation of the mining project. (Interview 
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23rd 2014 hundreds of policemen proceeded to violently evict the protest camp 
from the entrance to the mining compound injuring dozens of community 
members who had defiantly blocked the path based on their pacific resistance 
patterns. The private sector applauded the actions, congratulating the 
government on guaranteeing the state of law and the property rights. Human 
rights organisations on the other hand denounced the violence used by the 
police forces on peaceful demonstrators, leaving dozens injured and destroying 
the protest camp.  
The coercive response to implementing the mining project highlighted the 
inability of the state officials and the different elite sections linked to the mining 
project to engage on equal conditions in a dialogue with the dissenting sections 
of the population. Firstly, it evidenced the clearly biased role of the state and its 
representatives who saw the dialogue as a mechanism to convince the 
community members of the benefits and advantages of the mining company 
and its activities. They saw this as a way to dissolve supposed 
misunderstandings on the mining project. Secondly, there was a clear 
avoidance of speaking about the obvious irregularities in the legal basis of the 
process to implement the project or the violations of rights which had occurred. 
Accordingly, the violation of the rights to previous information and consultation 
of the communities on the mining project as well as the different direct attacks 
on members of the RPLP were not addressed.  
As a community member argued, the violent response was the only solution left 
for the authorities: 
“In this case the party opposing dialogue is clearly the government. The 
government clearly does not have the capacity to dialogue because it does 
not have the technical nor legal arguments to do so and the only remaining 
alternative is repression. It is under pressure from the company and so it 
ends up repressing in order to ensure the company can start to operate.” 
(Interview community activist, San Pedro Ayampuc, 29/09/2014) 
In the course of the dialogue, the RPLP had aimed to counter the risk of state-
agents following the co-optive patterns that mark decision-making procedures 
by introducing a number of conditions, among them: The reformulation of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
community activist, San Pedro Ayampuc, 29/09/2014. 
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representation; transparency and public character of the meetings; an appeal to 
the state’s legal responsibilities; the introduction of participative decision-making 
processes. In the end a combination of the conditions issued by the RPLP 
seeking to halt these patterns and the weak legal and technical arguments 
provided by the institutional actors, left coercion as the only option to implement 
the project.  
However, despite the biased or often even criminalising coverage of the 
mainstream media, the community members have in the course of their 
articulation been able to advance their agenda into a national public arena. By 
insisting on the role of the local population in decision-making regarding their 
territories, the RPLP echo the idea of “recuperating the real sense of democracy 
starting with the inversion of political processes.” (Interview community activist, 
Guatemala City, 13/11/2013)   
While articulating messages towards a national level, the RPLP has also 
persisted in the local context after the eviction of 23rd May 2014. The coercive 
responses by the state advance the direct implementation of elite-interests in 
the short run. However, the generalised sense of injustice resulting from these 
measures also nurtures the possibilities for new convergences around the 
differential perspectives. The flow of messages and actions of solidarity 
following the violent eviction were key in convincing the RPLP to continue: The 
day following the eviction the community members went about setting up a new 
protest camp, only a few yards from the previous one. In the course of the 
following months this has been expanded and has retaken its previous position 
at the entrance to the mine. While a 24-hour presence of the police guarantees 
the access for vehicles and personnel of the company to the mining compound, 
the RPLP has persisted, although it was forced to adjust the direct objective of 
their resistance: The protest camp represents a signal of dissent, not just with 
regards to the mining project Progreso VII Derivada but also with regards to the 
other licences planned for the region and for which La Puya constitutes the 
entrance point. This means the RPLP maintains its affirmation of ‘difference’ 
and struggle to voice the local demands, while at the same time protecting a 
space where their ‘difference’ is consolidated and continues to evolve.121  
                                                          
121 On 15th July 2015 a Guatemalan court ordered the suspension of all operations linked to the 
Progreso VII Derivada mining project, in response to a legal complaint filed by two alcaldes 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated how the implementation of a mining project in 
the municipalities of San José del Golfo and San Pedro Ayampuc has sparked 
processes of convergence among local community members. The 
establishment of the protest-camp as an autonomous physical and symbolic 
space, independent from government and national political parties has 
constituted a crucial dimension in the organisational process of the RPLP. This 
collectively created space has acted as a signifier whose meaning was 
constructed in the course of the resistance based on a discourse articulating 
concerns on the environmental impact of the mining project and an affirmation 
of life. The organisational process has consolidated an antagonistic position of 
‘difference’ among the community members. In contrast to the previous case-
study, in the case of the RPLP the ethnic root of this ‘difference’ is less explicit. 
Instead, their antagonistic stance has resulted from a relatively short-term 
process and draws on a variety of locally embedded meanings based on the 
experience of rural life as well as the local demographic complexity. Within the 
social and political space of La Puya this has also enabled the reconciliation of 
gender and ethnic differences, setting a contrasting example in a society 
marked by patriarchal and racist patterns. 
The process of collective action has encouraged the integration of participatory 
notions that seek to emphasise the horizontality of relationships and a rejection 
of hierarchical forms of leadership. Accordingly, the assembly of the RPLP, 
which is open to the participation of all members, has consolidated as the 
central decision-making space. In doing so, it has also exemplified the collective 
appropriation of the organisational process among the local community 
                                                                                                                                                                          
auxiliares (auxiliary mayors) of El Carrizal and El Guapinol, two communities of San Pedro 
Ayampuc with a strong participation in the RPLP. They had argued that the company had been 
operating without a construction permit as well as not having the required documentation on 
various environmental aspects. The court found the company to be operating illegally and 
without the authorization of the municipality of San Pedro Ayampuc. Additionally, it ordered all 
activities to be suspended until a community consultation is held. This has represented an 
unexpected and positive turnaround for the RPLP, however, it is unclear to what extent this 
judicial order will halt the project and legal battles are likely to follow, as the mining company 
launched an appeal against this decision. 
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members. These inclusive modes of decision-making have been reproduced 
within a number of communities involved in the opposition to the mining project, 
reflecting a similar process towards empowering the ‘local’ that was noted in the 
previous chapter.  
The engagement of the RPLP with the institutional apparatus has emphasised 
the antagonistic character of this collective agency and brought the 
incompatibility of contrasting perspectives and practices to the forefront. 
However, these interactions also offered a platform to highlight the 
inconsistencies in the discourses of elites and the state and enabled the RPLP 
to articulate its demands to a national public. The violent eviction of the protest 
camp ultimately represented the state’s response to the attempts of the RPLP 
to safeguard their positions from co-optive patterns and establish a dialogue on 
the basis of transparent and equal conditions. By insisting on remaining in 
control over their local spaces and setting out their participation in decision-
making as the starting point for political processes, the RPLP, like the 
communities in the Northern Quiché, articulate this aspect as a key condition for 
the construction of democratic processes in Guatemala. 
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9. Conclusion 
Methodological and theoretical insights 
The central research objective of examining the collective agency in defence of 
territory emerging in the context of a Guatemalan state co-opted by different 
elite factions and exploring its implications for democratisation, encouraged me 
to engage with different methodological approaches. Accordingly, while 
engaging in a problem-driven, inductive research process, I moved at the 
interface of methods generally associated with either political science or 
anthropology. On one hand, the engagement with ethnographic tools reflected 
my interest in the characteristics of specific nodes of agency, the ongoing 
processes of production of meaning as well as their procedural and 
organisational understandings. On the other hand, the research also examined 
the implications of this agency in relationship to Guatemala’s specific 
institutional constellation and social setting. Therefore, this aspect also sought 
to determine the role of localised articulations for issues at the heart of political 
science, such as the inter-relationship with institutions as well as insights with 
regards to the construction of political and democratic processes. 
The engagement with approaches closer to political science and anthropology 
was also motivated by the idea of bridging two disciplines not just with regards 
to their methodology but also in terms of their research focus. Anthropological 
research has frequently engaged with grass-roots movements and expressions 
of collective action. Nonetheless, the insights they offer and their implications 
for meta-political debates, which lie closer to political science, have often been 
neglected. Political science, on the other hand, has had a tradition of focusing 
on debates around democracy and institutions. However, in many cases this 
has side-lined the attention to the level of meanings and cultural complexity at a 
grass-roots level. This means not enough attention is paid to understand how 
these aspects influence the patterns of political processes or the relationship 
with institutions at the ‘local’ and beyond. In the course of the research I have 
bridged these two fields, not just in a methodological sense but also by 
expanding their respective research perspectives. 
The incentive for me as a trained political scientist to engage in methods closer 
to anthropological work was also based on considerations around my position 
as a researcher in a context marked by cultural complexity such as Guatemala. 
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Accordingly, I have argued that the engagement with ontological and 
epistemological frameworks is crucial for an understanding of the behavioural 
patterns and motivations underlying the collective action I was analysing. 
Despite not engaging in a ‘thick description’, the methods of participant 
observation as well as interviews provided me with essential insights into the 
flow of meanings and organisational patterns among local communities.  
The approaches closer to a political science perspective, on the other hand, 
were in part also motivated by the experiences made in the course of the 
fieldwork. They evidenced that the communities and collectives are very much 
aware of being immersed in a broader context marked by correlations of power 
and mechanisms of domination. Thus, as highlighted in the course of the thesis, 
the confining and overlapping dynamics of a co-opted state constitute an 
extremely challenging environment for this agency. Therefore, community 
members frequently recognise that their struggles involve strategic negotiations 
and relating with institutional levels at different scales especially by demanding 
the compliance with legal frameworks, in order not to remain isolated in this 
context. Additionally, the predominantly local orientation of the community-
based articulation reflects the importance of recognising the concrete 
experiences embedded in every-day relationships that drive the organisational 
processes and constitute its primary focus. 
The features of the political ethnographic approach also had implications for the 
theoretical understandings that frame the research. Instead of an overly 
mechanistic structure-agency approach, I have introduced a conceptual 
framework that gives space to ontological and epistemological difference at the 
level of the research subjects. This seems to be of special relevance in 
countries like Guatemala with evident levels of cultural complexity among the 
population. I have argued that although Giddens’ (1979) structure-agency 
approach made an attempt to address this dimension by introducing a relational 
perspective, it still has three central shortcomings. 
Firstly, the failure to acknowledge different ontological frameworks that underlie 
the motivations for action and behavioural patterns of subjects and collectives 
(Stones, 1996; Chesters, 2012). Secondly, although I obviously acknowledge 
that agency is also about correlations of power and antagonisms, Giddens’ 
approach struggles to escape from an overly mechanistic framing of agency 
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(Urry, 2003). Thus, he fails to sufficiently recognise the contingent as well as the 
frequently ‘non-linear’ orientation of collective action. Thirdly, by failing to pay 
attention to collective agency he side-lines the potential for production of 
knowledge and meanings at this grass-root level. In doing so, he fails to create 
space for these ongoing struggles to make everyday lives ‘more democratic’ 
resulting of convergences into bodies of collective agency. 
While emphasising ontological differences in contexts of cultural complexity 
such as Guatemala, I have refrained from conceptualising subjects and 
collectives as static, non-evolving bodies and identities. Instead, based on a 
Deleuzian understanding, I have emphasised them as being situated in a 
constantly relational settings and immersed in processes of ‘becoming’ 
(Deleuze, 1994). Following this line of thought I have used assemblage theory 
to argue that expressions of collective agency can be seen as aggregative 
bodies characterised by varying degrees of cohesiveness (De Landa, 2006). As 
the experience of community-based organising in Guatemala shows, processes 
of collective convergence involve the revitalisation of shared meanings or 
collective signifiers such as ‘community’ that are defined by discourses and 
practices in the course of organisational processes. Accordingly, the often 
locally based assemblages or communities in their struggle for the defence of 
territory develop ‘emerging properties’ (De Landa, 2006) in the course of their 
resistance, which are reflected in evolving, collectively articulated discourses 
and practices. 
The concept of ‘meanings’ adds more detail to the understanding of this 
convergence into bodies of collective agency. I have argued that this is reflected 
in attempts of collectives to re-appropriate or to stay in control of the production 
of meanings as they are faced with mechanisms aimed at redefining social and 
cultural objects. This view is in line with scholars who understand individuals 
and collectives as producing and contesting not just economic resources, but 
also symbols, relationships, needs and identities (eg. Melucci, 1989, 1996; 
Álvarez, 1998; Dagnino, 1998; Escobar, 1992, 2008). As I have highlighted, 
these conflicts around meanings are especially evident in countries, where the 
cultural complexity combines with hierarchical and often coercive attempts at 
imposing meanings on other groups of population. Accordingly, the sources of 
agency under analysis in this research seek to escape from and are contesting 
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the ‘coding’ of their spaces and practices through elite or state actors seeking to 
re-signify the ‘local’. The exploitation of natural resources as well as policies in 
line with Harvey’s (2003) understanding of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ 
represent ongoing processes that seek to integrate rural areas of the Global 
South into strategies of accumulation. It is in the course of this expansion into 
new territories that networks of production of meanings are uncovered or an 
accentuation of meanings is sparked and in turn ignites processes of “defensive 
localisation” (Escobar, 2001, p.149) among the rural population. 
I have also used the conflict or antagonism around the production of meanings 
to outline an understanding of ‘difference’ as underlying the antagonistic 
agency. A differential production of meanings refers to the variety of 
understandings associated with symbols, words and processes, which are seen 
as originating in certain cultural practices and thinking. In addition to this 
‘difference’ at the level of meanings, I have emphasised how this has translated 
into a political notion of this ‘difference’, which is conveyed through practices 
and alternative designs of political interactions. In this regard ‘space’ and 
understandings of ‘territory’ acquire special relevance for local community 
members since they constitute a basic condition for their ‘difference’ and its 
reproduction. The potential for an affirmation of ‘difference’ cannot be restricted 
to determinate or fixed identities nor limited to a purely oppositional sense. In 
line with Deleuze's (1994) understanding of ‘difference in itself’, I have argued 
for this collective action to be seen as constantly evolving expressions of 
agency with immanent characteristics, which are reflected in practices and 
discourses. This approach aids to deconstruct ‘essentialising’ understandings of 
culture or tradition and indicate their imperfect nature as well as the dynamic 
internal tensions that mark social assemblages. Additionally, it recognises the 
potential for ‘difference’ that goes beyond a purely antagonistic stance to be 
constructed by social collectives based on diverse characteristics, without being 
restricted to specific ethnic or cultural criteria.  
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Research findings 
Understanding agency and its constraints 
The first research objective of the thesis aimed to provide an understanding for 
the emergence of the agency around the defence of territory in Guatemala. In 
doing so, I have also related it with some previous forms of agency that have 
obtained a certain level of public projection, to identify differences and 
similarities that help to specify the characteristics of the current expressions of 
collective action. The present organising among communities in defence of 
territory has obviously developed in a context in which it has been preceded by 
a variety of organisational processes that have sought to challenge the elite-
dominated social order. Two lines of analysis were pursued while examining 
some of the previous generations of agency and their features: Firstly, the 
external constraints they have faced, which in most periods were represented 
by a repressive state dominated by economic and military elites. Secondly, their 
internal patterns to assess their ability to address the cultural complexity of the 
population. 
All generations of agency have at some stage been confronted with constraints 
imposed by the state controlled by different elite factions. In the case of the 
democratic interlude between 1944 and 1954, the community-based organising 
of the 1960s as well as the guerrilla factions, the coercive arm of the state either 
halted or set limits to the respective articulation. Even the guerrilla factions, 
whose military and logistical capacity has often been exaggerated, failed to 
pose a sustained and serious threat to one of the most numerous and well-
equipped armies in Central America. For later articulations emerging in the 
course of the transitional framework as well as the context of the Peace 
Accords, the limitations were to a lesser extent coercive. Instead, it was the 
level of control elites were able to exercise on different state institutions and the 
formally democratic political system that strongly limited the impact a new 
indigenous leadership and other civil society organisations could make on the 
institutional framework. The informal determination of decision-making 
processes, the watering down of or failure to implement legal frameworks, the 
restrictions on ministerial budgets and influence of indigenous state officials as 
well as the consolidation of clientelistic electoral dynamics were among the 
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mechanisms that impeded any significant challenge to elite rule along 
institutional channels.  
While the constraints posed by the state were clearly the most evident, in the 
case of the expressions of agency aiming for central power the failure to gather 
enough organisational strength, especially in the rural hinterlands also marked 
the respective articulation. The popular, nationalistic, middle class-led 
democratising attempts in the 1950s as well as the guerrilla forces were unable 
to assemble sufficient grass-roots support or outline projects that would bridge 
the rural-urban divide and speak to the different sections of the population. The 
reformist governments between 1944 and 1954 clearly had a democratising 
intent that translated into a series of progressive legal frameworks. However, 
they were also driven by an assimilative mission, aiming to integrate the 
indigenous population into a ladino-led nation-building project. This distance 
between the urban world of reforms and the rural world also left the urban pro-
democratic forces isolated as they attempted to respond to the 1954 coup.  
The guerrilla factions that went on to set up their base in the rural areas made 
timid approaches to integrate issues of culture and questioning racism. Their 
discourse nevertheless continued to be dominated by an economistic analysis 
of class-relationships and the objective of taking power through a revolutionary 
project. In practice, the level of repression and genocidal character of the 
military campaigns drew indigenous communities in the highlands and the 
guerrilla factions closer, however, without resulting in a convergence. On one 
hand, this can be attributed to the fact that even the main insurgent factions 
never developed the logistical and organisational capacity to incorporate 
broader sections of the population into their struggle. On the other hand, the 
organisational logics of the communities required a space for autonomy that the 
insurgent project could not offer. 
The latter aspect also contributed to the detachment from the rural communities 
that was identified with regards to the new indigenous leadership emerging in 
the course of the transitional framework. Their multiculturalist discourse 
focusing on indigenous rights, culture and a reversal of racism was increasingly 
framed around a particularist agenda, as they claimed to speak for the 
indigenous communities. However, their failure to base articulations within the 
communities and their casting within a clearly delimited civil society framework 
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as advocated by international donors, undermined ties with the rural, indigenous 
hinterland. NGOs became the most frequent organisational format, which 
translated into a professionalisation and a gradual demobilisation of indigenous 
activists. Additionally, these articulations were unable to prevent the 
consolidation of elite control over institutional spaces to ensure the 
implementation of the reform processes outlined in the Peace Accords. 
The analysis of the different generations of agency has signalled the parallel 
and overlapping flows of collective agency and in many cases their contrasting 
directionality. Some articulations were orientated towards the institutional 
framework as a means to gain power. Others, such as the community-based 
agency of the cooperative network in the 1960s or the CPR, at least in part 
sought to avoid the reach of the state. The current policies linked to the 
targeting of natural resources, which translates into an economic integration of 
rural territories sets up a new panorama. While this expansion of the reach of 
the state in economic terms is not accompanied by an extension of social or 
political rights for the population, it also leaves the grass-roots communities 
without the possibility to avoid the antagonistic dimension of the resulting 
conflicts. The local orientation of the expressions of agency signals a reluctance 
to engage with a co-opted institutional framework beyond this local scale. 
However, a certain engagement with institutions, especially through the 
demands around national and international frameworks of rights, is seen as 
necessary in order not to remain isolated and to carve out spaces in which 
‘difference’ can be reproduced and developed.  
Despite a certain level of public engagement, I have argued that the incentives 
for the convergence are to be found in the locally embedded meanings as 
organisational processes are consolidated that flow alongside the formal 
political spaces and institutions. Therefore, to understand the public emergence 
of these patterns of ‘localisation’, the incompatibilities between policies 
promoted by elites and locally embedded attachments to ‘place’ and ‘territory’ 
have to be taken into account. As the case studies have indicated, these 
meanings can be rooted in cultural traditions and worldviews or emerge on the 
basis of instinctive experiences of rural life. However, it is the revitalisation and 
production of these meanings in the course of the organisational processes that 
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have nurtured the resistance among community members and also encouraged 
them to continue to politically ‘develop’ their ‘difference’.  
 
Contextual features: The genesis of a co-opted state 
The second research objective established the contextual link of the 
community-based agency with the evolving character of the Guatemalan state. 
The tracking of the state-formation process across different periods allowed me 
to highlight some of the features that characterise its current nature. I have 
identified economic elites and their drive to access rents and perpetuate 
strategies of accumulation as central to this process. Since colonial rule, this 
has translated into attempts to impose a specific cultural system of 
understanding society and ordering it in accord with the elites’ interests. The 
conversion of social realities into resources and population into labour became 
a central feature of this ‘colonial coding’. Throughout the different periods of 
colonial and authoritarian rule, elites’ behavioural patterns and policies have 
been strongly influenced by the cultural imaginaries enacted by global elites. 
Accordingly, they derive their right to power and a privileged position in society 
from their capacity to access rents and accumulate wealth.  
The state has played a central role in stabilising societal power-relationships. 
The almost permanent authoritarian control of elite factions over the institutional 
framework has enabled them to strongly influence legal frameworks, policies 
and discourses. During the post-colonial period this elite dominance 
consolidated a regime based on features of primitive capitalism with the 
exploitation of the indigenous population as well as the concentration of land 
and resources representing its crucial axis. This also translated into the racist 
hierarchy that has accompanied and continues to be reflected in the constitution 
of a mono-cultural state in a pluri-cultural society. Additionally, this elite 
dominated order was characterised by the periodic use of coercion to 
consolidate an exclusive societal structure and perpetuate strategies of 
accumulation. This reinforced the image of the state as a means to perpetuate 
strategies of accumulation and gain access to rents, as in the course of the 
brutal counter-insurgent campaigns, military officers went about establishing 
their own state-project and schemes of enrichment.  
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Different moments of inter-elite tensions became apparent in the course of the 
armed conflict as the interests of traditional economic elites and military elites 
clashed. Confrontations between different factions of the economic elites were 
also frequent, with the drive for accumulation of the different factions setting 
limits to cooperative behaviour. However, the capacity of the traditional 
economic elites to unite in key moments or at least find points of shared interest 
has been crucial to consolidating their dominance and allowed them to take 
charge of the transitional process.  
I have argued that the ‘top-down’ transition to a formal democracy initiated in 
1985 has gradually adjusted the mechanisms used by elites to maintain a 
determining influence over the state. I have identified the control over the 
political system as well as key institutional spaces as paving the path for this 
renewed period of elite dominance. Their crucial role in the creation and 
financing of political parties allowed elites to transfer the patron-client patterns 
from the economic sphere into other societal spaces and to structure political 
and institutional relationships accordingly. Additionally, a certain level of social 
mobility at the level of elites was pointed out: Based on the patterns by which 
traditional elites relate with the state, emerging elites— some of them linked to 
illicit activities— have also been able to establish similar economic and political 
networks, gain access to institutional spaces or link up with sections of networks 
of traditional elites. An array of legal and illegal, formal and informal 
mechanisms are used by elite factions as they seek to control the design and 
implementation of laws and policies, thus consolidating a scenario of ‘state co-
option’. A bidirectional dynamic has developed as different elite factions 
establish alliances with officials within the state or with political operators with 
the capacity to influence the actions of key actors positioned within the 
institutional framework. Bribery, corruption, exchange of favours and coercive 
strategies are used as different elite factions are locked into competition and 
cooperation. In this context the formal institutional functions and rules are co-
opted or reconfigured to promote specific interests, strategies of accumulation 
and capture rents. Accordingly, an implicit elite pact has consolidated at the 
intersections of formality and informality, legality and illegality, while the different 
elite factions are unwilling to make any concessions towards the establishment 
of an impersonal institutional framework beyond their control.   
 268 
 
Within this context of state co-option, the current orientation towards natural 
resources has represented the most recent attempt at revitalising and adapting 
strategies of accumulation to the requirements of global and national elites. At 
the same time the population of the rural areas, is left without a voice with 
regards to these policies that impact and reconfigure their immediate 
surroundings. The resulting conflicts reflect the nature of state-society 
relationships in this context, as aspects of the institutional framework, policies 
and laws are oriented towards advancing these economic interests linked to 
natural resources. A reactivation of human rights violations, the criminalisation 
of expressions of resistance as well as coercive policies— often under the 
pretext of re-establishing governability— have added an authoritarian notion to 
this trend. 
 
Defending difference and territory, imagining democratic processes 
The third research objective aimed to explore insights for democratising agency 
emerging from the expressions of collective action in the context of a co-opted 
state. The challenge to the exploitation of natural resources indicates how 
collective agency becomes a mechanism to highlight fundamental 
incompatibilities that are produced by the implementation of these policies 
especially at the local level. Given the inadequacy and erosion of the 
established channels of participation as well as the informal determination of 
institutional spaces, expressions of dissent emerge from outside the political 
centres of society. Rather than broad societal movements or expressions 
associated with national political parties, they constitute localised assemblages 
of resistance, confined and overlapping with the patterns of a co-opted state.  
As I have indicated, the grass-roots organisational processes around the 
defence of territory have been marked by a strengthening of locally embedded 
meanings around ‘territory’, as well as a revitalisation of the ‘community’ as a 
collective signifier. As the case of the communities in the Northern Quiché has 
shown, culturally rooted meanings reproduced in language and worldviews 
provide a crucial underlying dimension in their process of resistance. The case 
of the RPLP has on the other hand highlighted how the meanings that frame the 
collective organising have emerged in relatively short-term processes, drawing 
on the experience of rural life as well as multiple sources of knowledge, among 
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them that of indigenous community members. In both cases their ‘affirmation of 
difference’ has been reflected in ‘relational’ understandings that highlight the 
profound incompatibilities with the elite-promoted ‘commodifying’ views of 
natural resources and territory. Accordingly, these processes advance an 
understanding of territory that emphasises the relationship between humans 
and nature as a condition for the physical and cultural survival of their 
communities. The various nodes of agency engaging in defence of territory 
have been met by a renewed increase of human rights violations, 
criminalisation of their actions and coercive state intervention. However, the 
perception of injustice and threats posed by the elite and state promoted 
projects or policies have also spurred a sense of solidarity among local 
community members. In doing so, it has in many cases strengthened a further 
‘relational’ dimension by enhancing the bond between the individual and the 
collective or the ‘community’.  
The attempts to re-appropriate decision-making processes have represented 
one of the central aspects of the local response to the elite-promoted 
modernisation project. This has been evidenced by the organisation of 
community consultations among the communities in the Northern Quiché 
region. In doing so, the communities have highlighted how, in the course of the 
convergences or aggregative processes at this local level, a politicisation of 
their ‘difference’ takes place. This has been reflected in the attempt to 
consolidate participatory spaces of decision-making at this grass-roots level, 
framed around the community assembly. Accordingly, the consolidation of local 
public spheres based on the experiences and problems of the community 
members has been promoted. 
In both case studies analysed in the thesis I have indicated how the emphasis 
on the ‘assembly’ as the central space of decision-making has also been 
complemented by the figure of a ‘community delegate’ replacing that of a 
‘representative’. This has constituted a further measure to embed decision-
making among the community members and encourage an appropriation of the 
organisational process as such. Additionally, there have been attempts at 
creating deliberative spaces on the basis of criteria that stress ‘inclusiveness’ as 
well as their ‘horizontal’ character. Especially the RPLP has been emblematic in 
 270 
 
this sense by placing an emphasis on addressing issues of patriarchy and 
racism.  
Accordingly, as elites and the institutional framework have pressured for the 
implementation of the policies around natural resources, they have been unable 
to organise consent at this local level and have instead brought the agency 
among the communities to the surface. Fragile and imperfect processes of 
production of knowledge and practices continue to develop as the nodes of 
resistance go beyond a purely antagonistic stance. In doing so, they highlight 
the potential of creating meaningful public spaces at this local level based on 
the experiences, problems and voices of the community members. As this takes 
place in a context marked by coercive and co-optive dynamics, the primary aim 
of these struggles remains that of keeping alive their ‘difference’ and attempting 
to find ways to make their everyday lives ‘more democratic’.  
 
Socio-political implications of the research 
The central contribution of the thesis has been that of indicating the features 
collective agency takes on in the context of a culturally complex society as well 
as an institutional framework co-opted by elite factions. In recent years an 
increasing number of authors have focused on the issue of state co-option. 
Among them a body of literature has emerged to examine Latin American 
states, linking the expansion of co-optive mechanisms especially with the rise in 
organised crime and emerging illegal elites (Garay et al, 2010; Briscoe 2014). 
However, as the thesis shows, an understanding of state co-option cannot be 
separated from the historical trajectory of elites in state-formation processes. As 
the case of Guatemala shows, their dominant societal position had been 
established around an exclusive way of relating with the institutional framework 
that paved the path for patterns of state-co-option. Although the mechanisms to 
control and reconfigure state institutions have been adapted in the course of the 
transition to a formal democracy, it indicates how the attempts to stabilise power 
relationships and exclusive social orders have been an integral part of the elites’ 
behavioural patterns. Additionally, it is on the basis of similar ways of operating 
and relating to the state that an increasing permeation of traditional elite 
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networks with emerging illegal elite actors and criminal activities has taken 
place.  
The essentially undemocratic cultural framework of elites makes the exploration 
of non-elite forms of agency more relevant. This is not in order to fit them into 
conventional categories or channels of democratisation. Instead I have 
suggested this in terms of highlighting the persistence of fragile, non-linear and 
imperfect attempts at destabilising dominant discourses and redesigning 
political interactions on the basis of often disregarded local understandings and 
knowledge. Accordingly, I have pointed to the importance of acknowledging and 
taking into account these local processes in which embryonic forms of collective 
interaction and deliberation that represent a condition for democratic processes 
are ongoing. 
The complexity deriving from the pluri-cultural constellation of societies in the 
Global South has been analysed in different fields of social science. In the Latin 
American context scholars have highlighted the emergence of social and 
indigenous movements from marginalised sections of society. This challenge 
has been linked primarily to state policies that are perceived as detrimental to 
the local ways of life, territories and needs (Yashar, 2005). Especially in the 
Andean region broad social movements have emerged as a result of neoliberal 
policies and gone on to connect to or form political parties in order to promote 
their demands (Van Cott, 2007). However, although this has given way to a 
fundamental reconceptualization of state-society relationships in these 
countries, the tensions between the formal associative patterns of states and 
those of the rural communities have remained. This indicates the challenge of 
constructing broader democratic processes in countries with demographic 
complexity such as Guatemala. Additionally, in the case of Guatemala these 
tensions between ethnic groups as well as local organisational processes and 
the state are even more evident, as histories of repression and racism 
constitute the foundations on which the formal institutional spaces have been 
built.  
In the absence of ‘real’ channels or incentives for participation in decision-
making processes in a context of state co-option, the prime orientation of 
collective agency is determined by the local and the carving out of spaces 
independent of national political parties, the state or formal institutions. In this 
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context the defence of territory acquires special relevance as it also represents 
the space in which community members consolidate their own processes of 
production of meanings, social and political interaction as well as decision-
making. Additionally, as the case studies have demonstrated, the defence of 
territory and the affirmation of ‘difference’ cannot be associated exclusively with 
indigenous communities. In the case of the indigenous communities, ‘difference’ 
emerges with a strong bond to the past and ways of reading realities that draw 
on indigenous culture. However, differential meanings and practices are also 
produced among non-indigenous communities, in many cases to express their 
dissent with regards to the reconfiguration of their immediate surroundings. This 
highlights the challenges articulations face in terms of consolidating not only a 
position of ‘difference’ with regards to the external factors, but also having to 
address the diversity within and among the various nodes of resistance. 
At the same time these local articulations should not be romanticised. These 
spaces and social assemblages are also permeated by power-relationships as 
well as behavioural patterns that reproduce forms of cultural, political and 
economic domination. This underlines the importance of procedural 
mechanisms in these organisational processes to counter organisational 
patterns that tend to reinforce and stabilise hierarchies. Additionally, the 
defence of territory is not the only ongoing dynamic of localisation. The ‘local’ 
also represents an important level in processes of state co-option as it is 
frequently integrated into legal and illegal rent seeking networks based on 
formal or informal power-structures. This indicates the complex task of 
distinguishing between different processes of localisation and identifying their 
potential role within a context of state co-option that operates at multiple scales.  
The future holds big challenges for Guatemala’s communities as the elite-
guided reconfiguration of the rural area is bound to gain pace over the coming 
years. This is also likely to be accompanied by a persistence of co-optive and 
coercive strategies to ensure the implementation of these interests. However, 
the incompatibilities the various state policies and economic projections 
produce at the level of ‘every-day’ relationships also tend to multiply the 
articulation of dissent and nodes of agency not just in rural, but also in urban 
areas. Additionally, given that indigenous as well as non-indigenous areas alike 
are the focus of economic interests, new opportunities will arise for resistances 
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to ‘find each other’. In this context it will be crucial to see how the local attempts 
at creating more inclusive processes and dealing with cultural complexity can 
be translated into trans-local relationships. In these processes of trans-local and 
inter-cultural dialogue the crucial challenge will be that of preventing 
organisational processes from falling into the trap of hierarchical and 
protagonist leadership or from embracing procedural patterns that especially in 
the long term, are inadequate to address or create space for local complexities 
and differences.  
 
Research limitations and future lines of research 
Given the complexity of Guatemala’s contextual features, the research has 
clearly encountered limitations in getting an in-depth understanding of the 
different nodes of agency. In the case of the communities examined in the case 
studies a more sustained research and ethnographic approach would have 
been able to provide more precision in deconstructing the levels of production of 
meanings and knowledge. Additionally, I do not claim that the insights gained 
from the two case studies can be generalised or seen as representative for 
other nodes of agency that have emerged in Guatemala. Instead, it is important 
to emphasise the differences and contrasting patterns that mark the specific 
characteristics of these expressions of agency. The analysis of a variety of 
expressions of collective action would be required in order to reach a more 
general perspective on the common and diverging features of this generation of 
agency.  
With regards to future research the analysis of expressions of collective action 
based on a comparative perspective with other countries with similar levels of 
cultural complexity and/or of state co-option could represent an intriguing line of 
research. Comparisons with countries such as Ecuador or Bolivia would allow 
the identification of differences in terms of the orientation and characteristics of 
the collective action engaging in defence of territory and natural resources. At 
the same time, cases in Honduras, Colombia or Mexico could provide insights 
in terms of analysing similar patterns of organising and strategies in contexts of 
state co-option. While a focus on elites has predominated, it seems to be 
increasingly important to use a political ethnographic approach to highlight the 
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complexity and multiple arenas of democratic processes in these contexts and 
exploring the role non-elite agency plays in them.  
This kind of comparative research could also be pursued in the context of the 
increasing focus on the exploitation of natural resources across Latin America. 
The tensions and conflicts surrounding the issue of natural resources are likely 
to continue over the coming years and generate flows of antagonistic agency. 
On one hand, research is required to examine the implications for democracy 
posed by these policies promoting the issue of exploitation of natural resources. 
On the other hand, a broader exploration of the characteristics of this recent 
generation of agency around the defence of territory and its attempts to resist 
these policies and redesign political interactions, can provide important insights 
on these evolving, locally specific articulations as well as their epistemological 
processes. 
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